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The ‘localist turn’ in technology studies, exemplified by Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
and Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), emphasises the agency of actors in 
innovation processes while, arguably, neglecting structural influences. They provide 
rather little guidance regarding methodological choices apart from encouraging rich 
description and offer only limited capacity to explain the dynamics of technological 
change. This thesis addresses the need to articulate a more nuanced and comprehensive 
understanding of the contextually-shaped, often highly contingent processes of 
technological innovation. For this purpose a single, in-depth longitudinal case study was 
conducted of the development, implementation and use of a strategic information 
system - a strategic network planning tool - in a German car company. It was analysed 
applying a biographical perspective which argues for extended analytical foci across 
multiple sites, moments and time frames in technology studies to account for the 
complexities and uncertainties inherent in technological change processes. A mixed 
repository of historical and ethnographic data has been collected, drawing on public and 
internal corporate documents as well as 44 interviews and extended periods of 
participant observation at multiple sites. The data was coded and analysed aided by 
simultaneously building an extensive data-rich timeline of the innovation journey. As a 
result, our empirically detailed focus on a twelve-year period is contextualised by a 
historical narrative considering corporate historical developments over three decades. 
An ecology metaphor is articulated to appreciate multiple episodes and moments of 
innovation dispersed in space and time - a view neglected by common metaphors of 
systems and networks. The metaphor underpins a loose framework, tentatively entitled 
the Ecological Shaping of Technology, that draws on concepts from science and 
technology studies and cognate discussions in the sociology of professions to engage 
with the intricacies of space and scales of time in studying the ‘Biographies of Artefacts 
and Practices’ (Pollock and Williams, 2009; Hyysalo, 2010). The framework pursues a 
dynamic, longitudinal understanding of the evolution of a protracted technology 
development project which went through significant changes in conception and in the 
players involved and their configuration. This is conceptualised in terms of the 
development of a ‘kernel’ (Ribes & Polk, 2015) of resources and services managed by, 
and made available to, an alliance of players. While alliances can shift, the kernel persists 
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and evolves over time as players try to attract more resources by entering into 
negotiations in promising ‘arenas of expectation’ (Bakker et al., 2011) or navigating 
around those that are less amenable. Technology is portrayed as an element of a package 
of instrumentalities (de Solla Price, 1983) comprising theories, methods and instruments 
that are spread across a wider ecology of distributed boundary objects (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). Technologies crystallise from efforts of adopting, testing and 
developing packages to solve specific problems (Fujimura, 1995). A specific technology 
is co-developed, according to the set of local constrains and specifications delineated by 
a kernel's alliance of ecologies. These are understood in terms of Abbott’s (2005) 
conception of linked ecologies. The historically shaped and contingent ecological 
topography of an innovation project is highlighted as a major influence in the social 
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1.1 Motivation of this thesis 
“Give me a crate of beer and I will be writing up the history of [the 
artefact] for you in a weekend”. (Chris, doctoral student, personal 
communication, 12 November 2011) 
This was a comment by a former doctoral student located in the case study organisation 
who was the first to work on a technical prototype that, over a decade, evolved into the 
information-technological artefact that is the object of research of this thesis. His remark 
was made during a break in a focus group interview organised in a private space in a 
friendly atmosphere. It was a response to my attempt to explain the purpose of this 
research. His was a satirical comment to invoke a smile on the faces of bystanders. 
However it hinted at a lack of appreciation or at least understanding of the overall 
research undertaking. At that stage of research, when I was still struggling to clarify the 
goals of my research, something that was not resolved until very much later, I did not 
have the self-assurance needed to counter his wit. However, the comment remained with 
me ever since and became implicitly a benchmark for this research in terms of a 
contextualised instance of the infamous ‘So what?’ question every student has to 
respond to eventually. 
Obviously, the informant was at some level right in his claim that it would be possible to 
condense the history of the artefact to a weekend writing exercise. However, we1 dare to 
suggest, that the result would have been an anecdotal account from an actor-centred 
perspective emphasising detailed insights into technical descriptions. It might partly 
resemble an actor-network theoretical (ANT) narration that relies on the 
methodologically simple proposition of ‘following the actor’ in retrospectively 
explaining the story of a successful technology. An ANT approach does shed light on 
how a fabric of human and non-human actors is knitted to a strong network where 
effective individuals enrol powerful allies and become their spokespersons. Skilful 
translation of diverse strategies of multiple actors into homogeneous interests creates 
                                                          
1 For narrative reasons this study will henceforth apply the plural pronoun “we” to 
reduce the distance between the author and our readers. 
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obligatory passage points strengthening the legitimacy of both the artefact as well as the 
spokesperson (Latour, 1987).  
What could be learned from this hypothetical weekend-report? Without doubt, it would 
be an informative report with insights into how to negotiate with users, senior managers 
and suppliers. It would probably yield a firsthand account of Machiavellian engineers 
who made good decisions at the right time (Latour, 1988). However, what is it that 
would be missed out in this detailed report? To learn about potential limitations, we 
need to consider the perspective of our reporter. Although deeply involved in the 
development and initial diffusion of the artefact, the doctoral student described was a 
single individual who eventually dropped out from the technological project after his 
doctoral research was finished, barring him from learning about the details of further 
developments. Further, as an industrial engineer he was trained according to positivist 
paradigms of his field, where, for example, rhetorics of seemingly inevitable 
technological impacts are dominant. For the same reason it would probably lack the 
appreciation of a critical account that renders social, technical, economic and political 
aspects equally important to explain success as it is to explain failure. It could contain 
implicit narrative biases, where narratives had been reorganised and restructured so to 
remove noise and uncertainties that are common in everyday activities (Czarniawska, 
2004a). Eventually, the superiority of the artefact’s technical properties and their match 
with customer needs would emerge as the dominant success factors. Arguably, this is a 
speculative interpretation and extrapolation of the informant’s comment. However, it 
elicits a widely spread perception of the role of technology in society which assumes a 
linear process in respect of the development and diffusion of technology. 
This anecdote puts this doctoral study in perspective by reporting on an early experience 
in our data collection and relating this to an overall problem in understanding the 
nuances of technological change. It sets the scene for a description of the goal to research 
the role and influence of technology in society and, in turn, society’s perception of these. 
In this introduction, after briefly explaining the research purpose, we outline the 
research questions that guide the narrative of this social study of a technological artefact. 
This chapter finishes with an overview of the structure of this thesis. 
This thesis was motivated to question assumptions inherent in an actor-centric account 
and to explore the long and complex story of the development and implementation of 
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the technological artefact. Our study examines the ramifications of the distributed 
ecology in which the artefact was embedded and by which it was shaped. The account of 
the previously mentioned doctoral student was an important starting point but it was by 
no means sufficient to understand why the development unfolded the way it did and 
why it came about in the first place. To understand these questions we set out to learn 
about recent corporate history and developments that predated the technological artefact 
and that played an important role as precursors to subsequent developments. A diverse 
set of data was collected drawing on ethnographic as well as historical methods to 
produce a comprehensive and extended understanding of an innovation project, the 
development and implementation of a strategic network planning tool within a German 
car company. Our detailed reconstruction of a twelve-year period elaborates how the 
composition of the project’s organisational environment patterned the shaping of the 
artefact and how the emerging technological capabilities of the artefact in turn enabled 
the establishment of new relationships with other organisational units. Furthermore, the 
innovation project is contextualised by a historical narrative considering corporate 
historical developments over three decades.  
Articulating the long and complex story of the technology systematically, however, was 
a demanding task that we achieved by applying the emerging methodological 
perspective of the ‘Biography of Artefacts and Practices’. This was supplemented by our 
development of a tailored conceptual framework to take into account the extended 
historical approach. Both the perspective and the framework were the most significant 
elements shaping the framing of the research project. We will address both in more 
detail in the following section. 
1.2 Research purpose and the crafting of research questions 
The anecdote from the data collection incident intended to raise the issue of 
deterministic expectations about seemingly inherent technological properties. The 
limitations of the hypothetical report of our informant would neither be surprising nor 
uncommon. Contemporary technology studies both by academics as well as 
professionals are found limited in their capacity to credibly explain technological success 
in the long run (Pollock & Williams, 2009). Many studies, e.g. implementation or 
‘snapshot’ studies, are confined to short time spans and single locations. Findings 
produced by those studies describe so-called effects and impacts of technologies, i.e. 
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simple-minded rhetorics of technological determinism, which do not account for and, 
thus, underestimate long-term consequences of technological developments on 
developers, users and other actors exposed to technological change. To uncover and to 
investigate shortcomings stemming from technologically deterministic thinking, 
numerous scholars from different disciplines including sociologists, philosophers, 
historians and economists undertook social studies of technological change in recent 
decades. These social inquiries into technology were greatly inspired by the social 
constructivist approach advanced by students of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
(SSK). With a background in studying the social construction of knowledge claims made 
by scientists, scholars of SSK developed seminal perspectives including the ‘Strong 
Programme’. This perspective outlines methodological tenets to guide social inquiries 
receptive, among others, to matters of symmetry and reflexivity in the explanation of 
success and failure (Bloor, 1976). Drawing on social constructivist theories, students of 
technology developed a range of studies and theories which amalgamated under the 
umbrella term of the ‘Social Shaping of Technology’ (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). 
Characterised as a ‘broad church’ (Williams & Edge, 1996), the social shaping of 
technology tradition demarcates the historical origin of social inquiries into the 
technology/society relationship within the interdisciplinary field of Science and 
Technology Studies. 
Three decades of research into the social shaping of technologies produced insights into 
the complexity of innovation processes within diverse organisational settings. A 
particular strand of research elaborated the notion of ‘Social Learning’ which emphasises 
the number of learning processes and intermediaries at play in the innovation process 
(Sørensen, 2002; Williams et al., 2005). Within this line of research, analysts of technology 
frequently criticised methodological and conceptual limitations of both professional and 
academic analyses of technological change dynamics (Pollock & Williams, 2009). To 
avoid such limitations, including an overly actor-centric perspective, this research 
adopted the emerging ‘Biography of Artefact and Practices’ perspective to look beyond 
solitary confinements of single-sited and short-termed analyses. The Biography of 
Artefact and Practices perspective addresses the limitation of conventional technology 
studies and proposes a longitudinal and strategic approach for the social study of 
technological change (Hyysalo, 2004; Pollock & Williams, 2009). Following the 
guidelines of a biographical perspective we framed our research project to take into 
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account multiple locales and perspectives to give voice to not just the most immediate 
actors but also to other organisational players involved in the technological project. The 
case study began with an exploratory approach to learn about the scope and scale of the 
research problems in respect of the technological project under investigation. Rather 
than narrowing down on a set of predefined research questions from the outset, we 
maintained a flexible research agenda that was continuously shaped by early analysis of 
the data collected. The specific research questions foregrounded in this work evolved in 
the course of the study, and only took their current form as the analysis progressed (as 
we discuss below). Our revised research questions therefore are used as signposts to 
guide the reader through the research project (Creswell, 2009). Two major research 
questions have been articulated to translate our research interest in understanding the 
major dynamics driving the development of the technological artefact: 
RQ1. How does the development of a technological artefact in a private 
enterprise come about in the first place, and  
RQ2. how does a technological project sustain itself over time? 
The first question addresses the corporate-historical influences that patterned the unique 
organisational and ecological backdrop which allowed the technological project to 
emerge. We wanted to understand not just how the technology was developed but also 
why it was there in the first place. The second question addresses the circumstance that 
the development proceeded over an extended period of time. It appeared rather unusual 
for a research department in a car company to sustain the development of a highly 
specialised technological artefact over more than a decade. Thus, we were interested in 
learning about what motivated individual actors and institutional players to keep 
dedicating time and resources to the project. The third research question addresses a 
research problem that emerged when we attempted to analyse data and to narrate 
preliminary results. The more we explored the complexity of the case study the more it 
became apparent that prevalent theories on technology failed to appreciate and to reflect 
on nuances in technological change dynamics. Embracing the complexity of the case 
study, the methodological struggle became the analytical centre stage of the research 




RQ3. How to analyse and to report the long and complex story of a technological 
project considering historical and ecological influences? 
This research question aims to make explicit the emergent nature of our major research 
interest which was to find an approach that takes into account the history, context and 
content of a technological project and the social shaping of the corresponding 
technological artefact. Since the Biography of Artefacts and Practices perspective is a 
recent conceptualisation that is scoped broadly by default, it does not offer a precise set 
of tools or guidelines of how to go about doing a biographical analysis of technology. For 
this reason, we developed a conceptual framework that helped us in analysing the 
history and the wider context of a technological project. 
Innovation is a highly contextualised and contingent process dispersed over time and 
space. The third research questions addresses the need to articulate a more nuanced and 
comprehensive understanding of this complexity. We articulated an ecology metaphor 
to appreciate the multiple episodes and moments of an innovation project. It underpins 
our loose framework, tentatively entitled the Ecological Shaping of Technology, which 
draws on concepts from science and technology studies and cognate discussions in the 
sociology of professions to engage with the intricacies of space and scales of time. The 
framework pursues a dynamic, longitudinal understanding of technology development 
which can go through significant changes in conception and in the players involved and 
their configuration. In short, this thesis highlights that the historically shaped and 
contingent ecology of an innovation project is a major influence on the social shaping of 
technological artefacts. 
In summary, the framing and scoping of our research project was contingent on the 
course of the data collection and analysis process. Our broadly scoped approach 
embraced the complexity of the case study and inspired the research design and research 
agenda of this thesis. The research questions were revised as the research journey 
unfolded. We articulated an ecology metaphor in support of the development of an 
ecological framework that conceptualises a nuanced understanding of matters of space 
and time in technological change dynamics. In so doing, we extended the biographical 
perspective to analyse innovation projects in large organisations. Combining the 
biographical approach with our ecological framework eventually enabled us tell the long 
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and complex story of the development and implementation of a technological artefact. 
An overview of the empirical story is provided in the next section. 
1.3 Outline of the innovation process 
The subject of the biographical analysis was the development and implementation of an 
information system, the NetworkPlanner (see Figure 1 for an overview of the innovation 
process). The NetworkPlanner is a decision support system applied in practices of the 
strategic planning of production and logistics systems. It was developed by a team of 
industrial researchers in a German car company. The development did not follow a 
preconceived strategic plan but was a bottom-up initiative stimulated by historical and 
contextual circumstances. We examined corporate historical events in the 1980s and 
1990s to understand the dynamics that patterned the organisational landscape and that 
enabled the emergence of the research infrastructure in which the technological artefact 
had been developed. In 2000, this research infrastructure started out as a handful of 
researchers tasked with the objective to engage with other research projects to support 
technology transfer processes. However, facing obstacles in the primary objective, the 
research team soon ventured into other research areas. Participation in publicly funded 
projects provided for new resources which allowed the research team to recruit doctoral 
students and to embark on the development of prototypical artefacts. As time moved on, 
the research infrastructure grew in size and numbers while the artefact gained in 
capabilities.  
 
Figure 1 Overview of the development and implementation of the NetworkPlanner 
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Occasional engagements with internal departments provided for opportunities to learn 
about operational requirements and to test the prototype on real life business cases. The 
successful application of the artefact in a pilot project (Major Network Project, MNP) in 
2005 was a major breakthrough. After successfully supporting another major project 
(Very Important Network Project, VINP), the NetworkPlanner was accepted as the 
standard planning tool in the respective business unit. To initiate the transfer of the 
artefact into operations, a redesign of the prototypical artefact was commissioned to an 
external software company in 2008. However, a few months into the development 
project, the undertaking ran into problems which were resolved by a change in the 
project management structure. Instead of closing the research project, it was ramped up 
to cope with unanticipated technological challenges. Eventually, the technological 
artefact was officially launched at the end of 2010 to mark the end of the research project 
and to transfer the NetworkPlanner into operations for good.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured in nine chapters in total. This first chapter introduces the 
motivation, the purpose and the research questions of this study. It introduces the 
emergent approach in the design of the research study which will be detailed in the 
methodology chapter. The second chapter elaborates the literature that informed our 
understanding about the subject of this study and that traces the evolution of the 
understanding about the society/technology relationship. In the third chapter we explain 
the construction of a conceptual framework to address methodological and conceptual 
limitations identified in the preceding literature review. The methodology is described in 
the fourth chapter. Here we detail the methods we applied to go about doing this study 
and also account of external events that influenced the shaping of our research strategy. 
The fifth chapter is one of three chapters reporting on empirical details. In this chapter we 
begin with shedding light on the historical and contextual background of the case study 
to situate our ethnographic data within a larger picture. The sixth chapter and the seventh 
chapter report the detailed story of the multiple episodes of development and 
implementation of the strategic network planning tool under investigation. A discussion 
in the eighth chapter highlights the key issues of the empirical data and flags the 
interconnected dynamism of global and local processes in the technological project. The 
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last and ninth chapter reflects on the overall research journey and relates our 
contributions to current debates in the academic field. 
This chapter introduced the goals of this study and the roadmap to achieving those. In 
the next chapter, the literature review, we will establish the intellectual background of 
this study. It is a review of the evolution of the intellectual understanding about the 
mutual relationship of technology, innovation and society. Like a technology that is 
dependent to its social setting, the understanding of technology and innovation is 
situated within a dominant cultural and social setting. Since cultures and societies are 
subject of continuous change, our understanding of the technology/society relationship 
has changed in tandem. In a somewhat chronological manner, we will review how this 
understanding has changed over time. Eventually, this chronological review allows 
explaining how theorisations of technology placed emphasis on some issues and 
neglected others at the same time. Identifying and, more importantly, understanding the 








2 Literature review: Evolving articulation of technological 
change 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the theoretical articulation of technology dynamics in 
light of the development, implementation and use of technological artefacts. To do so, it 
is important to understand considerations of prior technological and social 
developments emerging primarily from the late 1970s. Initial theories on technology 
were developed to depart from modernist visions of technology which regarded 
technology as a reliable source of solutions to address social problems. New approaches 
in social studies of technology set out to explore the entanglement of social and 
technological factors in social shaping processes where various players sought to 
influence the course of action in order to advance their personal and institutional 
interests. From these social analyses it emerged that technology was not the discrete 
entity as portrayed, if at all, by mainstream social and economic theories but inextricably 
entrenched in historical and contextual factors of its immediate and wider social 
surrounding. This chapter will review these various conceptualisations of the 
technology/society relationship from different disciplines to build a theoretical and 
conceptual foundation for the construction of a loose framework that addresses the need 
to articulate more advanced and nuanced conceptions of technological change. 
This chapter is separated into three sections. The first section traces the emergence of 
technology studies as a critique of the modernist view on technology as engineered 
solution for social problems, a view generally identified as technological determinism. 
Two major theories on technology, Social Construction of Technology and Actor-
Network Theory, which both fall into the tradition of the Social Shaping of Technology, 
are examined in detail before the section will be concluded with a discussion about 
shortcomings of these early conceptions of technology. The second section contains a 
historical examination of innovation theories related to technology and thus inevitable 
will take us aback chronologically. Here, conceptualisations of the role and influence of 
technology in innovation processes both in broader society and in organisations will be 
discussed. The third section will focus on recent developments around the Social 
Learning perspective which builds on the tradition of the Social Shaping of Technology 
and which highlights long-term issues of implementation and use. The section, and thus 
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the chapter, will be concluded with a discussion on methodological concerns that arise 
when designing research on technological artefacts. 
2.1 Introduction: Critiques of technological determinism in 
technology studies 
This section will begin with examining the notion of technological determinism, a 
reductionist view that presumes a rational technology/society relationship. It will be 
discussed how the field of technology studies and in particular the Social Shaping of 
Technology perspective emerged as a result of intellectual efforts to repel insufficient 
conceptualisations about technology and its relationship to society. Two frameworks, 
Social Construction of Technology and Actor-Network Theory, will be introduced before 
the section concludes with a review of the micro/macro debate. 
2.1.1 Technological determinism and the “impact model” 
Technological determinism is a reductionist theory of technology. It presumes that 
technological change follows an inherent logic and has a determinable effect on society 
(MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). In that view, technology is perceived as a “discrete 
entity” with identifiable properties that are unrelated to social contexts or the history of 
participating actors (Kling & Scacchi, 1984). Since it allows simplifying usually complex 
matters, technological determinism is popularly evoked by futurists and technologists to 
frame dominant visions and utopian thoughts where technologies have predictable 
impacts. Proponents of “technological utopianism” propagate that technology plays a 
primary role in social transformations (Kling, 1991, p. 354). For example, advances in 
computing allowed for the proponents of various “computerisation movements” to raise 
expectations that computers will have positive transformative effects in domains such as 
local authority, office work, education, and private households. Metaphors like 
“information society”, “information age” and the general notion of “revolution” were 
utilised rhetorically to mobilise audiences and to fuel technologically deterministic 
ideologies (Kling & Iacono, 1988; Edwards, 1995). Similar potent claims were made in 
regards of computer-integrated manufacturing and computer-aided production 
management by technology vendors in the UK who oversold their offerings by 
promoting visions of novel information technologies having positive impacts on 
efficiency and productivity (Williams, 1995). Technologically deterministic statements 
are not limited to optimistic claims only but can also aim the other way. Marxist analyses 
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(for example, Braverman, 1974) tended to describe novel production technologies as 
exogenous factors that transform social relations and skill requirements in workplaces at 
the expense of workers.  
A technologically deterministic conceptualisation of technology by default invokes the 
“impact” model to explain changes apparently inflicted by the use of technology. 
Organisation and management researchers commonly apply variance approaches to 
examine differences among certain sets of variables in a given set of samples to identify 
the causes and effects of these impacts (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). Adopting a discrete-
entity view of technology conveniently allows looking for such variances in factors. 
Observed deviations were consequently classified and regarded as evidence for apparent 
impacts – or implications, effects or consequences for alternative terminology – of 
technology. However, since the discrete-entity model itself failed to grasp the complexity 
of technology, the “impact” model was an inappropriate concept to describe phenomena 
of complex technologies in organisations. Besides failing to reproduce “impacts” of one 
and the same technology in other social settings, also propagated as the diffusion and 
adoption of so-called “best practices” (Clark, 1995), the occurrence of unexpected 
impacts and effects were commonly reported.  
The case of computerisation of the banking sector is an example of a larger ecology 
where belief in impacts and effects yielded other results than those expected (Edwards, 
1995). The banking sector was the first major non-military sector in which computers 
were widely adopted. Although banks invested heavily to computerise their 
organisations and activities, the growth in productivity was low and many impacts were 
“neither foreseen nor desired by the designers” (Edwards, 1995, p. 278). An example of 
unexpected developments in a single organisation is Sætnan’s (1991) in-depth case study 
of the development and implementation of an information system in a Norwegian 
hospital that drew inspirations from materials and production steering systems as 
applied in manufacturing industries. Instead of increasing efficiencies and optimising 
practices, as anticipated by the ministerial funding body, the technological artefact 
reinforced existing power relations: 
“[The system] thereby became a fast but strong-willed and contrary 
typewriter. Instead of becoming someone's ally in renegotiating routines, 
[the system] became a slave to the old routines and thus reinforced them” 
(Sætnan, 1991, p. 434) 
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Until recently, technology has received little attention in management and organisation 
studies. An analysis of 2027 articles published between 1997 and 2006 in four 
organisation and management studies-focused journals found that only 4.9% of all 
articles addressed issues of the role and influence of technology in organisations 
(Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). In other words, 95% of the articles did not consider the role 
and influence of technology in organisational life. Reasons for the widespread 
inattentiveness to technology were found to be diverse and ranged from lack of interest 
and the classification of technology as not significant to organisational life to 
methodological reduction due to the complexities of organisational life and technological 
systems. This generally resulted in an unsatisfactory state of conceptualisation on 
technology in management and organisation studies which fails to grasp the richness 
and intricacies of technology’s role in organisational life. In these fields alone, and also in 
a more general sense, a better understanding of the technology/organisation relationship 
is needed to redress both technology determinism and the failure of social accounts to 
address materiality. Recent contributions in the field of organisation and management 
studies highlighted these methodological and conceptual shortcomings and started 
calling for greater attention to technology and for a more complex theorisation of the 
technology/organisation relationship (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; D’Adderio, 2010). 
2.1.1.1 Technology is not neutral 
Naive and simplified interpretations of the role and influence of technology can risk 
partial or total failures of technological projects which result in the loss of investments, 
the loss of trust from and potential disenchantment of employees in a single 
organisation. From a societal point of view, however, the risk is to allow for dominant 
political powers to steer wider technological developments in their favour. Accepting a 
notion that technological development follows any inherent logic detached from social 
processes implies that technology is politically neutral. This view is strongly contested 
by some authors. Langdon Winner (1980, 1999) effectively argued that technology has 
capacity to carry political weight. His seminal analysis of the political dimension of 
technology in an article published in 1980 was reprinted and prominently positioned as 
the first article in MacKenzie and Wajcman’s seminal ‘Social Shaping of Technology’ 
book (1999, first published in 1985). Examining the case of low-hanging bridges on Long 
Island in New York, Winner elaborates how urban planner and architect Robert Moses 
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used his power to implant his social class bias and racial prejudice into the urban 
infrastructure from the 1920s to 1970s (Winner, 1980, p. 123-124)2: 
“According to evidence provided by Robert A. Caro in his biography of 
Moses, the reasons reflect Moses's social-class bias and racial prejudice. 
Automobile-owning whites of ‘upper’ and ‘comfortable middle’ classes, 
as he called them, would be free to use the parkways for recreation and 
commuting. Poor people and blacks, who normally used public transit, 
were kept off the roads because the twelve-foot tall buses could not get 
through the overpasses. One consequence was to limit access of racial 
minorities and low-income groups to Jones Beach, Moses's widely 
acclaimed public park. Moses made doubly sure of this result by vetoing 
a proposed extension of the Long Island Railroad to Jones Beach.” 
(Winner, 1980, p. 123-124) 
He outlines two senses in which technology can exert political qualities during the 
design stage and after their implementation, respectively. First, technology is designed 
and adopted to achieve a certain politically desired effect. The example of nuclear power 
plants illustrates how such technologies reinforce the necessity of maintaining an 
authoritative system with centralised control of power. Second, technology can be 
strongly compatible with specific social and political relationships. The example for this 
case is solar energy, which tends to be more compatible with democratic and egalitarian 
societies rather energy systems based on coal, oil or nuclear power. This is so because 
solar energy reinforces tendencies of technical and political decentralisation.3 
The risk of seeing technology as politically neutral is that important political influences 
might be omitted from social inquiries. Technological determinist accounts try to render 
an image of technological change following an inherent logic or a particular trajectory. If 
this was true, technological change would be inevitable and thus outside of external 
                                                          
2 Winner’s (1980) analysis is contested by relativists (Woolgar, 1991b) on the grounds 
that his interpretation of the political meaning of the bridges is one out of many possible 
interpretations. Although Winner (1993) agreed to the possibility of varying 
interpretations, he discarded Woolgar’s (1991) critique by arguing for the hollowness of 
a relativist stance that stops short of taking into account wider societal concerns, for 
example, consequences of technological developments. 
3 A contemporary example for this thesis would be the UK energy system. Scotland, a 
part of the UK which seeks independence from central government, pursues a strong 
sustainable energy policy by committing to generate 100% of electricity demand from 
renewable sources by 2020 making this the most ambitious target in the European Union 
(Scottish Government, 2011). Meanwhile, the central government recently approved a 
deal to built a new nuclear power plant (Macalister, 2014). 
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political intervention. However, this view conceals the fact that behind every technology 
there is someone to gain from its development or adoption, either economically or 
politically. Technology vendors evoke images of technological trajectories in order to 
promote their products. Political parties emphasise benefits of technological 
infrastructures to reinforce existing and favourable power structures. Therefore, showing 
that technology has political capacity is a necessary step, firstly, to improve the 
understanding of the technology/society relationship and, secondly, to improve practices 
of technology policy making (Sørensen, 2002).  
Failures of technology projects and disappointing outcomes of technological promises 
indicated the inappropriateness of technologically deterministic accounts. To understand 
reasons for the poor performance of technological endeavours, several academic 
disciplines engaged with exploring in more detail the role and influence of technology in 
society. It was the accumulating findings from these research traditions that innovative 
perspectives on technology were developed. The next section will introduce the research 
traditions which formed the basics of what became known as the social shaping of 
technology perspective which will be introduced thereafter. 
2.1.2 Multiple research traditions criticise technological determinism 
A stream of research activities in the 1970s and 1980s dedicated their efforts in studying 
the phenomenon of underperforming technology projects. It was the beginning of a new 
movement among scholars from various disciplines who started to challenge 
conventional perceptions of technology, labelled as technology determinism, prevailing 
at the time. These predominantly social studies of technology contributed to forming the 
groundwork for a research perspective that was interested in shedding lights on the 
complex relationship between technology and society. These studies gave rise to the 
perspective of social shaping of technology (SST). Before introducing the social shaping 
perspective, this section will examine the multiple research traditions that marked its 
intellectual origin. Williams and Edge (1996) identify four research traditions which 
originate largely in Britain: sociology of scientific knowledge, sociology of industrial 
organisations, studies of technology policy, and economics of technological change. To 
this we add the contributions of historians of technology, especially the works of 
Thomas P. Hughes, as a fifth stream. Each tradition was concerned with different aspects 
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of the technology/society relationship and thus left individual imprints in SST-related 
theories. Next, each tradition will be discussed in turn. 
The sociology of industrial organisation is distinguished by its focus on a particular 
social context, for example shop-floor workplaces, and its exposure and reaction to 
technical change. Socio-economic interests, social processes and goals of industrial 
organisations are examined to explain dynamics of transformations in relation to 
technology development and adoption (Williams & Edge, 1996). For example, Marxist 
studies in the tradition of the ‘labour process theory’ elaborated the influence of 
numerical control (NC) machine tools in shifting power balances in favour of 
management and at the expense of shop-floor workers (Braverman, 1974). However, 
subsequent studies of NC machine tools and its successor technology computer-
numerical control (CNC) relativised such findings by stressing that under certain 
circumstances, like in smaller workshops, workers were able to gain back control despite 
embedded mechanisms that aimed to prevent this from happening (Noble, 1984).  
Critical studies of technology policy is a branch in social science that is concerned with 
studying the relationship of technology and the state in respect of the latter’s policy 
options to intervene in technological and thus economic development. Traditional 
technology policies implied linear innovation models which proved ineffective and 
failed in delivering promised economic and social benefits what eventually prompted 
technology policy studies (Russell & Williams, 2002b). For example, examining state 
interventions to reverse the industry’s dependence on military technology after World 
War II was an area for technology policy studies (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999).  
Economic theories differ vastly in the extent to which they acknowledge technology as a 
driver of economic growth. The majority of economic schools follow orthodox, neo-
classical theories which pay little or no attention at all to technological factors. There, 
beliefs in the overarching regulatory power of price stability, instant availability of free 
information and market equilibria are dominating mainstream theories. In contrast, 
economists of technological change acknowledge the significance of technology in 
influencing economic performance of firms and economies. This group of researchers 
can be assigned largely to the field of innovation studies. Members in that field share 
neo-Schumpeterian beliefs that technological change is an inherent and endogenous 
quality of economies and follows an evolutionary model (Nelson & Winter, 1977, 1982). 
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Another distinct feature present among some members is that they take into account 
historical developments to explain long-term patterns (Clark et al., 1981). 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) characterises a field that emerged from the 
philosophical endeavour to refute the belief in an apparent exceptionality of science 
(Yearley, 2005). Proponents of SSK adopt an impartial approach in studying scientific 
facts, beliefs or whatever was taken as knowledge. This particularly applies to beliefs 
that are regarded as true or false. SSK takes a relativist stance towards the truth value of 
knowledge claims by treating both as equally valid. What matters instead are the 
conditions under which such claims are produced in the first place. To ensure 
methodological rigour in the study of the so-called social construction of scientific 
knowledge, Bloor (1976) proposed the ‘Strong Programme’. This approach stresses the 
four tenets of impartiality, symmetry, causality and reflexivity. A study that follows the 
Strong Programme aims in explaining truth and falsity according to social terms rather 
than referring to the natural world. For example, the take up of oncogene theory in 
cancer research is explained by referring to social interactions of researchers in diffusing 
the knowledge of the theory in scientific communities rather than referring to the 
superiority of theory over competing theories (Fujimura, 1995). Studies published under 
the tenet of the Strong Programme became an inspiration for studies of technology as it 
enabled students to bridge the dichotomy of the social and the technical (Edge, 1988). 
Soon after its adoption in social studies of science, researchers from SSK transferred the 
new analytical approach to the study of technology despite criticism from some 
colleagues that the social constructivist project remains unfinished in its originating field 
(Woolgar, 1991b). Other researchers joined in criticising the migration of concepts from 
SSK to technology, however, for reasons that science has fundamental differences to 
technology rendering analytical approaches less effective (Sørensen & Levold, 1992). 
Relativist-constructivism proved its value nonetheless as it bridged the dichotomy 
between the social and the technical. Previously, the technical aspect of a technology, i.e. 
the shaping process, was the matter of engineers who followed the blueprints of an 
apparent inner logic. Social scientists were concerned with the social, i.e. the study of the 
effects. SSK’s analytical approach, however, allowed for an integrated approach which 
acknowledged the intimate relationship between technology and society: decisions made 
during the social construction process influenced the effects caused later (Edge, 1988). 
This turn to technology is predominately due to the approach titled the ‘Social 
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Construction of Technology’ (SCOT) which will be discussed further below (Pinch & 
Bijker, 1984). 
Contributions from historians of technology have long documented in great detail the 
role of technology in influencing social change. Technology has long been used as a 
political tool to control others. For instance, in some places in England in the 12th century 
the use of handmills at home was forbidden in favour of centralised watermills which 
allowed nobles to collect additional taxes (Bloch, 1999). White’s (1964) study of medieval 
technology elaborated how the heavy plough revolutionised agriculture and how the 
stirrup heralded feudalism in Medieval Europe. However, historians like White tended 
to represent technologically deterministic accounts of technology. In case of the stirrup, 
his causal claim that the stirrup introduced heavy armoured mounted knights and, thus, 
caused the emergence of feudalism was refuted by other historical studies. Both in Persia 
and China, where the stirrup was used before it reached Europe, the stirrup had no such 
‘effect’ because these societies and their political systems where constituted differently 
compared to Europe (Dien, 1986). Historians may differ on the subject of theorising, and 
many abstain from it (Gaddis, 2002). Thomas P. Hughes and his historical studies of 
Thomas Edison’s work (Hughes, 1987, 1999), however, contributed largely to theorising 
on the systems metaphor in the field of technology studies by introducing concepts of 
technological systems, system builders and the notion of the seamless web in general 
(Hughes, 1986). The idea of complex technological systems and the seamless web 
resonated well with ideas of social constructivists. This gave rise to a range of theories 
and concepts of which will be addressed in the next section. 
2.1.3 Social Shaping of Technology 
Prior to critical inquiries into the making of technology and its relationship with social 
contexts, rational explanations of technological change dominated which invoked a 
dichotomy of the technical and the social (Edge, 1988). The ‘technical’ was perceived as a 
subject matter of natural scientists and engineers. Their task was – here we draw on the 
vocabulary of Arthur (2009) without implying that he subscribes to a technologically 
deterministic view – to create technologies to harness natural phenomena for societal 
purposes. The ‘social’ matter was then left for social scientists to explain consequences 
and effects caused after technologies had been completed. Breaking down that 
technical/social dichotomy was the achievement of a stream of research that became 
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known under the umbrella term of ‘social shaping of technology’ (SST) (Edge, 1988). SST 
is a generic approach to the study of technology with an anti-determinist and anti-linear 
agenda (Sørensen, 2002). A basic tenet of SST is that: 
“[...] there are ‘choices’ (though not necessarily conscious choices) 
inherent in both the design of individual artefacts and systems, and in the 
direction or trajectory of innovation programmes. If technology does not 
emerge from the unfolding of a predetermined logic or a single 
determinant, then innovation is a ‘garden of forking paths’.” (underlined 
in original, Williams & Edge, 1996, p. 857) 
By emphasising the fact that choices are crucial in the design and development of 
technology, SST opened a debate over the negotiability and reversibility of technological 
choices (Williams & Edge, 1996). This debate is a departure from the idea that 
technology is a discrete “black box” independent from social contexts with contents 
which are predetermined by any exogenous force or logic. Instead, the creation of 
technological content is understood as being patterned by a range of organisational, 
political, economic and cultural factors. SST is thus concerned with demystifying the 
notion of a black box and locating its situation in social settings. 
As has been demonstrated above, the origins of SST can be traced to various disciplines, 
thus it being a ‘broad church’ (Williams & Edge, 1996). Although each research tradition 
has contributed in some way to enrich the intellectual capacity of students of science and 
technology, some disciplines and even schools of thought within individual disciplines 
are found to be more vocally represented than others. Thus, this allowed for and led to 
misleading simplifications about what constitutes the social shaping of technology 
perspective. It was found that conceptualisations from sociology of scientific knowledge 
have “often been taken (unhelpfully, we would argue) to be synonymous with the SST 
approach” (Williams & Edge, 1996, p. 861). In particular, the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) are often spotlighted as the 
“primary conceptual tools within social shaping” (Howcroft et al., 2004, p. 330).  
The 1980s have been an enlightening period of intellectual dynamism in technology 
studies. The debates kicked off during this time are of continued importance. First, they 
drove important conceptual developments in the field such as improvements to the 
effectiveness of technology policies (Sørensen & Williams, 2002). And second, they 
informed ongoing analytical issues in studying technology. The following sections below 
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will address the latter issue and explore frameworks that developed analytical concepts 
to understand technological development. 
2.1.3.1 Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) 
The key intention behind the conceptualisation of the SCOT approach was to replicate 
the success of Bloor’s (1976) ‘Strong Programme’ in studies of science and to apply it in 
technology studies. Studies in the tradition of the Strong Programme aim to explain the 
production and dissemination of knowledge claims through social terms rather than 
referring to any natural terms. The success of a technology is therefore to be explained 
solely within the domain of the Social World (Pinch & Bijker, 1984). To do so, SCOT 
draws on the relativist methodology as outlined by the ‘Empirical Programme of 
Relativism’ (EPOR). EPOR is a methodology in the studies of science to examine 
scientific controversies (Collins, 1981). It has two major stages. In the first stage, an 
analysis examines knowledge claims made by relevant scientists who represent different 
views and opinions on a controversial scientific subject. This stage intends to identify 
alternative interpretations of the same issue to establish that available scientific facts 
allow for ‘interpretative flexibility’. In the second stage, the analyst examines how the 
‘interpretative flexibility’ is limited and reduced in order to close the debate. The act of 
closure, hence, is based not on any technical superiority of one theory over another but 
rather on the successful persuasion, or silencing, of opponents. SCOT applies this 
methodology to explain how technology is being developed (Pinch & Bijker, 1984, Bijker 
et al.,1987). 
The starting point in SCOT is ‘relevant social groups’. This concept can include 
institutions and organisations as well as groups of individuals. Members of a relevant 
social group share similar beliefs and meanings over a technological artefact and its 
features. In their study of the evolution of the bicycle, Pinch and Bijker (1984) list 
different social groups including producers, young men, elderly men, women and 
tourist cyclists. Each social group had different views on the varying technical features of 
different models of bicycles at the time. For example, young and sportive men preferred 
the Penny-Farthing model, with its characteristic large wheel at the front and a small 
wheel at the back, for it allowed for high velocity. Due to its popularity at the time it 
gained the nickname ‘Ordinary’. However, the Penny-Farthing posed a safety risk due to 
its height for elderly people and was regarded as inappropriate for women who used to 
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wear long dresses at the time. The problematic issues surrounding the ‘Ordinary’ bicycle 
indicate that debates about a standardised design were not yet closed with the design of 
the Penny-Farthing model. Even the introduction of the air tyre, which was developed to 
improve comfort of riding and is standard nowadays, left space for interpretative 
flexibility as some engineers claimed that it made bicycles less safe. 
Highlighting interpretative flexibility in the case of a technological artefact is the first 
stage in a constructivist analysis. The next stage is to analyse mechanisms how the 
interpretative flexibility is reduced and, thus, how the design of an artefact is stabilised. 
This can be achieved either by convincing an audience that the problem has been solved, 
this is where advertising can be helpful, or by redefining the problem so that the artefact 
provides increased benefit. As an example for the latter, the air tyre was eventually 
promoted primarily for its ability to increase velocity. In contrast to EPOR, SCOT goes 
further and proposes a third stage where the relationship of a stabilised technology to 
the wider social context is elaborated. For this purpose, the concept of a technological 
frame is introduced (Bijker, 1989). It broadly describes a set of concepts, techniques and 
practices that are shared by a community in its problem solving activities. A 
technological frame is related to a specific relevant social group and describes why 
multiple actors apply the same methods in defining and solving problems. Technological 
frames also guide interactions between actors with similar interests and shape their 
thinking and acting (Bijker, 2009). In case of the Ordinary bicycle, an example for a broad 
definition of a technological frame was the common social practice of young men to use 
the technology a “macho machine” for “racing, showing off, and impressing the ladies” 
(Bijker, 1989, p. 172). Similar to the concepts of ‘paradigm’ (Kuhn, 1996), ‘technological 
paradigm’ (Dosi, 1982) or ‘technological regime’ (Nelson & Winter, 1977, 1982), which all 
aim for engineering related social groups, the concept of technological frame aims to 
explain clustering of similar technologies and problem-solving strategies by also 
including nonengineers. 
Since its introduction in the 1980s SCOT as a methodological approach went through 
different stages (Bijker, 2009). At its beginning the unit of analysis was an individual 
artefact, e.g. the bicycle. Thanks to influences from historian Thomas Hughes and his 
studies of larger technological infrastructures (1986, 1987, 1999), it was soon extended to 
technological systems to consider the intricate combinations of wider social, technical 
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organisational, economic and political elements. The next extension was the 
consideration of technology as a ‘sociotechnical ensemble’. This view is very similar to a 
technological system but allows gaining some distance from connotations of systems 
theoretical concerns. Hence, it is less restrictive and more inclusive in the sense of the 
‘seamless web’ metaphor which acts as a reminder that non-technical elements play an 
important role in the development of technology. In its final and current stage, SCOT is 
applicable to regard and examine the relationship between technology and society as a 
‘technological culture’. Since societies are saturated with technologies, they reshape our 
social practices. Industrial automation and the use of robots have not only reshaped 
workplaces but also the very meaning of what ‘work’ means (Bijker, 2009). 
SCOT has undoubtedly enriched the social shaping perspective by bridging the field of 
science studies and technology studies. Notions of ‘interpretative flexibility’ and 
‘technological frame’ shed further light on the multiplicity of interpretations in linking 
technological capabilities to social benefits and, respectively, on how shared beliefs give 
preference to one technological option over another. However, these elements were also 
met with some opposition. Generally, criticism of SCOT addresses its problematic 
accounting of social structures (Klein & Kleineman, 2002). Since actor-network theory 
has faced similar criticism rooted in relativism and reductionism, a general discussion 
about problematic issues of social constructivist, or just constructivist as propagated by 
ANT proponents (Latour, 2005), approaches will be addressed further below after ANT’s 
review in the following section. 
2.1.3.2 Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
Actor-network theory also emerged in the early 1980s when the sociology of scientific 
knowledge gained traction in science studies. Like SSK, ANT is interested in 
understanding how knowledge is created and how it is disseminated. What 
distinguishes it from SSK is that ANT finishes what SSK has stopped short of, at least so 
their proponents claim. Bloor’s (1976) Strong Programme appeals for symmetry when 
studying and assessing knowledge claims from competing scientists. The call for 
symmetry asks to treat claims for truth and falsity equally, i.e. each is to be assessed with 
the same criteria. For example, asymmetrical claims often emphasise technical 
superiority of successful cases while failure is explained in social terms, like resistance or 
incompetence of actors. Proponents of ANT go a step further and proclaim general 
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symmetry between human and non-human actors (Callon, 1986). One can say, they 
propose an even ‘Stronger Programme’. While SSK acknowledges scientists, 
organisations and social institutions as relevant actors, ANT grants non-humans and 
objects a similar status and the ability to voice their own interests. This radical move to 
allow for free associations – Latour (2005) describes ANT as ‘sociology of association’ – 
between humans, non-humans and objects is a deliberate strategy in order to break 
down boundaries of existing social structures. Proclaiming a new sociology, ANT 
departs from existing traditions in sociology where social scientists use predetermined 
analytical categories, such as groups, organisations or institutions, to make sense of 
reality and to create social orders (Callon & Law, 1982; Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; 
Latour, 2005). Instead, existing social structures are rejected to make way for the view 
that actors create reality through recurring interactions. The notion of ‘social’ is reduced 
to associations, or chains of associations, between human and non-human actor, the 
latter also called actants. Whatever the ‘social’ is, it is to be found between two actors or 
actants (Latour, 1987; Latour, 2005). For actor-network theorists society is performative 
in the sense that social structures are the consequence of action. In contrast, conventional 
sociology implies an ostensive definition of society where social structures are 
predetermined and exist outside the performances of actors (Strum & Latour, 1999). 
In ANT success is defined as the growth of a sustainable network. ANT’s strength lies in 
the richness of vocabulary which was developed in order to examine and describe a 
growing network. In science studies the interests of actors play a principal role. An actor-
network theoretical account is interested in examining “the manipulation and 
transformation of interests” (Callon & Law, 1982, p. 622). Thus, scientists, and other 
actors, engage in ‘interest work’ where they try to identify and manipulate interests of 
other actors and persuade them to join their activities. Successful attempts result in new 
members being ‘enrolled’ to social worlds as defined and controlled by the persuading 
actor. The identification, transformation and alignment of interests is the primary 
process, also called ‘translation’, which enables a network to grow (Callon & Law, 1982; 
Latour, 1987). The translation process proceeds along four stages, also described as the 
four ‘moments of translation’ (Callon, 1986). In the first stage, problematisation, the 
spokesperson of a network defines the problem and offers a rewarding perspective for 
the targeted actor to align her interests according to those of the network and to enrol. In 
this context, the concept of ‘obligatory passage point’ is introduced. The spokesperson 
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manipulates, or transforms, the interests of the actor and suggests that her network is the 
best possible, maybe only, way to solve a problem. The network is thus rendered as the 
obligatory passage point that has to be passed in order to attain a goal or solution to a 
problem. The second stage is interessement and describes the moment of translation, 
when an actor considers the benefit of enroling to the network. During the process of 
problematisation, the spokesperson of the network had drafted an identity and location 
for the actor within the network. The actor has to decide if she wants to submit to the 
proposed identity and location. If the actor makes a positive decision, she successfully 
enrols to the network, marking the third moment of translation, i.e. enrolement. The last 
moment in the process is mobilisation. After enrolling to the network, the actor submits 
to the leadership of the spokesperson who from then on is entitled to speak in the name 
of the actor and all other members in the network. The actor also becomes ‘mobile’ in the 
sense that the spokesperson can utilise the actor or rather a representation of the actor 
for different purposes. For example, by representing the actor as a data set in a graph or 
report, the actor is utilised to further forward the common cause of the network. In 
Callon’s (1986) study of fishermen and scallops, the population of scallops is represented 
quantitatively in tables and graphs. These sets of data are presented to others and used 
as ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour, 1987, p. 227) to advance the cause of the network. By 
that, scallops that physically exist only in the sea are displaced to remote locations. 
Since its beginning in the 1980s ANT has been developed further also due to the fierce 
criticism the approach met for its attempt to redefine sociology (e.g. Bloor, 1976). A 
notable contribution to reformulate the ANT project is Latour (2005). To move away 
from the apparent misinterpretation that ANT aims to establish “some absurd 
‘symmetry between humans and non-humans’” (Latour, 2005, p. 76), the approach is 
redefined to appear as a more general theory of action. To this effect, new concepts are 
introduced to avoid the plain human/non-human dichotomy. The notion of ‘mediators’ 
replaces actors as the source of action and the vehicle for meaning: 
Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the 
elements they are supposed to carry (Latour, 2005, p. 39) 
‘Intermediaries’, in contrast, are faithful in the sense that they do not alter the meaning 
they carry. As a consequence, action is no longer a result of causality but a translation of 
two mediators that engage with each other: 
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“So, the word ‘translation’ now takes on a somewhat specialized 
meaning: a relation that does not transport causality but induces two 
mediators into coexisting” (Latour, 2005, p. 108) 
As a theory ANT has moved from an approach describing translations of interests, i.e. 
manipulation and alignment of interests, to being presented as a social theory describing 
translations of associations where entities activate action through co-existence. Another 
consequence of this new theory of action is the heightened status of description as the 
outcome of scientific inquiry. According to Latour (2005) the new sociology seeks ‘thick 
descriptions’ (p. 136 in footnote) that do not leave wanting for any explanation, since 
explanations are residues of the old sociology. Because neither the observing social 
scientist nor the observed actors are able to respond to basic questions about the make-
up of our social world, the social scientist just ought to provide a description of the 
observations made and to leave it to the reader to make an interpretation. 
2.1.3.3 Micro/macro debate opens grounds for meso-level perspective 
Both SCOT and ANT follow the tradition set out by sociologists of science and scientific 
knowledge. This tradition draws attention to micro-level dynamics in the production of 
knowledge and truth claims. Social constructivists contributed in repulsing rational and 
deterministic theories of technological change by emphasising that ‘effects’ of technology 
were traceable to choices made by actors rather than being inevitable qualities of 
technological properties (Williams & Russell, 1988). These studies produced detailed and 
insightful accounts which illuminate how complex networks of social interests influence 
technology development processes. In both theories, SCOT and ANT, actions of 
individuals are the focal points of analysis. Following their activities, so it is proposed, 
will reveal how society is constructed through recurring interactions rather than being 
defined by the existence of any social structures. It is such post-modernist, philosophical 
exercise that provided novel views on the technology/society relationship that prompted 
constructive criticism on conventional perspectives. However, while addressing 
previous limitations of conventional theories, actor-centric approaches also introduced 
their own methodological and conceptual drawbacks. Since every framework or theory 
intends to reduce the complexity of reality, reductionism is an expected consequence. In 
regards of social constructivist theorisation of technology, reductionism affects to large 
extent the conceptualisation of social structures.  
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A major issue with SCOT and ANT is the problematic accounting for social structures. It 
was found that actor-centric approaches tended to overstate the power and autonomy of 
local actors while neglecting social surroundings and infrastructures that shaped the 
context of actions (Williams & Russell, 1988; Sørensen & Levold, 1992; Klein & Kleinman, 
2002). The lack of a strong representation of social structures limits the explanatory 
capacity of these approaches: 
“An acontextual account is underdetermined analytically. It leaves 
unexplained so many features: why the particular groups identified 
should be involved; their starting points; the different conditions 
affecting them; the ramifications of their actions, and so on” (Williams & 
Russell, 1988, p. 11) 
Both theories shed light on the creation of knowledge and artefacts, i.e. the content of the 
black box of technology. However, the approach taken results in analysts climbing into 
the box and closing it behind them, as indicated by the title of the contribution by 
Williams and Russell (1988). Social structures outside the black box are neglected and 
overtly discarded as some irrelevant ‘backcloth’ of prior interest (Callon & Law, 1982). 
Instead, ‘macro-structures’ are explained, or rather described as Latour (1987) would 
phrase it, by extrapolating micro-level interactions between actors: 
“Society [...] is constructed from the bottom upwards; the 'macro' is in 
effect reduced to the 'micro'.” (Williams & Russell, 1988, p. 1) 
It has been shown that social constructivism propagates acontextual interpetations. To 
that we add the criticism that it further promotes ahistorical interpretations by refusing 
to account for the so-called ‘backcloth’ of prior interests. This is demonstrated best by 
returning to Winner’s (1980) account of the low-hanging bridges in New York City. In 
his response to Woolgar (1991b), who challenged Winner’s interpretations on grounds of 
interpretative flexibility, Winner (1993) accuses social constructivists of lack of ambition 
to examine deeper relationships between technology and interests of the actors involved. 
Following the urban architect Robert Moses in his efforts to socially construct urban 
infrastructures would reveal less of his deeply-rooted cultural and political interests than 
tracing his life work in a biographical account. Both accounts, a social constructivist and 
a biographical, would reveal valuable insights into the social shaping of an urban 
infrastructure and, respectively, the contribution of an individual in propagating and 
engraining particular cultural values in public life. It would be wrong to accuse 
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proponents of SCOT and ANT of producing inaccurate descriptions of technological 
change. However, there is strong reason to doubt the explanatory capacity and reach of 
acontextual and ahistorical descriptions of micro-dynamics. SCOT and ANT do offer 
strong tools to examine ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, but they are unilluminating in 
respect of ‘why’ questions. 
To draw a conclusion from the limitations of social constructivist theories, critics of 
micro-sociology see an opportunity for middle ground by elaborating the space in 
between the micro/macro divide. A meso-level perspective emerges which is inspired by 
novel approaches of micro sociologists and informed by the existing stock of traditional 
macro-theories (Williams & Russell, 1988). This perspective sheds light on players which 
had previously been ignored: 
“[...] there are very important "intermediate" institutions and institutional 
arrangements (networks) involved in technological innovation, and they 
are neither fluid nor determined. Consider, for example, the role of 
banks, venture capitalists, colleges and universities, research institutes, 
and so on.” (Sørensen & Levold, 1992, p. 14-15) 
On one hand actor-centric theories highlight individual actions but neglect relations on 
organisational and institutional levels. For instance, organisation and business analysts 
would examine performances and strategising processes of individuals, employees and 
managers, of an individual company. On the other hand, macro theories would take a 
top-down approach with the national economy or the government as a starting point. 
They tend to focus on macro concepts such as economic growth, business cycles, policies 
and the diffusion of technology (Sørensen & Levold, 1992). The meso-level approach 
thus addresses a void in which a multitude of activities take place which micro and 
macro approaches under-theorise.  
This section reviewed the origins of the field of technology studies. This field emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s from various research traditions which criticised the widespread 
belief of technology determinism. This belief assumed that technology was a discrete 
entity separate from social settings and that technology contained inherent capabilities 
that allowed for deduction of any ‘effects’ and ‘impacts’ of technology. Multiple research 
traditions engaged with social studies of technology design/development and 
implementation to disprove technologically deterministic assumptions and to 
demonstrate the role of choices in shaping the contents of technologies. Two social 
29 
 
constructivist theories were introduced and discussed to illustrate the contribution of a 
particular branch, sociology of scientific of knowledge, to drawing attention to micro-
level dynamics of technology development and implementation. Although contributing 
largely to exposing technology determinism as a flawed concept, critics of the micro-
sociologist approach highlighted deficits in the theorisation of social structures. This led 
into a micro/macro debate which crystallised into the call for stronger focus on the space 
between the two extremes. The meso-level perspective was identified as middle ground 
between the action and structure divide. To draw a conclusion, early theories on the 
social shaping of technology played an important role in repelling unsatisfactory and 
inadequate perceptions of the technology/society relationship. This project was fairly 
successful but the theorisation of technology remained controversial due to emerging 
incompatibilities between different schools of thought. Despite unresolved theoretical 
debates among students of technology (and science) the prevailing idea that technology 
is intrinsically entangled with its social environment carried on to spread to other 
disciplines in social science and beyond. The next section will review how technology 
studies enabled a new articulation of processes of innovation which previously held 
strong technological deterministic assumptions. 
2.2 New articulation of technology and innovation processes 
in organisations 
The distributed but vigorous efforts to repel technological determinism in society and 
academic communities fruitfully resulted in the emergence of the field of technology 
studies. New and radical methodologies encouraged social scientists to challenge 
existing imageries of the science, technology and society relationship and to reveal the 
social activities going on behind the close curtains of laboratories, R&D departments and 
policy-makers. Previously common depictions of a carefully engineered society where 
scientists and engineers project technological solutions into the world gave way to sober 
accounts of individuals, social groups and powerful elites imposing their agendas and 
interests onto the wider population. However, early theories on technology tended to 
overly emphasise sites of technology design. Historical studies of technology also had 
the benefit of hindsight. The successful critique of technological determinism risked 
introducing a new bias, i.e. social determinism, which gives too much weight to 
powerful actors. This is where studies of innovation offered valuable insights into a 
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wider range of processes associated to technology development. Studies of innovation 
processes, i.e. processes of invention, development as well as diffusion of technology, 
widened the scope to other groups of players. In particular the focus on users in work 
organisations posed the challenge to scholars to consider that innovations often fail and 
that they have to be implemented and reinvented in use. This highlighted that 
technologies represent complex configurations of past technologies, techniques, tools 
and existing working practices. However, the understanding of innovation was strongly 
patterned by technologically deterministic views. As a result, innovation was largely 
misunderstood as a linear process where technology development progresses uniformly 
and relatively unproblematic through different stages. In their studies scholars of 
science, technology and innovation all faced similar challenges to tackle common 
misconceptions and inadequate conceptualisations. 
As innovation is intrinsically linked with technology, the theorisation of technology 
inevitable affects theories on innovation. Therefore, in parallel with the critique of 
technological determinism that led to technology studies frameworks, there has been a 
discussion of innovation processes. Intellectual advances in technology debates have 
been mirrored in innovation debates and vice versa. This led partially to cross-
fertilisation between scholars sharing grounds in both fields. In the first section of this 
chapter we have reviewed the evolution of technology studies as a field. This section 
aims to recount the evolution of innovation studies in respect of technology in general 
and in work organisations in particular. Unfortunately this requires a hop back in time to 
recall the origins of innovation theories and early conceptualisations of innovation 
models. Thus, apologies if some aspects of the discussion appear repetitious. The review 
will begin with an examination of the origins of the innovation model to understand 
how advances in innovation studies correlated with theorisations on technology. 
2.2.1 Emergence and evolution of innovation models 
A linear model of innovation aims to explain technological change by arranging social 
processes in a rational order which represents the flow of information and the increasing 
maturity of technological outputs. The discrete-entity model of technology witnessed its 
heydays from 1950s to 1970s when it served as the underlying concept for linear models 
of innovation. A linear model implies linearity in the social order of innovation activities 
where a technology is transformed and then passed on to the next stage in line. Thus, it 
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is build around the assumption that technology is a separate entity that can easily move 
about in an orderly process through space and time. In its most basic form, the linear 
model postulates that: 
[...] innovation starts with basic research, then adds applied research and 
development, and ends with production and diffusion: 
Basic research → Applied research → Development → (Production and) 
Diffusion (Godin, 2006, p. 639) 
The linear model started to emerge in literature in the 1940s. The conceptualisation of a 
model to depict the innovation process served initially, in turn and in different stages, as 
a rhetorical instrument for different scientific communities to pursue their own agenda 
(Godin, 2006). The first stage in the development of the linear model was initiated by 
natural scientists who put forward a conceptual distinction to demarcate the boundary 
between their honourable work on ‘pure science’ and the less prestigious activities of 
engineers and industrialists which the scientists belittled as ‘applied science’. Second, in 
the attempt to make science better measureable and accountable, statisticians and 
researchers in the US National Science Foundation and in OECD expanded the yet 
rudimentary model of basic and applied sciences with the notion of ‘development’ to 
summarise activities of industrial management of research and the development of 
technologies. And third, economist utilised the model for their purposes by extending it 
with further innovation activities to integrate the process of bringing a commercial 
product to market.  
The persistence of the linear model is linked to the need for science policymakers to 
justify growing public sector investments in research. Its dominance lasted up to the 
1950s when practitioners and policy-makers became increasingly unsatisfied about 
technological progress which often resulted in failures. The mixed success of 
technological and scientific projects in the 1960s and 70s prompted studies of the 
innovation process in the hope to improve technological progress by enhancing project 
management capabilities. Studies of military technologies, e.g. Project HINDSIGHT in 
the US (Sherwin & Isenson, 1966), and commercial technologies, e.g. SAPPHO in the UK 
(Rothwell et al., 1974), were commissioned which generated new empirical insights into 
the innovation process. Besides reporting opportunities to improve existing management 
processes these studies highlighted that success was not entirely dependent on 
32 
 
technological factors as depicted in the conventional technology-push model. These 
findings underlined that projects tended to be more successful the better they took into 
account user requirements. According to these findings, it was not exclusively the 
discovery of new scientific findings that sparked the development of new technologies. 
Instead, it was the coupling of user needs with technological capabilities that shaped 
successful technological projects. Consequently, a debate among economists arose 
promoting an alternative model which saw social forces, i.e. needs of a society and its 
individual members, being the imperative driving technological change. 
The need-pull model (or demand-pull as it is also known) emphasised the prevalence of 
user and market needs over technological and scientific excellence. Rhetorics of the 
need-pull model centered around the notion that people have to be coupled with 
innovation activities including marketing and production (Godin & Lane, 2013). As a 
result, science and technology, previously holding the pole position in the linear model, 
were relegated further down the stream to give way for considerations of market needs. 
Although sparking new debates on innovation processes, the need-pull model was 
insufficient in eliciting a more complex theorisation of technology and its relationship 
with society. What changed in the 1960s, however, was that innovation became a central 
subject for an emerging field in economics that later turned to innovation studies. 
Beyond 1970s, innovation models became more elaborate and stressed the mutual 
dependence of both technological and social factors. Integrated models combining the 
strengths of both the technology push and need-pull models started to appear as more 
attention was paid to the intricate role of technology in organisational settings (Rothwell, 
1992).  
The field of technology studies emerged about the same time when innovation scholars 
developed models of the innovation process which were more sophisticated and 
sensitive towards complex relationships between the technical and the social. United in 
the undertaking to improve understanding of technological change, the two fields 
overlapped sufficiently to enable to some extent the exchange of concepts and ideas 
among academics from different disciplines in social science. Technology students 
familiar with micro-level, bottom-up approaches were able to participate in innovation 
debates. Likewise, innovation students, who are adept in studying macro-structural 
phenomena applying a top-down approach could draw on theories developed by social 
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studies of technology. However, the exchange was limited and analysts of technology 
appeared to have benefited more from interactions than their colleagues from innovation 
studies (Martin, 2012). Nonetheless, fruitful interactions with other disciplines allowed 
technology studies to evolve into a multidisciplinary field. Reflecting its foundation in 
disciplinary diversity, theories and concepts generated by students of technology 
consequently transcended disciplinary boundaries. The next subsections will be 
reviewing how technology studies informed new forms of articulations of the 
technology/society relationship and the innovation process.  
2.2.1.1 Towards dynamic and interactive models of innovation 
Previously it was introduced how the combination of novel ideas from sociology of 
scientific knowledge with existing research traditions inspired a new generation of social 
studies of technology. Criticising technology determinism and the linear model of 
innovation, the social shaping of technology perspective emerged as an approach to 
understand technology as the outcome of numerous negotiations among a multitude of 
actors where choices are influenced by a range of social and technical factors (Williams & 
Edge, 1996; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). The origins of the linear model of innovation 
date back to the first half of the 20th century when boundaries were drawn up between 
‘pure science’ and ‘applied science’. This separation and categorisation is difficult to hold 
nowadays with literature from innovation and technology studies providing much 
counter-evidence. Technology and science are no longer seen in a vertical and 
unidirectional relation to each other but understood as different cultures that are in a 
horizontal and interactive relationship (Edge, 1988). The linear model of innovation 
overlooks the interactive and cultural nature of the two domains and thus fails to grasp 
the diverse range of interactions and uncertainties that surround the evolution of 
technical artefacts and their role in influencing social outcomes (Williams et al., 2005). 
Innovation is a complex social activity with interactions changing depending on the 
maturity of the technology and the moment of the innovation process. Transformation is 
not limited to technology but is a quality that is mutually shared between a technical 
artefact and its social surroundings (Williams & Edge, 1996):  
"Technologies, once developed and implemented, not only react back 
upon their environments to generate new forms of technology, but also 
generate new environments" (Williams & Edge, 1996, p. 868) 
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Models of innovation and technological change therefore should reflect the dynamic and 
interactive journeys a technology takes in course of the innovation process.  
Within technology and innovation studies we can identify two routes scholars have 
taken to articulate the dynamism and complexity observed in innovation activities. The 
approaches vary in the level of detail in attending to micro-level dynamics and in the 
degree of stability and continuity granted in theorising about technological change 
dynamics. One account seeks to explain broad patterns recognisable in the innovation 
process. It stresses the idea of continuity and is a top-down approach to explain 
systematically how meso-macro contexts interact with and influence turbulent and 
chaotic innovation processes. The other account attends to the fine structure of 
innovation processes shaped by particular contingencies emanating from complex 
configurations of multiple actors and contexts. It resembles a bottom-up account and 
stresses discontinuous elements in innovation processes. Both accounts attend to and 
provide explanations for technological dynamics. And thus they showcase a dilemma in 
that both account for dynamics in technological journeys albeit from different and yet 
irreconcilable perspectives. The remainder of this section will examine these two 
accounts in turn before the section thereafter introduces the perspective of social 
learning which attempts to find the middle ground between the two accounts. 
2.2.2 Account of continuity: patterns in evolutionary technological change 
Early studies of innovation were looking for consistent patterns and success factors in 
the production of ideas and in the application of problem-solving techniques. For 
example, analyses of patent data and clusters of inventions elaborated the idea of long 
waves such as Kondratiev’s 50-year cycles to understand the relationship between 
innovation and economic development (Freeman et al., 1982). The effects of apparent 
social forces and trajectories of technological advancement have been subject of 
theorisation by multiple authors. Abernathy and Utterback (1975, 1977) introduced a 
dynamic model of innovation that outlined the lifecycle of an innovation as it moves 
through different stages of development and shifts from a focus on product innovation 
towards process innovation. It is thus an extension of the s-curve depicting the progress 
of learning about an innovation as proposed by Rogers’ (2003) diffusion model. Other 
concepts included natural trajectories and technological regimes (Nelson & Winter, 
1977), and technological paradigms and technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982). The latter 
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two were a direct conversion of Kuhn’s (1996) concepts of paradigm and normal science 
into the innovation domain. A technological paradigm is defined as 
“"model" and a "pattern" of solution of selected technological problems. 
based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected 
material technologies.” (italics in original, Dosi, 1982, p. 152) 
Based on that, a technological trajectory is the progress directed by the parameters of a 
technological paradigm. 
The notions of technological paradigms and trajectories imply a strong, prescriptive 
understanding of technological change and thus “are not entirely free from deterministic 
overtones” (van den Belt & Rip, 1989, p. 136). Indeed, analysts of dynamics in 
information technology implementations argued that after closer examination, it was 
difficult to uphold assumptions made by these concepts (Fleck et al., 1990). For example, 
to sustain any trajectory, a certain level of stability and harmony is required among the 
forces driving a trajectory. However, the authors of the study commented that: 
“[...] there are tensions within the sphere of implementation which served 
to frustrate the trajectory that was expected at the beginning of the life of 
the technology.” (Fleck et al., p. 637) 
Thus, trajectories may be established in hindsight but it is problematic to identify them 
when a technological development is ongoing. The use of notions of trajectories 
therefore is the subject of rhetorics by promoters of technologies who draw up visions in 
the attempt to raise expectations. In contrast, the idea of technological regimes avoids to 
be entangled conceptually with any notions of inevitable technological change. A 
technological regime is a cognitive concept linked to a particular technology and related 
bodies of knowledge. It represents widely accepted beliefs of engineers and technicians 
“about what is feasible or at least worth attempting” (Nelson & Winter, 1977, p. 57). It 
varies only in nuances from Dosi’s (1982) ‘technological paradigm’ in that it is not as 
prescriptive in respect of technological progress. To illustrate the concept, Nelson and 
Winter (1977) draw on the development of the DC3 aircraft in the 1930s. Its design 
embodied the technological regime that aircrafts are best equipped with a metal skin, 
low wing and piston engines. Rather than trying to predict technological change, the 
technological regime concept foregrounds cognitive characteristics shared by a 
homogenous collective of engineers. It avoids making a normative assumption about 
behavioural patterns of firms and technological change but turns attention to the way 
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how engineers are socialised to perform problem-solving activities in a manner 
fashionable in respective sectors. The concept of technological regimes originates from 
the application of an evolutionary theory in the economics domain which the next 
section will introduce. 
2.2.2.1 Evolutionary theory of economic and technological change 
The widely cited contributions by Nelson and Winter (1977, 1982) became a turning 
point for economists of innovation and technological change (Martin, 2012). Nelson and 
Winter (1982) elaborated a new model of economic and technological change to depart 
from neoclassical accounts. Two structural pillars of neoclassical and orthodox economic 
models are the assumptions that, first, firms adhered strictly to strategies of rational 
profit maximisation and that, second, the notion of equilibrium is a powerful and 
applicable concept (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The popularity of the concepts of 
maximisation and equilibrium by economists lies in the ability to build formal models 
embodying these assumptions. However, Nelson and Winter both rejected these models 
for their flawed representation of firm behaviours and their neglect to acknowledge 
technology. Instead, they elaborated an alternative theory of economic change that 
appreciated the role of technology.  
Borrowing from the biological evolution metaphor, they developed the evolutionary 
theory of economic change (Nelson & Winter, 1982). An evolutionary theory assumes 
dynamics of change and reconfiguration. The biological evolutionary theory is 
concerned with the origin of existing and the emergence of new species. In economics, 
the evolutionary perspective is concerned with change dynamics in economic systems 
and the behaviours of players within the system, preferably firms. Similar to genes in 
biological organisms, firm behaviour is patterned by ‘routines’ which range from short-
run operational characteristics to strategic and predictable behaviours. Routines 
represent the memory of an organisation. Successful problem-solving techniques are 
internalised through repetition. A routine can be seen to embody the truce of an intra-
organisational conflict between members of an organisation who are required to 
collaborate beyond organisational and hierarchical structures.  
The concept of ‘selection environment’ is pivotal in the evolutionary theory as it 
addresses the observation that firms’ relative use of technologies changes over time – a 
phenomenon largely neglected by orthodox theories (Nelson & Winter, 1982). In a 
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selection environment, a flow of innovations producing technological variations is taken 
for granted. Firms are constantly exposed to a variety of technological options from 
which they can choose in order to improve their routines. Search routines in firms 
evaluate options and select those that promise the most profit. In contrast to 
maximisation models, the selection strategy is based on “heuristics rather than on an 
algorithm calculating an optimum” (Nelson & Winter, 1977, p. 53). Variation in the range 
of options has two origins. Either a firm develops a technology or service all by itself and 
enables its diffusion through growth, or a firm draws inspiration from successful 
developments of others and, thus, facilitates the diffusion of a technology via imitation.  
In sum, the evolutionary economics theory offers a conceptual framework to account for 
continuous technological change. It departs from orthodox economic models which 
assume a profit maximisation imperative and the notion of equilibrium seeking systems. 
Instead it highlights limitations in rational behaviours of firms by rendering the selection 
environment as an arena in which firms exercise search heuristics to sustain and to 
expand their economic activities. The theory is in line with observations of broader 
patterns and provides intellectual grounds for conditioned behaviours of other 
organisational players.  
However, accounts of continuity are limited in explaining observations and dynamics on 
the micro-level. The selection dynamic is an example where a narrow interpretation 
according to the biological metaphor has limitations for it is not necessarily the ‘fittest’ 
technology that is successful. For instance, insignificant, historical ‘chance’ events can be 
decisive elements that predetermine the success of one technology over another (Arthur, 
1989, 1999). An empirical example is the QWERTY scheme originating from typewriter 
key boards. Today’s domination of the QWERTY scheme is a likely result of “historical 
accidents” where “the wrong system”, in other words, not the best or most effective 
system, became a global standard (David, 1985, p. 335-6). An early lead over other 
schemes in 1880s resulted in a technological lock-in which became ever more costly to 
reverse.  
This brief example is to remind of the dilemma that besides global events there are also 
local developments that can have significant influences on the innovation journey of a 
technology. The next section will explore contributions that underline the 
unpredictability of the innovation process from a discontinuous point of view. 
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2.2.3 Account of discontinuity: technology and innovation in organisations 
Accounts of continuity are predominately concerned with a top-down approach that 
takes firms as the unit of analyses. In this discussion on the discontinuity perspective, the 
analytical flight attitude will be lowered to enquire about technology-related phenomena 
within firms and work organisations.  
Innovation is a complex and discontinuous process which can, and often does, end in 
failure when the user/technology match does not fit. Technological success depends on 
aligning user needs and expectations with technical capabilities. Orthodox theories of 
innovation neglected the bargaining power of users in the innovation process. Instead, 
deterministic accounts of technology overemphasised supplier organisations and their 
efforts and struggles in diffusing technological innovations. In the diffusion model, 
technologies are perceived as discrete entities that can be moved to other locales with 
relative ease for straight out adoption. Therefore, attention is paid to factors impeding 
diffusion and adoption which is often grounded on uncertainties surrounding 
information available to potential users as, for example, in the case of farmers in the US 
resisting agricultural innovations (Rogers, 2003). Rogers (2003) takes as its starting point 
the creation of a productive innovation by the supply side and then charts the processes 
by which these are taken up. Emancipatory theories of technology contest the condoned 
dominance of the supply side and the basic assumptions underlying the diffusion model 
and, thus, call for a re-theorisation of the diffusion of innovation. Studies of innovation 
in industrial organisations provided grounds to examine the technology/organisation 
relationship in more detail (Fleck, 1988; Clark & Staunton, 1989; Clausen & Williams, 
1997ab; Clark, 1997). These studies highlighted the contingency and discontinuity of 
social dynamics in episodes of implementation when users interacted with new 
technologies. A configurational perspective on technology was proposed to match the 
observation made. This technology in organisations debate will be reviewed in the 
following subsection. 
2.2.3.1 Configurational technology and the user 
In basic, the diffusion model assumed the implementation of finished technologies to be 
a more or less smooth ride interrupted only by problems in the flow of information to 
potential adopters (Rogers, 2003). Detailed analyses of technology implementations in 
industrial organisations revealed a more complex situation. Early studies on the 
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management of innovation demonstrated that firms cope better with innovation if they 
had an organic organisational structure as opposed to a mechanistic one (Burns & 
Stalker, 1961). An organic management system is more flexible in dealing with 
uncertainties and changing conditions because of flat hierarchical structures and flexible 
problem-solving cultures. Interactions occur more naturally and are not impeded by 
organisational silos, where information tends to be hoarded and shielded from the 
outside, as is often the case with mechanistic systems. However, innovation is an 
interactive and dynamic process that depends on an uninterrupted flow of information 
between actors within the adopting firm but also between users and members of the 
technology-supplying firm.  
A study of the implementation of industrial robots in manufacturing firms revealed how 
relevant bodies of knowledge emerged only after technologies have been put into 
practice in concrete locales (Fleck, 1988). Robots were initially promoted as universal 
machines capable of replacing human workers. The vision was stripped of any note on 
the social context. When implemented in manufacturing sites, however, robots had to be 
customised and adapted to very specific local requirements. The vision of a universal 
machine gave way of robots being configurational technologies. Instead of being simply 
diffused to new locales, robots had to go through additional development and 
innovation cycles at each implementation site. Extensive user participation was required 
to configure technologies and to make them work in the use context – if they were not 
abandoned altogether as happened often with advanced manufacturing technologies 
(Bessant, 1985). The configurations of robots and their components varied widely 
depending on the use case. New design configurations originated solely from problems 
encountered by users. Some user firms even began manufacturing robots themselves 
(Fleck, 1988). Fleck described this interactive and iterative process of configuration as 
‘learning by struggling’ and coined the term ‘innofusion’ to emphasise the intricate 
conjunction between innovation and diffusion (Fleck, 1988, p 22): 
“Development is a thoroughgoing evolutionary process, in which 
environmental contingencies are explicitly built in at each stage of 
variation. Thus each instance of diffusion, each configuration, may well 
represent a unique variation, a new innovation in its own right. In short 
we have a process of innofusion” (Fleck, 1988, p. 22) 
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The recognition of technologies being configurational, rather than pieces of equipment, 
foregrounded the relevance of the user-producer relationship in innovation processes. 
This focus on users automatically puts the wider social structure of user organisations 
into perspective. The relationship of technology, organisations and the innovation 
process in organisation will be the subject in the following section. 
2.2.3.2 Innovation in organisations 
Users in industrial work environments are essential in adapting technologies and 
configuring them according to the technical and social requirements of the respective 
implementation site. Innofusion is not a unidirectional process limited to the 
configuration of the technology. In order to make a configurational technology work, the 
work environment is also exposed to changes. Therefore, development and the 
organisation of work have to be analysed as a unity, as cases in robotics, (computer) 
numerical-control technological and office automation have shown (Fleck et al., 1990). 
Further insights from studies of the development and implementation of computer-
aided production management revealed how not only user-producer interactions at local 
implementation sites played a role but also how actors in professional associations, 
consultants and governmental initiatives contributed to the social shaping of industrial 
technologies (Williams, 1997a). 
Mainstream theories of macro organisation behaviour were oriented towards efficiency 
as the underlying axiom of analytical frameworks. This was prevailing with approaches 
based on the notion of equilibrium and functionalist models of innovation (Clark & 
Staunton, 1989). The critique on the overemphasis of notions of efficiencies gained 
traction in light of Japanese firms, especially from the automobile industry, penetrating 
markets in North America and Europe. Efficiency as the dominating imperative in the 
board rooms of US car manufacturers was found to be a major cause for decreased 
capabilities to innovate – a phenomenon Abernathy (1978) termed the ‘productivity 
dilemma’ where the focus on increasing the efficiency of production outputs can be 
detrimental to innovation capabilities. Likewise, the emphasis on efficiency in studies of 
macro organisation behaviour resulted in the negligence of innovation. It was therefore 
necessary to spotlight the notion of innovation and to rearticulate its role in 
organisational processes and settings (Clark & Staunton, 1989).  
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The innovation process has been characterised as being infused with uncertainty and 
discontinuity. Close user-producer interactions are required to configure technologies to 
the social settings. However, it has not been addressed sufficiently yet that it is not only 
technologies that change in shape and appearance. Organisations themselves are 
susceptible to change and adaptations in order to deal with changing circumstances. 
Clark and Staunton (1989) argue that static and functionalist models of organisations 
contributed to distorting the technology/organisation relationship. To highlight the 
dynamism of organisations, they put forward the concept of ‘structural repertoire’ 
introduced by anthropologist Gearing (1958). The concept was developed to explain 
shifts in social structures of a society, a Cherokee village in this case, that occurred when 
external conditions changed. At each moment in time, a society takes a structural pose 
which is characterised by the number and quality of relationships among its members. 
The relationships defined the roles and status of individual members. For example, in 
peacetime when hunting and household matters dominated social activities young males 
tended to be deferential and noncoercive towards clan elders and other members of 
society. In times of war, however, cognitive and social structures shifted towards 
coercive and hierarchical relationships giving young males increased privileges. A 
structural repertoire is the sum of all structural poses a society can take. Similarly, firms 
and other kinds of organisations change their structural poses depending on internal and 
external conditions. An organisation will show significant differences in its behaviour in 
times of prosperity as compared to situations where it is at the brink of bankruptcy. 
Extending on the problematic issue of multi-state situations of organisations in relation 
to the innofusion of technology, the ‘Decision Episode Framework’ was developed 
(Clark, 1997). It focuses on strategic aspects of the coordination and steering work by 
users and technology producers when it comes to migration and configuration, or 
rejection, of technologies: 
“The framework is constructed in order to explain the role of the user in 
appropriating an innovation and is therefor devised to make the role of 
the supplier more transparent” (Clark, 1997, p. 38) 
The framework renders the technology implementation and appropriation process as a 
series of episodes, i.e. sequences of change, rather than stages including agenda 
formation, selection, implementation and usage. In each episode users engage with 
supplier claims about their technologies and try to match them with their demands. At 
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the same time, the ownership of the innofusion process in the user organisation is 
contested by multiple functional areas and professionals. The issue of ownership is also 
articulated in respect of the overall structural repertoire and the varying structural poses 
of the organisation prevailing in different episodes. To sum up, the decision episode 
framework is an attempt to describe the fuzziness of the innovation process in light of 
the contingent and contested social dynamics in the user organisation. It is a valid 
response to the diffusion model and other theories which miss to address organisational 
and institutional contingencies complicating the innofusion process. 
In the case of urban planning, we learned how technology can be appropriated to 
reinforce political opinions (Winner, 1980). Thus, its configurability makes technology 
involuntarily an instrument for political manoeuvring. A study of the integration of 
health information systems in India revealed how the uneven distribution of political 
influence affected the strategising process of a small actor (Sahay et al., 2009). Lacking 
influential power the small actor was forced to seek alliances with bigger players in 
order to sustain the development of the information system. The emerging configuration 
of the artefact was thus patterned to large extent by engagements with temporary allies 
and their requirements. The notion of ‘configurable politics’ was proposed to 
acknowledge the possibility to advance a technological development by varying its 
technical configuration and linking it opportunistically to ongoing political debates 
(Sahay et al., 2009). A similar political influence on technology development and 
implementation was observed in a big bank. Implementing a multimedia technology, an 
internal team of researchers was required to regularly seek internal sponsors to support 
the ongoing implementation process (Gallacher, 2004). The case of a car company 
illustrates further instances of configurable politics in the innofusion of a supplier portal 
(Gerst, 2006). Disputes about organisational responsibilities and competences among 
different departments, collaborating competitors and external consultants rendered the 
complex arena in which local actors had to navigate and to align with to advance the 
development of the artefact. In all cases, the strategising process of actors involved was 
adapted according to contingent political situations stumbled across in course of the 
innofusion of the respective technology. However, stressing the configurability of 
technology for the sake of politics overemphasises design and downplays the user – a 
critique that applies to most early technology theories and that will be addressed in more 
detail in the sections on social learning below. Privileging sites of technology 
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development renders unjustly the image of an engineered society where science and 
technology is solely at the service of powerful elites. Later accounts explore the 
opportunities for users and other more marginal players to influence innovation 
pathways (see also Clausen & Koch, 2002, and Koch, 1997, on company social 
constitutions). 
In an early contribution by actor-network theorists, Callon and Law (1988) articulated 
the wider social context by describing the coexistence of two networks: first, a global 
actor network that supports a technological project by mobilising resources which create 
a limited negotiation space in which, second, a local actor network is granted relative 
autonomy to develop a technology. Any significant change in the global actor network 
was likely to be felt by the local network through a change in the availability of 
resources. Such resources are not limited to monetary funds but also could include 
political backing, for instance. The relationship between the global and the local 
networks was shaped by the technology in so far that technological properties enabled 
some options while constraining others. In the case of the British military aircraft TSR2 
examined by Callon and Law (1988), the technical specification episode was dominated 
by the Royal Air Force which demanded for an aircraft whose specifics did not match 
the demands of the Royal Navy. Thus, the Royal Navy became an opponent of the 
project which consumed a considerable part of the national budget allotted to procuring 
new military equipment. Besides political challenges in the global network, the 
development also struggled with technical tensions in the local network and eventually 
was abandoned after public scrutiny increased and put additional negative pressure on 
the project.  
The examples and concepts discussed above reassured the view that the outcome or 
success of a technology is not guaranteed but often strongly dependent on developments 
unrelated to the development of the artefact itself. Actors involved are required to 
manoeuvre along a complex network of users, supporters, sponsors and opponents:  
“developments proceed in a context of already strongly- articulated 
economic and social interests” (Williams & Russell, 1988, p. 10).  
These interests also represent existing infrastructures and entrenched technologies in 




The critical perspective on the technology/organisation relationship shed light on the 
social dynamics of multiple actors and institutions, and emphasises the intricate 
relationship of technology and its social and organisational surrounding. It is in contrast 
to mainstream theories on innovation, e.g. the diffusion model, which assume that 
technology is an endogenous factor in relation to organisations. The detailed 
examination of technologies in organisational settings underlines that innofusion is an 
unpredictable process exposed to a range of uncertainties and contingencies inherent in 
social settings which at times is interrupted and discontinued for reasons beyond the 
reach of the actors immediately involved. Stressing the element of discontinuity in the 
innofusion process emphasises that technology is rather an indigenous phenomenon in 
any organisation. Technology is not separable from its social context. Equally, it is not 
simply added to or implemented in an existing social context. It is an integral element of 
a complex sociotechnical configuration. The next subsection will be addressing this issue 
of complexity in sociotechnical configurations from the view of existing infrastructures.   
2.2.3.3 Information infrastructures in organisations 
The understanding of technology being configurational emerged from studies of failures 
and struggles of suppliers to build universal industrial machinery for a range of 
purposes in diverse industrial organisations. Another starting point for a view on 
technology having configurational characteristics is the increasing accumulation of 
various interacting technologies in organisations. The role and influence of existing 
infrastructures on the shaping of new technologies is addressed with the concept of 
‘information infrastructures’ (II). II as a notion is a re-conceptualisation of technology 
particularly in light of the increasing amalgamation of information technologies with 
communication technologies and other basic support systems (Hanseth & Monteiro, 
1998). Instead of being concerned with individual artefacts or technological systems, the 
II concept attempts to take into account the involvement of a large body of technical and 
non-technical elements in organisational life. As a consequence, matters of 
standardisation and flexibility are the dominant concerns in the IIs perspective (Hanseth 
et al., 1996, Hanseth & Monteiro, 1998). 
Management literature acknowledges the complexities surrounding IIs, corporate IIs in 
particular, but holds the view that it can be and should be centrally controlled (Ciborra 
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& Hanseth, 2000). This is challenged by some information systems researchers who find 
that infrastructures defy control. Rather, 
“infrastructures tend to ‘drift’, i.e. they deviate from their planned 
purpose for a variety of reasons often outside anyone’s influence.” 
(Ciborra & Hanseth, 2000, p. 4) 
Therefore, II as a concept is shy of definition and has been characterised as “elusive” 
(Hanseth et al., 1996, p. 409) and “without absolute boundary” (Star & Ruhleder, 1996, p. 
113). Scholars concerned with problematic issues of IIs are “jotting down a laundry list of 
characteristics” (Bowker et al., 2010) often with reference to Star and Ruhleder’s (1996) 
definition which offers a list of multiple dimensions. Bowker (1996), for example, draws 
on Star and Ruhleder’s (1996) dimensional characteristics and summarises them into five 
properties: 
 embededness ("it is 'sunk' into other structures") 
 transparency ("it does not have to be reinvented each time")  
 reach or scope (it is not a "one-off event or one-site practice")  
 being learned as part of membership (it is associated with a community of 
practice).  
 being linked with conventions of practice (it "both shapes and is shaped by the 
conventions of a community of practice") (Bowker, 1996, p. 49) 
Its broad definition allows the notion of II to be applied not only to modern information 
and communication technologies but also, for instance, to medical classification systems. 
Bowker’s (1996) historical study of the International Classification of Diseases 
emphasises how the infrastructural perspective foregrounds the contextual backdrop 
which, on one hand, plays an important role in shaping the classification system and 
which, on the other hand, is being itself shaped in course of the classification systems’ 
continuous development. Thus, as a “fundamentally relational concept” (Star & 
Ruhleder, 1996, p. 113), II underscores the dual relationship between surrounding 
elements and a technology. The notion of the ‘installed base’ stresses the significance of 
existing elements (Hanseth, 2000). It implies that a previous infrastructure is always in 
place and an infrastructure is never developed from scratch. 
Similar to the social shaping perspective, the II concept guides analytical attention 
towards the wider context of a technology’s implementation site. Where the concepts 
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differ is in the directions from where analysts are coming from. While the social shaping 
perspective is usually concerned with the innofusion of a single artefact or a family of 
artefacts, the II perspective starts with a consideration of an existing infrastructure as the 
enabler of organisational innovation. This difference is strongly visible in studies of 
strategic information systems (SIS). A SIS aims to provide an organisation with a 
competitive advantage that is grounded in the unique information infrastructure of said 
organisation so to avoid it being imitated easily by competitors (Ciborra, 1992). A 
common characteristic is that these systems often emerged unintentionally and due to 
tinkering and improvisation on the grassroots-level where the unique installed base 
consisting of technological and organisational capabilities are combined into an SIS 
(Ciborra, 1994, 1996). Thus, analyses of SIS rely stronger on enquiries into the role of 
existing information infrastructures than non-strategic information systems. 
As a concept II is a valid complementary framework to technology-centred perspectives. 
It foregrounds the installed base of a given social settings and requires the analyst to 
explain processes of technological change taking into account historical and current 
developments within that context. From this point of view, the II perspective carries the 
potential to bridge the divide between continuous and discontinuous accounts of 
technology. However, II is arguably a complementary concept adding primarily to the 
description of sociotechnical surroundings and articulation of embededness of 
technologies in organisational contexts. It remains of limited use to explain why and 
how technological developments are initiated and sustained over a longer period of 
time. Another approach in conceptualisation is demanded to make use of historical 
contributions of the social shaping perspective and the improved understanding on the 
implementation and use of technologies in organisations. The next and final section in 
this chapter seeks to discuss recent contributions in the theorisation of technology and 
outlines limitations in methodological approaches which arise from these more nuanced 
articulations of technological change. 
2.3 Conceptualising the new articulation of the 
technology/society relationship 
So far it was discussed how the emerging fields of technology and innovation studies 
reshaped conceptions of the technology/society relationship through top-down as well 
as close-up examinations of innovation processes. Now we will return to theoretical 
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debates about how to conceptualise and to bring together such different perspectives. 
Early theories of technology emphasised action and the role and influence of actors in 
the shaping of technology. Subsequent studies of technology and, in particular, the 
interaction of users and producers in their respective social environments shed light on 
how structural factors are important sources of contingencies in technology dynamics. 
Thus, these studies readjusted the focus on both action and structure which operate 
simultaneuously and are mutually dependent. Therefore, theoretical accounts have to 
address issues of action and structure equally and simultaneously. Building upon the 
debates in technology studies we are now in the position to address emergent theories 
that take into account both action and structure. This section develops our general 
epistemological framework and the foundation for the specific conceptual framework for 
this thesis. Next we will briefly return to the micro/macro debate to reflect on how the 
conceptualisation on technology has moved on since.  
The major source for discontinuous dynamics has been identified as the contingency and 
uncertainty pertaining activities of individual and organisational actors. Especially the 
role of users is an essential and unpredictable element influencing the shaping, 
adaptation and adoption of technology. Behaviours and reactions of users are difficult to 
control. Even design-centred development methodologies, which aim to integrate the 
user perspective early on in the development of a technology, are of limited use, at times 
misleading, because these methodologies still separate the development site from the use 
site. Such heroic perceptions of the design stage have therefore justly been dubbed to be 
a ‘design fallacy’ (Stewart & Williams, 2005).  
The discussion of the continuous account of technological change indicated that 
according to this view individual technologies are not the concern because a constant 
stream of innovation and technologies is taken for granted. As a consequence, individual 
accounts of technologies and actors easily go missing in this stream. In contrast, the 
discontinuous account recognises the significance in the contingent fates of individual 
technologies and actors. Eventually, it is the successful accommodation of technical 
capabilities within idiosyncratic social settings that allow a technology to advance on its 
innovation journey. In the beginning of this chapter, theories on technology have been 
introduced which emerged predominately in the 1980s. Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) have been presented as widely 
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known theories in the broad church of the Social Shaping of Technology perspective 
(MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999; Williams & Edge, 1996). However, these early approaches 
have been developed under specific circumstances. SCOT and ANT in particular where 
inspired by intellectual movements in studies of science and scientific knowledge. 
Limitations of transferring ideas from those approaches into the domain of technology 
studies have been exemplified in the micro/macro debate.  
The micro/macro debate circulated around the problem of justifying an appropriate 
entry point for the analysis of technological change. While social constructivist 
approaches demanded for a micro-level-only analysis, others argued for a stronger 
appreciation of the meso and the macro-level. It seems that the micro/macro debate has 
not been resolved as much as participants in the debate have simply moved on. For 
example, the use of vocabulary shifted partly from the ambiguous use of micro/macro to 
local/non-local terminology (MacKenzie, 1988). 
Early concepts in the emerging field of technology studies were concerned with making 
explicit the numerous choices and decisions made in regards of the design of 
technological properties. The debate between sociologists of the micro and sociologists of 
the macro was initially a methodological one: what level of detail should an analysis take 
into account; what is the appropriate unit of analysis, and so on. In that respect, micro-
sociologist taught macro-sociologists a lesson in that they showed that actions and 
intentions of individual actors at the local were essential in shaping phenomena in the 
non-local, e.g. in other laboratories (Latour, 1987). Locality as a spatial differentiation has 
been adopted as a unit of analysis but the conceptualisation of the non-local remained 
contested. In actor-network theory, accepting the conceptualisation of the non-local 
requires submission to a new idea of sociology – a move which arguably depends more 
on ideology than rationality. 
The preferred locales examined in early social shaping studies were sites of development 
and implementation activities. For example, in their historical study of the bicycle, Pinch 
and Bijker (1984) analysed how the bicycle design was socially constructed through the 
resolution of controversies around technical variations and their problematic adoption 
by different user groups. However, it remained undertheorised how these controversies 
emerged and how analysts learned about the nature of these controversies. Thus, the 
issues of testing and experiencing by users which stimulate the emergence of problems 
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and controversies in the first place were neglected. Indeed, actor-network theory’s 
proposal of a new sociology generally disposes of the conventional understanding of 
time and space in favour of an all-encompassing notion of actor network. Generally 
speaking, initiatives to advance the intellectual project of articulating new 
conceptualisations of the technology/society relationship with special attention to issues 
of time and space remained sporadic. A movement that appears promising but is 
gaining momentum only slowly is the attempt to propose a new articulation under the 
umbrella of ‘social learning’. This will be discussed in the following subsection. 
2.3.1 Social learning 
The social learning perspective emerged from the intention to find a broader definition 
to socio-technical change as compared to narrow definitions found underlining 
technology policies in OECD countries. The narrow focus of such policies on economic 
growth and competitiveness of national or regional industries resulted in over-
promoting new technology development. Issues of deployment and implementation, i.e. 
the concerns of users, were secondary. As a result of this negligence, the innovation 
process was less efficient and produced technologies that users struggled with 
(Sørensen, 1996). The research perspective of Social Shaping of Technology (SST) 
brought to attention that technologies are the produce of choices made throughout the 
innovation process. Social learning posed to address some weaknesses of SST. It 
advances the social shaping perspective by examining in more detail and with a more 
nuanced understanding who it is that makes these choices, when and under what 
circumstances (Williams et al., 2005). 
A weakness of SST has been identified by researchers of cultural studies. While 
emphasising the shaping dynamics during stages of design, SST studies gave little 
attention to efforts of marketing technologies and products to end users. Besides a few 
exceptions, e.g. Noble’s studies of the industrial-military complex and ideologies of 
scientists and engineers (Noble, 1984) and feminist studies of patriarchal ideology, 
Mackay and Gillespie (1992) argue that attention to issues of ideology has been largely 
neglected in SST. Thus they call for integrating notions of culture and appropriation of 
and by users. This is where social learning draws inspiration and tries promoting a 
dialogue with relevant research strands including works from a cultural studies 
perspective and from studies of ‘organisational learning’ (Williams et al., 2005). 
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It is not a psychological route of cognitive learning that social learning analysts are 
promoting (Sørensen, 1996; Williams et al., 2005). Rather, the focus is set on social 
processes around developing understanding and meaning-making by actors in relation 
to technology. The number of opportunities for interactions between actors and 
technology is infinite. The notion of space as a result of social processes is proposed as a 
helpful method to order and to make sense of interactions (Clausen & Koch, 2002). Space 
in the sense of social interactions is not a continual phenomenon, however. Besides 
space, social processes occur during occasions, i.e. episodes of negotiations and 
interactions. Therefore, the activities and modes of social learning in innovation 
processes vary depending on space and occasion. Different locations hold different 
opportunities for learning at different times as the following examples exemplify. 
Production functions of economists missed to explain sufficiently how workers’ 
acquisition of knowledge about machinery, materials and work process increased 
productivity. Arrow (1962) highlighted that although the accumulation of experience did 
not go unnoticed among economists, the observation was not adequately taken into 
account by neo-classical economic models. He introduced the notion of learning-by-
doing to highlight learning as an important concept and to explain the observed changes 
over time. This concept acknowledges workshops and work processes as the spaces and 
occasions for learning. While Arrow (1962) explored learning in production, Rosenberg 
(1982) extended the scope and reflected on learning that occurred subsequently when a 
product was used. His learning-by-using concept exemplifies that the characteristics of a 
technology or product have to be revealed after a prolonged period of use. Another 
learning process was elaborated by Andersen and Lundvall (1988) who examined the 
space between producers and users. Their learning-by-interaction concept points out 
how producers and users enhance their capabilities by institutionalising linkages to 
enable the exchange of information and experience. Learning is not restricted to 
producers or users. Regulatory bodies also have power to intervene in the innovation 
process through the introduction of regulations. Learning-by-regulating is a form of 
learning that aims for long-term developments by encouraging those qualities of 




Learning implies not only the acquisition of knowledge but also the transformation of 
existing knowledge. Social learning is also a response to criticism of the diffusion model 
which regards knowledge, and also technology, as a static entity that can be relatively 
easily transferred from one locale to another. On this note, social learning stresses that 
innovation is an inherently creative process which unfolds as knowledge and technology 
are created and reflected upon through multiple occasions of learning at different space 
(Sørensen, 1996). 
2.3.1.1 Making sense of technology: appropriation and domestication 
Expanding on the studies of science and technology, studies of media and 
communications explored the consumption of technologies in the domestic sphere and 
highlighted that technologies had a material as well as symbolic meaning (Silverstone & 
Hirsch, 1992; Silverstone, 2006). It did not only matter that a technology was acquired 
but details of its exact location within the household and its use and meaning remained 
subject of negotiation among family members, a domain that remains largely governed 
by gender stereotypes (Silverstone et al., 1992).  
In design-centred approaches users were ascribed a passive role. By designing the 
functionalities of a computer and thus limiting the actions of users, the technology and 
its designers attempted to ‘configure’ the user (Woolgar, 1991a). As even historical 
studies of technology have shown, users tend to reject their ascribed roles and are long 
accepted as important contributors to both the invention and innovation process (von 
Hippel, 1976; Noble, 1984; Fleck, 1988). To leverage the occasion of use of technology 
conceptually, an appropriation perspective is proposed. The appropriation of technology 
is an active process where technology is being integrated or embedded into a local 
culture (Silverstone & Hirsch, 1992). Appropriation is an important process to make a 
technology work. However, appropriation has been a widely adopted term which 
gained varying meanings. Therefore, the model of domestication has been pointed out 
for it is a more narrowly and well-defined approach applicable for the study of 
technology (Williams et al., 2005).  
Traditionally, domestication refers to the taming of a wild animal. Similarly, a 
technology can be domesticated, like a pet, to become part of a family (Berker et al., 
2006). The domestication results in turning a wild technology into a useful, reliable and 
trustworthy tool like the telephone, radio and TV. However, the process is not a one-
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sided but a dual process where the user and her social practices also are appropriated. 
Taking into account the complex and interactive relation between users and technology, 
the domestication model provides for a better account of explaining so-called ‘impacts’ 
of technology, an endeavour that conventional technology assessment attempted but 
failed for the lack of a nuanced view of technology as the following: 
“Domestication research suggests that only when the novelty of new 
technologies has worn off; when they are taken for granted by users in 
their everyday-life context that the real potential for change is visible” 
(Berker et al., 2006, p. 15) 
To summarise, the social learning perspective holds three promises (Sørensen, 1996). 
First, emphasising the role of use and consumption of technology, it draws attention to 
the need to expand analytical tools to understand better how technology becomes 
integrated and part of our culture and everyday lives. Meaning of technological artefacts 
emerges through negotiations between actors who engage in different learning 
processes. It is only in use and in the process of embedment in a specific social setting 
that an object is given an identity and meaning as has been remarked in cultural studies 
of commoditisation of things as well as human beings – the latter better known under 
the term slavery (Kopytoff, 1986). As negotiations between actors progress, the meaning 
of a technology can change over time. In other words, technologies have biographies that 
span more than just the development and implementation. Second, by drawing attention 
to different episodes in the biography of technology, social learning sensitises us that 
temporality is an important aspect. Relationships between technology and various actors 
unfold over time. Consequences emerge only after a period of use and experience 
gathering. This process can neither be predicted nor sped up. Third, the enhanced 
understanding of nuances in technology development and use allows for policy-makers 
to devise better strategies for regulations. 
2.3.2 Mapping dynamics in the social learning framework 
Above we have discussed that the design-centric analytical focus of earlier theories on 
technology were found to neglect cultural aspects in the innofusion process. Increased 
attention on matters of use and consumption of technology subsequently elicited a 
heightened sensitivity towards dynamics driving the innovation process. From the social 
learning perspective it emerges that three facets in the theorisation of technology require 
more sophisticated articulation of analytical concepts.  
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First, actors have predominantly been conceptualised as polarised and homogeneous 
groups. Especially users and corresponding episodes of use and consumption have been 
identified as under-conceptualised. Previous conceptions of users as static and passive 
elements are more and more giving way to the appreciation of users as active 
participants in the mapping of the innovation journeys of technologies. Second, the turn 
of attention to more differentiating notions of users also implied an increase in attention 
to the specifics of locales. Users usually do not share the same physical space as those 
designing technologies. Also, users of the same technology can be located in diverse 
locales. Characteristics of localities account strongly for differences in use and 
consumption and, thus, require more detailed inquiry. Third, change over time has been 
flagged as another under-conceptualised issue. The meaning of a technology is 
dependent to specifics of a particular time and space. As time moves on, social 
interactions and relationships between actors change and so does the meaning of the 
technology. The issue of time therefore has to be reconceptualised to acknowledge 
flexibility in the meaning and identity of technologies. In other words, the notion of 
biography of technology needs further exploration. 
Issues of use, space and time are by far not novel in technology studies. However, the 
social learning perspective demands to analyse these facets in unity. Changes in use and 
consumption occur over time as experience is gained and the meaning of a technology 
unfolds. A technology also witnesses shifts in space as it moves to other users and 
locales as its transformation continuous. Thus, the social learning framework is relevant 
for analysts of technology for it is concerned with how and why different actors engage 
in collaborative activities and how these engagements play out over time and space 
(Williams et al., 2005). The next sections will explore social learning concepts that have 
been elaborated in scope of studying technological dynamics and which address the 
three relatively under-theorised facets addressed above.  
2.3.2.1 Intermediaries and socio-technical constellations 
Adopting the social learning perspective reveals that a simple dichotomy of producers 
and user does not explain the variety of actors involved in technological change 
processes. In between producers and users there is a large space occupied by other kinds 
of actors. Intermediate actors, who have been missed out in the bulk of previous research 
studies and who have gained due attention only in recent years, have emerged as 
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important players in the innovation process (Howells, 2006). An intermediate actor can 
be a single individual, a group, an organisational department or an institution. 
Intermediaries identify, filter and provide relevant knowledge. They fulfil a gap-filling 
and bridge-building function between producers and users by developing networks and 
facilitating contacts (Howells, 2006). Besides identifying and providing existing 
knowledge and artefacts, intermediaries have also a transformative capability. They 
configure and transform existing relationships and visions of technology (Howells, 2006; 
Stewart & Hyysalo, 2008). For instance, intermediaries play an important role in 
conducting social experiments such as pilot studies or commercial trials (Jaeger et al,. 
2000; Williams et al., 2005). Located in-between producers and users intermediaries are 
dependent on functioning relationships between the two. In this position they are 
concerned to frequently evaluate their situation and to creatively adapt their strategies to 
the changing circumstances of their operational domain. For this quality they are 
particularly characterised as ‘reflexive actors’ to acknowledge their special interests and 
role in the innovation process (Williams et al., 2005). 
In the past the ecology of intermediaries has been growing and it has become more 
complex (Howell, 2006). The increasing participation and significance of a multitude of 
players in maintaining the innovation process challenges the applicability and validity of 
prevailing theories of technology. Social learning is a necessary recalibration of analytical 
sensitivities in the social shaping perspective to acknowledge stronger uneven 
trajectories and a relative degree of unplannability of technological developments 
(Williams et al., 2005). The element of discontinuity and uncertainty in the planning 
process is also due to the range of interests represented by various intermediaries. Not 
every actor and intermediary has interest in the success of a project. As exemplified in 
the development of the British military aircraft TSR2, the Royal Navy was opposed to 
the project promoted by the Royal Air Force and therefore tried to intervene (Law & 
Callon, 1988). Thus, the notion of socio-technical constellations is put forward to convey 
the idea that there also are gulfs between actors and intermediaries who remain “rather 
peripheral, distant and loosely connected” (Williams et al., 2005, p. 81). The idea of socio-
technical constellations is closely related to matters of space and thus leads us to that 
second facet in the next subsection. 
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2.3.2.2 Space and the topography of social learning 
Space in its physical meaning is a geographical location or area that exists naturally. In 
contrast, social space has been defined as cognitive concept which comes into being 
through occasions of social interactions (Clausen & Koch, 2002). According to this 
definition there is no such thing as empty social space. However, actors have interests, 
visions and expectations. They are constantly on the lookout for opportunities to make 
profits, as rational economic theory wants us to believe on one hand. The social learning 
perspective, on the other hand, acknowledges the social surroundings of actors which 
largely predetermines their capabilities as well as limitations. The notion of ‘translation 
terrain’ develops this idea of social space further and conceptualises a space that 
describes existing linkages between actors and potentials linkages to proximate actors 
(Williams et al., 2005, p. 84): 
“Social learning is shaped by its local context. Learning processes and 
outcomes differed between players according to their particular situation. 
In analysing the different patterns that emerged, our studies highlighted 
the importance of the specific ‘translation terrain’ – the immediate array 
of players with their historical and contingent concerns and capabilities, 
each trying to map out their strategy in interaction with other players 
and in the light of their broader social, economic and cultural setting.” 
(Williams et al., 2005, p. 84) 
A translation terrain is the spatial illustration of a specific socio-technical constellation. It 
depicts the immediate array of users interacting, either collaboratively or competitively, 
in scope of a particular technological development. However, it also includes actors 
interested in but peripheral to the development at hand. Actor-network theory, for 
example, describes a successful technological project as the construction of a strong 
global network of actors sharing the same interests. Local opportunities or conflicts are 
paid attention to only when the stability of the network is under threat. In contrast, the 
translation terrain emphasises that players are constantly exposed to actions by 
proximate players and thereof resulting changes to social settings. Participants in a 
technological development and players in general regularly map their translation terrain 
and strategise accordingly. Changes in the socio-technical constellation of the translation 
terrain enable opportunities or threats to arise which affect the decision-making process 
and thus influence the shaping of a technology.  
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A related concept that complements the spatial articulation of technological change is 
that of the ‘development arena’ (Jørgensen & Sørensen, 1999). It is defined as: 
“A cognitive space that holds together the settings and relations that 
comprise the context for product or process development” (Jørgensen & 
Sørensen, 1999, p. 410) 
This definition is fairly broad as it aims to include a number of actors, locales and 
processes involved in product development. For the purpose of this discussion, we are 
narrowing down the definition to elaborate the notion of ‘arena’. It stems from Arabic 
and marks sand grounds which are constantly in motion and thus never settled. In 
political science the term arena depicts “spaces and locations where negotiations, 
conflicts and ideas are exchanged and developed” (Jørgensen & Sørensen, 1999, p. 412). 
Arenas are the grounds where players meet for collaborations and for contestations. 
Events and activities that happen inside arenas have consequences outside. The 
development of a technological product thus entails multiple occasions in which players 
enter arenas to engage with other players collaboratively and competitively.  
The concepts of translation terrain and associated arenas, both established and latent 
ones, contribute to what can be classified as the topography of social learning processes. 
The translation terrain maps the topography of a technological development and serves 
as a tool for players to strategise which arenas to seek and which to avoid if possible in 
order to advance their cause. A topographical view of social learning processes is 
intimately associated with issues of time as will be explored in the following subsection. 
2.3.2.3 Time and its representation 
Change is a transition from one state to another within a set period. However, 
“history is not just an event in the past but is alive in the present and may 
shape the future” (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 270). 
Time is the frame of reference that defines what change we take note of and how we 
explain the change observed (Pettigrew, 1990). The properties of the frame of reference 
therefore are in a direct relation to the explanatory capacity of a study. Common studies 
of technologies, including snapshot and implementation studies, are unreflective about 
their inherent analytical timeframes. As a result, they often are retrospective, benefitting 
from hindsight, biased from a managerial view and of short duration and therefore 
ignorant of the extended lifespan of a technological artefact (Pollock & Williams, 2009, p. 
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85). Even after implementation, users have yet to learn about and explore the properties 
and consequences of a technology and the new practices it enables which unfold only 
over extended periods of time (Silverstone & Hirsch, 1992). As it unfolds, a technology is 
exposed to changes in itself and in its social setting which both transform its meaning 
and identity. These transformations give rise to “the unfolding of multiple histories” and 
“the different historical timeframes around which an object, event or activity may need 
to be analysed" (Pollock & Williams, 2009, p. 106). Social learning’s call for a nuanced 
view leads us to a differentiation of multiple timescales and multiple levels of generality 
that come with them. We will briefly discuss two representations of time: a hierarchical 
and a multi-dimensional view. 
The first representation of time is inherent in the multi-level perspective (MLP). This 
perspective examines how a number of players interact over an extended period of time 
and a wider scope of space (Geels, 2002, Ravena et al., 2012). Three hierarchical levels 
with varying timescales are distinguished: technological niches, sociotechnical regimes 
and landscape developments (Geels, 2002). Individual technologies emerge frequently 
and explicitly in ‘technological niches’ over short periods of time. These have an 
influence on and are being influenced by ‘sociotechnical regimes’ of wider social 
structures and institutions where change dynamics advance only slowly but are 
relatively traceable. Developments in the ‘landscape’ are characterised by inertia and 
barely accountable to single events as these developments are accumulations of events 
occurring over multiple years and decades, for example, “oil prices, economic growth, 
wars, emigration, broad political coalitions, cultural and normative values, 
environmental problems” (Geels, 2002, p. 1260). 
The ground for such multi-layered and hierarchical analysis of time has been prepared 
by subscribers to the Annales School. In particular, French historian Fernand Braudel 
strongly influenced the Annales School’s agenda with his examination of the structure of 
the ‘longue durée’ and the three-tiered conception of historical time (Hunt, 1986): 
structure (the long-term) at the base, then conjoncture (medium-length 
units of ten, twenty, or even fifty years), and finally, événement (the event 
or short-term) (italics in original, Hunt, 1986, p. 211). 
A major weakness and reason for the decline of the Annales paradigm was its 
methodological lack of focus, in particular on that of agency of individuals, among the 
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vast explanations of ecological, biological, structural, political and economic 
developments. MLP resembles the Annales School methodologically but is smaller in 
scale and targeted to study technological change. Nevertheless, proponents of MLP have 
been prompted to address similar criticism for its strong emphasis of structure over 
agency (Geels, 2011). 
 
Figure 2 "Hutchins cube", a representation of how multiple developments and 
speeds of change (the arrows) are present within a "moment of human practice" 
(the cube) (Hutchins, 1995, p. 372, as cited by Hyysalo, 2010, p. 51) 
A second and different conceptualisation of time is highlighted by studies adopting the 
social learning perspective. Hyysalo (2004, 2010) elaborated a more complex 
understanding of temporal issues by drawing on Hutchins’ (1995) study of distributed 
actions and cognitive learning during the navigation of a military vessel (Hyysalo, 2004, 
p. 12):  
"any moment in human conduct is simultaneously a part of the unfolding 
of a task, the development of the individual doing it, the development of 
the work community, and the development of the professional practice.” 
(Hyysalo, 2004, p. 12) 
In his illustration of a culturally constituted activity Hutchins (1995, see Figure 2) 
demonstrates how three timescales, each represented by its own dimensions, are at play 
in any moment in human practice where different things “are all happening at the same 
time in the same activity” (Hutchins, 1995, p. 372). This is in stark contrast to MLP and 
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the Annales School, where time (and space) is split into different layers and different 
contexts. 
It is not intended to highlight one representation as more applicable than the other. 
Rather, these representations were introduced to serve as a reminder that time is relative 
also in regards of the social analysis of a technological development. Choices of how 
time is represented thus have a strong influence on the analytical approach of a study. 
Exploring different representations of time and interrelated methodological implications, 
Czarniawska (2004b) distinguishes chronological and kairotic time which are based on 
Greek mythology and language, respectively: 
“Whereas Chronos measures time in mechanical intervals, Kairos jumps 
and slows down, omits long periods and dwells on others.” 
(Czarniawska, 2004b, p. 775) 
A hierarchical and multi-layered representation of time, in the tradition of the Annales 
School, follows chronological sequences where cause and effect appear to be 
comprehensible and traceable. Thus, it is common among historical and structural 
studies that take long-term perspectives which benefit from hindsight. Another feature 
of chronological analyses is that space is broadly taken into account as developments 
unfolded at different locales in different orders (sometimes simultaneously). A kairotic 
representation of time is a common characteristic of studies of recent or ongoing 
developments where events and agencies are yet unfolding and where the significance 
of individual episodes is yet unclear. Since such studies often are short-term oriented, 
the representation of space is limited to one or a few locales where actions are currently 
taking place. In short, time and space are intrinsically entangled. Choice about one 
dimension inevitably affects choices about the other. Historians are most familiar with 
how choices about the representation of time influence the interpretation of past events 
and, thus, the outcome of an historical analysis (Gaddis, 2002, p. 22):  
“Historians have the capacity for selectivity, simultaneity and shifting of 
scale: they can select from the cacophony of events what they think is 
really important; they can be in several times and places at once; and they 
can zoom in and out between macroscopic and microscopic levels of 
analysis” (Gaddis, 2002, p. 22) 
This review of matters of time revealed that the temporal dimension is a crucial factor, 
especially in the development and implementation of technology which can span 
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multiple locales and long periods of time. Time is a sensitive analytical subject and its 
(often implicit) representation determines the explanatory and analytical capacity of a 
research study. Following the call for a more nuanced understanding of technological 
change, it is necessary to take into account more complex conceptualisations of time, 
history and time scales. To conclude, the strategy of designing a research study and its 
representation of temporal as well as spatial dimensions predetermines to large extent 
the potentiality to generalise from the findings of that study. A discussion on analysing 
technological change and the lifecycle of individual artefacts inevitably leads to an 
examination of matters of time, space and research methodologies in general. For this 
reason, the next section will address methodological concerns and introduce the 
biography of artefact approach. 
2.3.3 Designing research to reflect complexity of technological dynamics 
Above it has been discussed how technological dynamics can be analysed from a social 
learning perspective. However, deploying such nuanced concepts and theories also 
requires an appropriate organisation of a research undertaking. The design of a research 
study predetermines the range of possible outcomes. Since existent research approaches 
yielded unsatisfactory analytical results, the design of a research study also becomes a 
concern for the analyst of technology. 
Historians have contributed vastly to both empirical and theoretical developments in 
technology studies. Especially Hughes’ (1993, 1987) historical studies on the evolution of 
electrical power systems advanced the understanding about large technological systems 
and provided fruitful grounds on which further theories of technology were developed, 
e.g. the social construction of technology (Bijker et al., 1987). However, since Hughes 
conducted his studies about a century after the deployment of the first commercial 
power distribution plant, it is obvious that many findings benefitted from hindsight. To 
confirm the ‘success’ of that technology, for example, it does not need any archival work. 
While historians typically are concerned with events and people that are long past, other 
scholars are more interested in recent history and ongoing developments. Sociologists 
are concerned with events whose witnesses are yet accessible to give accounts of their 
individual experiences. Among the best ways to study recent history is, arguably, that of 
historical sociology. In his study of the guidance systems of nuclear ballistic missiles 
MacKenzie (1990) explains how an ethnographic approach, drawing on interviews and 
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observations, allowed him to learn about the social shaping of these systems. An 
archival-only approach as applied by historians would not have yielded such deep 
insights into the intricacies and controversies surrounding the social shaping of guidance 
systems. Of course, relying on statements of individuals runs the risk to learn about facts 
that are questionable in nature, be it due to deliberately or unintentionally false 
statements. However, methods of triangulation against other interviews and 
documentary materials allow mitigating such risks to large extent (MacKenzie, 1990). 
A historical, ethnographic approach addresses important epistemological concerns of 
how to learn about the social shaping of a technological development. Another issue is of 
ontological nature and poses questions like what aspects of a technological development 
are to be analysed. There are different ways to frame a research design. Typical research 
designs, such as snapshot and implementation studies, define the scope and scale of an 
analysis and thus predetermine the range and quality of possible findings to be made 
and conclusions to be drawn (Pollock & Williams, 2009). The following subsection will 
examine such methodological pitfalls before introducing the biography of artefact 
perspective which tries to avoid those shortcomings. 
2.3.3.1 Limitations of episodic studies of technology 
Technologies can take years before any major benefits or consequences materialise. By 
default, snapshot studies, which focus on few particular moments in time such as before 
and after the implementation in the organisational setting, ignore the longevity of 
technological dynamics. Similarly, studies of the introduction of new technologies in 
organisational settings, labelled implementation studies, are restricted in scope and 
focus on single sites and limited episodes of the lifecycle of a technology (Pollock & 
Williams, 2009). Such studies frequently produce, often managerial-biased, accounts 
referring to ‘success factors’, ‘impacts’ or ‘best practices’ (Botta-Genoulaz et al., 2005). 
Although users and other actors are acknowledged as important ‘human factors’ these 
engineering-focussed studies fail to elaborate on them.  
This spread of snapshot and implementation studies compared to longitudinal studies 
stems largely from biases inherent in research designs and restrictions to accessibility. 
Besides being typically retrospective and unreflective of contextual social struggles, 
disciplinary traditions frame limitations in terms of methodological and analytical 
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qualities (Pollock & Williams, 2010). Different academic disciplines and schools within 
those even tend to give preferences to some mode of research over others which are  
“constrained within particular loci, timeframes, disciplinary perspectives 
and concerns” (Pollock & Williams, 2009, p. 81) 
Especially in regards of design-oriented studies, this has been flagged as a ‘narrative 
bias’ which are inclined to produce particular kinds of stories about technology (Stewart 
& Williams, 2005). The other reason for narrowly defined technological studies is the fact 
that the opportunities for researchers to access sites of development and implementation 
are limited. This is evident in the case of enterprise resource planning systems. The 
lifecycles of such systems span much longer timeframes than are reasonable, for 
example, for implementation studies that cover a few months or up to a year or two 
(Pollock & Williams, 2009). Maintaining access over longer periods of time depends on 
factors beyond the control of researchers and requires political currency which 
researchers often lack. Studies with opportunities of extensive exposure to organisational 
environments depend on coincidence and the goodwill of managers involved. Therefore, 
many studies with in-depth or comprehensive insights into some or all episodes of the 
design, development and implementation of a technology often are produced by 
researchers who previously have been associated with the organistion. For example, 
Suchman (1987) and Gerst (2006) as well as this study are made possible only because 
the researchers have been employees of the organisations concerned and, thus, were able 
to draw on privileged access not available to other researchers. 
2.3.3.2 Biography of Artefacts and Practices 
The ‘Biography of Artefacts and Practices’ approach attempts to combine methods of 
historical sociology with characteristics of longitudinal studies, i.e. studies of the same 
objects over a longer period of time. To large extent parts of the perspective emerged 
from a consistent research interest into studies of organisational technologies which have 
been conducted scattered over several decades (Brady et al., 1992; Clausen & Williams, 
1997ab, Pollock et al., 2003; Pollock & Williams, 2009). Another branch of the 
biographical perspective was developed in course of a systematic research programme 
dedicated to examining the technological evolution of a particular set of health 
technologies (Hyysalo, 2004; Hyysalo, 2010). The perspective’s development is partly 
motivated by frustrations caused by theoretical and methodological limitations such as 
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those discussed above and which were observed among a number of studies of related 
subjects on information and communication technologies including enterprise resource 
planning systems and its predecessors. 
Proponents of the biographical approach aim to learn from these methodological 
shortcomings and propose a perspective that accounts for the intricacies of technological 
change in respect of time and space. It is a research perspective that follows technologies 
“as they evolve and mature, progress along their lifecycle, and move 
across sectoral and organisational boundaries” (Pollock & Williams, 2009, 
p. 80) 
With that focus it is an intellectual companion of the social shaping and social learning 
tradition. While these approaches cover theoretical and epistemological grounds, 
Biography of Artefact and Practices acknowledges methodological concerns that have 
been raised by these theories. It addresses the problematic issues flagged up in the 
previous section on mapping the nuances of technological dynamics and attending more 
critical to matters of actors, space and time (see section 2.3.2.). In short, the biography of 
artefact calls for research designs that take into account: 
 Multiple timescales, 
 multiple sites,  
 multiple methods, and 
 multiple practices (Hyysalo, 2004, 2010; Williams & Pollock, 2009; 2010) 
The roles of different timescales and spaces have been elaborated in detail by the 
discussions on social shaping of technology and the social learning perspective. 
Innovation is a discontinuous process patterned by uncertainties, scattered over spatio-
temporal dimensions and contingent to influences from related developments. To grasp 
the innovation process of a single technology, a study has to examine events and 
developments driven by multiple actors at various sites and at different timescales. 
Besides calling for more nuanced conceptions of space and time, the biographical 
approach highlights that important choices are to be made in terms of methods and 
concepts applied and the relationship of the case studied with existing knowledge 
(Pollock & Williams, 2009). The deployment of multiple methods is proposed to do 
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justice to the demanding requirements of a comprehensive study of the biography of a 
technology. Appropriate methods include  
“historical studies, ethnographic research, qualitative studies of local and 
broader development and the use of larger-scale research instruments 
and quantitative data” (Pollock & Williams, 2009, p. 110)  
Drawing on a diverse range of methods enables to capture data of different scales and 
granularity to enrich the understanding of the many practices involved in any 
technological development, deployment and use (Hyysalo, 2010). A single study can 
hardly grasp the complexity of a technology project for a number of reasons. This thesis, 
for example, only barely scratches the surface of some aspects of the biography of the 
technology concerned due to limitations of time and resources. For this reason, along the 
notion of ‘multi-sited ethnography’ (Marcus, 1995), the idea of a ‘strategic ethnography’ 
has been sketched to indicate that a biography itself is a long-term project that ideally be 
attended to by a team of researchers instead of single individuals (Pollock & Williams, 
2010). 
This chapter has outlined the path we have taken to develop our line of thought. We 
discussed the origins of technological studies and traced the theoretical development of 
relevant theories on innovation and technological change to the articulation of more 
nuanced conceptualisations of theories of technology. Thorough theorisation of the latter 
issue has been a recent undertaking and, thus, leaves room for more detailed 
discussions. Therefore, we cut the general literature short to continue with a more 
targeted engagement with literature in the next chapter. The next chapter also introduces 
and explains the rationale for the conceptual framework that we have developed to 




3 Conceptual framework of the Ecological Shaping of 
Technology 
The previous chapter ended with the concern that existing theories of technological 
change lack methodological and epistemological capacity to adequately take into 
account issues of time and space. This chapter continues seamlessly with the discussion 
of theories of technology but will focus in more detail on the concerns raised. To do so, 
we will continue with a more targeted review of literature which leads to the discussion 
of a conceptual framework that we developed to address identified theoretical 
limitations. 
The foundation of theories of technological change, actor-network theory and social 
construction of technology in particular, are based on the assumption that attribution of 
any special status of historical occurrences is to be avoided. Proponents of the actor-
network theory (ANT) framework especially suggest focussing exclusively on the 
manipulations and transformations of interests of individuals (Callon & Law, 1982). 
Their preferred subjects of inquiry are powerful and privileged individuals, i.e. scientists 
and engineers, whose presence in the spotlight of social inquiry is taken for granted. The 
social inquiry focuses on the activities of these actors who engage in translation and 
alliance building processes constructing intrinsic networks comprising human and non-
human actors. In this perspective, context and social structures do not exist as entities 
outside the network but are represented by allies tightly interwoven in the actor-
network (Latour, 1987; Callon & Law, 1982). What about history, one is prompted to ask. 
Callon and Law (1982) address that question and express their view that tracing social 
structures, context and history is not of special relevance anyway:  
“Though it may be that for any particular study this process can only be 
traced so far before a ‘backcloth’ of prior interests has to be taken for 
granted, our aim would be to avoid attributing any special status to that 
backcloth”. (Callon & Law, 1982, p. 622) 
In short, the intellectual origin of early ANT downplays a broader historical analysis. 
Despite attempts to reformulate early conceptualisations by various authors (e.g. Latour, 
2005) this legacy remains strong at the core of the approach and is, therefore, subject for 
criticism. ANT proponents continue to advance the imperative to ‘follow the actor’ to 
trace relevant contextual information in the form of associations to other actors in 
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proximity. But which actor do you follow, is the next question. Because ANT emerged 
from laboratory studies, the scientist is regarded as a key figure in actor-network 
theoretical accounts of technological development (Latour, 1987). Actor-network 
theoretical accounts of engineering-related projects put their emphasis on engineers, 
who take the role of the heroic actor building networks of heterogeneous elements (Law, 
1987). Other authors criticise the framework for its atomistic and actor-centric focus 
which overstates the potentials of individual actors (Sørensen & Levold, 1992) and its 
inevitably militaristic tone (Fujimura, 1995). Sørensen and Levold (1992) also raise the 
insufficiently addressed issue of context and history and note that:  
“The problem is that the terrain on which engineers and technological 
scientists move has been thoroughly shaped by previous actions” (p.32) 
Merely observing engineers or scientists will not provide the insights necessary to 
understand historical processes as they occur beyond the reach of what can be observed 
locally and temporarily. Instead, they call for a biographical approach by arguing that a 
“heterogeneous mix of historical, ethnographic, economic, and sociological competence 
seems required” (Sørensen & Levold, 1992, p.32). Obviously, some theories of 
technology are methodologically restricted to take into account details of history and 
context, either by design as in the case of Actor-Network Theory, or by decision as in the 
case of Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) where the theorists lean on 
foundational ideas of ANT (see Pinch & Bijker, 1986). Therefore, these methods are of 
limited capacity in addressing certain social inquiries. They are valuable tools for the 
inquiry about issues of how technological development occurs and proceeds. But issues 
of context and history, or more generally time and space, which are crucial aspects to 
address “why” questions, are inappropriately and unsatisfactorily accounted for. 
These fundamental assumptions on the role of history and context marked an essential 
building block for numerous studies and a vast literature that produced a language and 
methodology to study the making of scientific facts and technological artefacts. 
However, as argued in this study, the methodological pitfalls that ensue upon adopting 
such actor-centric perspectives are severe. They, arguably, particularly misrepresent 
long-term dynamics. Previously it was argued that broader history and context were 
sacrificed to proclaim a new sociology which breaks down the human/nonhuman 
divide. Further, the “warlike” (Star, 1991, p. 82) and militaristic (Fujimura, 1995) 
67 
 
character of the Latour-Callon-Law metaphor of network building, as illustrated in 
Latour’s (1988) modern re-interpretation of Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’, introduced 
substantial methodological bias overstating the potential of individual actors (Sørensen 
& Levold, 1999). Feminist and other writers criticise ANT for being a managerial theory 
that systematically downplays voices from the margins of stabilised networks (Star, 
1991; Gad & Jensen, 2010). A possible way to ameliorate these problematic issues with 
ANT is to downgrade its self-proclaimed new sociological order and to see it rather in 
the manner of a “postplural attitude” or “nonhumanist disposition”, which admits that 
“it just might be a mistake to follow the actor in some cases” (Gad & Jensen, 2010, p. 73-
74). However, in light of our case study, historical events played an important role in 
patterning conditions of the social shaping of technology. Hence, the methodological 
biases of actor-centric theories constitute a profound limitation to respond to 
fundamental questions about origination processes of technological artefacts. These 
processes, however, are a primary concern in this work. On a one-dimensional axis that 
measures historical and contextual sensitivity, actor-centric theories would be found on 
one end. The intention of this thesis is to explore frameworks and theories that could be 
found on the other end of the axis where context and history are granted substantial 
explanatory relevance. This exploration begins with a discussion of different metaphors 
and their applicability for our endeavour. The discussion will critically examine the 
metaphors of networks and the closely related systems metaphor and suggest that the 
ecology metaphor is more applicable to appreciate the multiplicity and diversity of 
actors, locales and timescales in the development and diffusion of the artefact. 
3.1 An ecological perspective 
The following discussion aims to sensitise the reader to the differences between different 
metaphors that may be applicable for the study of technological change. The metaphors 
of network and system are most common and contributed significantly to the 
development of theories in science and technology studies but at the cost of limiting 
social inquiries in terms of time and space. To avoid the methodological downsides of 
network and system metaphors, this study applies an ecological metaphor as a guiding 
perspective to appreciate flexibility and shifts in relationships between different actors 
involved at different times in the case studied. The discussion below will introduce the 
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ecology metaphor and highlight its potential contribution to the biographical study of 
technological change.  
The ecological perspective has its roots in studies of natural ecosystems. It gained 
momentum in the 1960s and early 1970s and marked a departure from systems thinking 
which characterised ecosystems with features identified in closely coupled biological 
systems in terms of being closed, regulated and stable (Scoones, 1999; Folke, 2006). 
Systems-thinking was inherited from physics which lent much of its methods to the 
analysis of theoretical and empirical ecology. Traditional analyses in the systems 
thinking tradition focussed on the measurement of quantitative features, for example, 
differences in quantitative characteristics of ecosystems and the exact details of these 
differences (Holling, 1973). The emergence of the ecological perspective is rooted in the 
criticism that systems-thinking, an analytical approach that worked well in one area, was 
only of limited use in another area such as the study of natural ecosystems (Holling, 
1973).  
A similar critique has been raised for the transfer of concepts from studies of scientists at 
work in laboratories, from where actor-network theory emerged, or generally from 
sociology of science to technology studies:  
“I shall argue that to transfer the concepts of a sociology of science to 
technology is to ignore basic differences between the two, as activities 
and as products.” (Russell, 1986, p. 331) 
Critics argue that the work of scientists is aimed at the production and distribution of 
scientific knowledge whereas engineers are concerned with the development and 
implementation of technological artefacts and systems. For instance, a major difference 
between the two areas is that their primary products - respectively knowledge and 
artefacts - vary in mobility and universality of their character. While scientific 
knowledge is arguably universal in its application and easily distributed to other places, 
for example as published texts in journal articles, technological artefacts can be rather 
cumbersome logistically and pedantic in terms of local requirements at each 
implementation site (Sørensen & Levold, 1999).  
Returning to the ecological metaphor, problematic issues about the systems approach 
were identified regarding the introduction of notions of a single equilibrium state and 
global stability (Holling, 1973; Scoones, 1999; Folke, 2006). Failings in accounting 
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adequately for issues of external change dynamics, temporal and spatial heterogeneity 
and elements of surprise gave rise to the ecological perspective. The ecological 
perspective developed from concepts that acknowledged aspects of ecosystems which 
went unnoticed in the systems perspective. For example, the latter perspective did not 
appreciate the ability of ecosystems to persist despite severe fluctuations of external 
influences by changing to different states of stability. The notion of ‘resilience’ was 
introduced as alternative to the notion of ‘stability’ as a property to explain behaviour of 
ecological systems (Holling, 1973; Folke, 2006). The two properties are distinguished as 
follows: 
“Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system 
and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state 
variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist. [...] 
Stability, on the other hand, is the ability of a system to return to an 
equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance.” (Holling, 1973, p. 17) 
The notion of resilience puts spatial and temporal considerations into perspective by 
highlighting that the evolutionary history of an ecological system has important 
explanatory power to explain complex dynamics and interrelations. In this view, 
stability, or a state of near equilibrium, in an ecosystem is understood only as a 
temporary achievement in a specific locale. Unexpected changes in external conditions, 
for example a climatic change, can throw the ecosystem off balance. From a systems 
perspective, a shift in the balance of an ecosystem would be classified in terms of 
instability in the system. The resilience perspective, however, allows for a more nuanced 
interpretation for it is more appreciative of dynamics of temporally and spatially wider 
scales. It does not recognise any global stability from which the ecosystem can diverge. 
Rather, a shift in external conditions would be regarded as a shift in qualities of 
relationships which ultimately result in a move to a different state. In this instance, it 
would take into account how species in neighbouring locales less affected by the climatic 
change would react to changes in its surroundings as time moved on. One reaction 
observed in biological ecosystems was that climatic changes in one locale triggered 
immigration of other species from neighbouring locales (Holling, 1973). An ecosystem 
that is quickly affected by change would be characterised as instable but resilient if it 
persisted albeit in a different state of equilibrium regarding its constituting elements. 
Flexibility to change to another state of stability becomes a valid analytical property in 
the ecological perspective. Unexpected events and dynamics, as they naturally occur in 
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reality, are constituent elements of the concept. Actor-centric theories like ANT or SCOT, 
on the other hand, are based on narratives of global stability where a network or system 
rests in a single state of equilibrium. Success and failure are delimited by the ability of 
individual actors to accumulate allies and resources to gain power in order to maintain a 
state of equilibrium. Instabilities in these social constructions, important and anticipated 
dynamics in an ecological view, are regarded as cases of failure attributed to the central 
actors. Such simplified and deterministic explanations are favoured in domains where 
performances of projects are measured and individuals held accountable for outcomes. 
This perhaps helps explain why actor-centric theories have a tendency to reinforce a 
managerial view on technological change (Star, 1991). 
The ecological perspective is not new to the social sciences. Scholars in various 
disciplines have taken initiative to depart from traditional approaches (Scoones, 1999) 
including Science and Technology Studies (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Akera, 2007). 
However, social sciences remain strongly influenced by theories and methods which 
invoke limitations of network and system metaphors:  
“In the past, social science debates have often taken a static, equilibrial 
view of ecological systems, premised on assumptions about a balance of 
nature. This has led to a framing of issues that has tended to ignore 
questions of dynamics and variability across time and space, often 
excluding from the analysis the key themes of uncertainty, dynamics, and 
history. Such a selective view of ecological issues necessarily results in a 
partial and limited social analysis”. (Scoones, 1999, p. 480) 
The general critique that prompted the emergence of the ecological view in ecosystem 
studies applies equally to theories on innovation and technological change. Scoones’ 
quote above accurately delineates fundamental flaws in atomistic and actor-centric 
theories such as ANT and SCOT. For this reason, the ecological perspective is adopted as 
a guiding principle to interpret social dynamics and interrelations as part of a larger, 
interconnected ecology. However, any metaphor that is transferred from one domain to 
another bears the risk of introducing unanticipated conceptual or methodological 
problems due to the differences between the two domains. To minimise such risks, this 
study adopts the ecological perspective without applying mechanistically concepts that 
were developed in ecosystem studies, for example, the concept of resilience or ‘domain 
of attraction’ (Holling, 1973). Instead, this study will embrace the basic principles of the 
ecological metaphor as discussed above and, furthermore, it will draw on existing 
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theories and concepts in social sciences that offer valuable concepts in line with the 
metaphor.  
Like the empirical case studied in this thesis the process of ‘innofusion’, (i.e. the iterative 
combined learning cycle of innovation and diffusion [Fleck, 1988]), of any technology is 
complex in terms of its temporal and spatial qualities. The beginning of a technological 
project starts long before any technical artefact is put together. Historical and socio-
political dynamics pattern the starting conditions for any set of actors by enabling and 
delimiting a range of actions within a certain environment. Even when technology 
projects are under way, they are not exempt from both exogenous and endogenous 
changes to the fabrics of their supporting infrastructures. Although strategising and 
planning are important activities in the innofusion process, it is the innovator's capacity 
for dealing with an evolving and unpredictable landscape that shapes the technology 
along the way as the development unfolds. Thus, to gain a better understanding of how 
a technology emerges, the ecological metaphor elaborated above is proposed as the 
underlying foundation. To facilitate such an ecologically-aware social inquiry, a loose 
framework has been developed. For this purpose, four concepts have been selected that 
are in support of the ecological metaphor (see Table 2 on page 98 for an overview). In 
general, the framework attempts to particularise the unique spatial and temporal 
specifics of a technological project. The next section will highlight the spatial dimension 
and introduce the first two concepts to map the ‘ecological terrain’ of a technological 
project. 
3.2 Mapping the ecological terrain 
The first two concepts, linked ecologies and arenas of expectations, will propose an 
interpretative scheme to view actors as members of interlinked ecologies. These concepts 
help mapping an ecological topography, a ‘translation terrain’ of immediate actors with 
contingent histories and diverse agendas (Williams et al., 2005), that engage in 
promissory activities in arenas of expectations to compete with other alliances of 
ecologies over funding and other forms of attention. Drawing on the notion of a 
‘translation terrain’, an ‘ecological terrain’ outlines the immediate array of contiguous 
ecologies that share commonalities in their agendas and thus engage collaboratively with 
each other. Therefore, the first step in examining the ecologically-aware social shaping of 
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technology, or in other words, the ecological shaping of technology, entails the mapping 
of the ‘ecological terrain’.  
3.2.1 Linked ecologies 
In the beginning of this chapter it has been elaborated that for the study of technological 
change a perspective is recommended that acknowledges variability of spatial and 
temporal dimensions. An ecological perspective is put forward for its inherent 
appreciation of the evolutionary history of an organisational and institutional 
topography in which any technological project is embedded. A project’s topography, i.e. 
the historically shaped organisational structure that delimits an actor’s range of activities 
while at the same time providing resources and authority for actions in the first place, 
predetermines opportunities and qualities of relationships to other ecological entities. 
On one hand, the research project studied is surrounded by multiple other research 
projects or, more generally, groups of actors engaging with specified problem areas. On 
the other hand, the research project itself is an ecological entity in the surrounds of 
another project. Insufficiently accounting for this latter characteristic is what Abbott 
(2005) has identified a common limitation of ecological accounts in social sciences 
including his own previous work on the sociology of professions (Abbott, 1988). Typical 
accounts attribute parts of the social world ecological qualities but regard the rest, which 
is often outside of the analyst’s immediate attention, as fixed. To address this critique 
and to theorise the idea of social ecologies he proposed the concept of ‘linked ecologies’ 
(Abbott, 2005, p. 246): 
“Instead of envisioning a particular ecology as having a set of fixed 
surrounds, I reconceptualize the social world in terms of linked ecologies, 
each of which acts as a (flexible) surround for others. [...] The argument 
does not presuppose any ecology as ‘‘central’’ but rather makes a general 
claim about the structure of the social process.” (Abbott, 2005, p.246) 
His general claim about the flexible structure of the social world is a key principle in the 
linked ecologies concept. No ecology can be regarded central for it is only one out of 
many. Any centrality is therefore an ex post attribution by the analysing student who 
attempts to reduce the complexity of his observations.  
Abbott’s change of mind about the limitation in his earlier work on sociology of 
professions is based on the insight that success of an ecology is dependent on its 
interaction with other ecologies which themselves are neither simple nor unified entities. 
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Reflecting for example on the role of the state, often described in terms of a passive 
audience, he explains that the state “is itself an ecology, a complex interactional structure 
filled with competing subgroups and dominated by ecological forces quite similar to 
those driving the system of professions” (Abbott, 2005, p. 247). Constant fluctuations 
among multiple linked ecologies cause transformations in the topography of a larger 
ecology. This opens potentialities for new interactions but also forecloses opportunities 
for existing cooperation. Success, therefore, is to a large extent an external criterion that 
depends on contingent events and dynamics in contiguous ecologies. For a technological 
project to be successful, it has to bring together a combination of actors across multiple 
ecologies. Where a network-metaphor stresses the growth and strength of this 
combination, the ecological perspective highlights the changing texture of these 
relations. Alliances are not made because some spokesperson successfully translates the 
interests of others; alliances are made because partnering actors see a potential reward in 
their own struggle to compete against other alliances of actors. The historiography, in 
other words a biography, of a technological artefact thus requires paying attention to the 
history of alliances and linked ecologies. 
The analytical unit of an ecology is generally defined by three components: “actors, 
locations, and a relation associating the one with the other” (Abbott, 2005, p. 248). A 
location is a cognitive space constructed by social interactions. It is the result of actors 
constructing a relation to it - a process Abbott (2005) termed ‘ligation’ in order to 
distinguish it from the conceptually different meaning of the term ‘linkage’. In the linked 
ecology framework, therefore, location is a relational term as it refers to at least one 
group of actors attempting to gain control, i.e. jurisdiction, over an object of interest. The 
outcome of a ligation process can vary in degree depending on the success of actors of an 
ecology to convince the actors of another ecology holding authority over the location. In 
the best case, an ecology is granted exclusive jurisdiction over a location. In other cases it 
comes to a settlement where the location has to be shared with actors from other 
ecologies. For example, professions in the medical domain fight over locations, e.g. 
particular diseases such as alcoholism or the ‘Alzheimer disease’, to be granted exclusive 
jurisdiction for its treatment by state authorities (Abbott, 1988, 2005). 
In order to understand how professions and professional jurisdictions change over time, 
an explanation is required for how social entities, such as a profession, come into 
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existence in the first place. One way to make sense about this would be to assume that a 
social entity exists first and, consequently, delineates a boundary to its outside world. 
Another approach would be to examine how a boundary precedes the existence of a 
social entity. Abbott (1995) gives preference to the latter approach because he sees the 
former view of social reality to presume a rigid assumption about fixed entities. As a 
consequence, he argues, it struggles to explain change in those entities. Instead, Abbott 
(1995) draws attention to what he calls ‘sites of difference’. A difference can be any 
quality according to which things can be distinguished from each other. A site of 
difference is the social space in which a difference matters or is acted upon. If multiple 
sites of difference can be lined up in some systematic order, in a sense that it can be 
described as a dimension of difference due to recurring appearances, they become 
‘proto-boundaries’. Proto-boundaries indicate possible breaking points. A new social 
entity comes into existence as sites of difference are linked up with each other and, 
subsequently, detached from their currently hosting social entity. The case of social work 
shall provide an example to illustrate this process. The profession of social work 
emerged over a period of fifty years starting around 1870 (Abbott, 1995). Prior to that 
there were only ‘friendly visits’ of wealthy people to the poor, and activities of charities, 
welfare institutions, churches and other institutions providing social services. These 
activities demarcated sites of difference which slowly became proto-boundaries as 
similarities among these practices were noticed and articulated. Linking up these proto-
boundaries, a process Abbott (1995) describes as ‘yoking’, resulted in the creation of 
social work as a professional field. Yoking together proto-boundaries is noted as one 
way to create a new entity. New entities or change in existing constellations of entities 
can also be initiated by removing differences. 
To advance the terminology of how ecologies link up with each other, Abbott (2005) 
developed the concepts of hinge and avatar. A relationship between two linked ecologies 
develops when each ecology can benefit from the interaction with the other in some way. 
This condition of mutuality is termed a ‘hinge’. Hinges create opportunities for actors 
within ecologies to connect with other actors and locations across ecological boundaries. 
Although hinges represent dual rewards, a hinge can take different shapes depending on 
the ecology examined. While one ecology may be dependent on the services of another, 
the other ecology might be interested in the alliance only to use the former ecology as 
political currency. The other concept of avatars addresses situations where a formal 
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linkage is either no option or an option not sought after but where an ecology still wants 
to engage with another ecology. An avatar represents an image of a dispatching ecology 
within another receiving ecology. An example that Abbott (2005) provides to illustrate 
the use of avatars is the establishment and shaping of undergraduate degrees by 
professional bodies. In order to cater for a specialised and practical education of students 
in favour of a particular profession or identity, undergraduate degrees are created jointly 
between academic and professional bodies. Computer science is an example of an 
discipline that was created to meet for increasing demands from professionals. 
Undergraduate degrees, the avatars of professional bodies within the academic ecology 
in this case, were strongly shaped by the needs of professional organisations, the 
dispatching ecology. As time passes, however, shaping dynamics can erode the 
boundaries between an avatar and the ecology in which it is embedded. For instance, 
today computer science has been largely adopted by the academic ecology. It is no 
longer an undergraduate-only discipline but offers various postgraduate degrees and 
even PhD programmes.  
The linked ecologies concept offers a promising conceptual foundation for an ecological 
perspective on the social study of technology. It provides a specialised conceptualisation 
for interpreting processes in a social and interconnected world. However, it is necessary 
to emphasise the particular origin of this concept in light to the purpose of this study. 
Abbott (1998, 2005) conceptualised the notion of linked ecologies seeking to understand 
how professions develop and evolve. He takes an institutional perspective to analyse 
social interactions on a broader scale. This study, in contrast, seeks to theorise meso-level 
dynamics by examining local actions and behaviours on the micro-level. Thus, there is a 
latent discrepancy in terms of generalisation regarding the original conceptualisation of 
the concept and its application in scope of this study. While Abbott advances an 
institutional understanding of linked ecologies, where interactions between ecologies are 
grounded on hundreds and thousands of interactions by numerous actors over long 
periods of time, our purpose is to explore a functionalist interpretation by applying it to 
a single case study with lower numbers of interactions over limited periods of time. 
Thus, the application of this concept is promising in light of the dynamics witnessed in 
the case study, but the issues of different levels of generalisation are to be taken into 
account when drawing on this concept for analytical purposes. 
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So far the elaboration of the framework addressed basic epistemological and ontological 
concerns. A general discussion of metaphors emphasised the insufficient 
acknowledgement of temporal and spatial considerations in common metaphors such as 
network and system. The ecology metaphor was introduced as an alternative 
perspective, and as the preference for this study, for its stronger account of historical 
dynamics, the multitude of locales and contingent processes involved in technological 
change. Further, the concept of linked ecologies was introduced to provide a conceptual 
foundation that is in line with an ecological perspective. It outlines an ontology of 
ecologies and describes why and how different ecologies interact with each other. The 
following section will introduce the notion of ‘arena of expectations’ to reinforce the 
notion of linked ecology by helping to understand in more detail how relationships 
between different ecologies are established and maintained.  
3.2.2 Arenas of expectations 
 ‘Arenas of expectations’ is a concept that emerged from the growing field of sociology of 
expectations which recognises expectations as an essential driver of technological change 
(van Lente, 1993; van Lente & Rip, 1998a). Expectations have the capacity to “guide 
activities, provide structure and legitimacy, attract interest and foster investment” 
(Borup et al., 2006, p. 285-286), particularly in the early stage of development when levels 
of uncertainty are high and promises, which are positive expectations, are used to 
mobilise actors and resources (van Lente & Bakker, 2010). A way to represent the 
mobilisation of actors is to understand the process as a promise-requirement cycle (van 
Lente, 1993). The cycle begins with an actor (enactor) making a promise to another actor 
(selector) who sees the potential to gain a reward which can be funding, attention or 
other forms of credit. As soon as the selector accepts the promise, a mandate is given to 
the enactor whose selected promise turns into a requirement (van Lente, 1993; Bakker et 
al., 2011).  
A promise-requirement cycle is not an isolated process but is nested in a particular social 
context. They start out in niches where they are protected from competitive real life 
conditions. For example, the fuel cell is a yet emerging technology which would not 
survive was it not for the protection of its niche by combined funding from public and 
private sources (van Lente & Bakker, 2010). The shape and contents of promise-
requirement cycles can vary depending on the expectations they carry. Three levels of 
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expectations can be distinguished: specific, functional and generic (van Lente & Bakker, 
2010). Each level of expectation addresses different sets of qualitative features (see Table 
1). 
Table 1 Levels of expectations (van Lente & Bakker, 2010) 
 Specific Functional Generic 
Builds on and 
adds to 
local agenda (of a 
firm or research 
laboratory) 














will meet criterion Y 
in 
two years’ 










future; general; ‘new 
materials like X will 
change the 
economy’ 
Fallibility high medium Low 
  
The space or the “battlegrounds” where promissory interactions take place is termed an 
arena of expectations (Bakker et al., 2011, p. 159, see Figure 3): 
“These arenas can be defined as the loci where expectations are voiced by 
the enactors and tested by the selectors, where they are confronted with 
experience, knowledge, and interests.” (Bakker et al., 2011, p. 159) 
The concept of arenas of expectations is helpful in understanding where and how 
promise-requirement cycles operate. Arenas are located between enactors and selectors. 
Enactors feed and maintain expectations in an arena in the hope of being granted a 




Figure 3 Arenas of expectations (the figure is taken from Bakker et al., 2011) 
A mandate turns promises into requirements and thus constrains the enactor not to 
deviate from their promises. Selectors inform (and constrain) themselves based on 
promises available within the arena. After assessing expectations, a mandate is given by 
picking the winners of the evaluation. This cyclical process shapes an arena and general 
expectations inherent in that arena as the knowledge about successful assessment criteria 
makes enactors adapt their strategies accordingly to increases their chances in future 
mandate struggles. Drawing on Kuhn’s (1996) idea of a disciplinary matrix, which was 
adopted to broaden the interpretation of the term ‘theory’, Van den Belt and Rip (1989) 
elaborate the notion of a ‘cultural matrix of expectations’ to explain this phenomenon of 
mutual positioning of actors that are not directly linked to each other. A cultural matrix 
depicts a deeply rooted set of beliefs and expectations shared among multiple actors that 
success can be achieved if a specific strategy is pursued. An outcome of mutual 
positioning is the, often implicit, articulation of an agenda shared by multiple actors (van 
Lente & Rip, 1998b). 
An important distinction of promissory activities within an arena of expectations from 
ANT’s equivalent of the translation process, a process in which other actors’ interests are 
aligned according to the interests of the spokesperson and in which the enrolled actors 
become muted (Callon, 1986), is that expectation theory allows keeping sight of any 
power imbalances between the two actors. While ANT’s spokesperson flattens the world 
and inserts selectors into a single large network with scallops, baboons, electrodes and 
humans closely tied to each other, selectors in the promise-requirement cycle retain their 
ontological form and location in the selection environment. As a consequence, or rather 
non-consequence for no ontological transformation is happening, the selector retains its 
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voice and independence in deciding about renewing or withdrawing the mandate from 
the enactor as the engagement unfolds. An aspect that Bakker et al. (2011) do not 
highlight, however, is that the classifications of enactor and selector are not clear cut. 
Actors can have more complex and reciprocally constituted interrelations. A selector can 
become an enactor itself due to the adoption of a technology as our case study will 
discuss show. Generally, the nature and quality of a relationship between an enactor and 
a selector, who holds financial or political powers, is significantly different than a 
relationship with peers or non-human components. Changes in this relationship are also 
differently interpreted. In ANT, the retreat of an actor is assessed as a treacherous act 
signifying potential instability in the network. In an ecological perspective, the retreat of 
a selector would simply be a change in the ecological topography. Furthermore, it is a 
chance event for contiguous ecologies to act upon a potentially new opportunity to link 
up.  
The idea of contiguous ecologies also aligns with the co-existence of multiple arenas 
(Bakker et al., 2011). Actors and expectations can interact beyond the confines of 
individual arenas at various levels of aggregation. For example, the testing of highly 
detailed and specific expectations can take place in arenas different to the arena where 
generic expectations are voiced and maintained. An issue of spatiality is inherent in the 
analysis of interaction across multiple arenas. However, although the spatial metaphor 
of an arena is adopted, matters of spatiality are not further elaborated by the authors of 
the arena of expectations concept (Bakker, et al.,2011). This remains a conceptual 
shortcoming from the analytical point of view taken in this thesis and will be taken into 
account in the later discussion. 
3.2.3 Combining the concepts to guide the mapping exercise 
The concept of arenas of expectations has been introduced to serve, similar to linked 
ecologies, as an analytical instrument that informs social inquiries in line with the 
ecological perspective. Both linked ecologies and arenas of expectations help in mapping 
the ecological terrain, the set of immediate actors engaging with each other within a 
concrete landscape of linked and contiguous ecologies, and the strategies and agendas 
pursued by players involved. The two concepts address similar dynamics but from 
different angles and by drawing on different terminology. Indeed, Abbott (2005) defines 
the space of ‘arenas’ as general zones of experience where no ecology has yet gained a 
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clear authority over the location concerned. Herein lies the potential benefit where the 
two concepts can add to each other when being applied in combination.  
Linked ecologies can be understood as the more abstract theorisation of social processes 
which enables the generalisation to a larger picture. Meanwhile, the concept of arenas of 
expectations provides strong analytical capabilities to examine the concrete process of 
formation of a linkage between two ecologies. In other words, the arena of expectations 
offers a more detailed theorisation of the ligation process. Basically, the ligation process 
comprises of an ecology claiming and competing with other ecologies for the jurisdiction 
over a location and another ecology granting the jurisdiction over it. The arena of 
expectation expands on these dynamics by distinguishing enactors from selectors. 
Ligation becomes a cyclic process in which expectations are raised, evaluated and 
selected. The varying aggregations of expectations also provide opportunities to 
differentiate a social inquiry. In short, the arena of expectation idea adds more depth and 
contrast to the analysis of how ecologies link up with each other and why they possibly 
break up again.  
The combined application of these concepts promises to help in keeping track of how the 
topography of an ecological terrain changes. This enables to map interactions between 
players and to analyse social learning processes taking place between them. 
Transformations and reconfigurations of linkages between ecologies go along with 
change of practices within these linked ecologies. They allow for new opportunities of 
social learning as actors find new ways to interact with and to interpret meaning of a 
technology in new contexts. Mapping the ecological terrain in a longitudinal approach is 
therefore an important prerequisite for a biographical analysis of a technology. 
The next section will explore a set of concepts that conceptualise the processes that 
eventually lead to the social shaping of a technology and to social learning process in 
which the meaning of an artefact is elaborated. These concepts are necessary to form a 
consistent but yet loose framework for investigating technological change from an 
ecological point of view. 
3.3 Mapping the technological development 
Seminal social studies of technology (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999; Bijkers et al., 1987) 
and subsequent studies of the use and consumption of technology (e.g. Sørensen & 
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Williams, 2002; Williams et al., 2005) have prominently investigated the mutual 
relationship between technology and society. The social shaping perspective has 
emerged as a 'broad church' (Williams & Edge, 1996) which unites a range of scholars 
from various disciplines who are looking into opening the black box of technology to 
learn and to make visible what is happening inside and how it is put together. Thanks to 
the social shaping perspective, we know that the processes of development, 
implementation and use of technology do not follow any inherent logic but are driven by 
countless choices: small and big, deliberate and unconscious, evident and hidden, etc.. 
Thus, technology results as a consequence of numerous choices made by actors involved 
in the shaping process (Williams & Edge, 1996). 
But where does technology emerge from? Some theories in the social shaping domain 
deflect this question by arguing for its irrelevance in bringing to light any explanatory 
insights about the technology itself and its creation process. We have learned from actor-
centric theories that it is the immediate and contemporary networks and systems that 
shape technological artefacts. But where do these networks and systems emerge from? 
Atomistic theories, that follow activities of individuals, struggle with providing an 
explanation for existing structures and thus imply:  
"some sort of tabula rasa as the beginning moment of research, to be 
gradually filled in as we encounter the "real" world" (italics in original, 
Clarke & Star, 2008, p. 116)  
However, many contributors to Science and Technology Studies who where unsatisfied 
with this response have filled this void with alternative ideas. There exist now many 
concepts that theorise about the spaces in which actors exist, how these spaces come into 
existence and how these spaces interact with each other. For instance, Clarke and Star 
(2008) outline the social worlds framework, an inherently ecological framework that 
seeks: 
"[...] to understand the nature of relations and action across the arrays of 
people and things in the arena, representations  (narrative,  visual,  
historical,  rhetorical),  processes  of  work  (including cooperation  
without  consensus,  career  paths,  and  routines/anomalies),  and  many 
sorts of interwoven discourses." (Clarke & Star, 2008, p. 113) 
The social worlds framework overlaps with the framework developed in this thesis, as it 
shares fundamental assumptions, and concepts, about how social worlds exist in parallel 
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and how they interact with each other. Where the frameworks diverge is in the attention 
paid to the artefacts that emerge through social interactions between social worlds, or 
linked ecologies. Our framework focuses on the development and implementation of 
artefacts and stresses temporal and spatial dimensions in the shaping process. 
Although the matter of technology is of primary concern, it is not the central unit of 
analysis as it is in other frameworks like, for example, Molina's (1995) sociotechnical 
constituencies. Instead, technology is regarded as a (re)configuration of (existing) 
technologies (Arthur, 2009) that is being designed and embedded within a linked 
ecology. Technology, thus, is inherently configurational in the sense that technology is 
developed and configured iteratively according to the requirements of its users, a 
process we have already been introduced to as ‘innofusion’:  
“Development is a thoroughgoing evolutionary process, in which 
environmental contingencies are explicitly built in at each stage of 
variation. Thus each instance of diffusion, each configuration, may well 
represent a unique variation, a new innovation in its own right.” (Fleck, 
1988, p. 22) 
Shaping and configuration processes do not take place in empty space, for there is no 
such thing as empty social space. Foregrounding the locality of social shaping processes 
and relationships to other spaces is thus the motivation to develop a distinct framework. 
Although the question 'What is technology?' poses an interesting empirical and 
philosophical challenge, it is not necessarily a crucial exercise for conceptualising the 
relationship between technology and society. A more revealing and conceptually 
relevant question is “How is technology made?” (Bijker, 2009). However, as has been 
addressed above, this question stops short of investigating origins of technological 
change. Thus, this study aims not only to explore how technology is made but also 
where it emerges from. 
Considering the ecological perspective elaborated above, the conceptual concern 
addressed below is how to reconcile the development of linked ecologies with the notion 
of configurational technology. The way how and why ecologies are momentarily linked, 
i.e. the ecological landscape at a moment in time, defines the dominating technical 
requirements and specifics according to which technology is shaped. It is the temporary 
texture of an ecological landscape that patterns the content and shape of an artefact. It is 
thus why we explicitly speak of the ecological shaping of technology in contrast to the 
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more general notion of ‘social shaping of technology’ (see MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985; 
Williams & Edge, 1995).  
The previously introduced concepts of linked ecologies and arena of expectations 
proposed an approach to map social dynamics across an ever-changing terrain of linked 
ecologies. A further set of concepts will be introduced and discussed that help in 
understanding how technology results from interactions within contingent and 
historically shaped linked ecologies. In other words, these concepts intend to help 
mapping the process of technological development and the crystallisation of a 
technological artefact within a dynamic environment. The first concept of the kernel of a 
research infrastructure explains how a technological project maintains stability while 
allowing for flexibility to incorporate change over a longer period of time. The other 
concept is the instrumentality package which aims to link the reciprocal evolution of 
scientific knowledge and technological artefacts. In the next section the concept of the 
kernel of a research infrastructure will be introduced first. 
3.3.1 Kernel of a research infrastructure 
The previous concepts have focussed on outlining a loose conceptual framework to 
reduce the complexity of social reality and to facilitate an ecological analysis of the case 
studied. These concepts describe what ecologies are, how they come about and why they 
hold together. This is somewhat a complete but yet static representation of an ecology. 
What is missing is a consideration of time that accounts for occasions and episodes of 
emergence, stability and continuity as well as for change, surprise, disruption, and 
discontinuity, since ecologies and relationships between ecologies shift and transforms 
over time. To emphasise change in ecologies, the concept of a ‘kernel’ (Ribes & Polk, 
2015) is regarded a valuable addition to the framework. However, before introducing the 
concept, a detour will be taken to highlight why a more nuanced and temporal view on 
the issue of change and flexibility, defined in terms of capacity to respond to 
unanticipated change, is necessary to push the ecological agenda further. 
3.3.1.1 An ecological approach to change 
What is change and “What is an infrastructure flexible relative to?” ask Ribes and Polk 
(2014). Although these questions, primarily the first one, appear as trivial philosophical 
exercises these are easily overlooked questions that are worth being addressed to 
supplement a discussion on technological change. Flexibility and change are highly 
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ambiguous terms and can have distinctive meanings depending on the context and 
perspective. For example, in manufacturing the term ‘flexibility’ yields different 
descriptions depending on what aspect of the complex manufacturing process is 
considered (Slack, 1987). In an industrial context, flexibility is only one of a number of 
similar terms such as reconfigurability, agility and changeability which all have 
somewhat different meanings (Zaeh et al., 2005). Appreciating nuances in the 
interpretation of the term change thus promises to improve the understanding of what 
there is that can change. 
Examining the meaning of change in regards of information infrastructures, three facets 
of change can be distinguished: technoscientific, sociotechnical and institutional (Ribes & 
Polk, 2014).4 Starting with the sociotechnical facet, it is described as follows: 
“The sociotechnical facet is the intersection of social organization, 
coordination, and collaboration technologies, users, and information 
systems.” (Ribes & Finholt, 2009, p. 288) 
It is argued that the sociotechnical is the most studied and theorised facet in the field of 
information infrastructures (Ribes & Finholt, 2009). Reasons for the dominance of the 
sociotechnical view can be found in the bias of disciplinary and methodological 
traditions and the resulting limited scope of research foci (Pollock & Williams, 2010). A 
further reason why many studies emphasises the sociotechnical is inherent in Abbott’s 
(2005) critique that implicit assumptions about the static nature of entities at the 
periphery of scientific enquiries are limiting analytical reach. Because common 
approaches focus on the actions of central players and neglect events peripheral to the 
immediate locale, relevant change dynamics escape an analyst’s attention. To overcome 
                                                          
4 The ambiguous use of terminology requires a note of clarification. Ribes and Finholt 
(2009) draw on Latour’s (1987) term “technoscience” to describe as technoscientific those 
objects that attract the interest of scientists. However, Latour’s interpretation of 
technoscience goes far beyond Ribes’ and Finholt’s narrow definition. The very existence 
of the concept of ‘technoscience’ intends to do away with the categorisation of anything 
that is social, technical or institutional (Latour, 1987, p. 174 , emphasis in original): “I will 
use the word technoscience from now on, to describe all the elements tied to the 
scientific contents no matter how dirty, unexpected or foreign they seem”. Grouping 
observations in categories such as technoscientific, sociotechnical or institutional runs 
the risk of violating the basic principle of the term ‘technoscience’. In their narrow 
definition Ribes and Finholt omit this original and radical meaning of the term. Thus, to 
avoid confusion when making sense of the three facets, it is recommended to refer to 
‘technoscience’ as namesake only and to ignore its intellectual origin. 
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this bias, an “ecological approach to change” is called for (Ribes and Finholt, 2009, p. 
289). Consequently, the technoscientific and institutional facets are elaborated to 
facilitate a more nuanced and ecological understanding of change: 
“Accounting for the flexibility of research infrastructure in the face of 
change demands an inspection of features beyond the design of 
information infrastructure, systems, and practices. We find that change 
may  be  rooted  in  transformations  to  the  practice  and  objects  of  
science  (technoscientific),  and  in funding and regulatory regimes 
(institutional). A robust and adaptable sociotechnical architecture is 
necessary but not sufficient to explain successful adaptations to change in 
each facet.” (Ribes & Finholt, 2009, p. 288) 
Since the kernel concept originates from the empirical study of a research-based 
organisation, a research infrastructure, its authors draw on vocabulary from the field of 
science. However the definition of the technoscientific facet can be unproblematically 
expanded to consider not only practices and objects of science but also that of 
technology. From this follows that technoscientific changes address changes in the 
package of scientific knowledge and technical artefacts utilised in an ecology. 
Besides the empirically common focus on sociotechnical aspects, issues of 
technoscientific and institutional change are inevitably foregrounded when a more 
nuanced, ecological perspective on change is taken. For example, instrumentalities, i.e. 
technological and scientific objects, are found to be connected to collective practices 
across multiple locales (de Solla Price, 1983). Events in a remote location can influence a 
local technoscientific configuration and vice versa. Political dynamics in remote 
institutions can have drastic effects on a local organisation of work and vice versa. 
Distinguishing changes according to the three facets, therefore, has the sensitising effect 
of stimulating an ecological perspective and drawing attention to events and dynamics 
beyond a single site when investigating the development of a research infrastructure 
(Ribes & Finholt, 2009) or an information infrastructure in general. The next section will 
built on these three facets and elaborate how practices are embedded in and 
interconnected across different time-scales and locales. 
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3.3.1.2 Different time-scales in ecologies of actions connected through structure 
The kernel concept originates from studies that examined the subject of time in the field 
of ‘cyberinfrastructures’ (Ribes & Finholt, 2009).5 The term cyberinfrastructure 
circumscribes ambitious science projects with long-term-oriented institutional 
configurations. The challenge to plan such long-term developments, for example a clock 
that is built to last ten thousand years, requires dealing with issues that span over 
different time-scales from immediate technical problems to long-term institutional 
concerns. Thus, efforts to think today about future requirements of infrastructures 
prompted the conceptualisation of time as the ‘long now’ (Ribes & Finholt, 2009). In 
general, the long-term perspective is an inherent concern of a biographical view on the 
innofusion of a technological artefact (Pollock & Williams, 2009; Hyysalo, 2004, 2010). 
The ‘long now’ is a reminder that related practices can operate on different scales. There 
are different examples available which conceptualise how practices on different scales 
are interconnected, for instance, enacting technology, organising work and 
institutionalisation in building information infrastructures (Ribes & Finholt, 2009); 
problem-solving, career-building and line-of-research-building in scientific work 
(Fujimura, 1988); or, more generally, conduct of an activity, development of the 
practitioners and development of the practice in the case of navigation of a battleship 
(Hutchins, 1995). What all these representations have in common is that a local activity, 
e.g. building a technological component, analysing a probe of cancerous cells or 
navigating a ship, is simultaneously embedded in and connected to a broader set of 
practices divided across multiple sites and occurring at different speeds. 
This interconnectedness of practices and distributed quality of collective work is what 
has been characterised as ‘ecologies of actions’ (Fujimura, 1995). In these complex 
interrelations ecologies of actions are subject to constant changes on technoscientific, 
sociotechnical and institutional dimensions. When investigating a particular 
development within these ecologies, for example the development and implementation 
of a new technology, a perspective has to be taken that allows tracing how a particular 
                                                          
5 The term cyberinfrastructure is common in the United States and known as ‘e-
infrastructure’ in Europe (Ribes & Finholt, 2009). For generalisation purposes, the term 
information infrastructure will be preferred. For now, Star and Ruhleder’s (1996) basic 
principles of an infrastructure are considered to define information infrastructures 
broadly as a technological development that is embedded in organised practices. 
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set of ecologies organises and maintains its distributed activities. Hence, to learn how 
technology is shaped in a dynamic environment, a conceptualisation is sought that 
appreciates moments of both change and stability. Furthermore, such a 
conceptualisation should account for change and stability in a sense of the ‘long now’ 
where micro-level dynamism is part of a long-term, largely stable pattern. To recognise 
this ‘long now’ relationship the concept should reconcile the short-term perspective of 
change dynamics and the long-term perspective of stability. The next section will 
introduce the concept of the kernel which promises to build a bridge between short-term 
changes and long-term stability.  
3.3.1.3 Kernel of a research infrastructure 
The kernel concept draws inspiration from computing (Ribes & Polk, 2015). A kernel is 
the main component of an operating system that facilitates the interaction between the 
user and the hardware by managing the access to services and resources of the 
computer. The kernel of a research infrastructure serves a similar purpose in a social 
context: 
“The kernel of a research infrastructure is made up of the resources and 
services that members work to keep available in preparing, managing, 
and responding to changing research objects, all the while continuing to 
support ongoing investigations” (Ribes & Polk, 2015, p. 3) 
While the concept of a package of scientific and technical objects, as discussed shortly in 
section 3.3.2, spans over a wide range of ecologies, the kernel is narrower in scope as it 
targets a specific infrastructure. However, it is broader in scope in the sense that it is not 
limited to a single package or approach as it encompasses all resources and services 
available to an infrastructure.  
Tracing how an infrastructure sustains access to and availability of resources and 
services to associated ecologies despite ontological changes is how the kernel concept 
consolidates the notions of flexibility and stability. While flexibility is an important 
concern, “persistence is the kernel’s most important quality” (Ribes & Polk, 2015, p. 3). 
To maintain this balance, the kernel focuses on ontological changes to the objects of 
investigations of an infrastructure: 
“[...] ontology refers specifically to the objects of investigation, and 
change to how they emerge, fade, or recur as objects of investigation. The 
kernel is the constellation of concepts we employ to explain 
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technoscientific flexibility: the capacity of research infrastructure to 
support investigations of partially or wholly unexpected objects.” (Ribes 
& Polk, 2015, p. 3) 
What the object of investigation is depends in turn on the infrastructure under 
investigation. The kernel was developed based on the study of the ‘long-now’ of the 
Multicenter AIDS Cohort Study (MACS) that was founded in 1983 and which is still in 
existence today (Ribes & Polk, 2015). When it was established, the object of investigation 
for MACS was the, at the time, poorly understood causes and patterns of transmission of 
the AIDS disease. As time moved on, the knowledge about the disease improved and the 
object of investigation changed. The discovery of HIV as the root cause and the 
development of a treatment that turned AIDS from a fatal to a chronic illness, required 
MACS to adapt its focus and the resources and services available to it to investigate the 
shifting objects of its research in order to sustain its activities. In other words, MACS’s 
kernel transformed in parallel to its research objects as time moved on. Examining 
ontological changes of the research objects enabled in return understanding of how 
MACS adapted to remain “the same study” over time, a quality the authors referred to 
as technoscientific flexibility (Ribes & Polk, 2015, p. 2). Three major change processes 
were identified according to which the kernel changed. Besides the initial process of 
building a kernel, the processes of ‘repurposing’, ‘elaborating’ and ‘extending’ shape the 
form and contents of a kernel and its inherent resources and services. ‘Repurposing’ 
describes the addition of new objects of investigations without any corresponding 
changes to the kernel. ‘Elaborating’ is the introduction of new instruments or analytical 
categories that bring additional depth to the investigation of objects. Finally, the process 
‘extending’ brings in new resources and services that enable the investigation of new 
objects. Another distinct dynamic is characterised as ‘forking’. This occurs when the 
kernel is split up or imitated to address research objects that require more autonomy. For 
example, to study how AIDS affected women (MACS focused on men), the kernel was 
forked to establish the Women’s Interagency HIV Study, a “sister site” which shared 
some space, instrumentalities and even organisational members with MACS (Ribes & 
Polk, 2015, p. 23).  
Previously we have noted that transferring a concept from one domain to another bears 
the risk to ignore conceptual incompatibilities. However, to avoid the complex process of 
developing a matching concept from scratch, we temporarily borrow this concept from 
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the science studies domain to draw attention to important elements highlighted by the 
kernel concept. Similar to linked ecologies, we proceed carefully in our application of the 
kernel metaphor and its extended conceptualisation when conducting our analysis. To 
extend the concept beyond the science domain and to apply it in the study of technology, 
technological artefacts such as the system studied in this thesis are to be considered as a 
resource and a service that are available for actors in an infrastructure. As a resource it is 
subject to configurational activities that change its shape and functionality. At the same 
time it is a service that is offered to others as a promising resource to solve problems. 
While a science-oriented organisation engages in generating knowledge about a research 
object, a technology-oriented organisation engages in problem-solving activities. In the 
latter context, a technological artefact becomes a resource available in the kernel to 
address the objects the infrastructure is concerned with. The notion of an object of 
investigation, which is the subject of technoscientific change, does not transfer well to 
technological artefacts. A generic term such as object of intent or, generally, objective 
would do more justice to non-scientific investigations. For instance, the objective of a 
technology development-oriented kernel could be the solution of a particular technical 
or business-related problem. 
The main contribution of the concept of the kernel to the ecological perspective is to 
provide a conceptualisation of how resources and services are prepared, managed and 
made available to others in an infrastructure and how they change over time. Previously 
introduced concepts of linked ecologies and arenas of expectations addressed issues of 
sociotechnical and institutional change as ecologies interact and create alliances through 
the construction of social relations and collective practices. These concepts emphasise 
changes in the fabric of an alliance of ecologies, i.e. ontological changes to the objectives 
pursued in these ecologies. The kernel, however, addresses how these changes relate to 
the configuration of resources and services of an infrastructure within the ecology. While 
changes in social relations between ecologies can have immediate effects, for example, 
when conflicts interrupt or discontinue interactions between ecologies, effects on an 
infrastructure’s resources and services trickle-down slowly. A technological artefact does 
not disappear as does social space when interactions cease. Similarly, a newly linked up 
ecology can immediately draw on an existing kernel that has been developed through 
interactions with other ecologies. A kernel’s ability to account for persistence across time 
and space is what motivates tracking the accumulation and transformation of resources 
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and capabilities in analysing the development and implementation of a technological 
artefact. Therefore, the kernel conceptualises a persistent structure that is stable enough 
to mediate between practices on different time-scales and in different locales, and 
flexible enough to allow for change over time. This feature is particularly helpful in 
relation to promise-requirement cycles.  
In the empirical case studied, the technological artefact accumulates functionality 
through numerous promise-requirement cycles with various actors involved. While the 
actors on both sides of the promise-requirement cycle, i.e. the enactors and the selectors, 
change over time, the kernel remains ‘the same’ as do the technological artefact and the 
services made available by the kernel. This focus on something that remains ‘the same’ 
delimits a particular viewpoint that is constructed by the set of actors involved (Pollock 
& Williams, 2009). The concept of agora, which is the Greek term for “market” or 
“marketplace”, has been introduced to conceptualise broadly the social space where all 
producers and consumers of technology interact (Kaniadakis, 2006). A market player can 
be a producer and consumer at the same time: its role is determined by its interaction 
with other players. A viewpoint makes a slice of the agora and highlights a certain set of 
relationships between players. We remind that our research delineates a particular 
viewpoint on a particular set of actors involved in the development and implementation 
of a technology. The kernel concept is instrumental in our attempt to follow not just the 
actors but also technological components, resources and services that are accumulated 
and transformed over time. It anchors the analytical focus to a particular locale within a 
broad ecology and wider infrastructure where change occurs. Thus, the kernel is a 
fundamental element in defining what is constituted by the notion of the ‘local’. 
3.3.2 Instrumentality Package 
The kernel concept introduced a shift in focus on material and technical qualities which 
emerge as social interactions unfold over time. A growing stock of resources facilitates 
the accumulation of expertise and technical capabilities. Expertise allows members of a 
research infrastructure to make use of technical capabilities as a means to accomplish its 
objectives. Subsequently, competence over a problem area enables a research 
infrastructure to develop its own technological artefacts to enhance its services. This 
process can stretch over time and space. Although the kernel concept allows keeping 
track of these changes, it does not conceptualise how and why these resources change. 
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Therefore, a set of three concepts are combined to address the evolution of knowledge 
into technological artefacts within a distributed ecology of innovation. The three 
concepts are boundary objects, a theory/method/technique package and instrumentality. 
The conceptual combination of these concepts is termed an ‘instrumentality package’; an 
local representation of the package in a kernel is termed ‘instrument’. The key feature of 
an instrumentality package, however, is that it is not limited to a single kernel but 
extends to developments in remote locales not directly related to the kernel concerned. It 
highlights the common lineage of related technologies which are connected by the fact 
that the same theoretical assumptions underline their developments. Understanding the 
emergence of a technological artefact requires an understanding of the origin of the 
theoretical assumptions embedded in the artefact. Next, the three concepts will be 
introduced in turn beginning with the concept of boundary objects. 
3.3.2.1 Boundary objects 
Accounts of the development and use of technology frequently focus on actors and their 
interactions. These concepts may also often interpret interactions as attempts to translate 
and thus manipulate interests of others (as in the case of actor-network theory), or as 
attempts to settle disputes about technical details (as in the case of social construction of 
technology). An alternative approach takes a similar route as actor-network theory but 
without attributing extraordinary capabilities to single individuals to create exclusive 
bottle-necks. The concept of ‘boundary objects’ (Star & Griesemer, 1989) proposes an 
interpretation that allows for multiple viewpoints and agendas and thus provides an 
alternative to ANT’s narrowly-defined and managerial view:  
“Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to 
local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet 
robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They are 
weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in 
individual-site use. These objects may be abstract or concrete. They have 
different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is 
common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a 
means of translation. The creation and management of boundary objects 
is a key process in developing and maintaining coherence across 
intersecting social worlds.” (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 393)  
Analysing the historical dynamics in the development of a museum and its ecological 
surroundings, the authors elaborated the idea of multiple obligatory passage points as 
bridges between different actors and their social worlds. In contrast to ANT’s single 
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obligatory passage point, which is controlled by a single or a limited set of dominant 
actors, the compelling idea of boundary objects is that it distributes the centre of 
authority across a wider range of actors. Instead of framing a narrative around a 
dominant perspective, subordinating all other interests according to the dominant 
interest of the central spokesperson, multiple viewpoints are acknowledged to highlight 
other narratives where other, often marginalised (Star, 1991), agendas are prevailing.  
To sum up and to indicate how boundary objects are interpreted in light of this study, 
boundary objects are interfaces that allow for collaborative interactions between 
ecologies. Boundary objects can have different meanings depending on the viewpoint of 
the respective ecology but they offer enough similarities to encourage continuous 
interactions. This definition strongly resembles what Abbott (2005) termed a ‘hinge’ in 
his analysis. In Abbott’s view a hinge is a dual reward that stimulates two ecologies to 
work together. The duality refers to the fact that the reward can look different for each 
ecology. Both, a hinge and a boundary object share the common trait to connect two 
distinct social worlds or ecologies, respectively, for collaborative purposes. This study 
will give preference to the use of Star and Griesemer’s (1989) boundary objects concept 
for its comprehensive definition and its relation to the packages concept that will be 
addressed in the following section. 
Earlier in this chapter it was criticised that concepts from the domain of science had been 
uncritically transferred to the domain of technology. Boundary object was 
conceptualised researching the evolution of a museum. Although many objects 
addressed in Star and Griesemer’s (1989) study were of physical nature, the generation 
and distribution of knowledge about methods and facts remained a major focus of their 
study. The next concept addresses this problem to some extent by distinguishing 
boundary objects according to levels of abstractions and their spatial affiliation. This 
distinction addresses and appreciates the differences in characteristics between the 
domains of science and technology. 
3.3.2.2 Theory, methods and technique package 
The previous concept of boundary objects theorised in more details about the linkage 
between two ecologies. Ecologies share a boundary object where each side of the 
boundary object has a specific meaning that distinguishes each ecology but still has 
enough similarities to bond a relationship. Yet, a limitation of the boundary object is that 
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its conceptualisation does not look far beyond the two ecologies it is connecting. It has 
only a weak relation to other boundary objects. This is where Fujimura’s (1988, 1992) 
package concept extends the boundary objects idea. Studying the emergence and 
diffusion of the oncogene theory in cancer research, she proposed the concept of a 
package of theory, methods and techniques that is ‘co-developed’ by diverse groups of 
actors of different disciplines as a theory is being adopted, tested and developed in 
multiple laboratories (Fujimura, 1995).  
In her earlier work Fujimura generally referred to ‘standardized packages’ (Fujimura, 
1988, 1992). She appears to retract from this generalised definition in her later work 
(Fujimura, 1995) where she attributed the ‘standardised’ attribute to technologies and 
techniques only, not to theory. This differentiation makes some justice to a 
differentiation between science and technology but is not sufficiently distinctive yet for 
this study. Fujimura’s focus is the diffusion of knowledge about facts and techniques to 
make use of this knowledge in different laboratories to innovatively address a multitude 
of existent problems previously addressed with traditional sets of knowledge. Because of 
the complexity of her empirical study she can only brush the surface of the kinds of issue 
that are at the heart of this study, which is the development and implementation of a 
localised instance of a technique, a technology, that was concretised from an abstract and 
general theory. What Fujimura refers to with ‘standardisation’ is the increasing 
mobilisation of more actors in the development and provision of technologies and 
resources such as probes of cancer-causing molecular cells called ‘proto-oncogenes’. 
These actors are attracted by the expectation to gain economic advantages through 
economies of scale as the methodology is taken up by more and more laboratories. A 
major distinction between science and technology is that knowledge and technological 
artefacts have different mobilities (Sørensen & Levold, 1999). While scientists in public 
laboratories are incentivised to share their findings, privately-funded scientists and 
industrial researchers are more reluctant and restricted to do so. Private organisations 
tend to avoid disclosure of scientific findings that ensure a competitive and profitable 
advantage. Rather, knowledge is absorbed by private organisations and only selectively 
shared with others. In short, standardisation of techniques and technologies occurs 
differently outside the scientific community.  
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This brief detour on standardisation is to remind that the emergence of any 
‘standardised technology’ and technology in general is by far more complex than 
Fujimura could have addressed in her study on distributed knowledge and practices in 
cancer research. Indeed, the reasons for the lack of attention to artefactual qualities of the 
package can be attributed to Fujimura’s empirical focus on the co-development and 
diffusion of the oncogene theory. The social shaping of artefacts that resulted from the 
analysis of oncogene theory is considered but not addressed in detail. This study will 
extend Fujimura’s approach by emphasising the social shaping of technological artefacts.  
The significant conceptual contribution of Fujimura (1995) is that she links different, 
distributed boundary objects to each other through a lineage of abstractions in different 
practices. The way how different social worlds, or ecologies, are interlinked through 
multiple boundary objects shapes the local practices in these alliances of ecologies. 
Together, these practices form a distributed network of collective work. Although the 
actual content of the work in each ecology looks different, all practices are connected by 
an instrumentality package containing related theoretical conceptualisations and 
technologies. A novel general theory can provide a new perspective on problems that 
were previously overlooked, ignored or unsolvable. It does not need to go as far as 
heralding a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1996). But it must be significant enough to create a 
‘bandwagon’ to mobilise more actors (Fujimura, 1988; Fujimura, 1992). This is achieved 
through the redefinition of research objects into doable problems by combining new 
theory with new methods and techniques: 
“This combination of the abstract/ general proto-oncogene theory and the 
specific, standard technologies was used to generate novel doable 
problems. By locally concretizing the abstraction in different practices, 
researchers with ongoing enterprises (re)constructed the new idea and 
the new methods in new sites, thus further extending the network.” 
(Fujimura, 1995, p. 333) 
Similarly, the process of concretisation and localisation of a technological development 
has been addressed as a process of crystallisation where an artefact emerges as the 
relationships of its surrounds solidify (de Solla Price, 1983; Fleck, 1988). Because the 
articulated package concept privileges knowledge-related aspects, it will be amended to 
distinguish it from Fujimura’s original conception. To do so, the package concept will be 




Understanding the relationship between science and technology has been a core concern 
of the entire science and technology studies discipline. One approach in analysing this 
relationship centred on the development and transformation of the means available to 
scientists and technologists. De Solla Price (1983) examined the science/technology 
relationship by exploring historically how the use of theories, methods and technologies 
influenced the work of practitioners of science and technology. His empirical findings 
advance the perspective that progress in science and technology is a reciprocal 
development. For science to progress, it requires new or refined technologies to enable 
better observations of nature and more sophisticated sense-making practices. For 
technology to advance, it requires for a better understanding and mastering of nature or, 
as Arthur (2009) put it, for improved capabilities to harness natural phenomena. Such 
reciprocal progress relies on the co-development of what de Solla Price (1983) termed 
‘instrumentality’ and which he defined as 
“to carry the general connotation of a laboratory method for doing 
something to nature or to the data in hand” (de Solla Price, 1983, p. 13) 
For example, Galileo Galilei’s astronomic observations were an important step in 
heralding the Copernican Revolution. But this was made possible only because he could 
make use of the telescope which was “a new technology arising from the ancient craft of 
making eye-glasses” (de Solla Price, 1983, p. 8). Instrumentality does not refer to the 
invention or improvement of a technological artefact only but also to the competence in 
using it. Emphasising de Solla Price’s example of Rosalind Franklin, who contributed 
with her extraordinary expertise on x-ray crystallography to the development of the 
‘double helix model’ of DNA, Faulkner (1994) points out that knowledge and skills in 
handling techniques and artefacts are equally important characteristics of 
instrumentality. The notion of instrumentality, therefore, implies the reciprocal 
advancement of both technological artefacts and scientific knowledge as well as skills 
and practices to utilise the two.  
Fujimura’s (1995) concept of a theory, methods and technique package articulates the 
establishment and ramification of an ecology of related practices in science and 
technology. The instrumentality concept is added to the framework to emphasise the 
close relationship between science and technology, and to reinforce technological 
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artefacts in the array of theory, methods and techniques. Indeed, in our framework, the 
notion of technological artefact replaces that of technique. To follow up on this route it 
could be reasonable to articulate a distinction between method, technique and 
technological artefact. However, for the purpose of this study and for the sake of 
simplification, we drop the notion of technique. The array of instruments is not to be 
understood as a one-way roadmap of technological development where a technology 
yields from the concretisation of theory. Since science and technology are reciprocal 
developments, the array also operates the other way round where a technological 
artefact can be the starting point for the discovery of new scientific facts as in the case of 
Galileo Galilei. 
To sum up, science and technology interact through the development, (re-)configuration 
and skilful use of instrumentalities (de Solla Price, 1983; Fleck, 1988; Arthur, 2009). 
Fujimura’s (1995) package concept, which stops short of appreciating the influence and 
role of technological artefacts in the interactive science/technology relationship, is 
extended by the notion of instrumentality to offer a conceptual tool to map the reciprocal 
evolution of technological artefacts as well as scientific facts. We term the extension an 
‘instrumentality package’ to distinguish it from Fujimura’s original concept. An 
instrumentality package is broadly defined as a distribution of practices that draw on 
theories, methods and technological artefacts which are associated to each other. The 
main feature of an instrumentality package is characterised by the common lineage of its 
constituents. The package transforms over time as its constituent instrumentalities are 
worked on and distributed to other locales where new problems and requirements shape 
the characteristics the package. 
3.3.2.4 Mapping the evolution of technical qualities 
A valuable property of the package concept is its implicit appreciation of multisitedness. 
An instrumentality package connects a scientist in a public laboratory, who articulates a 
general and abstract theory, with an engineer in a company, who designs a concrete and 
specific instrument or technology based on the principles of that general theory and 
under consideration of the specifics and requirements of the locale where the product 
will be implemented at. The concretisation of an abstract theory in a specific locale is 
simultaneously the testing of it under new local conditions. Outcomes of a crystallisation 
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process in one locale, in turn, inform the generic development of abstract theory. The 
package concept thus confirms its validity as an extension of boundary objects in that it  
“serve[s] as a dynamic interface between multiple social worlds and 
concurrently represents the contingent articulations of [the same practice] 
at different sites” (Fujimura, 1995, p. 335).  
An instrumentality package underlines the role of expectations as each ecology has 
different requirements and reasons to ally with other actors in the package-ecology. Each 
actor is driven by a mix of incentives which, depending on their context, range from 
egoistic, opportunistic to idealistic commitments rather than being simply ‘translated’ to 
do so by a central figure (Fujimura, 1988). These incentives feed and are fed by dynamics 
of expectations which are influenced by what is happening in the wider ecology.  
To conclude and to emphasise the contribution of the instrumentality package concept to 
this framework, it extends the boundary object (Star & Griesemer, 1989) and theory, 
method and technique package (Fujimura, 1995) concepts and specifies further how 
multiple ecologies are either linked up or associated to each other through links between 
related instruments being utilised in these ecologies. The distinction of abstract theories 
and concrete instances of methods and technologies underlines the collective and 
collaborative work across multiple, heterogeneous sites. It delineates a process of local 
concretisation or instantiation of general abstractions that leads away from reductionist 
cause-and-effect interpretations towards an ecological, process-oriented understanding 
of technological change (Akera, 2007). The package concept reinforces the understanding 
that scientific and technological change is not the product of an isolated actor-network 
but part of a larger whole intertwined in an ecology of ‘metonymic relationships’ (Akera, 
2007). 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has introduced a number of concepts that outline a loose framework that 
was termed ‘ecological shaping of technology’. In contrast to the generic meaning of 
‘social shaping of technology’, a view that technology and society are closely intertwined 
and shape each other (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985; Williams & Edge, 1995), the 
ecological shaping of technology stresses concretely that each technology carries the 
imprint of the particular historically and socio-politically shaped constellation of an 
alliance of ecologies, with a unique set of resources and practices at its disposal, in which 
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the technology emerges. Acknowledging that technology is socially shaped is not 
enough to explain why a technology was developed and adopted. A detailed and 
historically-rooted examination is necessary to learn about the particularities of an 
interlinked ecology of various locales and arenas where the shifting agendas of 
individuals, organisations and institutions define the objectives for collective work, and 
eventually, the patterns of technological artefacts. Four concepts where selected to guide 
a social inquiry into the ecological shaping of the development and implementation of a 
technological artefact (see Table 2 for an overview).  
Table 2 Overview of the concepts to guide a social inquiry into the ecological 
shaping of technology 
Concept Description 
Linked ecologies  
(Abbott, 2005) 
An ecology is a set of actors that attempt to gain control 
over a location. Ecologies form alliances to compete with 
other alliances. 
Arena of expectations 
(Bakker et al., 2011) 
The social space for promise-requirement cycles where 
expectations are voiced and evaluated.  
Kernel 
(Ribes & Polk, 2015) 
A kernel manages and makes available resources and 
services for the investigation of research objects. It accounts 
for technoscientific flexibility and stability simultaneously. 
Instrumentality package 
 
An instrumentality package comprises of related theories, 
methods, techniques and technologies that form a network 
of distributed boundary objects. 
 
The ‘ecological shaping of technology’ framework was developed to inform a 
biographical perspective on technology. The biography of artefact perspective emerged 
from the critique on methodologically and analytically restricted studies of technologies 
which suffered from disciplinary bias and narrowly framed research foci (Pollock & 
Williams, 2009; Hyysalo, 2010). The framework developed here embraces the conceptual 
principles proclaimed by the biographical approach which include the broadening of 
research foci to expanded time-scales and spatial distribution of collective practices. 
Thus, the biographical approach is a close ally of the ecological metaphor as it was 
outlined in the beginning of the chapter. 
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What is regarded as the core advantage of the ecological shaping of technology 
framework is its analytical scalability in terms of time and space. Its detachment from 
individual actors and focus on ecologies enables the analysis to trace developments 
across time and space. Interactions are not centred on the alignment of dominant 
individual or group interests but driven by the mutual negotiation of expectations over 
joint benefits. Furthermore, success and failure are no longer attributable to individuals, 
previously hailed as heroic scientists and engineers, but the contingent achievement or 
performance of a distributed ecology. To wrap up, the ecological approach is a corrective 









This methodology chapter outlines the rationale for choosing a research strategy and 
appropriate research methods that helped producing evidence to investigate research 
problems and to answer research questions. It aims to provide a reader with enough 
information to evaluate the validity and the methodological adequacy of this study 
(Seale, 2004). This chapter documents the approach we have taken in collecting and 
interpreting the data necessary to address our research purpose. It begins with a 
discussion of the emergent character of the research design which was greatly influenced 
at the outset of the research by various external events. After elaborating how these 
events shaped the research focus, the research strategy will be discussed which also 
includes a reflection of our role as researcher and an overview of the case study 
organisation and the technology under investigation. Since we pursued a ‘biographical’ 
approach to study a technology, the strategy is a combination of three approaches: case 
study, participant observation and the historical method. Based on these strategies we 
derived the data collection procedures which will be introduced before we turn attention 
to the data analysis process. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the validity and 
credibility of this study and the consideration of ethical issues. 
4.1 Emergent research design 
Research design prescriptions stress the importance of a proactive approach which 
begins with a thorough planning process to produce a research design (Blaikie, 2009; 
Creswell, 2009). Generally, the research design outlines a set of guidelines that comply 
with specific theoretical assumptions about the representation of reality. It connects 
these with strategies of inquiry and methods for collecting empirical data to support 
arguments with evidence (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). This research project is characterised 
as a qualitative study because we are committed to an interpretive approach in which we 
aim to scrutinise and criticise politics and methods of positivism (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1998). Positivist-oriented studies involve the use of research instruments based on an a 
priori conception of the issues under examination. In contrast, nonpositivist, e.g. 
constructivist, studies are characterised by discovery (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). In an 
ideal situation, as many decisions as possible will be made before the research project is 
carried out. In practice, however, it is impossible to finalise a design that will be ready to 
respond to any unforeseen circumstance. Especially studies that engage with exploratory 
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and developmental work, as this one does, are difficult to plan because later stages 
depend on the outcomes and experience made during earlier stages of a research project 
(Blaikie, 2009). Furthermore, unexpected events are likely to appear and thus can require 
improvisation and further adjustments which in the long run alter the research design. 
This study has experienced several critical events that affected the research design 
significantly. Therefore, to understand how the research design of this project came 
about, it is necessary to draw attention to significant factors that arose particularly in the 
early stages of the research project before proceeding to a detailed discussion on our 
methodological approach.  
4.1.1 Complications and discontinuities in the early stages of the research journey 
This research journey began in October 2009 located both in a different university and 
discipline than it has ended. Starting in a school of computing the initial research 
proposal envisaged exploring the take up of social media technologies in private 
organisations. However, the anticipated supervisory configuration to support this 
research interest did not come about due to institutional circumstances. Consequently, 
an alternative supervisory team was put in place. An unexpected consequence of this 
change was that the new supervisory team asked for a change in the direction the 
research was taking. This change was pursued to avoid an early topical bias and to be 
more general about researching a wider technological field. As it turned out later, this 
foresightful decision helped mitigate a practical problem that emerged during an 
exploratory data collection pilot. 
A first pilot study was conducted in a familiar organisation to probe the data collection 
strategy. This pilot raised critical issues about accessibility to relevant participants in the 
target organisation. An option would have been to look for another case study. 
However, this option was discarded for the reason that the pilot study organisation 
indicated the possibility to sponsor the study if it was adapted according to its 
requirements. Since funding for this study was not fully secured at that time, we decided 
to take advantage of the opportunity. As a result, the initially proposed research focus 
was adapted to accommodate the new research object. What started as improvised 
workaround, turned into a strong empirical case study in terms of accessibility and 
depth of data. The supervisory advice to change the direction of the doctoral research 
and to take a more general stance on the study of technology resonated well with the 
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early experience in the field. Instead of researching the narrow subject of social media, 
the focus turned towards the general development and implementation of information 
technologies. 
A further disturbance affected this research project when one of the PhD supervisors 
took up a position in another university in September 2010. Since this supervisor was the 
driving force for changing the initial research focus, his departure left a gap in the 
intellectual guidance for this study despite the effort to keep the supervisory 
configuration going for occasional meetings were still manageable. As a result of the 
change in direction, the weakened supervisory support and complications in the early 
stages of the research journey, doubts about the match of the research topic with the 
institutional setting cropped up. Eventually, a radical decision was made to transfer to 
the current university and research institution that was found to be more suitable to and 
experienced in doing research on the new research focus. The transfer was undertaken in 
August 2011 – by which time the majority of data had been collected. 
4.1.2 Implications on the articulation of research questions 
A problem emerging from these complications was inconsistency in the research design. 
Uncertainties and unexpected shifts in the supervisory team, the institutional context 
and the case study organisation took their toll and complicated the establishment of a 
clear line of sight on the research purpose. What began as a curiosity about the emerging 
trend of social media, micro-blogging in particular, turned into a general examination of 
the role and influence of technology in professional organisations and eventually to a 
detailed investigation of the innovation process of a particular technological artefact. 
These extrinsically-motivated shifts in research interests complicated the process of 
translating the research problems under investigation into clear research questions. 
Although precise research questions are perceived as one of the most important elements 
of a research project it is acknowledged that they can be emergent in their composition 
(Blaikie, 2009; Creswell, 2009). Indeed, the use or non-use of research questions can be 
dependent on both the purpose of the study and personal preference (Punch, 2000). An 
alternative to narrowing down the research focus could be to uphold a broader focus in 
order to examine the ‘problem behind the research’, particularly in cases of unfolding 
studies (Punch, 2000, p. 16).  
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This thesis represents a somewhat idiosyncratic case of an ‘unfolding’ study, where 
important circumstances were unstable in the first years. Consequently, this research 
remained broadly focused on the case study at hand. Postponing the narrowing down 
on specific research questions, the data collection stage maintained a broad perspective 
as we collected a wide range of information about actors and dynamics involved in the 
technological project concerned. Although some research questions were formulated for 
occasional oral presentations to academic audiences, they were not the driving influence 
until late in the research project, by which time they had been radically reformulated. 
Thus, the revised research questions in this thesis are those articulated in the course of 
this study, and are used as signposts to guide the analyst and the reader through our 
research journey to analyse findings from a largely completed empirical study to reach 
our final conclusions (Creswell, 2009). We argue that had this research project 
encountered fewer difficulties, it probably would have been easier to identify specific 
research questions earlier and, thus, this study could have unfolded differently. 
However, we were required to adapt to these circumstances. Our research focus was 
rather broad and not closely specified and progressed in a somewhat pragmatic manner. 
This led us to adopt a distinct investigatory strategy. Indeed, the methodological 
emphasis of this study was greatly influenced by the availability of a broad and rich set 
of data. 
4.1.3 Research problems and corresponding research questions 
As explained in the previous section, the eventual research questions were articulated 
very late in the research project and, thus, are articulated predominantly as signposts for 
the reader. After overcoming practical obstacles and settling in a new institutional 
environment, the major driving force of this study was the intention to disentangle the 
many intertwined stories that had been discovered in multiple locales during the data 
collection. We developed an interest in understanding how and why these spatially and 
temporally dispersed stories and practices concurred with each other in the social 
shaping process of the technology concerned. Translating this initial research interest 
into research questions, two major research questions can be phrased as follows:  
RQ1. How does the development of a technological artefact in a private 
enterprise come about in the first place, and  
RQ2. how does a technological project sustain itself over time? 
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The first question addresses the corporate-historical influences that patterned the unique 
organisational and ecological backdrop which allowed the technological project to 
emerge. We wanted to understand not just how the technology was developed but also 
why it was there in the first place. The second question addresses the circumstance that 
the development proceeded over an extended period of time. It appeared rather unusual 
for a research department in a car company to sustain the development of a highly 
specialised technological artefact over more than a decade. Thus, we were interested in 
learning about what motivated individual actors and institutional players to keep 
dedicating time and resources to the project. 
Another research problem began to appear in terms of analysing the empirical data and 
narrating the results. The more this complexity was explored the more it became 
apparent that prevalent theories on technology failed to appreciate and to reflect the 
nuanced interdependence of multiple innovation processes in technological change 
dynamics. Instead of narrowing down the focus, and thus reducing the complexity of the 
case at hand, we decided to embrace and to make sense of this complexity. 
Consequently, the methodological struggle became the analytical centre stage of this 
research project. The research question that would describe this emergent research 
problem can be articulated as: 
RQ3 How to analyse and to report the long and complex story of a technological 
project considering historical and ecological influences? 
This research problem emerged when the methodological limitations of prevalent 
theories and frameworks were identified in the process of making sense of and 
explicating the data analysed. By phrasing this research question we aim to make explicit 
the emergent nature of our major research interest which is to find an approach that 
coherently takes into account the history, context and content of a technological project 
and the social shaping of the corresponding technological artefact. In the following 
section we will elaborate how we proceeded to address the identified research problems. 
It documents how we set out to answer these research questions. 
4.2 Research strategy 
The research strategy describes in general terms how the researcher goes about 
conducting the study. It details on the set of skills, assumptions and practices that are 
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being applied to put the research design into practice (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). Our 
research strategy has been shaped in line with our research interests. Although the 
research interests changed in course of the study, especially in the early years, the major 
focus remained on technological dynamics within a specific case study organisation. The 
research strategy was developed according to the intention to explore the role and 
influence of technology in that organisation. After the transfer of this doctoral research 
project to a different academic institution, parts of the strategy had to be interpreted 
anew and in the light of a new perspective. 
4.2.1 A biographical approach to research design 
The ‘Biography of Artefact and Practices’ perspective is an emerging approach to define 
a methodological guideline for the social study of technology (see section 2.3.3.2). The 
biographical perspective calls for a longitudinal and strategic approach to study 
technological processes which reach across multiple locales and unfold in different 
speeds. Technology analysts are encouraged to design a research project to take into 
account these spatial and temporal nuances of technological change. First and foremost, 
a biographical account requires a diverse set of data. To collect this data, we drew on 
methods from multiple research strategies including case study research, participant 
observation and the historical method.  
Rather than applying each strategy independently from each other, these strategies 
supplemented each other throughout the data collection process. Such a combinatorial 
application of different methods was necessary due to the emerging understanding of 
the case under investigation. The ethnographic investigation yielded detailed 
information about events and activities involving the technological project and its 
immediate vicinity. These insights about individual actors and practices were then put 
into perspective by a broader examination of historical contexts which on the other hand 
produced new leads for the ethnographic investigation of different locales or moments 
in the innovation process. Hence, the data collection was a reciprocal process in which 
the utilisation of one method informed and called for the utilisation of the other method. 
Utilisation of multiple methods is a common approach in science and technology studies 
where longitudinal analyses take into account historical contexts of current or recent 
developments. Describing this systematically is the concern of the biography 
perspective. Applying a mix of ethnographic and historical approaches in scope of a 
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biographical study of a technology and in scope of a doctoral study has been pioneered 
in the examination of a health care technology (Hyysalo, 2004). Strategic ethnographies 
combine decades of social analyses of manufacturing-related technologies that draw on 
historically grown sets of interrelated studies. These studies shed light on historical 
developments in the broader technological field as well as on the locales of individual 
firms and actors (Pollock & Williams, 2009). Recent contributions reaffirm that the 
empirical intertwinement of historical and ethnographic perspectives in the studies of 
technologies and practices has been widely adopted and that it is gaining more traction. 
The biographical approach has been advanced by studies of various technologies and 
practices including the investigation of virtual worlds (Johnson, 2010), dynamics of 
dispersed peer-innovation (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015), novel conceptualisations of the 
innovativeness of technical artefacts (Höyssä & Hyysalo, 2009) and of users of 
technology (Pollock & Hyysalo, 2014), and the evaluation of new concepts in the 
interaction of users and developers (Hyysalo & Hakkarainen, 2014). Hence, this study 
continues this line of research and contributes to the biographical approach by 
examining dynamics of a technology project within a large corporation. The following 
sections will introduce and discuss the different strategies in more detail to highlight the 
strength of partially overlapping methods applied to this study. 
4.2.2 Case study 
Historically, the case study approach has suffered from discussions that confused it with 
techniques of data collection and analysis. But it re-emerged in the 1980s when it was 
found to be a flexible approach adaptable to the purpose of a study, be it as a research 
strategy or a method to select sources of data (Blaikie, 2009). Case studies are applicable 
in both qualitative and quantitative studies. The approach also suits different research 
purposes including studies that seek to explore, describe or explain social phenomena 
(Yin, 1994). The case study strategy is recommended when investigating a contemporary 
phenomenon that is intricately connected with its social context (Yin, 1994). It is this 
feature that makes the case study particularly suitable for the purpose of examining a 
technological artefact.  
Although the technology flags our main entity of interest, its genesis is intricately 
connected to its historically shaped surrounding. Thus, attention is dedicated to the 
unity of both technological and social change which is embodied by the notion of the 
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technological project. This understanding of a technological project differs from how a 
project is commonly defined in an industrial context. While the latter type of project 
usually has clearly defined boundaries, in terms of budget and duration, the 
interpretation of a technological project that we adopt for the purpose of this study is 
much broader in the sense that it transcends time and space. The constituents of the 
technological project change as time moves on. The artefact changes in shape, 
individuals involved come and go, new sponsors are enrolled while others cease their 
allocation of resources to the project etc. Thus, the unit of analysis of this case study is 
the technological project as it shapes and is being shaped by its socio-political 
surrounding. In contrast to a holistic case study, which focuses on global features of a 
case organisation, this is an embedded case study that examines in detail how events 
unfold across sub-units of one and the same organisation (Yin, 1994). The embedded 
case study allows studying technological and organisational change in tandem as 
processes span various levels and locales simultaneously (Blaikie, 2009). 
A narrow case study can yield detailed insights, but it also marks a weak spot as there is 
a risk that the larger social setting may drop out of the frame (Yin, 1994). Such 
methodological limitations in conventional studies of technology have been frequently 
criticised and are the reason for the development of the biography perspective (Pollock 
& Williams, 2009). To avoid this shortcoming and to keep sight of the greater picture, we 
followed the new perspective’s principles and applied a mix of research strategies. 
Especially the historical method shed light on the corporate history and helped relating 
micro-level findings to broader events which unfolded across multiple locales and at 
different timescales. Applying the historical method to supplement the case study 
approach was not a one-off event. It informed our research activity throughout the 
research project as has been deployed at multiple occasions often triggered by new 
insights gained from ongoing data collection activities. Another criticism of the case 
study approach is its apparently insufficient capability for generalisation. Being a 
bottom-up approach generalisation is based on specifics of a limited number of cases, or 
even one case as in this study. This “may result in narrow and idiosyncratic theory” and 
misses the grandeur of theories such as resource dependence, population ecology or 
transaction costs (Eisenhardt, 2002, p. 30). However, a case study approach aims at a 
different level. Generally, multi-sited approaches have been earmarked for contributing 
to a better understanding of the space between micro and macro-scale theories, 
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identified as the middle range of theory (Hine, 2007). In contrast to ‘statistical 
generalisation’ where inferences are made about population based on samples, the case 
study approach draws on ‘analytical generalisation’ which, comparable to individual 
experiments, allows for testing, validating and advancing of existing theories (Yin, 1994). 
Applying the ‘Biography of Artefact and Practices’ perspective in line with theories of 
social shaping and social learning increases the validity of our approach and outcomes 
as we base the methodological approach on existing knowledge and contribute to its 
further advancement. 
4.2.3 Ethnography and participant observation 
The definitions of participant observation and ethnography can be ambiguous and 
sometimes are used interchangeably (Delamont, 2004). Both terms describe the practice 
of studying a group of people by immersing in their culture and social environment and 
by exploring the nature of social phenomena over an extended period of time (Atkinson 
& Hammersley, 1998; Bryman, 2004). The definition of ethnography, however, can range 
broadly from a philosophical paradigm to a research method (Atkinson & Hammersley, 
1998). Its prevailing feature is that besides describing the method of research it also 
refers to the written outcome of a research (Bryman, 2004). At the end of the day, 
ethnography is “a theorized account of the culture studied with ethnographic methods” 
(Delamont, 2004, p. 207). In this study we draw on the method of participant observation 
with its ethnographic elements for it covers a mixture of observation, interviewing, note-
taking and document analysis (Delamont, 2004). The ethnographic approach played a 
major role in facilitating the interaction with the case study strategy and the historical 
method. New findings discovered in the field informed the further application of the 
other strategies. For example, interviews that uncovered the participation of another 
organisational player initiated an exploration of the history of that new player. Historical 
findings, on the other hand, deepened understanding and allowed more detailed 
questioning in the field. 
The level of immersion is also the boon and bane of this strategy because ethnographic 
data can be susceptible to specific weaknesses. Particularly talk-based data can be 
misleading in several ways. Interviewees can provide false information by telling lies or, 
if they are not aware of being lied to themselves, mislead the interviewer by giving 
incorrect accounts of facts and events. Further, the researcher can be misled because 
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informants can be unaware and unreflective about certain aspects of their own activities. 
These potential methodological pitfalls have been described as the ‘ethnographic 
illusion’ to remind the researcher of the multiple layers of mediation a piece information 
can pass before being written up (Van Maanen, 2002). Maintaining distance to the object 
of study is another challenge for the student of ethnographic methods. A researcher 
unfamiliar to a social and cultural setting generally has fewer difficulties in spotting 
interesting aspects worth closer inspection (Delamont, 2004). Because we had privileged 
access to the case study organisation due to prior engagements, it was more challenging 
to be critical and analytical in our approach. It is likely that our analytical struggle to 
narrow down the focus was connected with our familiarity of the case study 
organisation study – an issue that had been somewhat resolved by expanding the scope 
of the analytical focus to cover the overall technological project rather than narrowing 
down on a specific feature within it. 
4.2.4 Historical method 
The previous two strategies address primarily matters of space. The case study approach 
delimits the organisational boundaries of this study while the ethnographic approach 
locates our position within the cultural confines of particular groups of actors. With the 
use of the historical method we are stressing temporal concerns pertinent to this study. 
Time can be divided into three parts: the past, the present and the future. Historian John 
Lewis Gaddis (2002) prefers  
“to think of the present as a singularity [...] through which the future has 
got to pass in order to become the past. The present achieves this 
transformation by locking into place relationships between continuities 
and contingencies: on the future side of the singularity, these are fluid, 
decoupled, and therefore indeterminate; however, as they pass through it 
they fuse and cannot then be separated.” (Gaddis, 2002, p. 30) 
Continuities are defined as patterns that extend across time, whereas contingencies are 
phenomena that do not from patterns. When the present is viewed as a process that zips 
up continuities and contingencies, then structure is the survivor of passed processes 
(Gaddis, 2002). Further, if space is understood as the location where events take place, 
then the past is a landscape and the historical method the effort of mapping out what 
happened when and where (Gaddis, 2002). In this sense, the historical method supports 
an ecological understanding of reality. Mapping historical events enables the analyst to 
examine how individual events interacted with each other across time and space. This 
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historical-ecological perspective takes into account qualitative changes over time and 
provides more insights than merely looking at the sum of all parts (Burgelman, 2011).  
Some argue that a key difference between historians and social scientists is found in the 
origin of data (Goldthorpe, 1991). While social scientists are privileged in being able to 
generate their own data, historians are bound to what has been preserved over time, e.g. 
archival documents, or what relics are being discovered, for example, by excavations, 
sometimes by chance as in the recent case of a thirteenth-century slab and the skeleton of 
what is believed to be a knight or other nobleman that have been discovered during the 
demolishment of a car park nearby our research institute.  
What history and social science have in common is that research remains an interpretive 
enterprise (Tuchman, 1998). There is no “true” or “objective” meaning that can be 
uncovered with the historical method. Rather, the interpretation of historical information 
allows for multiple meanings to co-exist. Historical sociology is an approach to combine 
the historical method with methods from social sciences. For example, applying 
ethnographic methods to elicit events of contemporary history where eye witnesses are 
still accessible, MacKenzie (1990) produced one of the exemplary account of social 
shaping of technology in the case of guidance systems of nuclear ballistic missiles, a 
development that started in the post-war era.  
Our case study covers a period between the 1980s and the 2010s in which the first two 
decades are only examined from an historical point of view. We apply the historical 
method to map out the landscape, and the timescape (Gaddis, 2002), in which the 
technological development is embedded and by which its unfolding is influenced. The 
historical perspective complements our ethnographic approach and helps locating the 
technological development concerned in the broader context of recent corporate history. 
4.2.5 Researcher’s role 
A qualitative research approach relies on the interpretive competence of the analyst. This 
entails an element of subjectivity and biases that can affect the interpretation and 
analysis process. A way to mitigate such effects is to be aware of these influences and to 
reflect upon them (Creswell, 2009). In this section we highlight personal circumstances 
that had a significant influence on this study. 
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Despite our preference to use the plural pronoun for narrative purposes, this thesis has 
been written by a single individual with a personal history that affected the outcome of 
this research study. The most significant influence was our previous entanglement with 
the case study organisation. Prior to the doctoral research we have been working part-
time with the organisation for almost three years in parallel to our undergraduate 
studies. In particular, we were supervised by the employee who at one stage became the 
project manager of the technological project investigated in this study. It was due to this 
prior engagement that we selected the organisation as the site for the pilot study because 
we were familiar with the department and people involved. Our familiarity with the 
organisational context allowed us to align our academic research interest with the 
agenda of the industrial research team. Taking advantage of this strategic relationship 
was crucial for gaining access to the organisation and the people involved in the 
innovation process. In this case gaining access meant that we entered the project as an 
external contractor who was commissioned to support the industrial research team in 
their efforts of developing and implementing the technological artefact under 
development. From June 2010 to December 2011 we have been involved as participant 
observers in the technology project. Our role in particular was to support 
implementation efforts by identifying the training needs of new users and by developing 
training materials in cooperation with other collaborators. 
At the same time, our familiarity introduced elements of bias towards this study. 
Knowing about norms and cultural expectations of the specific organisational context 
influenced our ability to recognise taken-for-granted assumptions and the ability to be 
critical about phenomena we observed and experienced. This challenge to gain distance 
has been already addressed above. Reflective discussions with the supervisory team and 
the development of an analytical framework were two approaches to counteract these 
challenges. However, other challenges emerged during data collection which made the 
reporting of data problematic. For example, at some point the implementation of the 
technological artefact was in a critical state due to interpersonal conflicts between key 
project members. The incident was addressed in one empirical chapter but carefully 
worded because information was made available asymmetrically in this instance as some 
interviewees refused to comment while others were keen to address the issue. This is 
also a good example to indicate how triangulation of data in terms of getting data from 
multiple individuals familiar with an event was helpful in validating empirical data. 
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4.2.6 An overview of the case study context: CarCo and the NetworkPlanner 
The case study organisation selected for this research is a publicly-traded, multinational 
automotive corporation based in Germany with a historical timeline that dates back 
more than a hundred years. In the financial year 2014, CarCo was among the top 10 
automotive manufacturers worldwide in terms of revenue (Statista, 2015). CarCo 
distributes a range of vehicles that are sold across multiple brands. It is structured in five 
business units of which four are concerned with the production of vehicles while the 
fifth business unit deals with financial services. The four operational divisions are 
differentiated by the type of vehicle manufactured. To distinguish these divisions in this 
study we refer to them as cars, trucks, buses and vans division, respectively. Each 
division operates independently but is accountable to the management board which 
manages the enterprise and represents it in dealings with third parties. 
The technology concerned in this study, referred to as the NetworkPlanner, had been 
developed by a team of industrial researchers. This team was based in CarCo’s research 
organisation which will be referred to as the research group. Although the research 
group provides services to all operational divisions, it was located organisationally 
within the cars division. Senior management of the research thus reported to the cars 
division management team. The team of industrial researchers was the main locale 
examined in this study. However, other departments within the operational divisions 
also played an important role in this case study. The technological artefact was 
developed for and implemented in strategic planning departments. These departments 
were concerned with conducting strategic analyses of production networks and site 
locations to inform decision making processes.  
The NetworkPlanner is a decision support system informing strategic planning 
processes. In particular it supports strategic planners in the quantitative analysis of a 
large number of scenarios. It does so by analysing different sets of data including, for 
example, capacity details of manufacturing sites, transportation and manufacturing 
costs, bills of materials, market forecasts and others. Drawing on operations research 
methodologies the information system applies highly-specialised mathematical models 
tailored to CarCo’s specifications to process data and to identify optimal solutions based 
on both the given set of data and the selected minimum/maximum function. 
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4.3 Data collection 
Qualitative research is generally characterised as an inquiry paying attention to describe 
phenomena in relation to organisational contexts, to interpret processes and the meaning 
thereof, and to develop understanding about social phenomena (Silverman, 2014). This 
research was a qualitative exploration of events and developments of past times as well 
ongoing processes witnessed at that time. The research strategy section above outlined in 
generic terms the rationale of our approach to collected data about relevant events and 
processes in respect of this case study. Although we identified a set of three different 
approaches, they have much in common in regards of actual data collection procedures. 
We gathered different data from multiple sources and multiple perspectives to inform 
our interpretation of the social order and meanings of events and developments in 
relation to the innovation project. In this section we will discuss the multiple means by 
which we collected different data to explore the research problems described in the 
beginning of the chapter. 
4.3.1 Participant observations 
We begin with reporting on qualitative observations for it allows us to sketch the 
timeline of our exposure to CarCo. Collaborating with the team of industrial researchers 
we were granted access to the research department where parts of the NetworkPlanner 
were being developed – basic software components were coded by an external software 
house following instructions from the industrial researchers. The collaboration with 
CarCo ran from July 2010 to November 2011. During this time we spent different periods 
in the field varying from one to three weeks. Between field trips we returned to 
Edinburgh to continue with other research activities. Thanks to a direct flight route of a 
low cost airline between Edinburgh and a regional airport in Germany, it was possible 
and within budgetary limits to strike a balance between research work in Edinburgh and 
fieldwork. Drawing on an overview of flight records we estimate that we spent about 
30% of our time during this period doing field work. The extensive and prolonged 
exposure to the case study organisation and individuals involved enabled us to learn 
about and “to reflect the detail, the subtleties, the complexity and the interconnectedness 
of the social world” under investigation (Denscombe, 1998, p. 149). Being part of the 
team made possible to see the technological project through the eyes of the insiders. We 
observed activities and events that would not have been captured had we not physically 
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been there. We learned to understand the (technical) language of our research subject 
and to map the contexts of various social settings.  
Our initial struggle of finding a clear research focus contributed to enriching our 
participant observation experience. Instead of narrowing down the focus on a particular 
process or aspect of the technological project we started out exploring various directions. 
Although in the beginning this was a tenacious undertaking it became more insightful 
the more was learnt about past events from both formal interviews and informal 
conversations with project members. The main locales for observation were the offices of 
the industrial research team. Besides frequent informal interactions on-site and off-site 
with members of the project we also were allowed to attend meetings and workshops 
with customers and collaborating partners. These were valuable opportunities to 
observe, for example, how the researchers, representing vendors of a technological 
artefact, dealt with current and potential customers. 
Developing trustful relationships, we expanded reach beyond the research department. 
Nine months into the field work, we were granted permissions to spend ten weeks in 
total working on-site in three user departments. It provided the opportunity to learn 
about the user requirements which, on the other hand, enabled us to deepen our 
understanding about the technological artefact and its meaning from a different 
viewpoint. Additionally, we spent another week with a consultancy firm specialised in 
providing operations research-based services and solutions which was involved in the 
development and implementation of the technological artefact. 
There are challenges that emerge from the immersive character of the method in the 
form of potential biases. The ‘ethnographic illusion’, as described by Van Maanen (2002), 
reminds us that unnoticed taken-for-granted assumptions and mediated interpretations 
of informants run the risk of skewing our own interpretation of reality. It is not possible 
to avert such risks completely but our awareness about such risks was an important 
preventive measure. Further, the collection of a mixed set of data was another way to 
improve validity of data. Drawing on findings from interviews and documents helped in 





Interviewing is among the most common methods in qualitative studies also because it is 
flexible in allowing a researcher to revisit data later assuming it has been recorded and 
transcribed (Yin, 1994; Bryman, 2004). We applied mostly an unstructured interviewing 
approach where we drew on a few notes to make sure that we covered a certain set of 
topics that we found the interviewee could be knowledgeable about due to her role in 
the project. Since this was an exploratory study, a structured approach would have been 
prescriptive leaving less leeway for the interviewee to expand on subjects that she was 
particularly aware of and which we did not anticipate. A challenge during the interviews 
was to encourage the interviewee to openly speak about her experience of the project 
while making sure that the interview did not go off track. All but nine interviews had 
been recorded and transcribed. Most interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. 
Depending on seniority and availability, a few interviews lasted just about 15 minutes 
but provided essential information. Where recording was not possible or not permitted, 
notes were taken instead. Generally, notes were taken in all interviews to trace the topics 
discussed and to help advancing the interview. At the beginning of each interview, 
interviewees were asked to sign an informed consent form to confirm that they have 
been made aware of conditions of anonymity and that their participation in the research 
undertaking is voluntary. Nine interviews were held over phone. In these cases 
interview partners were send the form via email and then asked to confirm that they 
have read the form and acknowledged its contents. 
In total, forty-four individuals have been interviewed. The majority of the interviews (34) 
were conducted in the first eighteen months after the collaboration with CarCo had been 
established (see Figure 4 for a time-line). Face-to-face interviews had been conducted on-
site in the workplaces of interview partners with one exception when an interview was 
held on the road during a journey to a meeting with customers (the vehicle was driven 
by a third person). This improvised setting was due to the limited availability of the 
interviewee who was an external collaborator based in London at the time. 
The last seven interviews were arranged with individuals who were not available during 
the main data collection stage. Mostly, these individuals had left the company. Their 
insights became necessary to provide details on the early history of the technological 




Figure 4 Timeline of interviews 
Most interviewees, twenty in total, were recruited from the research department which 
was the main locale of the technological development. With a few exceptions we 
managed to interview all researchers involved in the development of the artefact at some 
point of time. The most significant person that we could not locate was the first team 
leader of the research team. This gap was compensated with interviews of his colleagues. 
The user departments provided for the other big group of interviewees which numbered 
eighteen (see Figure 5 for an overview of interviewees per group). The ‘Others’ group 
comprises individuals of external organisations, e.g. the consultancy or software house, 
as well as individuals who were remotely involved in the project including a professor in 
the field of operations research, an internal patent lawyer and the director of an 
engineering consultancy. The latter individuals contributed in shedding light on social 
contexts of the development. In particular, the director of the engineering consultancy 
provided valuable insights and helped triangulating data by contributing a critical and 
external perspective on the early history of the technological project. We note that roles 
and job positions changed across time. Employees and students working with the 
research team switched to user departments. We also note that two individuals had not 
been interviewed face-to-face but were interviewed in course of the focus group which 
will be addressed below. The overview in Figure 5 is not a snapshot of some point in 
time but a representation of the organisational origins of an interviewee. A current 
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Figure 5 Overview of interviewees (per group) 
To protect the anonymity of interviewees and, at the same time, to maintain the 
readability of the empirical chapters, we are applying pseudonyms to refer to the 
interview data.  
The notion of the ‘ethnographic illusion’ reminds a researcher that information gathered 
from other people is susceptible to social and psychological flaws (Van Maanen, 2002). 
Besides the deliberate manipulation of facts, an informant can unknowingly be the 
provider of incorrect data when she herself was being lied to by others. Even if no foul-
play is involved, understanding of events and facts can be misconstrued due to lack of 
information or analytical capabilities. Talk-based data can be the best source of 
information but has to be treated with care and needs to be corroborated with data from 
other sources (Yin, 1994). Another weakness of the interviewing technique is the 
intervention by the researcher in guiding the process. Interview data is manufactured 
data (Silverman, 2014). By framing questions researchers can manipulate the production 
of data. It thus takes a skilled interviewer to elicit the kind of valuable data that is sought 
after. Our advantage was that the first interviewees were students doing placements in 
the research department who were more patient and forgiving when we were struggling 
in the beginning to make sense of the complexity of the technological project. 
4.3.2.1 Focus group 
Originating from commercial market research the focus group meeting is a particular 















specific subject area (Silverman, 2014). What is the most interesting characteristic of a 
focus group is the chance for group interaction. Rather than aggregating opinions, 
interaction and the joint construction of meaning are the focal points (Bryman, 2004). 
Initially, a focus group was not anticipated in the research design as we deemed it 
unrealistic to bring together a group of professionals dispersed organisationally and 
geographically. However, the former manager of the research department in which the 
industrial researchers were based proposed to organise a focus group meeting. In fact, 
the manager had retired at the end of 2009 and took the chance to refuse our request for 
a face-to-face interview. Instead, he insisted on us organising a get-together of relevant 
project participants in his home with an opportunity for a focus group discussion. We 
note that our previous employment with the research department, a time when we had 
the chance to interact and work with him occasionally, probably was a beneficial factor 
influencing his willingness to support our research activities, although under his terms 
only. 
The focus group meeting attracted eight individuals of which two had not been 
interviewed before. Three participants were researchers actively involved in the project 
at that time. Three participants also were involved in the project at some point but had 
moved on since or had retired, respectively. One attendee was from a user department 
and the remaining attendee was from a department providing legal advice to 
researchers. It lasted two hours and was recorded as well as transcribed. The discussion 
was organised in a way that each individual was given the chance to contribute his or 
her perspective. Because the attending participants represented project participants of 
different stages in the technological development, it was possible to arrange the 
discussion to follow a chronological order. We started the focused discussion revisiting 
the time before the project began and ended with the implementation as perceived by 
the only attending user representative. 
Although the focused group discussion did not elicit any substantially new piece of 
information, its most important contribution was the opportunity to negotiate, 
retrospectively, a commonly shared narrative about the journey of the technological 
development. In hindsight, the outcome of this focus group event was a valuable set of 
data for the triangulation and validation of the general narrative of the innovation 
process that shaped the technological artefact. As this method also represents a talk-
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based data collection technique, it is susceptible to similar weaknesses as single 
individual interviews. However, the interactive approach mitigates such risks as 
participants intervene and negotiate about the interpretation of meanings. Also, the 
common risk of individuals dominating the discussion (Denscombe, 1998) was mitigated 
by the informal setting of the meeting and the diversity of attending participants. 
4.3.3 Documents 
Juxtaposing a document with the transcription of an interview one could argue that both 
represent written text and as such could be treated similarly. For this reason, a document 
is distinct from a transcribed interview for it is created without the intervention of a 
researcher (Bryman, 2004; Silverman, 2014). An overview of all documents collected 
follows below. 
1) Materials on research programmes of public funding bodies. Documents and 
websites provided information on research programmes funded by public 
bodies including the European Commission, the German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research, and the Wing consortium, an industry-led global 
collaborative programme to advance research in manufacturing-related subjects. 
Information on the Fifth Framework Programme (1998-2002), the thematic 
programme on “Competitive and sustainable growth” in particular, and 
announcements of the Federal Ministry about research grants, especially on the 
“Research for the production of tomorrow” programme (1999, 2000), informed 
the understanding about the wider context of the technological project 
examined.  
2) Materials on publicly-funded projects. Information on the publicly-funded 
projects, SATFAB and LICOPRO, enriched understanding about the early stage 
activities of the researchers involved in the technological project. These were 
found on the websites of these projects, on the websites of institutions involved. 
3) Internal events and meetings. Agendas and other documents of internal events, 
such as inter-departmental meetings, user community events and the launch 
event, supported the development of a chronological overview of the 
technological development 
4) Functional descriptions of the artefact introduced technical features represented 
ideal states of the envisioned product. Interim reports on the development of the 
NetworkPlanner version 2 explained the modular functionality and use cases of 
the artefact. In contrast, a promotional document of a competing information 
system, GlobalDB, improved understanding about the functionalities of the 
technological development. 
5) Student dissertations and internship reports. In total, 85 documents from master 
students, doctoral students and students on work placements were accessed. 
121 
 
Student-made reports provided details on functional development of 
prototypes. A few individual dissertations provided valuable insights into the 
process of strategic planning and other relevant organisational practices. 
6) Internal archive of corporate newspapers and other media. The corporate 
intranet held archives of internal newspapers that documented special events 
and projects. Articles provided details on the public representation of the 
technology concerned and its application in larger projects. Further articles 
showcased the technological development when it was awarded the corporate 
innovation award in 2008. A particularly helpful document elaborated the global 
sales history of the company providing relevant information on historical 
strategic decisions. 
7) Annual business reports. Publicly available annual business reports of the case 
study company shed light on historical organisational developments. In 
particular, these documents revealed details on the establishment and 
transformation of the corporate research organisation. 
8) Social networking websites. Networking websites for professionals, in particular 
linkedin.com and xing.com, helped complementing chronological data on the 
involvement of individuals in the development, implementation and use of the 
artefact. 
9) Public archives on municipal developments. A report on the 20th anniversary of 
the science park, a cluster of R&D-focused firms and research institutions in the 
city of Ulm where CarCo’s largest research facility was based in, provided 
insights into the formation of the research facility in this particular locale. A 
time-line of the history of the science park, available on the website of the city of 
Ulm, depicts the chronological development of the research facility. 
We distinguished two sorts of documents in the data collection: documents about the 
organisation available in the public domain and documents for internal use only. The 
most relevant publicly available documents for us were annual reports of the overall 
organisation. We examined the annual reports of the last three decades to trace the 
recent history of CarCo, in general, and its organisation of research activities, in 
particular. The history of the overall firm was widely publicised. However, learning 
details about the organisation of its research activities required thorough reading of 
annual reports. Another relevant source on the history of the research facility was the 
documentation of the 20th anniversary of the science park where the facility was located 
at. Finally, from online archives of regional newspaper articles we gathered further data 
relevant to understand regional economic history. These public resources helped us to 




Documents produced for internal purposes were helpful in learning about corporate and 
project-related  processes and events. Here we distinguished three kinds of documents. 
First, a selection of corporate-wide available documents provided us with a public 
representation of the research project. Since the team was awarded the corporate 
innovation award it was widely publicised in the internal newsletter and intranet. This 
provided information about how the NetworkPlanner and its capabilities were 
presented to a wider audience. Second, project-related documents provided technical 
details and insights into negotiation processes between researchers, external developers 
and internal customers. This allowed us to get an intimate understanding of past 
meetings and other events upon which relevant decisions were made. An internal 
network folder where most files were stored was the most important source for project-
related documents with the exception that documents with sensitive user data where not 
accessible. Third, theses of students working with the industrial research team provided 
important insights into technical but also organisational details. Especially the one-page 
acknowledgement sections became a highly important resource for learning about 
relationships between students and industrial supervisors. Since we could not access 
databases to learn about employee details, the acknowledgement sections filled 
important gaps in our timeline. Thus, we were able to locate them on the time axis and 
we could trace their technical contributions to the shaping of the NetworkPlanner. 
Another supplementary source to fill this gap were online business networking websites 
like ‘Linkedin.com’ and ‘Xing.com’, its German equivalent. 
Documents by themselves are not as useful as they are in relation to other sources of 
data (Yin, 1994). Just like interview data it can be inaccurate and biased since documents 
also are produced to serve particular interests (Denscombe, 1998). Therefore, they are 
helpful in corroborating or contradicting other data if used carefully.  
4.3.4 Pilot case study 
A research project requires a serious commitment of time and resources. A pilot study 
gives the chance to explore areas of uncertainty or to learn about interesting areas that 
one has not been aware of previously (Janesick, 1998). Generally, pilot studies allow for 
testing the research design before fully committing to the research project as they “may 
reveal inadequacies in the initial design” (Yin, 1994, p. 52). Based on the performance of 
the pilot, researchers can recognise inadequate methods or flawed assumptions and 
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modify the design accordingly. Selection criteria for a pilot case study can be based on 
reasons of convenience including access and geographical proximity (Yin, 1994). For ease 
of access and familiarity with the organisational context we decided to approach CarCo, 
a former employer of ours, to test the research design and to learn more about our field 
of interest. After all, the initial research proposal was inspired by our previous work 
experience with this firm. 
About six months into our studies, in the first half of 2010, we reached out to former 
colleagues in a research department at CarCo. We managed to gain access to the 
organisation as a guest to collect a first set of data on the case study organisation. At this 
time we had not committed to a particular technology or research focus yet. By 
definition this approach was “much broader and less focused than the ultimate data 
collection plan” (Yin, 1994, p. 75). Before and during the pilot study we attempted to 
reach out to individuals working in departments that appeared particularly relevant for 
our research interest at that time. However, we failed to attract sufficient interest and the 
responses were negative. As a result the research design required modification. The 
resolution for this problem was relatively easy thanks to the contacts to our former 
colleagues. Instead of looking elsewhere in the organisation we modified our research 
interest according to the research activities pursued by the industrial research team we 
were most familiar with. Thanks to the previous decision to take a more general stance 
on the technology/society relationship it did not pose a big challenge to adapt our 
research approach and was still in line with the previous literature review. 
To summarise, the pilot study was a pivotal element in this research undertaking. It 
elicited problematic issues early on in data collection and, therefore, allowed us make 
necessary adjustments to the research purpose and design. It contributed significantly to 
shaping the research agenda as it required us to reconsider our situation and the range 
option available at that time. 
4.4 Data analysis 
Data analysis is the process of making sense of the data collected in a way to elicit 
evidence to support meaningful and conclusive findings. Two general strategies for 
qualitative data analysis are identified: analytic induction and grounded theory (Bryman 
2004; Blaikie, 2010). Grounded theory emphasises theory-building in iterative steps 
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which alternate between data collection and analysis. A central feature of this approach 
is the role of data as the ultimate foundation on which theory is built. In the analytically 
inductive approach, theory building starts out with a hypothesis informing the analytical 
process in which the examination of deviant/non-deviant cases guides further analysis. 
However, our case study approach afforded the application of another specific analytical 
strategy which is the reliance on theoretical propositions (Yin, 1994). We relied on 
theoretical propositions suggested by concepts deriving from theorisations of the social 
shaping of technology and social learning. These concepts guided our analytical gaze by 
foregrounding some processes and phenomena over others.  
Besides understanding how the technological artefact had been developed and 
implemented, a central question of this study was to understand ‘why’ all these 
processes happened and how they related to each other. Thus, we were led by a strategy 
of ‘explanation-building’. This is an analytical approach in narrative form that is 
supported by theoretically significant propositions (Yin,1994). Its process is characterised 
by gradually building explanations as a result of a series of iterations in which case 
study data is examined and theoretical positions are revised in turn.  
The analysis process was supported by the codification of data, which is the central 
activity in the analysis of qualitative data (Blaikie, 2010). It aims to reduce the complexity 
of raw data and allows its arrangement in a meaningful order. Documents were 
analysed following the principles of source criticism (Tosh, 1991; Kalela, 1999). Instead of 
analysing documents for their contents only, we took into account the role and 
intentions of the authors to put into perspective the reasons for producing those 
documents. Documents intended for public or wider audiences provided valuable 
contextual information. Internal documents were produced with certain political 
motivations and thus were treated with care. However, they were particularly useful to 
provide insights on technical details and specifics of the artefact and to triangulate other 
data.  
Rather than focusing on linguistic features or utterances of particular details, we applied 
grounded theoretical approaches to analyse the contents of the interview data (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). In a first step, open coding was applied to break down the interview 
data and to find meaningful categories. This provided an overview, for example, of the 
range of categories about activities and events individuals were involved in or 
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occurrences they knew about. In a second step, axial coding was applied to align 
categories in a meaningful order. Linking categories with each other produced an insight 
into chronological occurrences of events and other causal and otherwise meaningful 
relations. This multi-stage coding process helped categorising events and actions of 
individuals and collectives and linking these to wider contextual developments. The 
coding process was facilitated by Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis application.  
Another important process that guided our analysis was the development of an 
extensive timeline. Yin (1994) addresses the use of time-series and chronologies but 
relates them to quantitative analysis. Our timeline, on the other hand, was an attempt to 
relate and to align a mixed set of qualitative features along a time axis. Figure 6 shows a 
corkboard representation of the timeline which has been primarily developed in a 
spreadsheet format. The timeline spreadsheet became a crucial point of reference that 
helped in getting an overview and comprehensive understanding of the complex 
ecology of actors involved and events marking pivotal moments in the innovation 
project (for an aggregated version of the timeline spreadsheet see Appendix A). 
Furthermore, the timeline allowed developing a spatial map that helped making visible 
changes in spatial relationships, i.e. the ecological landscape, over time between the 
research group and other units of the company. Although the spreadsheet variant 
contained more details, the physical variant was developed as an additional iteration in 
order to get a different perspective – it also made for a better visual representation than 
the snapshot of a spreadsheet. Beside the first two markers, which remind of two 
decades of corporate history, each blue marker in the top lane indicates a year, starting 
with 2000. Each horizontal white strip (of tape) represents the involvement of an 
individual actor while the black strips separate organisational units. Significant events 
are marked by pieces of paper. The threads attempted to indicate spheres of influences of 




Figure 6 Visual representation of the case study timeline (corkboard variant) 
The visualisation is indicative of the different stages through which the technological 
project passed and, more generally, of the complexity inherent in the case study. It 
played an important role in reconstructing and ordering historical events. The timeline 
was also a helpful tool for triangulating data from other sources. 
In course of the data analysis process, we have attempted to interpret the timeline in 
various ways. The timeline represents the participation of individuals by plotting their 
periods of involvement along a temporal axis. This provided us with a small set of 
quantitive data which allowed us to experiment with various quantitative analysis tools. 
Before eventually settling with the spreadsheet representation, we tested other time-
series analysis applications. In particular, we tested the two open source applications 
TimeFlow6 and Gephi7. Both applications provided functions for the visualisation and 
analysis of quantitative data (for preliminary visualisations see Appendix B). While 
TimeFlow supports journalistic enquiries, Gephi was created to analyse larger sets of 
quantitative data. Despite Gephi’s focus on large data sets, it provided a timeline 
function to visualise change in data sets over time which was useful for our purpose. 
Our attempts in quantitative analyses did not follow a systematised approach. However, 
these experiments helped us in getting a better understanding of the interrelatedness 
and simultaneity of events and developments across multiple locales. Although we did 





not focus on the use of these quantitative tools, the experience contributed to the further 
analytical process and the elaboration of the detailed timeline spreadsheet. We 
continued experimenting with the quantitative data drawing on functions offered by the 
spreadsheet application (for examples see Appendix C). Biographical studies that draw 
on larger data sets with time periods could probably make better use of such 
quantitative tools and elaborate appropriate methods for timeline analysis.  
4.5 Validity and credibility of research 
Validation is a process by which we make claims about the quality and trustworthiness 
of data collected, e.g. its reliability (Yin, 1994), and our interpretations thereof (Kohler 
Riessman, 2002). Since terms such as validity and reliability carry connotations of 
quantitative research, alternative criteria have been proposed to do justice to the 
requirements of qualitative research including concepts such as credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Bryman, 2004). 
We will draw on the four latter criteria to argue for the quality and trustworthiness of 
this research. 
Why is our account of reality better than that of our informants? This is a major question 
to test the quality of procedures to collect and to analyse data.  It addresses the 
credibility of the data we produced and interpretations we made thereof. Two 
techniques to test credibility are respondent validation and triangulation (Bryman, 2004). 
The first technique describes the procedure whereby the researcher asks informants to 
give feedback on produced data or, if available, preliminary findings from analysed 
data. The second technique describes a procedure in which multiple data sources are 
used to corroborate or to contradict information to build a coherent account of reality. 
The focus group we organised at the end of the main data collection stage inherently 
applied both techniques at the same time. Drawing on our understanding of the main 
themes of this case study, we were able to get feedback on preliminary findings from 
multiple participants. The attending informants negotiated about a joint interpretation of 
these themes and thus corroborated findings during this process. More generally, since 
our prolonged study is characterised by a multi-local and multi-perspectival approach, 
we can argue that the research design allows catering for the credibility criteria by 
default. We note, however, that some authors question these techniques because, in their  
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view, the ‘situatedness’ of actions in particular contexts cannot be accounted for 
appropriately even by drawing on multiple methods and sources (Silverman, 2014). 
How can we apply findings from the case study of a German car company to other 
companies or institutions? Transferability raises issues of generalising findings from one 
context to another. In general, the case study approach has been questioned for its ability 
to making generalisations, mostly by critics who themselves operate in logics of 
statistical inference (Blaikie, 2009). In response, other forms of logics have been proposed 
for case study methodology including analytic generalisation (Yin, 2003; Blaikie, 2009). 
Analytic generalisation allows to link between case studies and, thus, supports theory 
development and testing. Our approach followed and contributed to the tradition of 
theorisation of the social shaping of technology. Consequently, we have drawn on a 
robust set of theoretical principles which have been applied and tested in numerous 
other studies examining technological projects in a variety of national and cultural 
settings. In that sense, we have applied methods of logical inference to increase 
replicability and validity of our approach by emphasising linkages to other theoretical 
and conceptual accounts (Mitchell, 2006). In summary, we argue that our findings offer 
valid theoretical contributions that can be generalised to other cases of technological 
developments which have similar empirical features, e.g. large organisations in the 
private sector. 
How can we trust in that the data was produced following commonly accepted 
operational procedures and that conclusions have been drawn free from personal biases? 
These questions of dependability and confirmability call for transparency in 
methodology and for reflection on our personal role in the research project. To address 
these issues it is suggested to adopt an auditing approach (Lincoln & Guba, 1982; 
Bryman, 2004). This approach aims to establish that research has been conducted 
“rationally” and that it represents a “fair” account of the phenomena observed (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1982, p. 5-6). In this chapter we elaborated the research design and the 
operational procedures according to which we conducted this research undertaking. We 
have done so to be transparent about the process and circumstances of how we 
generated data and how we drew conclusions from it. We also reflected in detail about 
the contingencies that patterned the unfolding of this research project and our personal 
involvement in the case study organisation. Opening this study for an audit and 
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providing an overview of the applied methods also corresponds to the intention to make 
available a guideline for other students of technology to follow. 
4.6 Ethical issues 
Above we have discussed matters of credibility to underscore our claims for the 
trustworthiness of this study. In this section we want to address ethical issues which 
underscore the integrity of a study (Bryman, 2004). Social research may constitute an 
intervention into the lives of individuals and social life in general (Blaikie, 2010). The 
consideration of ethical issues intends to avert the possibility of informants being put at 
risk due to their participation (Creswell, 2009). Since we studied an industrial context 
populated by highly skilled individuals, we did not work with vulnerable people like 
children or patients. Regardless of the status of participants, we took measures not to 
expose informants to any harm that could result from our activities. 
External research students were a common sight within the industrial research context 
and the technological project in particular. There was no need to hide our intentions or 
research activities. Thus, all participants and other collaborators had been made aware of 
our dual role as project member and participant observer throughout the data collection 
process. Being open about our status helped avoiding the risk of someone disclosing 
confidential material without knowing about our research interest (Denscombe, 1998). 
Besides, before we could engage with CarCo we were required to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement which prohibited us from disclosing any confidential material in the first 
place. Confidential material in this case concerned data of business cases that had been 
evaluated with the technology under investigation. For reasons of confidentiality, we 
also committed to not disclose the name of the case study organisation. Instead we draw 
on the pseudonym ‘CarCo’ to refer to the organisation throughout this report. 
To inform participants about their rights and to reassure them about efforts to protect 
these we handed out informed consent forms (Creswell, 2009). We prepared a form that 
provided our details, outlined the purpose of this research project and highlighted that 
participation was voluntary. Further, we guaranteed the anonymity of our informants 
and assured that the interview can be interrupted at any time. Our multi-local approach 
led us to conduct interviews at different locales. Thanks to the opportunity to do 
placements with different organisational units, we were granted access to different 
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departments and the respective members of the technological project. In addition to 
asking project members for interviews, we approached relevant gatekeepers, usually 




5 Empirical chapter 1: Historical transformations and 
contextual dynamics 
The motivation of this thesis is to understand how the technology concerned had been 
developed and, most importantly, why the technological development came about in the 
first place. In order to comprehend the origins of the development we have to go back in 
time and to other locales to examine events that preceded events and episodes involving 
the technology project. In this first empirical chapter, we will examine historically the 
dynamics and events that led to the initiation of the technological development (see 
Figure 7 for an overview of the empirical data discussed in this chapter).  
 
Figure 7 Overview of the innovation process addressed in chapter 5 
The first of the three sections in this chapter examines the corporate history of recent 
decades. It sheds light on how the struggle of implementing a grand vision shaped 
CarCo’s organisational landscape to the extent that the research group faced a difficult 
situation when a new grand vision was put in place. The second section reports how the 
research group created a new team to deal with organisational tensions. Finally, the third 
and last section describes how this team adapted to the tense situation by extending its 
activities to access resources from funding bodies outside the company. Next, we will 
begin with reporting how the research group was established as an organisational unit in 
the first place. 
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5.1 Historical context of CarCo’s research organisation 
CarCo’s research was not centrally organised until the establishment of a dedicated 
organisational unit in 1986. The circumstances of why and where the research division 
was established and how it was managed thereafter established crucial structural 
conditions that patterned later events. It was due to historical and local contingencies, 
involving not just CarCo but also regional and local administration and a higher 
education institution, that allowed a situation to arise in which a few individual 
researchers were assigned to work on subjects that later afforded the development of the 
strategic network planning system. An important historical precursor for these events 
was the appointment of a new CEO in 1987 who set in motion a momentous 
transformation of the company. 
In mid-1980s CarCo embarked on a journey to transform and expand its organisational 
landscape. Until the end of the decade, several companies were acquired that extended 
the range of products offered by CarCo. Further, a new CEO was appointed in 1987 who 
pushed to transform CarCo. His vision of an integrated technology company was 
informed by the idea to diversify CarCo in terms of the products manufactured and 
markets where those were sold to. This diversity strategy aimed at reducing dependence 
on few single markets and at the same time reducing the risks of volatility in these few 
markets.  
At the time when the new strategic approach was implemented CarCo had a 
homogeneous product portfolio focusing on passenger cars and utility vehicles. This 
narrow product portfolio made the company susceptible to the market volatility of the 
automobile sector.8 To put the new vision into practice the new CEO set out to expand 
the competencies of CarCo. What followed over the next years was a strategy of 
acquisitions. Traditionally CarCo produced automobiles for roads. After several 
acquisitions CarCo’s product portfolio comprised vehicles also for rails, aerospace and 
                                                          
8 Suddenly changing sales figures had an immediate impact on the overall performance 
of the company. Economic crises, such as the oil crises witnessed in the 1970s, reminded 
executives in the automobile sectors that political instabilities are a threat to their 
businesses. Diversification was a usual response to avoid single market dependencies 




waters. Besides expanding its automobile products, CarCo also significantly expanded 
its capabilities to produce electronic goods. 
5.1.1 Research and technology consolidated in new central department 
After a period of rapid growth the landscape of CarCo had been strongly transformed. 
Newly acquired and integrated firms with different organisational structures extended 
CarCo’s and challenged its executives to align everything according to an overall 
structure. These needs of realignment were met with internal reorganisation efforts. One 
of the significant internal changes was the establishment of a central division for 
research and technology in 1986 (Document: Annual Business Report, 1986). Besides 
organisational reasons there were also exogenous motivators to restructure the 
organisation. An important objective for CarCo’s researchers was to address increasing 
environmental restrictions imposed by German and European regulators.9 Car 
manufacturers bore the consequences of stricter emission regulations. Meeting new 
regulations required the development of more efficient combustion engines and other 
technical components that emitted less pollutants. Another impetus for centralisation of 
R&D was the increasing diffusion of new technologies into the manufacturing domain, 
information technologies in particular. 10  Thus, even prior to CarCo’s organisational 
expansion, increasing legal requirements and the general advance of technology pushed 
CarCo’s existing research laboratories already to their limits. With the acquisition of 
                                                          
9 The increasing awareness of environmental pollution peaked in the public debate of the 
causes for acid rain throughout Europe in the 70s and 80s. Particularly in Germany, the 
public was sensitive to the subject and demanded political interventions which came in 
the form of stricter regulations for industry. 
10 From an information-technological perspective, the 1950s are characterised by military 
inventions and developments spilling over to industry and businesses. Computers and 
information technologies found their way into workplaces and shop floors. Sites of 
manufacturing were first equipped with stock and inventory control systems in the 
1960s. The development continued with Material Requirements Planning (MRP) systems 
in the 1970s and Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II) systems in the 1980s 
(Pollock and Williams, 2009). Similarly, other information technological developments 
occurred in different settings. Increasing volumes of international trade handled by 
customs in mid-1960s saw the emergence of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to speed 
up transfer of information and reduce costs. Emerging standards in the 1970s eased 
implementation and offered cost reductions to other industries dealing with vast 
quantities of materials and goods (Gifkins & Hitchcock,1988). These and other 
technologies challenged the principles of conventional manufacturing systems but also 
offered new ways to tap into new profitable opportunities. 
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firms, CarCo’s research capacities to do and to manage research were further stressed. 
Particularly the acquisition of an electronics company contributed to great extent to a 
rapid increase of employees working in research laboratories. For this reason CarCo 
restructured its research organisation to consolidate all research activities in a single 
organisational unit. 
For large, companies with distinct ‘mechanistic’ hierarchical structures, reorganisation 
and establishment of new organisational units is a common response to deal with change 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961). Changes to internal and external conditions are met with 
redefinitions of functions and responsibilities as well as reshuffling of capacities and 
resources. In this light, the consolidation of both research and technology into a separate 
organisational unit was a comprehensible move. The new division pursued three areas 
of activity. Firstly, it would host product and production-related research. Secondly, the 
division would be responsible to deal with information technology by tracking and, if 
applicable, exploiting technological opportunities. And finally, it would coordinate 
centrally the utilisation of technical facilities within CarCo.  
A year after the establishment of the new division, research executives were looking for 
a way to harmonise the diverse research activities undertaken within the transformed 
CarCo organisation. In pre-diversification times, research activities in predevelopment 
departments were both located closely to production plants and aligned closely to the 
requirements of specific business segments. With an increasingly heterogeneous range of 
products, research-in-progress did not reflect the more diversified research-needs of the 
new organisational landscape. In tandem with the establishment of a dedicated 
organisational unit for research and technology, a new facility was envisioned to provide 
a central home for current as well as future researchers. The idea was to consolidate 
CarCo’s research also in a physical location. Thus, a visible landmark of CarCo’s 
diversification and consolidation strategy was the construction of a new research facility 
in early 1990s.11 
                                                          
11 The decision to construct a new facility was also contingent on certain local and 
regional developments. The electronics company acquired by CarCo employed about 
400 industrial researchers in the city of Ulm. Around the same time, this city was over-
proportionally affected by an economic crisis triggered by closure of large 
manufacturing sites in recent years (Stadt Ulm, 2006). Local councillors were keen to 
attract new investments to fill these gaps and thus allied with the University of Ulm and 
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5.1.2 Open agenda for the new research facility 
CarCo envisioned the new research facility as a space to yield synergy effects of a 
diversified company. However, the company had no experience yet about how to 
proceed and to develop a research agenda for a heterogeneous organisation in the 
beginning. It was commonly perceived that the research policy should not aim to fulfil 
the requirements of just one division. Indeed, it was stressed that CarCo’s research, in 
general, ought to undertake cross-functional research that would produce outputs 
relevant for a wider set of products. Translating these broad requirements into a concrete 
research agenda was a piecemeal undertaking.  
The annual business report (Document: Annual Business Report, 1990) published in the 
year when the construction of the research facility had begun, explained that the 
definitions of research foci and the qualifications of new researchers yet to be recruited 
were the next items on the agenda. In practice this early uncertainty about research 
objectives entailed enhanced privileges over funding and personnel, and increased 
freedom of decision making about the research agenda by the researchers themselves. As 
Patrick, the former head of a research department, recalled: 
“I remember, when I started to work in the CarCo’s research, there was [a 
former head of research] who said ‘Do cutting-edge research and come 
back in four years to show results’. […] many of the [research] subjects, 
which were started in our department, they did not develop because 
some director told us ‘do that’ but because they emerged bottom up” 
(Patrick, former head of the research department, focus group interview, 
12 November 2011).  
Such a free mode of operation was not arbitrary - large companies are rather known for 
strict hierarchical orders - but a consequence of the rapid increase of research capacities 
and the yet unanswered question of how to translate the vision of a newly-forged, 
integrated technology firm into a concrete research programme of a newly established 
division.  
                                                                                                                                                              
the regional government of the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg to push for the 
development a so-called science park, an innovation cluster following the model of 
Silicon Valley, on the outskirts of the city (Stadt Ulm, 2006). Since the support of the 
regional government was bundled with public funding, CarCo accepted the invitation to 
take part in the undertaking and decided to locate its new research facility in the newly 
established science park. 
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The intellectual freedom of the early years was soon confined by initiatives of senior 
management to wrest control over research activities and to move these away from basic 
research towards a more business-related agenda. CarCo began to cultivate a culture of 
strategic and entrepreneurial thinking (Document: Annual Business Report 1992). It also 
encouraged their researchers to become “entrepreneurs within the enterprise” 
(Document: Annual Business Report 1993). In 1994, a control mechanism was introduced 
to assess the performance of research projects (Document: Annual Business Report 1994). 
Research projects were audited regularly in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness. To 
pass the audit, a research project had to prove that it met international standards and 
that it could match with competitors as well as demonstrate high potential for success. 
The requirement to implement this critical review process indicates that the performance 
of some research projects, which were initiated prior to the implementation of rigour 
audits, was in some way unsatisfactory. These attempts to influence and control research 
activities indicate the relatively loose alignment of research projects to the requirements 
of CarCo’s operational divisions at that time. 
5.1.3 Vision did not materialise and was succeeded by an economically oriented 
vision 
After almost 10 years the vision of an integrated technology company did not prove 
successful in economic terms. Timing also turned out not to be in favour of risky 
undertakings as an economic crisis and a looming recession where under way in the 
early 1990s. Throughout the German automobile industry, operational efforts were 
targeted at implementing rationalisation measures. ‘Leanness’ and lean production was 
the leading management fashion among German executives (Benders & Bijsterveld, 
2000).  
Eventually a change in CarCo’s board heralded the end of an era of organisational 
diversity in 1995. A new CEO was appointed who put emphasis on the shareholder 
value and de facto abandoned the vision of an integrated technology firm. CarCo’s 
traditional core competencies in producing cars and other vehicles were again set as the 
leading corporate mission. This triggered yet another corporate-wide reorganisation to 
undo previous transformations. In the years to follow, parts of the company were 
scrutinised and evaluated according to their contribution to the new shareholder value-
led vision. Many of the organisational units acquired and integrated in the past decade 
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experienced substantial changes. Profitable units were consolidated. Problematic units 
were downsized or, if no other acceptable option was found, sold off or liquidated.  
The research group was not exempt from this new wave of transformational changes. 
Although it did not witness dramatic structural changes as did other organisational 
units, it was affected generally by rationalisation programmes that were felt throughout 
the research group. An interviewee from the research team indicated that the mood 
among employees in the research group, who saw their privileges shrinking, darkened 
as a result of these rationalisation efforts. 
5.1.4 From excellence to efficiency: change in the evaluation culture 
For the research group and the new research facility these developments had particular 
consequences. Because the product portfolio was subsequently cleared of products not 
directly related to automobiles, the cross-functional research projects increasingly lost 
their anticipated realm of application. For example, advantages of economics of scope 
necessary for the cost-effective utilisation of a new technology were not achievable any 
longer in a smaller and more homogeneous company landscape. An indicator for the 
unsatisfying success of research activities was the low transfer rate of research outputs 
into products or the production system after the completion of projects in later years. 
Arguably, this low spillover was the result of a research programme that was relatively 
loosely coupled to the specifications of the automobile-producing divisions of CarCo, as 
the former head of the research department explained previously. However, blame for 
this apparent underperformance is not exclusively to be sought among researchers. This 
perceived lack of value of research outcomes is also to be interpreted in light of the 
changes triggered by the new direction pursued by CarCo’s board of management. 
The change in the management board did not only bring a new order in the social 
structure of decision makers but also a cultural change of how performance ought to be 
interpreted and evaluated in the entire firm. Under the previous corporate vision the 
research division was regarded as a bridge between the diverse operational divisions. 
The proponents of the integrated technology firm hoped that cross-functional research 
would provide equal benefit to all divisions. This belief manifested in expectations on 
research outputs. Konrad (2006) describes how ‘collective expectations’ influence 
generally the perceived worth of potential project outputs in favour of dominating 
evaluation criteria. Collective expectations implicitly shared by a larger group can 
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persuade a sceptical individual to back an undertaking despite having second thoughts. 
The vision of the integrated technology firm perpetuated a culture where technological 
excellence was the dominating criteria. This created a protected space where research 
projects were evaluated and selected primarily based on promises of technological 
excellence. Thoughts about the ultimate application of research outputs and economic 
considerations were of secondary order. The new vision with its focus on shareholder 
value - a perspective that puts economic considerations at the fore-front - triggered a 
top-down cultural change reversing that order. Previously taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the value of research outputs changed and were replaced by new 
assumptions based on different expectations. Suddenly, technological excellence as 
criteria was degraded in favour of economic factors. The new evaluation regime affected 
how the worth of existing projects was interpreted. A project that was previously 
evaluated as worthwhile due to the potential excellence of its research output lost its 
worth due to the suddenly leveraged priority of economic factors. 
5.1.5 Research organisation facing increased internal pressure 
CarCo’s strategic redirection and the later resulting low research transfer rate due to the 
change in the corporate landscape had a negative effect on the research group in the long 
run. The notion of research as a strategic advantage experienced a rapid increase in 
significance for the firm due to the vision of an integrated technology firm that directed 
CarCo’s corporate strategy from mid-1980s onward. Investments into technology and 
research competences were regarded as an essential link to yield the benefits of the 
integrated technology firm. Newly acquired as well as existing capacities were 
consolidated to create a separate research group. All these costly acquisitions and 
investments in favour of the research group were made possible only by the profitable 
operations of the operational divisions in CarCo. This exemplifies the relationship 
between the research group and the other profit-generating divisions. Each profit-
generating division is oriented towards the development, production and distribution of 
their products. From this point of view the research division was an organisational unit 
that did not contribute directly to producing profits for CarCo.  
Generally, the research group followed a closed innovation system model as opposed to 
an open innovation approach, where a research and development department directly 
interacts with external actors and thus could generate revenue through licensing or 
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selling its research outcomes to markets outside of the firm (Chesbrough, 2003). Instead, 
the research group was geared towards the operational divisions as the only internal 
consumers of their products and services. Therefore, the research group was accountable 
to the operational divisions and had to justify its expenditures by producing outcomes 
that could be transferred either to improve directly the value of the products or at least 
indirectly by improving the production of the products. If the research group did not 
deliver and thus failed to meet expectations of the operational divisions sufficiently, then 
further expenditures were at risk of being critically examined and probably called into 
question. With the old vision failing and opposition to the structural residues of the 
grand vision of an integrated technology firm increasing, the research group faced a 
changing reality where its legitimacy came under scrutiny. 
Support from the operational divisions was an essential component legitimising the 
work of the research group. Sustaining and fostering this relationship became more 
important in a new evaluation culture where economic factors replaced the dominance 
of technological excellence. In this context, a low spillover from research into operations 
was particularly harmful since it endangered to strain the relationship even further. A 
major reason for this gap between research output and its successful implementation 
was found to be the inadequate consideration of economic factors during the research 
and development process. Concerned researchers and managers were aware about the 
methodological shortcomings when it came to the economic evaluation of their projects. 
Thus, an attempt to bridge this gap was the creation of a dedicated team that would 
provide missing economic skills sets and methods to support the consideration of 
economic factors in research undertakings. The next section will report about this team 
and the story that unfolded after its formation. 
5.2 A new research infrastructure: the Production 
Management Team 
The previous section reported how the corporate research infrastructure was established 
in the course of the grand vision of a diversified firm. Consolidating its research 
capacities centrally, CarCo built a new research facility to unite previously distributed 
research activities. However, a change in the corporate strategy and subsequent 
transformation of the firm triggered a slow-down in the performance of the research 
group. Eventually, after severe organisational transformations and a shift toward a 
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culture of economically-oriented evaluation of performance, a low spillover of research 
outcomes into operations prompted the research executives to take action.  
The following section elaborates how a new team was formed to address the problem of 
the low rate of research outcomes being successfully transferred into products or the 
production system of CarCo. However, the team of researchers struggled to enlist its 
fellow colleagues to collaborate as the structure of incentives turned out to be not in their 
favour. To compensate for underutilised capacities within the team, efforts were directed 
towards another venue which opened up thanks to participating in publicly funded 
projects. This new line of work branched into a novel field of research that proved 
rewarding for the research team and that resulted in the shaping of a technological 
artefact. 
5.2.1 A new research team to address consequences of change 
Among research executives a main reason for the low transfer rate was understood to 
stem from the neglect of ‘soft factors’ as one interviewee put it. After the centralisation of 
the research group and still in course of the old vision new research projects were 
initiated with little consideration of socio-economic factors. Instead, fulfilling the 
stereotypical tradition of German engineers, technological excellence was the main 
criteria in both conducting research as well as designing new car models. Thus, the 
criticism of some authors that a car newly introduced by CarCo in 1991 “was massively 
over-engineered and ridiculously expensive as a consequence” (Cooke & Morgen, 1994, 
p. 100) can be carried over to indicate the technology-led focus of some of the research 
projects undertaken within the CarCo research group. 
When a research project approached later stages, issues regarding feasibility and 
applicability of its output became apparent. It was perceived that it was not the 
technology but the neglect of socio-economic factors that caused the problem. Thus, the 
idea was to have a team of dedicated specialists that would cater for the socio-economic 
factors, or the ‘soft factors’. These specialists would work with other researchers to 
address previous shortcomings. They would provide missing skills and capacities to 
conduct economic evaluations of technologies which were under development in the 
research laboratories. In the fashion of technologically deterministic thinking, the 
eventual though late consideration of missing socio-economic factors was expected to 
positively affect the successful transfer of research outcomes. 
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The new team was named the Production Management Team (PMT) and comprised 
fewer than five researchers in the beginning. It was allocated as a second team to a 
department with another team of scientists doing research on rapid prototyping 
methods and technologies. The programmatic direction and initial configuration of the 
new team reflected the primary objective defined by the research organisation. To get 
started the team got in touch with other researcher groups and enquired about 
possibilities to get involved and to support other research teams. 
5.2.2 Social learning through interactions with other projects 
Although this track of work proved to be less fruitful for PMT in the long-run, it was the 
first opportunity for the team to learn about difficulties in technology transfer 
endeavours. For example, one of these technological projects was the development of a 
high precision laser welding technology. From a technological point of view it was a 
technical challenge that would, if solved, contribute to a better quality of goods 
produced. A question that popped up only late in the research and development process 
was if the benefit of the technology could eventually be put into practice at all. A PMT 
member’s task was to evaluate and estimate the productivity and costs of the 
implementation and use. Such an assessment would include the costs to install, operate 
and maintain the technology. Further, it would take into account social, organisational 
and environmental factors which were neglected in previous estimations. What skills 
would be required to operate the technology, and if so, what would it cost to train 
workers?  Does the technology fit into the existing production routine or would the 
organisation of work have to be adjusted? 
Because there were no pre-existing tools PMT could draw on, the researchers were 
required to develop their own sets of tools. Thus, PMT acquired special expertise on how 
to evaluate the feasibility and productivity of technologies in development. As indicated 
previously, the objective to collaborate with other research teams proved fruitless in the 
long-run but the expertise gained thanks to such engagements was practical for research 
activities in scope of publicly funded projects later on. Compared to their other research 
colleagues, PMT members were more exposed to operations for they had to understand 
about the requirements of potential users of the technologies. Increasing awareness and 
understanding of the operational side resulted in better comprehension of the different 
culture and principles prevailing in this, from the point of view of the research facility, 
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rather distant but dominating part of the firm. This social learning process, a concept 
that emphasises learning by interacting with various social actors (Williams, Stewart & 
Slack, 2005), turned PMT members quickly to the most practice-oriented and best 
networked research team within the research group. The ability to generate outreach 
was acknowledged by the head of PMT’s research department who noticed that in the 
end, the team leaders of PMT dealt with more managers in senior positions than he did. 
5.2.3 A financial model with a flaw 
A crucial factor turned out to be the funding model according to which PM’s budget was 
allocated. PMT’s budget comprised a mix of 50% fixed funding and 50% variable 
funding which was to be acquired from other research projects. This funding model was 
intended to encourage the team to seek collaborative relationships with other research 
projects in the research facility. The model required PMT members to regard the research 
group as a market on which they had to offer and promote their services. Such a model 
works well if the service or product is perceived of high value. When the team was 
established, senior managers assumed that PMT would successfully team up with other 
researchers who required their skills. However, this was not the situation that PMT 
encountered. 
The internal market approach was taken up well by PMT’s members. It was a relevant 
and successful incentive for PMT members to be creative and proactive in connecting 
with others. The problem was that no equivalent mechanism was arranged for on the 
other end of that relationship. As it turned out, other researchers were reluctant to team 
up with PMT members. Approaching their anticipated clientele, PMT members were not 
overly successful in raising high expectations of any benefits resulting from their 
services. One reason to turn down PMT’s support was, for example, that at that late a 
stage of a research project no such services were required any more. If any social 
investigations or economic calculations were required, the researchers, so they thought 
and argued, could undertake those themselves. They would not need any outsider 
evaluating their work. In fact, other researchers were reluctant to disclose their projects 
to detailed scrutiny by outsiders. Thus, collaborative relationships were difficult to 
establish. It seemed the idea of creating PMT was good but not without flaws.  
This fundamental problem was fed back to the senior management of the research 
group. However, PMT’s small size resulted in the team’s concerns not being heard by 
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the research management. Establishing a new team is a political decision and takes 
negotiations to clarify details about resource allocation and other details. Undoing such a 
decision would again take effort and negotiations. Thus, a decision to change the 
situation was delayed and not highly prioritised. As a new team they had no time yet to 
create a strong network of allies and as a result had no strong voice within the research 
group. 
The newly-established Production Management Team faced a substantial threat after the 
business model of the team proved to be impractical under the given circumstances. 
Because the appeal to senior management was not immediately responded to, PMT had 
to find other ways to acquire resources. Indeed, this search did not take long because an 
opportunity arose not long after the establishment of PMT. An engineering consultancy 
approached CarCo with an offer to participate in drafting a research proposal to apply 
for a research grant from a German ministry. 
5.3 Publicly funded projects 
In October 1999 the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (FMER) 
released the first announcement to introduce the framework for a funding programme 
titled “Research for the production of tomorrow” (Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung, 1999). The target of the programme was to fund research activities which 
aimed at strengthening producing industries in Germany. Research proposals that 
would benefit SMEs were particularly welcomed and preferred. The funding intended to 
create protected spaces where research activities and collaborations could be initiated 
which otherwise would not happen. 
An engineering consultancy firm got notice of the call for project proposals and set out to 
submit an application. The firm was specialised in providing consultancy services to 
companies in the manufacturing industry. In course of its consultancy activities, it had 
an array of customers which it had worked with before. Drawing on experience from 
working with these customers the consultancy was able to draft a research proposal 
which addressed concerns and problems of its clients. For the consultancy, it was also a 
practical approach to strengthen relations to its customers. The consultancy approached 
a selection of its clients and invited to join in shaping the draft of the proposal as 
research partners. One of those clients was CarCo which confirmed its interest in 
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participating and shaping of a potential research project. In particular it was PMT that 
responded to that call to engage in the collaborative work on drafting a joint research 
proposal. 
It is important to emphasise the significance and contingent role of the consultancy as an 
intermediary that brought together this set of actors and research partners. The FMER 
funding scheme aimed primarily at SMEs in Germany. CarCo is among Germany’s 
largest companies and thus was not among the preferred target group of the 
programme. In its intermediary role the engineering consultancy had links to various 
different actors including both SMEs and larger corporations. As such it was in a better 
position to enrol multiple SMEs to form a research consortium that largely met the 
requirements of FMER’s funding scheme. Due to the research goals of the project, which 
will be described in the next section, CarCo was accepted as a representative of the 
customer of these SMEs. In hindsight, this moment can be pinpointed as the starting 
point of PMT’s research on flexibility of production networks. 
5.3.1 Project SatFab 
The joint research proposal was submitted and eventually the funding was granted by 
the Federal Ministry for Education and Research. The project, titled SatFab, ran from 
February 2002 to December 2004 (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, n.d.).12 Short 
product life-cycles, increasing product varieties and fierce competition frame the ever 
rising challenges a factory has to cope with. Generally, flexibility in a production system 
is a concept to plan for instability and uncertainty in order to deal with the 
aforementioned factors (Slack, 1987).13 
                                                          
12 Its title ‘SatFab’ was derived from the German word ‘Satellitenfabrik’ which translated 
means ‘satellite factory’. A satellite factory is a decentralised factory of a supplier firm 
which is located in proximity to one or more original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
such as a car manufacturing plant. 
13 Because flexibility is an ambiguous term which is often used interchangeably with 
other concepts (Zaeh et al., 2005), it is important to delimit the context. In regards of a 
single factory, flexibility can be defined as an ability to master a given set of different 
states without altering the system. The concept of changeability, on the other hand, 
describes the ability to shift the production system with little investment to  operate 
within a range of different states (Zaeh et al., 2005). For example, a factory that is able to 
select the product for manufacturing out of a variety of products of one family of 
products can be regarded as flexible. A highly changeable factory would be a factory that 
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The seven members of the SatFab project, comprising six industrial firms and the 
engineering consultancy, aimed to research innovative concepts and exemplary 
solutions to set up a satellite factory with a high degree of changeability. CarCo’s role 
was to represent the customer that procures goods manufactured by the satellite factory 
of a supplier firm. The task was to elaborate approaches of how to co-design a 
production network and how to identify and influence parameters that affect the 
changeability of factories. The starting point for the project was the problem that 
supplier factories usually were designed to meet the prevalent requirements of a 
previously determined product. However, future requirements shaped by the 
continuous change of both products and production systems were not considered in the 
planning and design of a satellite factory. Consequently, supplier factories were rigid by 
default and unfit for change. Therefore, SatFab was set up to address that design 
limitation and to find novel concepts for a flexible and sustainable integration of satellite 
factories into the value chains of OEMs. The project promised to reconcile the conflict 
between the producer and the supplier firm resulting from tensions caused by the 
uncertainty and complexity of globalised and volatile markets. 
5.3.2 From national to European level 
The first call for proposals announced by the German Federal Ministry for Education 
and Research for its “Research for the production of tomorrow” funding programme 
contained a reference to a similar programme run by the European Union 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 1999, p. 9).  From 1998-2002 the 
European Union ran the 5th Framework Programme to fund research, technological 
development and demonstration activities among its member states. One of the four 
specific thematic programmes was titled according to its objective to foster “competitive 
and sustainable growth” (European Commission, n.d.). The German Federal Ministry 
pointed to the key action “innovation products, processes and organisation” that was 
similar to its own research programme. Because the Ministry’s funding aimed at 
domestic actors only, this remark brought applicants’ attention to consider submitting a 
proposal application on European level if the scope of the project was adequate for this 
purpose. 
                                                                                                                                                              
is additionally able to select its produce from a different family of products with 
minimum investment of time and money. 
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Considering the limitations of the SatFab project (domestic focus, limited budget, no 
research institute involvement and supplier firms-oriented project contents) there were a 
number of good reasons for PMT to expand the scale of its research on flexibility. 
Particularly the opportunity to align a project’s direction according to the needs and 
specifics of CarCo was a compelling reason. PMT took the initiative and set out to search 
for project partners and to draft a proposal. The particular researcher in PMT who was 
mainly in charge for SatFab was tasked to also engage in this activity. 
5.3.3 Project LICOPRO 
The project proposal was eventually granted and co-sponsored by both the European 
Commission under the 5th Framework and the ‘Intelligent Manufacturing Systems’ 
(IMS) initiative.14 With a supranational scope this second project boosted PMT’s 
capabilities further than the SatFab project in advancing its research activities in the 
subject of flexibility in production systems. The project was kicked off September 2002 
and ran until October 2005. The project acronym LICOPRO was an abbreviation for 
“Lifecycle Design for Global Collaborative Production”. While SatFab’s unit of analysis 
was a single factory, LICOPRO covered the entire production network. Its overall 
objective was to “develop a comprehensive explanation model for lifecycle robust design 
of global collaborative production” with research outcomes including “reference 
architectures, methods and tools for strategy deployment, (re)configuration planning, 
and evaluation and design of information technologies for global collaborative 
production” (ETH Zurich, 2007). 
5.3.4 Three levels of flexibility 
The LICOPRO project was an important signal for senior managers in CarCo’s research 
group to allow PMT’s researchers to continue engaging with its secondary objective. The 
project’s funding enabled PMT to expand its operational capacity dedicated to this task. 
As mentioned before flexibility in manufacturing is an ambiguous term (Zaeh et al., 
2005). Depending on the context there can be different meanings of similar concepts. 
                                                          
14 The IMS initiative was an “industry-led, global, and collaborative manufacturing RTD 
programme, supported by the governments/public administrations of most of the 
world’s leading manufacturing nations, i.e. Australia, Canada, the European Union, 
Norway, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, and the US. It involved large and small 
companies, users as well as suppliers, universities, research organisations, and 
governmental organisations” (Wing consortium, 2007a, p. 11). 
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Therefore, research on flexibility had to carefully take into account these differences. 
PMT’s approach in line with the research project proposal was to recruit three doctoral 
students. Each student was tasked to do research on the same topic but on different 
levels. To resolve ambiguity surrounding the term of flexibility, the research problem 
was split into three levels ranging from the local to the global. The first level 
encompassed the assembly line focusing on the factors relevant for assembling a product 
including machines, equipment, workers and all related processes. On the next level, the 
entire factory was taken into account where different shift models and other factors 
played an important role. Finally, the network level focused on the interconnected 
network of manufacturing plants. Our empirical journey will continue following the 
developments that unfolded around the research activities focusing on the network 
level. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The thorough review of historical dynamics and events is an important precursor to put 
the local processes of the technology project in perspective with other events and 
dynamics within CarCo’s organisational landscape. We have learned that the team of 
industrial researchers was put together to primarily deal with a particular purpose that 
was not related to the development of new technological artefacts in the first place. 
Indeed, the reasoning to establish a new team has been related to other dynamics that 
were influenced by struggles of organisational reconfigurations. Although the idea of 
forming a new team to address an urgent internal demand appeared to be reasonable to 
begin with, it was foiled partly by the decision to develop a business model that was 
dependent on the collaboration with other research teams. The design flaw resulted in 
the unintended consequence that the research team increasingly focused on other, in 
part, more lucrative because prestigious sources of funding from public bodies. This 
enabled PMT to transform the kernel of its research infrastructure to include researchers 




Figure 8 Transformed kernel after external funding was acquired (new elements 
are highlighted in bold) 
The figure illustrates the flexible quality of the kernel concept. Rather than narrowing 
down on particular aspects of the technological change, e.g. the growing actor-network, 
it encompasses a range of elements involved in the innovation process. The next chapter 





6 Empirical chapter 2: The shaping of a research 
infrastructure 
The previous empirical chapter was an account of historical events and developments 
that transformed large parts of CarCo’s organisational landscape. These transformations 
resulted in organisational tensions that affected CarCo’s research organisation. A 
significant change of the corporate culture put the research group and its research 
undertakings in the spotlight of economic scrutiny and expectations about the 
production of useful outputs. A new research team was formed to address the low 
spillover of research outputs into operations. However, the team struggled to accomplish 
its objectives due to the reluctance of other research colleagues to collaborate. Facing a 
shortfall of financial resources, the team engaged with external organisation to acquire 
public research grants. External resources from two publicly funded research projects 
allowed the team to focus on a new area of research. In the course of this new line of 
research, the team began working on technological prototypes. One of the prototypes 
was the technological artefact investigated in our doctoral research project. This chapter 
will report on the events and developments that unfolded after the Production 
Management Team was formed (see Figure 9 for an overview of the empirical data 
discussed in this chapter). 
 
Figure 9 Overview of the innovation process addressed in chapter 6 
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While the previous chapter examined social phenomena from a distance, mostly due to 
the variety of locales and extended timescales covered, this chapter will focus on 
examining actions of individuals in a fewer number of locales. This will allow seeing 
how historical and contextual dynamics played out on a local level. The next sections 
will recount in more detail the early episodes of PMT’s existence. 
6.1 Establishing an infrastructure 
As described in the previous chapter a research team was formed to address the problem 
of low transfer rate of research outcomes into operations. The formation of Production 
Management Team (PMT) was also the creation of a space in which the technological 
artefact under investigation would emerge eventually. We adopted the idea of the kernel 
of a research infrastructure to enrich the conceptualisation about this space and the 
elements belonging to it. The kernel concept allowed us to track how the team interacted 
with its broader social environment and how configurations of social, technical and 
institutional elements changed over time as a result of these episodes of social learning. 
PMT’s actors were key agents of change but they were dependent on the set of resources, 
services and instruments accumulated over years. All these elements and the 
configuration to each other, however, changed in some way or the other throughout the 
years. Hence, it is the kernel that our analysis regards as the social entity that remained 
‘the same’. It is particularly because of the inherent flexibility of the concept of the kernel 
that allowed us to observe how the technological development and corresponding social 
processes of the NetworkPlanner artefact unfolded across time and space.  
 
Figure 10 The kernel of PMT's research infrastructure 
In the beginning, however, when the first members of PMT came together, there yet was 
little in place besides a mission statement (see Figure 10). Therefore, the actions of the 
151 
 
first team members were decisive in setting the agenda and building capabilities of the 
team which were the basic elements of a yet emerging research infrastructure. 
6.1.1 Building an agenda for the new team 
When the Production Management Team (PMT) was created around 2001 there were 
less than a handful of members. Two of these members were of particular interest for 
this case study. The first team leader, Martin, was a visionary individual who was a 
driving force to get the team established. He was well connected to research executives 
within the research group and thus was aware of current concerns and organisational 
tensions. Among those tensions was the problem of the low transfer rate of research 
outputs. It was an opportunity for him to take control over a problem that was given 
significant attention to by the management. Martin was among the key individuals who 
pushed for the proposal to establish PMT to address the research transfer problem. His 
efforts were rewarded with him being promoted to be the leader of the newly formed 
team.15 The other relevant and early member, Kai, was a doctoral engineering graduate 
who was recruited into the research group shortly before PMT was formed. His task was 
to support PMT and to work with other researchers in order to improve the chances for a 
successful transfer of technologies from research into operations. When the opportunity 
arose to work with the engineering consultancy to draft a project proposal it was him 
who was allocated to collaborating with the consultancy. In course of drafting the 
proposal it was among the first opportunities for him and PMT to get in touch with 
internal departments in operational divisions. This external engagement was to gather 
information about the needs and problems of practitioners in regards of flexible 
manufacturing processes and systems. Insights gained during several field trips to 
planning and other departments were fed into the drafting of the SATFAB project 
proposal. When SATFAB was kicked off in February 2002, PMT had already developed 
an understanding of flexible manufacturing system-related challenges and a number of 
contacts to internal practitioners who were interested in working with researchers who 
promised to address some of their problems. 
                                                          
15 Initially, another individual, Kate, was designated to take the role as PMT’s first team 
leader but the candidate stepped down due to personal reasons. However, she will 
reappear as a project manager later in the story. 
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6.1.2 Local manufacturing site as a testing ground for ideas and methods 
The second publicly-funded research project LICOPRO commenced in September 2002. 
Considering formal procedures, deadlines and the larger number of partners involved, it 
can be assumed that the proposal for LICOPRO was drafted around 6-12 months ahead 
of the project start. The seven months difference between the two projects allowed PMT 
to incorporate insights learned during the SATFAB drafting process and to further 
specify CarCo’s particular needs in the project proposal for LICOPRO. At the time when 
LICOPRO started, PMT was several months into doing work on flexibility in 
manufacturing systems. During this period PMT was able to learn more about CarCo’s 
production system, the organisation, locations, hierarchies etc. and respective problems 
dealt with by practitioners. 
Coincidentally, one of CarCo’s manufacturing plants was less than 15 km away from the 
research facility. This plant was one of only two large manufacturing sites of the Buses 
division in Germany. Because of its relatively smaller size and localised operations16, the 
buses division and this site in particular were characterised by flatter hierarchies as 
compared to other divisions. These characteristics allowed for a faster decision making 
process. For example, the strategic planners in this plant covered a wider range of 
responsibilities. This included the planning of future production programmes as well as 
planning and overseeing the construction of new facilities abroad. In comparison, 
colleagues in the larger divisions were more specialised on subsets of these tasks. All 
together, these features made it easier for PMT to get access to relevant practitioners to 
introduce their work and to enrol them into their research projects.  
Another reason encouraged practitioners of this nearby manufacturing site to collaborate 
with researchers. Although the legitimised distraction from their everyday work was 
reason enough for some, there was a competitive element that played a role in 
encouraging managers to allow their subordinates working with the researchers. The 
other large plant of that division in Germany was regarded somewhat a competitor to 
                                                          
16 This plant was added to the buses division when CarCo acquired a local motor vehicle 
manufacturer in 1995. Before the acquisition the company had been operating 
independently and thus had based most of its operational functions and related 
departments close to its main manufacturing site. Although some functions were 
removed and centralised at the headquarters of CarCo after the acqusition, this 
manufacturing site retained much of its operations locally. 
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this local plant. In times of over-capacities in the automobile industry, manufacturing 
sites compete against each other to maintain or increase their production volumes. 
Despite operating under the same brand the productivity of factories can vary 
significantly (Womack et al., 1990). When it comes to decisions of allocating production 
volumes, such differences can decide about the future of that manufacturing site and the 
responsible management team in charge of its operation. Some level of competition is 
encouraged by the central management to ensure that individual plants remain active in 
maintaining a culture where improvements and innovations are continuously sought 
after. Therefore, the practitioners of this manufacturing site were open for the fortunate 
opportunity to work together with researchers in the hope to gain an advantage over the 
other plant. 
This manufacturing plant became an important partner for PMT in the early stage of its 
existence. Flat hierarchies, short decision-making processes and the willingness to 
collaborate were relevant circumstances that allowed PMT to access practitioners to 
enquire for their needs and problems, to test ideas and elaborate their methods. In sum, 
this manufacturing site was a crucial element in the early biography of the artefact 
concerned in this study. This manufacturing site was part of the protected space in 
which PMT was able to unfold its early research activities. It became a valuable ally and 
testing ground for the development of the first prototype. 
6.1.3 Expanding research capacities: the recruitment of new student members 
At the time when LICOPRO commenced, PMT had already established basic elements of 
a research infrastructure comprising an accessible network of people interested in their 
work, methods relevant for addressing their research questions and legitimacy granted 
by research executive to continue and expand their work thanks to positive feedback 
from collaborating practitioners. Positive feedback on PMT’s progress was well 
perceived by senior research executives who appreciated opportunities to showcase 
successful collaborations between research and practice to their superiors. Many 
research projects were scrutinised by practitioners only in later stages when a technology 
was supposed to be transferred. PMT’s approach, however, sought collaboration with 
practitioners at early stages. A way to engage with many practitioners was to have 
students work on the publicly funded projects. 
154 
 
The start of LICOPRO was accompanied by the recruitment of the three doctoral 
students mentioned in the previous chapter in context of the ambiguous meaning of the 
term of flexibility. Each of the three students was allocated to study different contexts or 
levels of flexibility. Three levels were distinguished: the assembly line, the factory and 
the network of factories. Research on the latter context gave rise to the artefact studied in 
this thesis. 
Funding from the new research project and the recruitment of new research students 
expanded PMT’s capacities significantly. Doctoral students are a practical instrument for 
an industrial research team. They are well-trained and motivated researchers eager to 
apply their theoretical knowledge in practice. At the same time, they are cheaper than a 
full-time employee and their limited contracts fit well into an environment where long-
term labour commitments are difficult to arrange. Kai, the researcher who was chiefly in 
charge for drafting the proposal for LICOPRO, took the role of an internal supervisor for 
the doctoral students. Henceforth, he will also be referred to as the supervisory 
researcher to distinguish him from other PMT colleagues. 
One concern over the doctoral students was that their work would not be distinct 
enough and that this would cause problems in terms of competition and lack of 
communication and interaction among each other. This was a particular concern in the 
first year when all three of them explored similar research areas. The student focusing on 
flexibility in manufacturing processes developed a distinct approach which interfered 
little with the other two and, thus, was not affected by this risk. The other two students, 
however, had a strong overlap in the early stage of their work as both their research 
topics related to factories as the unit of analysis. However, they differed in the quantity 
of factories involved. As it turned out, the two students developed a collaborative and 
interactive relationship in which they discussed ideas, helped each other out and shared 
resources. This high level of collaboration stimulated a coordinated division of labour 
and increased the pace in which methods were explored, tried out and either dismissed 
or elaborated further. 
6.1.4 Division of labour: support by interns 
SATFAB and LICOPRO defined work packages for which PMT was responsible. The 
work was shared among the full-time researchers involved and the doctoral students. 
However, the team was further supported by undergraduate or postgraduate students, 
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who were recruited as interns for usually six months to work on small and clearly 
defined work packages.17 Supervised mostly by the doctoral students, these students 
explored subjects which were relevant or of interest for the doctoral student’s research 
topic. Therefore the students extended the capabilities of the doctoral students by 
looking into areas that the doctoral students were interested in but which they could not 
afford to investigate themselves. To distinguish the doctoral students better from 
supporting students, the latter will be addressed as interns henceforth. Interns were 
selected by the focus of their studies. If a task required knowledge of developing a 
technical artefact, an intern studying an appropriate technical degree was recruited. If 
the task required strong subject knowledge about finance or economics, an intern from a 
business school was selected.18  
Interns were a valuable link to access and explore and to implement state of the art 
academic knowledge in technical prototypes. Over the years, strong links were 
established to a few expert academics and research centres which provided a platform to 
recruit new interns if required. Because all job offers and internships were publicised on 
CarCo’s online recruitment platform in the internet, interns from outside this network 
were also able to join PMT. The incentive for interns was the opportunity to base their 
dissertations, or other kinds of reports they were expected to produce, on their work in 
                                                          
17 In Germany, internships are often integral parts of degree programmes in Higher 
Education. Internships are variable and can take place either in the middle of a 
programme or at a later stage. Additionally, students in Germany are encouraged to do 
their theses at the end of their degree with an external partner. Through these 
experiences students have the opportunity to gain practical insights in their anticipated 
sector to inform and pave the way for their future plans. The industry has well adapted 
to this system. Offerings for internships or industrial theses can be found in large multi-
national corporations as well as local small and medium-sized enterprises. 
18 No complete list of all interns ever contributing to the development was available but 
a folder on the network hard drive of PMT, used to archive dissertations and other 
reports submitted by students, allowed an estimation of the total number of interns 
working at or with PMT during the period 2005-2010. The folder contains 85 document 
produced by interns. Since most interns where in their final year of studies, the majority 
of these files comprised dissertations, “Diplomarbeiten”, i.e. final year student 
dissertations. It is difficult to estimate whose work contributed directly to the artefact 
because only few state explicitly which of the several projects at PMT they were working 
on. Taking into account the interns found in the folder and additional interns identified 
via other data collection methods a list of 29 individuals was produced who worked on 
the artefact. Eight of those 29 interns became doctoral students themselves continuing 
their working with the strategic network planning application. 
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CarCo and to gain valuable experience for their future careers. The process of recruiting 
interns was an important element for methodological and artefactual developments not 
just in PMT but in the entire research facility. As already indicated, these cohorts of 
interns became the talent pool from which some future doctoral students were selected 
to continue research and development of the technical artefacts. Many of the doctoral 
students remained with CarCo after graduating, although most of them left the research 
group for non-research related positions in the other divisions. 
6.2 Creating the artefact: NetworkPlanner, version 0 
Soon after its formation the members of the Production Management Team started to 
investigate the research problems it was tasked to address and to identify possible 
solutions for. The seven months difference between the two public projects gave PMT 
time to conduct a review of literature and best practises. Findings of the preliminary 
review where gathered in a repository in the form of a slide show. Since CarCo used 
Microsoft’s office package throughout the company, an initial repository on ideas and 
concepts about flexibility was stored in the MS PowerPoint format. Slides were an easy 
and practical way to gather information of different formats.  
In the first months, when there was only the SATFAB project, the focus was researching 
concepts concerning suppliers, manufacturers and the relationship between the two. 
During the interview, Kai, the supervisory researcher referred to the repository as an 
interactive multimedia encyclopaedia which he titled ‘SATFAB Navigator’. Indeed, 
name-giving was a typical characteristic of him as highlighted by other interviewees. He 
pushed the doctoral students in making their work comprehensible for outsiders, 
particularly practitioners in operational divisions. Giving prototypical artefacts a name 
was one method - it was also him who proposed the name for the strategic network 
planning system under which it became known throughout the company, 
NetworkPlanner as referred to in this thesis. Kai came up with many proposals to 
simplify the technical prototypes. It was among his ideas in the early stages to add a 
map as a visualisation layer to enrich the user interface of the planning system. 
6.2.1 Configuration of spreadsheets 
Based on the slides of the ‘SATFAB Navigator’ the doctoral students worked on 
interpreting the general concepts and methods and looking for ways to apply them in a 
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way relevant for CarCo’s manufacturing system. In the first year the doctoral students 
explored the field to learn about existing literature and relevant concepts. While general 
ideas were stored in MS PowerPoint slides, the first approaches in putting concepts into 
practice were attempted using MS Excel. Its calculation and spreadsheet analysis 
functionality made MS Excel a powerful and versatile tool for quantitative analysis. It 
allowed for storage and manipulation of vast quantities of data. Further features made it 
a strong instrument to quickly develop technical prototypes. For example, Visual Basic 
for Applications (VBA)19 allowed development of automated routines and to access data 
and other applications external to the spreadsheet itself. First prototypical spreadsheets 
were constructed to formalise and quantify a manufacturing system.  
Spreadsheets are ideal tools for collecting diverse sets of data and for interlinking it with 
each other as one spreadsheet can contain multiple worksheets. For example, one 
worksheet stores the bill of material while another sheet contains data on materials and 
products. A third sheet links to the data stored in these two spreadsheets and calculates 
any information demanded depending on the purpose. Following this approach a model 
of a manufacturing system was represented by building a complex set of interlinked 
spreadsheets. 
Developing and elaborating meaningful and practical models of an automobile 
manufacturing system was one of the first challenges for the doctoral students. The 
doctoral students were encouraged to elaborate general models first before defining 
specific constraints typical for the automobile industry. Thus, the first models could have 
described manufacturing processes of cars, bicycles or refrigerators. This level of 
generality allowed thorough exploration and learning about relevant concepts to model 
a manufacturing system and about appropriate methods to process data for deriving 
meaningful information. 
6.2.2 From a set of spreadsheets to a configuration of spreadsheets with a map 
Gathering and processing manufacturing-related data in an innovative but generalised 
manner in spreadsheets was an interesting task for a researcher but not yet sufficiently 
interesting for a practitioner who has to deal with highly-specialised data sets and 
                                                          
19 Visual Basic for Applications is a programming language implemented in multiple 
Microsoft Office applications. 
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objectives. Kai encouraged the students to go beyond the researcher’s perspective and to 
consider the point of view of planners in practice. Chris, the doctoral student working on 
the network-level characterised Kai, his supervisor, as someone who 
“[…] always tried to develop Excel solutions further, so that it is more 
generalisable, so that you can apply them as a tool. He always thought 
about tools. […] And he always was ‘we need a tool that can be marketed 
well and such’”. (Chris, doctoral student, interview, 9 May 2011) 
It was the Kai who approached Chris and presented him a sketch of an idea where he 
used the graphics application Microsoft Visio to draw a map and link it to a spreadsheet. 
Microsoft Visio is an application for drawing diagrams and vector graphics. Being part 
of the Microsoft Office package, it also comprised a VBA interface and, hence, enabled 
rich interaction with MS Excel. What the map achieved was displaying a graphical 
representation of a production network. Previously, it was represented only in the 
spreadsheet’s tabular format. The map rendered simple outlines of water, land and 
territorial boundaries. Further, MS Visio allowed displaying other data including 
notations or data about relationships between individual plants (e.g. transportation costs 
between two plants). 
With a 2-dimensional spreadsheet a person without prior knowledge of the problem 
would struggle making sense of data and their relations to other cells in different 
worksheets. It can be tedious work to make sense of an unfamiliar spreadsheet. 
Furthermore, explaining contents and structures of a spreadsheet can be tricky. 
Presenting contents of spreadsheets to others when there is little time to introduce meta-
information about a spreadsheet like the name of different columns, relationships to 
other worksheets etc., is a difficult task. Taking the viewpoint of the audience, the 
presentation of a spreadsheet does most certainly arouse the interest of a minority of 
people only. A visual representation, however, is easier to understand - an image says 
more than a thousand words - and helps making sense of a complex issue because a map 
is a familiar type of visualisation particular for spatial and relational data. 
The introduction of a map was not immediately welcomed by Chris. Initially he was 
reluctant because the performance resulting from a technical configuration with MS 
Visio was poor and unacceptable for him. However, the potential benefit was apparent 
and he admitted that  
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“There was an ‘aha’ moment”. (Chris, doctoral student, interview, 9 May 
2011) 
A later doctoral student, John, used the description that the map was more “sexy” when 
addressing its effect on external people seeing the prototype (John, doctoral student, 
interview, 7 October 2010). For the time being Chris agreed that he would pursue this 
idea further but under the condition that the technical side would be improved 
significantly. This early MS Visio-based prototype of the NetworkPlanner was the first 
that combined analytical capabilities with visualisation techniques. It was to become a 
model for later, more elaborate versions. To distinguish this state of the technology from 
later, more mature states, we call this prototype the NetworkPlanner, version 0. 
6.2.3 Visual representations 
Extending the technical configuration by a graphical feature was in some way a 
departure from the previous approach. Due to the large quantities of data necessary to 
model a network with its numerous elements, spreadsheets can become complex 
configuration. For a researcher, who tinkers with these spreadsheets and its contents on 
a daily basis, the credibility of the configuration is a taken for granted fact. The 
researcher has a good understanding about the origin of data and algorithms inherent in 
the technical artefact. Any outsider, however, who is confronted with the artefact for the 
first time, does not have a prior relation to it. There is no prior knowledge except of what 
has been told about it either directly by the researcher or by other colleagues. Basically, 
the artefact would appear a black box for any outsider being exposed to it. 
The introduction of the map was the most significant addition that appealed to the need 
of those actors without prior knowledge of the black box or the methods at work inside 
it. A map is a familiar instrument and transmits recognisable information about spaces 
and relations. An unfamiliar actor would pick up important information quickly when 
looking at a map. An experienced planner would immediately recognise the meaning if 
nodes placed on a map indicating location of plants. An edge between two nodes would 
also be interpreted as relationship and hierarchy within a production network. The map 
was the first element resembling characteristics of a boundary object that became part of 
the overall technical configuration of the artefact. A boundary object is defined as having 
different meanings in different domains but still having a common enough structure that 
allows for recognition (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Thus, the map functionality reduced the 
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threshold for interaction between researcher and practitioner by introducing an element 
of mutual understanding. A boundary object further advances interdisciplinary 
interaction from the discussion about classification and morphology towards a 
discussion of process and function (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Although initially 
seemingly trivial in its technical implementation, the map helped both researchers and 
practitioners to reduce the epistemic gap between each other. The map expanded the 
rhetorical repository, the collection of technical vocabulary already acquired through 
previous research activities, by spatial and referential vocabulary, i.e. it was easier to talk 
with each other and to understand each other’s perceptions about difficulties and 
challenges yet to overcome. 
Most notably, the researchers benefited from this new capability to engage with 
practitioners without starting to explain basic features of their black box. This became an 
important feature to reduce uncertainties and to increase visual appeal when presenting 
the strategic network planning system to practitioners. Particularly individuals in 
management positions appreciated the simplicity of visual features in general. The map 
was just a starting point. Later, the system was supplemented by other visual 
representations, in particular graphs that displayed results of data analyses. Especially 
visualisation techniques that presented results of the complex calculations caught the 
attention of managers, who were looking for qualified information to make business 




Figure 11 NetworkPlanner version 0 gains shape as practical expertise and 
technological capabilities increase 
The additional resources from public projects allowed PMT to engage with the 
evaluation and development of methods to address the practical problems that strategic 
planning practitioners faced. The initial prototypes helped in scoping the research 
problem and testing different approaches towards potential solutions. They also served 
as medium to test different means of communicating expectations to various audiences 
including researchers as well as internal and external practitioners. (Bakker et al. 2012). 
The growing set of technological and practical capabilities inherent in PMT’s kernel, i.e. 
the increasing number and quality of resources, services and instruments available to 
members and partners of PMT, enabled the team of industrial researchers to engage with 
other audiences that moved closer in a social manner. 
6.3 Expanding the infrastructure 
After the exploration stage, when basics about flexibility concepts and methods were 
learned and tested in the first prototypes, contact was made again with the nearby 
manufacturing plant of the buses division. The plant was a valuable gateway for PMT to 
discover needs and concerns of practitioners during the stage when the research project 
proposals were drafted. Yet again, the plant was approached for collaborating with PMT 
members in scope of their flexibility research. The local practitioners responsible for 
production planning were willing to work together with the researchers to co-develop 
methods and to validate them using their business cases. In return the researchers 
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supported them in doing some of the calculations and evaluations required for their 
ongoing projects. 
6.3.1 Gaining practical expertise and elaborating the prototype 
A challenge in early collaborative engagements between researchers and practitioners 
was the cultural difference. Although both parties worked for the same company, they 
did so in fundamentally different functional areas characterised by different objectives 
and modes of operation. Particularly in the beginning, PMT’s work on flexibility was 
based on a systematic approach that underscored generalisability and theoretically solid 
methods. In contrast, practitioners tend to follow a pragmatic and practical approach 
typical in a business environment. This divide was apparent in the difference in methods 
applied to solve problems. Despite having conducted preliminary research about the 
needs and specifics of practitioners, the researchers yet had to work with abstract 
problem cases. In contrast, practitioners in the plant had to deal with concrete cases 
which were driven by short-term objectives and affected by uncertainties. While general 
approaches might be helpful to explain to some extent the complexity of processes and 
dynamics taking place in the plant, the social setting of local actions rendered every local 
situation differently.  
A core achievement in working with practitioners from the nearby plant, was to acquire 
data for real-life cases and, even more so, to get exposure to their mode of operation. 
Regarding the mode of operation, the strategic planners of that division were complying 
with standards defined centrally by respective authorities within CarCo. In particular, 
standards of financial assessments were set by controlling departments. Financial 
controllers are responsible for gathering financial and non-financial information about 
the performance of the organisation to inform and support managers in their decision-
making process. The profession of financial controllers uses standardised practises to 
gather and to produce relevant data. There is no right or wrong practice, but a range of 
methods depending on the sector, functional area, level of aggregation etc. Thus, every 
company and functional area develops an individual set of practices that proved useful 
and workable over time. 
Working with strategic planners from the nearby plant allowed PMT members to learn 
in detail about these practices. Further, this experience was encoded and implemented in 
the prototype to produce various standardised key performance indicators, which are 
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commonly used throughout CarCo and to some extent expected by decision makers. In 
the course of these engagements with strategic planners, the researchers undertook 
analyses on behalf of the practitioners, while the latter evaluated the results. For a 
technical software prototype it is typical to have bugs, i.e. errors in the code of a software 
programme. The practitioners checked the results and hence helped spotting errors and 
de-bugging the code.  
This loose but fruitful collaboration was maintained for several weeks as long as the 
practitioners were in need for another pair of helping hands in their projects. When the 
projects were finished, the collaboration ceased. Later, when another doctoral student 
tried to reinstate the interaction, he was rejected because of a change in the planning 
premises of the division. At some point, the senior management made a political 
decision in favour of a harmonic capacity utilisation throughout the division’s 
manufacturing plants. Instead of optimising the best production programme, it was 
fairly distributed between the two plants. In other words, the objective of the strategic 
planning department changed to the extent that there was no more need for a system as 
the NetworkPlanner. 
6.3.2 Gaining legitimacy through exposure to external audiences 
Enrolling practitioners from the buses division was eased by previous interactions and 
by the proximity of the plant. Nevertheless, it remains a delicate undertaking to establish 
collaboration even when such mitigating factors are at play. Originally, PMT’s 
motivation to seek out business opportunities stemmed from its financial problem to 
generate income to fill its financial gap. In time, other reasons for interactions with 
operational departments arose. The longer the development continued and the artefact 
matured, the more important it became to find a final host for a sustainable long-term 
solution. The public project granted so much funding only. It was for PMT to arrange for 
a sustainable situation after funding ceased. Engaging with the buses division was the 
first attempt to find a host. The yet immature state of the artefact and the weak demand 
for it in the buses division deemed this solution insufficient. Thus, the search continued. 
Irrespective of other divisions, there is always an opportunity to approach actors outside 
of CarCo’s boundaries. Technology firms, such as Cisco, Intel or IBM are examples of 
how research outputs can go both ways in an open innovation model (Chesbrough, 
2003). They acquire interesting technology from outside to integrate it into their 
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products. At the same time, they do not hesitate to sell or license their in-house 
developed technologies and research results to other firms, if they cannot make use of it 
to gain a competitive advantage or if there is a worthwhile business opportunity. The 
doctoral student, Chris, had presented his work at a conference, when he was 
approached by a senior manager from Siemens, a German multinational engineering and 
electronics company. The manager was intrigued by the capabilities of the artefact at that 
time and offered to either buy the artefact or at least to license it to address a current 
difficult business challenge he was facing. However, CarCo research management 
rejected the offer as the open innovation model was not a strategy pursued in the 
research group. However, this incident caught the attention of research executives and 
put PMT research activities in the spotlight. This indicated a slight shift in the senior 
management’s thinking about the research in flexibility conducted by PMT. 
Paraphrasing this shift in thinking among senior research executives, Chris indicated 
how sparsely PMT’s activities were appreciated by them in the beginning: 
“Oh, maybe this is not just a student’s science fair project”. (Chris, 
doctoral student, interview, 9 May, 2011) 
This encounter with the Siemens manager can be broadly interpreted as a trial of 
strength where an authoritative representative of an interest group is persuaded to 
accept claims made by a spokesperson to be objectively valid (Latour, 1978, p. 78).  
Presenting preliminary results and a prototype at a public conference, an opportunity 
facilitated by the fact that this was a publicly funded project, exposes previously private 
research to external public examination. A positive response like the approval by other 
researchers, or practitioners as in this case, confirms the objectiveness and legitimacy of a 
research direction and a potential worth for others. Rejecting someone else’s research, 
however, denotes it to the work of subjective individuals who do not have anything 
important to contribute to the community. Thus, the presentation of the artefact and the 
research approach in general to a public audience was a successful trial of strength for 
PMT.  
Not every trial of strength results in a clear case of success or failure. Another such trial 
was the anecdotal confrontation of PMT with another research team which could have 
ended PMT’s approach right there on the spot. There was a team in a research facility in 
Berlin doing similar research on production networks but drawing on techniques of 
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simulation as compared to PMT’s approach based on mathematical optimisation. Upon 
learning about PMT’s research undertaking, the other team tried to intervene because it 
felt being under threat by PMT. The Berlin research managers demanded for PMT to 
cease their research justifying this with the claim that research on manufacturing 
flexibility was under their jurisdiction. Indeed, the decision to cease PMT’s research on 
flexibility in production networks had been confirmed by the research management in 
Ulm. However, Jürgen recalled, the order to abandon this branch of research was just  
“not executed immediately”. (Jürgen, team leader of PMT, focus group 
interview, 12 December 2011) 
He further explained:  
“They had the strategically better levers and they said ‘this is our core 
subject, you are not allowed to continue’”. (Jürgen, team leader of PMT, 
focus group interview, 12 December 2011) 
Their strategic lever was that the managing researcher had a higher rank than the Kai, 
who represented PMT during that confrontation. Organisationally, a situation such as 
this one would have usually been resolved by abandoning the subject and allocating 
resources to another project. This is relatively easy in cases when there are only full-time 
employees involved. However, because the technological project involved doctoral 
students, a simple reallocation of resources and employees was no viable solution, at 
least not without jeopardising the fate of the student’s doctoral dissertation. Thus, a 
compromise was made along the methodological divide between the two research 
teams. Because simulation methods was the field of expertise of the Berlin team, it was 
decided that PMT’s doctoral student in Ulm would be allowed to continue his work only 
if he would not cross this methodological line. For PMT and the doctoral student, this 
compromise was easily acceptable. Their research tended to lean towards the 
specialisation in optimisation methods, anyway. And after probing this subject 
previously themselves simulation was found not to be an interesting branch of research 
for their set of objectives. 
Despite the methodological differences between the two research teams and the success 
in averting the conflict, the episode highlighted the weakness of PMT’s political status. 
At this moment it was secondary which method was superior. A political decision 
weighted more than any technical argument. If it was not for the peculiar configuration 
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of PMT’s research infrastructure, which generally consisted of a mix of full-time 
employee, doctoral students and interns, this claim for jurisdiction by another 
department could have ended the development of the artefact. An interpretation of this 
incident allows drawing the conclusion that the social-technical configuration and 
particularly the diversity of the research infrastructure proved stronger than the political 
power of another department. Jürgen compared this incident with a wave under which 
they had to dive under:  
“For a moment you hold your breath and wait for the wave to pass over 
you. As soon as the threat has passed, you surface again and continue 
your work”. (Jürgen, team leader of PMT, focus group interview, 12 
December 2011) 
After this particular trial of strength, PMT was confined to a narrower selection of future 
methodological choices. However, as they ruled out this path anyway, it only reassured 
their determination to focus on optimisation methods. 
6.3.3 Soliciting business and growing the network of contacts 
The Production Management Team was different than other research teams in that it was 
a fundamental requirement for its members to seek collaboration with others to generate 
income to fill a financial hole in their budgets. For Kai, the supervisory researcher, and 
Chris, the doctoral student, this detail was not much of a burden on top of their 
everyday work activities. Several interviewees highlighted their skills in dealing with 
other actors and that both became a good team in presenting their team’s work and 
particularly the potential of the artefact under development. Especially Kai’s skill to 
present a subject to any audience was singled out. Patrick, the manager of the 
department which PMT was reporting to, recalled a particular anecdote to describe his 
skill set: 
“[Kai] was a gifted marketing person and a genius in some way. When 
we were driving from [the research site] to [a production plant], we had 
no slides with us. I was driving and he made slides and presented them 
convincingly. And I was sitting on hot coals thinking: ‘Gosh! We have not 
prepared anything’. ‘I will take care of it’, he said. A PowerPoint artist; 
and he could put things across convincingly”. (Patrick, former head of 
the research department, focus group interview, 12 December 2011) 
Confronted with this term during the interview, Kai rejected the notion of marketing or 
selling in general as “misleading” (Kai, team leader PMT, interview, 22 June 2012). From 
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his point of view it was a combination of empathy and “reasonable collaboration” (Kai, 
team leader PMT, interview, 22 June 2012). It was important to understand the 
requirements and problems of the user side in order to progress collaboratively. Also, he 
did not miss to point out that “a bit of fun also generates the motivation, more freedom” 
for successful social interaction (Kai, team leader PMT, interview, 22 June 2012). This 
strong personal trait, characterised by a collaborative and transactional approach, in 
contrast to an authoritative regime not uncommon in a hierarchical and bureaucratic 
organisation such as CarCo, contributed to arousing curiosity of various audiences and 
eventually to a successful acquisition of new users. His skill was very valuable when he 
teamed up with Chris to introduce the technical prototype, the NetworkPlanner, to 
potentially new users.  
The acquisition of a new user followed a common pattern with three general stages. 
Firstly, a user working on projects with production network-relevance had to be 
identified. Previously, PMT identified such users by pro-actively approaching relevant 
departments. But thanks to an expanded network of contacts and collaborators within 
CarCo, PMT members were informed about interesting projects which were under way 
elsewhere. For example, in one case PMT was informed about an important project by 
the partner of one of the doctoral students. She was working at that time for CarCo’s 
internal engineering consultancy. In this position she learned about many projects taking 
place in different places throughout CarCo.  
Secondly, a meeting was arranged with members of the targeted department, ideally 
including the manager responsible for granting the permission for collaboration. It was a 
situation like that, when the complementary duo of the supervisory researcher and the 
doctoral student could make use of their combined presentation skills. An intern 
remembered one occasion when he witnessed their performance at one meeting with 
potential users. The supervisory researcher would deliver a general introduction about 
the kind of projects managed by PMT and the expertise available in the team. The 
doctoral student would then take over and introduce the planning tool. Their 
performance was so persuasive, as the student described, particularly because both 
performers convincingly conveyed the message, that they were strong believers in the 
value of the technical artefact and even more so in its capability to solve the problems 
which the target group was dealing with. Of course, the artefact was up for the task, so 
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they assured. It would only take a few minor adjustments. Both the researcher and the 
student exaggerated the existing capabilities of the artefact to accommodate the 
requirements of the users and to raise their expectations. Thanks to a strategy of 
translating the needs and requirements of their audience generously in favour of their 
abilities, they won the trust of their audience and got the opportunity to demonstrate 
that they truly were able to deliver what they promised. 
Thirdly, once they had their foot in the door, they would continue interacting closely 
with their clients to make sure that the users were happy with their services throughout 
the engagement. Keeping up users’ interest was a critical and important concern. Kai 
referred to this as an “art” to keep them interested despite the bugs and raw results in 
the beginning (Kai, team leader PMT, interview, 22 June 2012). He emphasised that it is 
not always the practical and technical value that was critical. Social factors were also 
carefully catered for. For example, individual users were invited to the research facility 
for focused discussions or knowledge sharing sessions. Alternatively, the researchers 
visited the users and spent a few days in their offices to get to know the business cases 
and problems first hand. This high level of openness and engagement reduced the 
cultural distance between researchers and practitioners and facilitated sustaining long-
term relationships. 
The collaboration with the buses division followed this pattern before it was ceased due 
to a political decision. This was not too much of a setback for PMT because, by the time, 
the cars division had already indicated their interest in learning more about the 
capabilities of the NetworkPlanner. This division was the largest of all divisions in 
CarCo. Having gained substantial insights into real business cases and, thus, having 
improved the artefact correspondingly, the cars division was a welcome opportunity to 
test the artefact, which still was just a prototypical configurations of appropriated 
technologies built by an engineering student, in a new business environment. 
6.3.4 Applying the NetworkPlanner in a new social setting 
At the time, when attention switched from the buses division to the strategic planning 
department the cars division, the technical artefact was a complex construct of multiple 
worksheets interlinked with each other via numerous and complex formulas. Further, 
the configuration was extended by a map functionality based on MS Visio. On one hand, 
this resembled an improvised but operative artefact capable of solving highly specialised 
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business cases in the domain of strategic network planning. On the other hand, however, 
its downsides were manifold due to its exploratory and opportunistic style of 
development. Improvisation comes along hastily integrated components, inefficiently 
coded algorithms, makeshift workarounds and unfriendly user interfaces. As long as the 
prototype was operated by an expert, of which there was only the doctoral student who 
assembled the configuration, it was a useful artefact. Except for Kai and fellow doctoral 
students in PMT, the NetworkPlanner, version 0, posed a puzzle for everyone else 
consisting of multiple worksheets with a map attached to it. As soon as one tried 
changing a parameter, the chance that the configuration would just collapse was very 
likely. In other words, it was basically useless for non-expert users without the 
concierge-like service offered by PMT. For this reason, Jürgen, the later team leader of 
PMT, referred to this version 0 as a demonstrator, rather than a prototype. 
The opportunity to work with the cars division emerged about a year after Chris started 
his doctoral work on the project. It was not only the opportunity to work with a new 
customer, it also marked the appearance of the first intern who was under Chris’s 
supervision. She was an industrial engineering and management student joining PMT to 
do her final year dissertation and she was recruited to deal with the new cars division 
collaboration. The strategic planning department in the cars division enquired for PMT’s 
participation to demonstrate the capabilities of their artefact, the NetworkPlanner, 
version 0. PMT readily complied with the request and allocated the first intern to work 
with the planning department. She was as a representative of PMT and served as the 
bridge between the research group and the strategic planners who were located an 
hour’s drive away at the headquarters of CarCo.  
With a helper on-site, the Chris could assign complex tasks to her. Her close distance to 
the customers allowed her to directly interact with the strategic planners to collect 
relevant data necessary to operate the NetworkPlanner. Although Chris also spent much 
time with the planners of the cars division, she was a valuable assistant to collect data 
and to interact with practitioners to clarify issues and solve emerging problems on the 
spot. Her participation sped up data collection and helped the researchers to come to 
terms about the specific requirements of the cars division quickly in order to adapt the 




Figure 12 Additional resources from internal departments also bring new political 
currency to the kernel 
Thanks to the engagements with the two strategic departments and the brief interaction 
with external audiences, i.e. the Siemans manager, PMT was granted access to new 
resources to expand the kernel. Although the financial reward was welcome, PMT 
gained immensely from the political currency that was attached to the internal funds (see 
Figure 12, changes to the previous kernel figure are highlighted in bold). However, 
despite the effort, this collaboration eventually turned out another dead end.  
MS Excel was a common application allowing for the development of complex tools for 
quantitative analysis of large quantities of data. Strategic planners made extensive use of 
such tools and therefore were skilful experts in creating their own purpose-built 
solutions. The strategic planners applied the NetworkPlanner in a project to learn about 
its capabilities and to compare its results with an internal MS Excel-based solution 
developed by them. Although the actual results produced by the NetworkPlanner were 
useful, it was found that the benefit to implement the NetworkPlanner did not justify the 
overall effort. The financial commitment alone, comprising a significant six-digit figure, 
was too high a threshold to continue any attempt to adopt the artefact. Despite another 
setback, the PMT researchers were not discouraged to continue their work since they 
were sure that strategic departments were definitely the right location for the 
NetworkPlanner. It was just that the circumstances had not been in favour of the 
researchers so far.  
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While a political decision had rendered the buses division unfit, the strategic planners at 
the cars division found that the NetworkPlanner was providing no added-value in 
comparison to the MS Excel-based methods they got accustomed to. The reason why the 
NetworkPlanner did not provide any added-value compared to its MS Excel counterpart 
was that the business case it was used for did not comprise a minimum level of 
complexity. The advantage inherent in the application of the NetworkPlanner was the 
increasing integration of higher order mathematical methods drawn from the field of 
operations research. To take advantage of these effective methods it required a project 
that posed a challenge with a minimum level of complexity involved. Here, complexity 
refers to the interconnectedness of high numbers of factors including products, 
production plants, markets, and other parameters. At the time of the encounter with the 
cars division, the planners were dealing with problems which yet were below the 
minimum level of complexity that would justify the application of the NetworkPlanner. 
It does not mean that the planners were dealing with simple problems. Far from any 
such claim, their business cases represented complex problems on multiple dimensions. 
Nonetheless, the NetworkPlanner was deemed to be of no use for the cars division. 
Again, the situation was not in favour for the NetworkPlanner. Despite having a large 
and globally operating organisation, the cars division was organised in a way that all 
relevant problem cases could be analysed adequately relying on bespoke MS Excel 
solutions created by the strategic planners themselves. The engagement with their 
customers ceased once again and PMT had to move on searching for another potential 
sponsor for their development elsewhere. 
6.4 Elaborating the artefact – NetworkPlanner, version 1 
Similar to the experience with the buses division, the interaction with strategic planners 
in the cars division was, although unsuccessful after all, a valuable opportunity for 
having had access to a real business case and social environment. The artefact was not 
adopted but it proved to be a useful and appropriate tool for evaluating production-
related network projects and providing meaningful results to inform decision-makers. 
Viewing the experience as a failure in finding a host for the artefact is one possible 
interpretation. But as an experiment in the field, it was clearly a success case that 




6.4.1 Improving usability and visual appeal 
Although finding a host was an important objective, it was not yet a problem PMT had 
to address immediately. The collaboration with the cars division lasted from mid-2003 to 
early 2004. Funding from both public projects kept the research on the artefact afloat but 
the end of the SatFab project was on the horizon in December 2004. 
In mid-2003 efforts were directed at improving the technical foundation of the artefact. 
The artefact to that date was mostly an improvised configuration developed 
opportunistically and shaped strongly by experiences made at different occasions and 
under varying circumstances. In fact, Kai, the supervisory researcher, indicated that 
Chris was not really into doing technical work on the artefact. Chris was eager to 
delegate this task to another intern who was recruited in August 2003. 
A chemical engineering student from Spain was looking for an opportunity to do his 
final year dissertation somewhere in Germany. He found the description for the 
internship interesting because the requirements demanded experience and skills in 
programming. Chris recruited his second intern and delegated all technical 
responsibilities to him in order to free himself up for working on methods and dealing 
with practitioners at the cars division at that time. 
At the time when technical development was delegated, the artefact was a configuration 
made of MS Excel spreadsheets and a MS Visio-based map. The objective was clearly set 
on finding a way to improve the technical configuration and, most importantly, the 
visual interface of the artefact. In hindsight, Ricky, the former intern from Spain who 
was working in the production programme planning department of another car 
manufacturer at the time of the interview, realised the importance of improving 
particularly the visual appeal of the artefact: 
“I can realise, after the years, in order to have success in this kind of tools, 
it has to be like everything was like all top things in the world, that it has 
to be good and it has to look good. When another manager in the 
company would hear about [the NetworkPlanner] and it would be 
presented to them, if it was easy to use and a nice visualisation it would 
be better. So I think that is the point they were taking that much effort in 




Thanks to the work of the intern, the integration of the map was subsequently improved 
and enriched by further functionalities and more interactivity. User-friendliness became 
an explicit requirement besides the never ending improvement of the code and methods. 
However, at some point, the limitation of MS Visio became apparent. It was an 
application to draw diagrams which can be enriched with a limited degree of 
interactivity. But not to the extent demanded by the researchers. Therefore, a 
professional software firm was commissioned to support the intern’s technical work by 
developing a bespoke graphical user interface (GUI). The bespoke GUI had the 
advantage to provide a level of interactivity unachievable with a MS Visio-based 
solution. The intern emphasised the connectedness between the map and the 
spreadsheets as one of the core functionalities. For example, a factory created by clicking 
on the map appeared automatically in the spreadsheet. Such and other automation 
features made the map and thus the artefact more intuitive and easier to be used by non-
experts, at least on a superficial level. This was much progress compared to early states 
of NetworkPlanner, version 0. Indeed, the new development drive, which saw the 
substitution of components by more effective and integrated modules, changed the face 
and capabilities of the NetworkPlanner. This greatly improved artefact, in particular the 
new GUI and its more elaborate integration, is what will henceforth be referred to as the 
NetworkPlanner, version 1. 
6.4.2 Further configuration of concepts and methods 
Among the concepts integrated in the NetworkPlaner was the Gozintograph (see Figure 
13). This concept exemplifies the kinds of ideas that were being implemented in the 
artefact over time. The Gozintograph represents the production structure of a 




Figure 13 Gozintograph - graphical representation of production structure of a 
manufacturing process (Loos, 2001) 
It organises the bill of materials by displaying what number and what type of material 
‘goes into’ (from which the term ‘Gozinto’ is derived from) what product. Individual 
concepts, like the Gozintograph, are informative but limited in its application. It is the 
integration and combination of numerous concepts and methods which gradually 
increased the capabilities of the prototype. For example, the significance of Gozintograph 
was strongly enhanced by combining it with sales forecasts. Forecasts are a relevant type 
of information regarded as future demands by strategic planners in their network-
related projects.20 Knowing or forecasting how many products will be sold in a particular 
period allows calculating the demand on materials for the same period. These and other 
calculated figures allow planners to evaluate different scenarios and network 
configurations. 
                                                          
20 Car companies forecast sales figures by drawing on various sources including 
estimates reported from their car dealers. Salespeople are closest to the customer and 
therefore are among the best to estimate future sales performances by evaluating recent 
sales figures in the light of current circumstances and potential future trends. Forecasts 
are collected by a central department in CarCo and enriched with other data, e.g. 
product life-cycle information, before the figures are made available to other 
departments like strategic planners. Sales forecasts are represented by concrete figures 
which are split up according to markets. A market can be a single country or a region 
comprising several countries. Although these heuristics to estimate future demand are 
not particularly reliable - an average difference between forecasts and actual sales was 
measured to be about 40% (both + and -) at US car company General Motors (Jordan & 
Graves, 1995) - it is a methodological approach to derive a figure to work with. The 
German car company BMW’s horizon for long-term strategic planning is twelve years 
(Fleischmann et al., 2006). For a network analysis project at BMW, thus, the demand for a 
product under investigation would be fixed for the twelve year planning period. 
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A network analysis comprises the evaluation of not one but of numerous network 
configurations and scenarios. The level of complexity jumps significantly when 
flexibility is the subject of a network analysis. An analysis of low-level flexibility in a 
solitary production structure, i.e. one product is produced by one factory only, can be 
handled by a spreadsheet solution with confidence as practised at the cars division at 
that time. The advantage with solitary production structures is that the amount of 
potential configurations to investigate is manageable. However, when a higher level of 
flexibility is investigated, a manual spreadsheet analysis based on conventional methods 
can become a balancing act where the capabilities of an individual strategic planner are 
stressed to her limits. Complexity of a network analysis increases exponentially the more 
flexibility is taken into account. Basically, conventional spreadsheet solutions developed 
by strategic planners, who are experts in using spreadsheet applications, are not scalable 
to meet the requirements of complex network analyses. This is where methods of 
operations research as promoted by PMT promise tailored solutions. 
Two approaches to solve complex production network-related problems in the field of 
Operations Research were described in the anecdote about the conflict between PMT and 
another research team in Berlin. PMT chose to investigate methods of optimisation while 
the latter researched simulation as a method to analyse a production system.21 First 
experience with simulation was gathered by PMT with an intern who worked on a 
simulation-based approach to investigate potentials for cost reductions in a press shop 
network. Supervised by one of the full-time researchers in PMT, this student was 
employed almost at the same time as the three doctoral students. The early experience 
with simulation techniques informed the decision to pursue optimisation methods as the 
way to go forward in the subject of flexibility in a production network. Getting to the 
                                                          
21 Optimisation and simulation are distinct methods to address problems of complexity 
with different approaches. The method of optimisation, e.g. linear programming, 
requires a descriptive model that abstracts reality into a function with constraints and 
variables. Solving a linear function allows to determine an optimal solution, e.g. 
minimum costs or maximum profits. For a simulation, a behavioural model is developed 
with a set of rules to simulate different behaviours and states of a system. Simulation 
allows investigating unpredictable events and thus is useful for a situation where a 




point of having a functioning optimisation module integrated in the NetworkPlanner 
was a complex undertaking, however.  
6.4.3 Developing an optimisation module for the NetworkPlanner 
The cornerstone for PMT’s strong focus on operations research, in general, and on 
optimisation methods, in particular, was laid by the first generation of doctoral students 
working on the subject of manufacturing flexibility. After overcoming, firstly, technical 
challenges of designing a working prototype and, secondly, social challenges of finding 
cases for application and extensive learning, Chris intensified efforts to increase the 
methodological capabilities of the artefact. While an intern was assigned each to deal 
with the technical and social challenge, a further two interns were recruited at the end of 
2004 to address the methodological challenge. To distinguish these two interns by the 
order of recruitment, they will be referred to as the first OR intern and the second OR 
intern, respectively. Since we conducted an interview with the first intern, we will refer 
to him also by the name Jörg. 
The two interns were not recruited at the same time but their placements overlapped to 
large parts so that one student could inform and expand on the findings of the other. A 
major contribution is credited to Jörg, the first OR intern, whose assignment was to test 
different optimisation methods to identify a best practice approach for the kind of 
problem dealt with by PMT and its customers. His recruitment was a good example for 
the teamwork between the doctoral students Chris, who focused on the network-level, 
and Matthias, who focused on the factory-level. Initially, the first OR intern applied for a 
job offer posted by Matthias. However, when Jörg embarked on his assignment, he was 
given a choice to work on a different subject with Chris. Because the specifics of working 
on methodologically-oriented rather than a technically-focused subject were more 
appealing to Jörg, he gladly accepted the offer and switched to the other topic. For Chris 
this was a lucky coincident, for he was successfully establishing links to strategic 
planners of another division, the trucks division, at that time and he was in need for 
interns to take on the incoming workload. At the same time PMT also engaged in a 
further undertaking with practitioners from the buses division again. The second OR 
intern was assigned to work with the buses division. It was after this project that buses 
division made the decision to harmonise its production programme to equalise capacity 
utilisation among its plants. This move basically terminated the need for any network 
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optimisation as offered by the researchers. Meanwhile, PMT was commissioned by the 
trucks division to support them in conducting a network analysis to determine the 
future production programme of a follow-up product. The trucks division was the 
second largest business unit of CarCo and, thus, a highly-lucrative customer.  
To this point at the end of 2004, the artefact was not yet capable of deriving 
mathematically optimal solutions based on optimisation methods. This capability existed 
by means of a manual capability of the researchers involved but its integration into the 
artefact was yet to be achieved. So far, the artefact was capable of managing relevant 
data of network-related problems and of representing it practically on a map. But its 
actual data processing capability was rudimentary and yet not close to what was 
promised to practitioners. However, the roadmap for expanding methodological 
capabilities was set and Jörg was assigned to work on the methodological challenge 
posed by the new network problem from the truck division. One of his first tasks was to 
identify the best methodological approach on developing a descriptive model to 
represent the network problem. Only when a problem is abstracted into a descriptive 
model, can it be solved. However, research on manufacturing flexibility in the field of 
OR was still developing at that time and the availability of appropriate models was 
scarce.  
It was the ‘seminal work’ by Jordan and Graves (1995) that marked an important 
milestone in that subfield of OR that focused on production networks (Volling et al., 
2013, p. 250).22 Their model became a template and inspiration for other researchers to 
apply and adopt their approach for similar problems in various industrial contexts. 
PMT’s researchers also recognised it as an interesting model to address the kinds of 
research problems they encountered in strategic planning departments. Volling et al. 
(2013) also indicated that, over time, PMT grew to a significant player in the application 
of OR methods in the field of global production networks.23 But in 2004, when OR was 
                                                          
22 Jordan and Graves developed a descriptive model to represent a product-to-plant 
assignment problem and to prove that even a limited state of flexibility already yielded 
many advantages of a fully-flexible production network in contrast to a solitary strategy 
production system (Jordan & Graves, 1995). 
23 Volling et al. (2013) reviewed research on OR methods and applications in the domain 
of global production systems. Among others, this review presents a table with 27 
publications including both doctoral dissertations by Chris and Matthias. Their listing 
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just being explored at PMT, there was only one intern struggling with developing the 
first model. Supervised by Chris and supported by Matthis, the first OR intern learned 
from available models and used them as templates to incrementally create a bespoke 
model representing the business problem encountered in the trucks division. The 
descriptive model gradually grew from a relatively general model to a complex model 
that incorporated more and more of the factors and details relevant in the analysis of a 
production network reflecting the specifics of the trucks production system.  
While the problem of modelling the business problem was incrementally solved, another 
challenge was to run algorithms efficiently. With a descriptive model and with the 
support of a calculator, one can solve a particular problem using pen and paper. But a 
network analysis comprises the investigation of numerous configurations with varying 
sets of input parameters defined as scenarios. Each configuration would require 
completing one calculation procedure and would result in determining one local optimal 
solution under the given parameters. A network analysis increases in robustness the 
more qualified configurations are analysed and eventually compared with each other to 
find a solution that meets a diverse set of requirements. In the end, a strategic planner 
aims to find a global optimum among all the locally optimal solutions derived from 
analyses of single configurations and scenarios. The robustness of a network is measured 
in its ability to cope with uncertainties of markets, currencies and other socio-political 
circumstances. A production network that generates profits in cases of both high and 
low demand is more robust than a production network that generates higher profits in 
cases of high demand and higher losses in cases of low demand. Undertaking such an 
extensive network analysis manually would be not only an uncomfortably monotonous 
activity but also one prone to human error. The purpose of the NetworkPlanner was to 
automate these calculations - a capability widely promised by Kai and Chris to their 
customers, but which yet was to be delivered. Having a model of the problem, or at least 
being on a promising track, therefore, was just one of two problems solved. 
                                                                                                                                                              
indicates the significance of their final research outcomes in this particular niche. The list 
also comprises works of five other doctoral students who worked with PMT at later 
stages. For the sake of completeness it also is mentioned that two other publications 
listed were lead-authored by former interns that worked with PMT. 
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Once again, Jörg, the first OR intern was not required to re-invent the wheel but to look 
out for existing technologies. Several commercial software solutions were available on 
the market to fill this gap. These software solutions, so-called solvers, comprised 
algorithms to solve mathematical problems, which are formalised in a generic form 
readable by the solver. Three software providers were short-listed and contacted to get 
more information. Some vendors visited PMT to discuss the requirements in person. 
Selecting one particular vendor and implementing its software solution was an 
important milestone in the overall undertaking, as Jörg recalled: 
“I think this was a crucial point, that I eventually compared three 
different vendors to automate the problem-solving. So, I was able to 
entirely focus on the mathematical description of the problem. 
Eventually, I found a black box which I could feed and which would 
produce a solution in the end.[…] Subsequently I mostly focused on 
modelling the problem and on gradually increasing the complexity of the 
model. That means, to include more and more restrictions, customs, 
multi-level supply processes. That means going from the simple model to 
a more complex problem”. (Jörg, first OR intern, interview, 13 February 
2013) 
After finding a solution to the second problem and developing a solver module for the 
artefact, Jörg conducted performance tests to find out about the limits of the solver. 
Although computer capacities are immense nowadays, an ineffectively modelled 
problem can easily crash a solver.24 The developing and testing went in parallel to the 
work on the actual business problem posed by the trucks division. Users were 
encouraged to install the software at their workplaces to use it themselves, but typical 
problems of early stage applications rendered its use problematic because numerous 
errors continuously interrupted the work flow. Chris as well as the interns frequently 
provided customer support services when users experienced problems with the 
NetworkPlanner. 
The successful development of a functioning model by the first OR intern was significant 
in enhancing a strategic planner’s interest in the NetworkPlanner for it allowed 
automation of a usually complex problem. The automation of this part of the strategic 
                                                          
24 A crash of the solver is a welcome response because it immediately terminates the 
automated process. Otherwise it could end up computing the problem in a seemingly 




planning process unfolded prospects previously unthinkable for practitioners involved 
in the process. For PMT this achievement was an absolute necessity because after many 
sessions of promissory meetings with potential users, the team eventually was able to 
deliver a technology that met the high expectations of users, at least on the 
methodological side of the artefact. It the beginning it was yet only a feasibility study 
embodied as separate prototype developed by the first OR intern. The next step was 
interweaving this methodology as an OR module into the artefact. However, parallel to 
the methodological development, a second major technological development regarding 
the artefact was under way. 
6.4.4 Poor performance 
From about the end of 2002, when the doctoral students began doing research on 
manufacturing flexibility, up to mid-2005 the artefact endured incremental as well as 
radical changes. Spreadsheets were created, elaborated and supplemented by a map 
representation. The map was later replaced by a GUI with enhanced interactivity 
features. Although the artefact became clearer in its shape, the overall performance 
remained unsatisfactory. Spreadsheets were the format in which data was stored and 
manipulated so far. The advantage of MS Excel as a technical foundation was its 
availability throughout the company and its ease of use, even for more complex 
applications. This is practical for an experimental stage where prototypical development 
requires much tinkering and improvisation. But a spreadsheet is not the best technology 
to manage data efficiently in the long run. A spreadsheet is like a plain playing field on 
which data can be dumped and handled with ease. But the more data is amassed and 
linked up with each other the less dynamic and manageable it becomes. Besides a 
separate editor for programming in Visual Basic for Applications, the MS Excel 
environment does not offer much specific functionality to a software developer. 
Generally, MS Excel provided a rich set of functionalities but, overall, its performance 
was lacking. What was missing was an ability to deal with data flexibly and efficiently. 
This was a functionality provided only by proper database management systems. 
Particularly in light of the need to use an external solver application, it became obvious 
that MS Excel was a poor foundation and that it turned to a reverse salient, a subsystem 
that delayed the progress of the overall system (Hughes, 1983). Thus, the technical 
foundation of the artefact required a redesign, it was found. MS Access, another software 
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application from the Microsoft Office Package, was selected to replace MS Excel and to 
serve as the underlying database management system. 
As of that date, Ricky, the intern from Spain who was responsible for the technical 
development, had already graduated. However, he had continued working with PMT as 
a self-employed technical consultant.25 This was by far an easier alternative to maintain a 
working relationship than attempting to employ them directly. Budgets were tight and 
new faces appeared mostly due to organisational reshuffling rather than new 
recruitment. Indeed, of all the doctoral students working with PMT only one student 
was ever employed after his funding period ended. Overall, only three interns remained 
with the project for a period longer than 12 months. All three of them were responsible 
for the technical side of the artefact, i.e. coding basic functionalities, developing data 
management and processing components, expanding data analysis features, improving 
usability etc. Two of these three interns worked with PMT for two years, one of them 
part-time as he had continued studying in the city where the research facility was 
located. The other intern remained with PMT for 18 months. This latter intern, an 
industrial engineer named Karl-Heinz who will also be referred to as the technical intern 
henceforth, was the successor for Ricky, the intern previously responsible for the 
technical development. Their work overlapped for less than four weeks giving the 
successor less time to be trained about artefact than he was comfortable with. 
The new recruit was assigned to swap the spreadsheet foundation with a proper 
database, MS Access in that case, and to reintegrate the other existing components. Karl-
Heinz summarised his task as follows:  
”[m]y main focus was, principally, to turn this spreadsheet-construct into 
a database, which was underlying the GUI, and, at the same time, to 
integrate all calculation and optimisation algorithms into the Access 
database, and, when all the data was collected, to shape it in a way that 
the Access database could be regarded as a second module in which data 
analyses could be undertaken”. (Karl-Heinz, technical intern, interview, 7 
June 2012) 
                                                          
25 After graduation, interns could not be employed under the same conditions. To keep 
them involved as long as necessary, and as long as they wanted to stay involved, they 
were commissioned as self-employed consultants. 
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Another task he inherited was to continue overseeing and coordinating the work on the 
GUI which was still under development. Generally, he perceived the state of the art of 
the technology as unfinished, mostly because the integration of the different components 
was not tight: 
“Well, it was not really mature. It really was only the ideas which existed 
in the minds of [Chris] and all other OR experts; somehow represented 
by Excel spreadsheets which, linked up with each other, resulted in a 
fairly mazy construct for an outsider. Well, in principle it did deliver 
results, but not applicable for everyone”. (Karl-Heinz, technical intern, 
interview, 7 June 2012) 
It is of little surprise that Karl-Heinz, the artefact appeared somewhat chaotic when he 
glimpsed at the interiors of the NetworkPlanner. Taking into account that his 
predecessor had to deal with ever changing early-state components, the GUI and the 
optimisation module, it was obvious that the state of the artefactual configuration 
mirrored the large extent of tinkering and improvisation. The slightly easier start, from 
which the new recruit started off, was that by now an understanding about a dominant 
design for the artefact had emerged. A good design depends to large extent from 
demanding users who continuously push the designers and engineers to deal with their 
peculiar requirements. A robust design, in particular, goes further and accommodates 
demands of yet non-existent but anticipated requirements (Gardiner & Rothwell, 1985). 
The NetworkPlanner acquired over time a fairly good and increasingly robust design by 
having regularly been exposed to problems in different user locations where the 
problems encountered were similar but different in details – a learning process termed 
as Social Learning (Williams et al., 2005). All the effort invested in working with various 
users had paid well off in terms of gaining a diverse set of knowledge from user 
interactions. This continuous social learning process was characterised by tight and yet 
flexible intervowenness of actors, spaces and resulting improvised problem-solution-
configurations. Although the overall result of the social shaping process was an 
unfinished and buggy artefact, it was, nonetheless, a bespoke solution for a tiny but 
needy and important niche in a large organisation. Putting all together to a neatly 




6.5 Embedding the artefact in a new social setting 
Around the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 was a period with important 
achievements and events. The methodological approach was significantly substantiated 
and a redesign of the technical foundation was under way. But another trail of events 
was just about to unfold thanks to the involvement of the trucks division. This division 
turned out to be the home for the artefact, which the PMT researchers had been hoping 
and looking for. It later claimed ownership over the intellectual property of artefact and 
engaged in funding and pro-actively promoting its diffusion throughout the company. 
Understanding the reasons for this intense engagement requires a brief historical 
analysis of the trucks division and especially of the departments housing its strategic 
planners. 
6.5.1 Pilot project at the trucks division in Team A 
Previously, the work of an intern was reported who successfully developed a descriptive 
model based on the production network of the trucks division. His participation on the 
project was made possible because PMT successfully negotiated access to strategic 
planners at the trucks division. This negotiation process was not at all straight forward 
but very much a hard-earned achievement. In the interview, Chris remarked that it was 
a difficult and politically sensitive undertaking for researchers to approach higher ranks 
in operational departments in order to promote PMT’s services. What was so sensitive 
about this approach was that they basically were poaching in territories under 
jurisdiction of other functional departments. Particularly the head of financial controlling 
was unpleased when learning about PMT’s activities in his division and especially in his 
arena of responsibility. It was only due to the intervention of the head of planning of the 
trucks division that they were granted the permission to get involved in yet another 
network project anyway to demonstrate the feasibility of their technological project.  
In the past there were two network planning departments in the division which later 
were merged to one in July 2006. To distinguish the two sets of strategic planners, the 
department where the NetworkPlanner was applied first will be termed Team A. Team B 
will play an important role later in the story. The first pilot project in the trucks division, 
which PMT was granted to work on, plays a crucial role. It will be referred to as Major 
Network Project (MNP). Following a similar approach as with the cars division, an 
additional intern, Karsten, was recruited to work closely with the practitioners. Since the 
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recruit joined in January 2005, the kick-off of MNP can be dated back to the end of 2004. 
The role of the new intern was to facilitate the application of the NetworkPlanner at the 
customer side. Different to other interns he was a mature student with a background in 
business administration. Karsten re-enlisted to higher education to gain a second degree 
in mechanical engineering and applied for the job at CarCo to do his final year 
dissertation on a practical project. To distinguish this intern from others, he will be 
referred to as the planning intern. Instead of being recruited by PMT in the research 
group, the planning intern was recruited directly by the strategic planning department at 
the trucks division and was, therefore, reporting directly to the strategic planners.  
The collaboration between Karsten and members of PMT was quickly established and 
well maintained throughout the pilot project. A first introduction of the NetworkPlanner 
to the planning intern was supervised by Chris. Aware of the opportunity posed by the 
collaboration with the trucks division, Chris was often present in the department to be 
briefed on MNP and its progress as well as to explain the use of the planning tool and to 
address any problems arising. Thereafter, the planning intern was responsible for 
applying the planning tool at the trucks division. The collaboration intensified quickly 
because many bugs and errors hampered the work flow and required much interaction 
with PMT. Reflecting on the state of the artefact when Karsten came in touch with it, he 
described the artefact as being in a stage prior to that of a prototype. He located it 
somewhere between a prototype and the next lower level of a demonstrator. His inputs 
became an important point of reference for PMT to debug the software as well as to 
implement new feature requests that emerged due to the planning intern’s practical 
work with the tool. Karsten was the first key user of the NetworkPlanner outside of 
PMT. His views were not clouded by a forgiving developer’s perspective. Facing the 
clearly defined task to contribute to a running network project, he had to comply to the 
MNP deadlines and objectives. Researchers found in him a demanding but helpful 
collaborator who helped shaping the user-friendliness and usability of the artefact. 
The technical auxiliary student in charge, Karl-Heinz, remembered how busy it was at 
this time as user requests kept floating in regularly. A problem that was difficult to get 
hold of remained the poor performance of the tool. Much time in the beginning was 
spent on learning how to use the artefact and, especially, the descriptive model to 
represent the problem. Performance problems were caused initially by inefficiently 
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designed models. Although a general descriptive model was developed it yet required 
trial and error approaches to find the best way in representing an actual network 
problem. Calculations by the solver either took an unsatisfactorily long time to finish or 
crashed in the process due to lack of computational capacities or hidden flaws in the 
model. Increased experience slowly resolved these kinds of problems thanks to better 
modelling of the problem. Other technical problems were addressed one by one 
increasing the reliability of the tool over time. Performance problems, however, 
remained a problem for many years particularly because the expectations of planners 
were very demanding, if not to some extent unrealistic. Network problems are complex 
and require a considerable amount of computation time to be solved. Nevertheless, these 
performance problems were regarded as a necessary evil and the struggle abounded 
with it was not reflected to the decision makers in upper ranks. This low profile about 
operational problems with the artefact helped creating an external image of a well 
working tool. 
Another challenge that emerged was a concern with the financial controlling department 
in the trucks division. Although the presence of the researchers was tolerated thanks to 
the temporary mandate given by the head of planning, it did not go as far as coercing 
financial controllers into accepting the NetworkPlanner. Thus, their initial scepticism 
posed a problem for they remained an important element in the general strategic 
planning process. A strategic planner’s job was to manage a network project analysis. In 
brief, a strategic network analysis included the identification of a set of possible 
solutions, liaising with practitioners working in the plants, gathering data relevant for 
assessing potential solutions, conducting necessary quantitative assessments to get 
representative results to, eventually, report a set of recommendations to decision 
makers. In the strategic planning process, the role of the financial controllers was to 
conduct detailed profitability accounting of those possible network solutions that were 
short listed by the strategic planners. From their point of view, the NetworkPlanner 
threatened to dispute their jurisdiction in this process and, in the long run, to push them 
out of the planning process. 
To mitigate this problem, the researchers and the users in the strategic planning 
department, henceforth we refer to the combination of these two parties as the 
NetworkPlanner community, approached the controllers to address their concern. The 
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NetworkPlanner, as far as it was perceived by the NetworkPlanner community, was not 
intended to replace the involvement of financial controllers. Its purpose was to enhance 
the capabilities of a strategic planner. This enhancement did not make planners 
independent from controllers but allowed planners to make higher numbers and more 
thorough analyses to derive more robust results before handing them over to the 
financial controllers. In fact, if the development of the  artefact had been adapted 
accordingly, it could have had the potential to incorporate a larger extent of the work 
usually conducted by financial controllers. After all, the concerns of the financial 
controllers were reasonable to some extent. However, the willingness to adapt the 
NetworkPlanner to that purpose was not there at the time also for the reason that, in the 
end, it still required a user experienced in financial controlling to legitimately conduct 
such an analysis. At a much later stage in development of the artefact, this route indeed 
was probed by undertaking a network project in collaboration with financial controlling 
within their domain. Meanwhile, the trust of the financial controllers had yet to be 
earned by the NetworkPlanner community. 
Financial controllers voiced their scepticism by criticising the validity of results 
produced by the NetworkPlanner. Not being briefed in detail about the internal 
workings they assumed that calculations were not in compliance with the division’s 
standards. Much effort by the NetworkPlanner community went into aligning 
algorithms and calculation methods to fulfil the requirements of financial controlling. 
Fortunately, a harmonisation of methods had already been undertaken in an earlier stage 
when PMT worked with financial controllers at the buses division. Therefore, the 
researchers readily disclosed the details of how the NetworkPlanner made use of 
relevant key performance indicators and how it produced its results. This allowed 
financial controllers to scrutinise algorithms to evaluate the artefact’s methodological 
validity. To support the trust building effort, the NetworkPlanner community undertook 
network project analyses drawing on existing input data used by financial controllers for 
previous projects. Results produced with the NetworkPlanner were juxtaposed with 
results produced manually by the financial controllers. This comparative exercise 
convinced the financial controllers that the NetworkPlanner complied with internal 
accountancy standards. Eventually the division’s head of financial controlling gave the 
NetworkPlanner his blessing but only after winning the reassurance that financial 
controlling would keep its role in the strategic planning process when it came to detailed 
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profitability analyses. Finding a consensus with financial controlling was important to 
pave the way for the further implementation of the artefact. Otherwise, this 
organisational department could have been a powerful opponent in the coming struggle 
to diffuse the artefact in the rest of the division. 
Having satisfied financial controlling and stabilised the link to the trucks division, work 
continued with gathering data and computing results expected by the strategic planners 
in respect of the MNP project. The operations research-based methods were an 
innovative approach for the strategic planners to undertake a network project. However, 
it was still a black box for them. Thus, it was necessary to explain these strategic planners 
how these methods worked so they in return were able to understand how the results 
came about. A difficulty for each planner was to learn the basics of OR methods to trace 
the mathematical process because in the end it was them who presented results to their 
superiors. Presenting results of strategic network analyses to their superiors, they were 
usually expected to explain their recommended solution and to stand detailed 
interrogative questions. Eventually, all steps of the strategic planning process had been 
taken successfully and a decision was made to proceed with putting MNP into practice. 
The successful application of the NetworkPlanner in the pilot project with Team A was 
among the most important milestones in the long development of the artefact for it was a 
valuable acknowledgement of the high practical value of the artefact for the strategic 
planning process. 
In the midst of MNP, when the success of the collaboration between researchers and 
practitioners was looming, an important actor-related transition occurred. Chris, the 
doctoral student responsible for the artefact development saw the end of his contract 
with PMT approaching. This raised two issues. Firstly, a succession plan had to be put in 
place. And secondly, he had to plan his next career step. The first issue was addressed by 
looking for a candidate who could continue the work on the artefact. In the stage where 
the development was at, the ideal candidate was supposed to have sufficient knowledge 
about OR as well as software developing. Thanks to the constant involvement of interns 
and close collaboration with universities, there was a pool of well-qualified candidates to 
choose from. The successor student selected was an intern who had been recruited 
previously to support Chris in regards of OR-related challenges. He was a student of 
business informatics with a focus on OR methods and thus was an ideal candidate to 
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continue work on the artefact. The second issue regarding Chris’s next career step was 
also quickly resolved as it was aligned with his recent activities in the trucks division. He 
became the assistant to the head of planning at the trucks division. It was the same 
manager who arranged for the researchers to participate in MNP after another senior 
manager had raised his objections. The student’s transition from research to the position 
of assistant to the head of planning was a fortunate move, not only for him individually, 
but for the further diffusion of the artefact in general. The former doctoral student 
became a strategic ally with direct access to a senior manager who held decisive power 
over the fate of the NetworkPlanner. 
Another significant detail of this truck episode was that the LICOPRO project finished in 
October 2005 (SATFAB finished almost a year earlier in December 2004). This was about 
the shortly before the student moved to a new job and after the pilot project came to 
fruition. The pilot project at Team A, therefore, was still benefitting from the financial 
cushion that was provided by a public funding body. Figure 14 illustrates the kernel as it 
looked shortly before the end of 2005. PMT’s members continued to work on their initial 
objective and to collaborate with other research teams. But they also continued focusing 
on growing the successful kernel by elaborating the artefact, which had reached version 
1 by then, and expanding to other users.  
 
Figure 14 PMT's kernel after successful accomplishment of the first pilot project in 
the Trucks division at the end of 2005 
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Having improved internal representation of the NetworkPlanner, it was an ideal 
moment for a subtle follow-up campaign to diffuse the artefact to other strategic 
planners in the division. As noted above, the team of strategic planners which PMT 
worked with in course of the pilot project was only one of two teams responsible for 
strategic planning in this division. To put the next stage in the diffusion of the 
NetworkPlanner into perspective, a historical detour will shed light on the 
organisational setting of strategic planning in the trucks division and explain the co-
existence of another strategic department. 
6.5.2 A historical detour: two strategic planning teams in competition 
By the early 2000s two strategic planning departments had emerged in the trucks 
division. The twofold organisation stemmed from the spatial separation of a major 
component plant from the headquarters. The plant and the headquarters of the trucks 
division were more than an hour’s ride by car away from each other. The component 
plant produced engines for domestic production as well as production abroad. The 
plant’s production volume and the significance of the component, the engine is the 
single most expensive component in a vehicle, as well as the relative size of the engine 
production network justified having its own strategic planning team, Team A, located 
close to the actual site of manufacturing. The team based at the headquarters, Team B, 
managed the final products as well as other major components. Further, the two 
departments were also distinguished by different philosophies in their approaches. The 
team in the headquarters, Team B, adopted a somewhat holistic approach, also 
characterised as “strategic-visionary” by an interviewee (David, strategic planner, 
interview, 9 May 2011), while the other team was project-oriented, tackling problems 
practically as they arose. The origin of the latter philosophy is explained with a tradition 
strongly influenced by a senior financial controlling manager at the trucks division. His 
philosophy was to minimise expenses and to avoid investments in production capacities 
whenever possible. Instead, this philosophy encouraged the reuse of existing 
infrastructure. In regards of component manufacturing, this was easier to accomplish 
than with finished goods. If more of a component X was required then plant Y was 
capable of delivering, than plant Z would produce more of the same component to 
satisfy the surplus in demand. Any surge in demand at one location can be relatively 
easily compensated by drawing on available capacities of another under-utilised plant at 
another location. Components are suitable for such compensatory tactics but less so are 
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finished goods, i.e. commercial vehicles in this case. Shipping a finished good to satisfy 
unanticipated demand elsewhere, however, quickly carries extra hurdles in the form of 
customs or other tax penalties besides immense transportation costs. Thus, the planning 
team in the component plant tended to solve problems by rerouting material flows based 
on available capacities in other plants rather than increasing capacities of a bottleneck 
plant through costly investments. The planning and coordination of existing capacities 
and material flows in the production network required thorough financial evaluation of 
specific and complex business cases. The NetworkPlanner, therefore, offered a 
functionality that was more welcomed in Team A as it fit better their mode of operations: 
it was project-oriented, i.e. specific data had to be collected anew for every new project, 
and was capable of a thorough analysis of large and complex sets of data. 
In contrast to that, the team at the headquarters pursued a holistic approach. This is most 
evidently observed in its attempt to develop its own information system that embodied 
the described characteristics. This information system was intended to be a database 
holding information on the global production network, thus it will be named GlobalDB 
for reference. GlobalDB should store all information about the production network that 
was relevant for strategic network projects. This included production-related 
information about production capacities, capacity utilisation as well as basic details on 
the address of the plant, products, plant layouts etc. Its purpose was to serve as the 
reference system for any network-related project so that the data had not had to be 
retrieved anew for every emerging project. Different to the development of the 
NetworkPlanner, GlobalDB was fully developed by an external software house and 
coordinated by a strategic planner in Team B with a background in information 
technology. The requirements for the system were relatively well defined and did not 
accommodate complex mathematical methods, although a secondary function was to 
provide for limited analytical capabilities. Development on the system started in 2003, 
about a year later than the work on NetworkPlanner. After a successful pilot project the 
development was commissioned to a larger software house. The collaboration with this 
company turned out unsatisfactory and so the smaller software house, which had 
developed the artefact for the pilot project in the first place, was again commissioned to 
develop the full system. This was about the time when the researchers entered the arena 
to compete against GlobalDB. Generally, both artefacts served different purposes. 
GlobalDB stored information for general use while the NetworkPlanner was a 
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specialised tool for specific use cases. In principle, they did not necessarily compete 
against each other in terms of functionality. The opposite seemed to be true in that both 
systems filled gaps in different niches. It was rather social and practical reasons that 
turned both into competitors. The competition set in only after the NetworkPlanner was 
successfully applied to support the strategic planners of Team A in the Major Network 
Project. 
After NetworkPlanner’s success in one department, the strategic planners of Team A 
themselves tried to introduce the tool to their colleagues in Team B. At first, this 
happened occasionally via rhetoric means by praising the value of the innovative 
planning tool in the strategic planning process. However, these initial attempts failed 
clearly as the planners in fact were not able to demonstrate the use of the artefact or 
explain the details of its operation. Asked for a demonstration, they stumbled because 
they did not use the planning tool themselves but drew on the planning intern or the 
doctoral student to operate it. Thus, the strategic planners at the headquarters were 
sceptical about the grand claims and promises made by their colleagues. When the 
NetworkPlanner was officially introduced in a special meeting organised by the 
planning team who were involved MNP, the result was not as expected. Instead of being 
informed and convinced about the benefits of the artefact, the audience was left irritated. 
Max, who attended the introduction meeting, summarised the experience: 
“[T]he presentation was, in my opinion, a failure […] They introduced it 
as a mega tool… Super, super! But I did not at all understand what it was 
all about”. (Max, strategic planner, interview, 7 April 2011) 
What did impress him was the ambition and strong belief of the researchers in the value 
of their artefact. However, in this episode of diffusion to Team B, little ground was won. 
Learning about overly praised capabilities of the planning tool in a presentation, to 
which the planners of Team B were made to attend, is a different scenario than being 
genuinely interested and testing it on a real case. In the end, learning the use of a new 
software application is a time-consuming and not necessarily pleasant activity. Further, 
because the department was working on its own information system, which actually was 
not fulfilling its promises either, Team B was saturated with information technological 
innovations. Thus, the attempt to introduce the NetworkPlanner bottom-up by 
persuading strategic planners failed.  
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Besides the relative indifference of his staff, the manager of the strategic planning 
department of Team B was personally attached to GlobalDB. A reason why the manager 
kept holding on to GlobalDB was the fact that he himself became head of the department 
only a few months ago. Struggling with familiarising himself with the new job he was 
little interested in taking a strong position in a debate he was not clear about all facts yet 
since the development of GlobalDB was initiated by his predecessor. Thus, cancelling the 
development of that system could have had unintended consequences for him like the 
loss of trust of longstanding members of the team. Chris, now assistant to the head of 
planning at the trucks division, anticipated that as long as GlobalDB was an asset in 
Team B there would be no space left for another system. He therefore took advantage of 
his new position and intervened by convincing the head of planning to demand an 
official evaluation and direct comparison of the two information systems. 
A technology assessment was eventually conducted and the result was clear in favour of 
the NetworkPlanner. The NetworkPlanner was a practice-proven, highly innovative and 
niche-tailored expert system that had been used in various business cases across 
different user locations. GlobalDB, on the other hand, was a general information system 
bespoke for a single user location. It was not fully operational and did not noticeably 
contribute to the strategic planning process yet. Even if the idea of GlobalDB had been 
superior to its competitor, it was in an underdeveloped state which could not compete 
with the already available capabilities of the NetworkPlanner. Actions were taken 
swiftly and GlobalDB’s development was cancelled. Although the system had been 
around for a long time, its lack of strong support from the manager of the department 
and other staff members sealed its fate. After GlobalDB was out of the way, the 
NetworkPlanner won by default because its adoption was also an order imposed top-
down by the head of planning. This order was an act of de jure standardisation, i.e. the 
NetworkPlanner was by authority declared the standard planning tool for strategic 
network projects. Coincidentally, soon after the victory of the NetworkPlanner over 
GlobalDB another internal development affected the two planning teams. An internal 
structural reorganisation in the second half of 2006 resulted in the two strategic planning 
departments being merged to one. Team A from the component plant was allotted to the 
head of Team B so that both teams were led by the same manager after all. 
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6.5.3 Pilot project in Team B 
In light of the new techno-political configuration, with GlobalDB being removed and a 
top-down order being in place, a new approach to introduce the NetworkPlanner was 
undertaken by its proponents. The previously witnessed reluctance of the users was not 
necessarily due to individual strategic planners, but depended also on the dominance of 
the prior techno-political situation. In this new situation and after an initial struggle to 
adapt to the change, the strategic planners demonstrated that they were ready to give the 
NetworkPlanner another chance. This new attempt was largely facilitated by the 
coincidental emergence of a new important network project with a relatively high level 
of complexity. 
Having acquired other companies in the recent past expanded the division’s production 
network by new brands and several manufacturing plants in a major foreign market. The 
new network project was initiated because, as time goes by and markets change, the 
need emerged to consolidate the production network in this foreign market. The task 
was set to optimise the existing network to prepare it for present as well as future 
challenges. It was a major reassessment of the existing network of manufacturing plants 
open for considerations such as adding new plants or removing existing ones. Therefore 
it was an extensive network problem requiring the analysis of large structures and 
countless interrelationships - an activity difficult for manual analysis, as described 
above, but ideal for an expert system such as the NetworkPlanner. To simplify the 
narration and to emphasise the importance of the project, this project will be referred to 
as Very Important Network Project (VINP). 
Chris, the assistant and former doctoral student, made the first move by approaching the 
two planners in Team B, who were tasked with analysing VINP, and convinced them to 
give the new planning tool a chance. He personally introduced the NetworkPlanner and 
explained its use to them. The beginning of this collaborative interaction was difficult 
and a particular aspect in the project was found that was not covered by the planning 
tool. To address this, the successor doctoral student, Tom, was called in. Being an expert 
in OR methods as well as software development, he was able to create a bespoke 
solution for that problem. Proving his competence and his willingness to put in extra 
effort, Tom quickly gained the trust of the two planners. As a result, he became involved 
in the planning process for VINP to support the planners and also to replace Chris who 
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had to deal with other responsibilities and therefore could not afford being involved any 
longer. This was the moment when the transition of responsibility from one doctoral 
student to the other completed as Chris did not play an active role in the story any 
longer. 
After getting on board the VINP, Tom quickly emerged to be a key actor in the project as 
well as the establishment of the planning tool for he had expertise to apply the tool and 
to develop it further every time a problem was identified. The project started to demand 
all his attention and a deal was made with PMT’s research department manager to 
continue this intense collaboration. One of the two strategic planners remarked that the 
research department manager was very cooperative because he recognised that VINP 
had the potential to be the final breakthrough to transfer the tool out of research and into 
practice. The research manager himself had overseen the technological project ever since 
PMT started research into flexibility in respect of the public projects. Facing pressure to 
cease the use of resources for non-research related endeavours, the work on the 
NetworkPlanner was by then internally regarded as being at a stage beyond the 
responsibility of a research department, he was also eager to find a home for this 
outcome of years-long research. 
Network projects can vary significantly. Some projects are repetitive and are done just in 
weeks when the problem is relatively small and data can be reused from previous 
analyses. But projects can also be intensive when problems are large in scope and 
complexity. VINP was an instance of the latter sort. Time is not necessarily a factor to 
measure the complexity of a network problem as smaller projects can take many months 
when frequent requests change the nature of the problem and hamper with results of 
previous efforts. However, in the case of VINP, the complexity of the problem stretched 
the project over a long period of time. The involvement of the planners started sometime 
in mid-2006 and lasted about one and a half years until the end of 2008. 
This long period also marks a period when no significant development was made 
regarding the NetworkPlanner because the new doctoral student, Tom, was fully 
occupied by his work on VINP. Gathering data and operating the NetworkPlanner was 
one part of his task, another important responsibility was being the informal tutor to the 
two strategic planners in charge of the project. VINP was a hands-on experience for these 
practitioners to learn how the NetworkPlanner was to be used and how it worked 
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internally. Particularly one of the two planners was dedicated to understanding the logic 
coded into the artefact. This is the same person who, as noted above, described his 
introductory meeting with the planning tool as a ‘failure’. Because he turned to be a key 
actor in the later diffusion process, we will henceforth refer to him as the ‘lead planner’ 
to distinguish him from other colleagues. The term ‘lead planner’ does not refer to any 
special status within Team B. It is to emphasise his representative role as a lead 
proponent of the NetworkPlanner among all strategic planners and does not indicate 
any extraordinary capability to use of the tool compared to his colleagues. What 
distinguishes him from other users was that in course of the work on VINP he displayed 
strongest interest in understanding the reasoning behind the algorithms. He thoroughly 
scrutinised the results produced by the artefact and questioned Tom frequently and 
thoroughly: 
“And I got very interested in it and we discussed it frequently: why does 
it work, how does it work, why does it not work, what is a LP [linear 
programming], what is MIP [mixed integer programming] and so on. 
This interested my, personally. Like you would be interested in collecting 
stamps. Also it was not necessarily linked to any ends… I just found it 
fascinating. And I wanted to know more and more and more and so I got 
intrigued by that”. (Max, strategic planner, interview, 7 April 2011) 
Thanks to his strong personal interest in the subject, the strategic planner gained a better 
understanding of the methods designed into the artefact and learned to appreciate its 
contribution to the overall strategic planning process. An origin for his personal interest 
can been identified his sceptical view on the conventional methods of strategic planning 
in the first place. On this he remarked: 
“Well, it was not transparent. I mean, we did qualitative comparison of 
things. Sorry, but this was just pairwise comparison26. This probably was 
interesting around 1964 […] it hardly goes beyond common sense. Well, 
                                                          
26 Pairwise comparison refers to a general method known as Analytical 
Hierarchy/Network Process (AH/NP) (Saaty, 2008). This is a method to deal with 
complex problems that are difficult or impossible to quantify. Instead of relying on 
universal numerical order (1 is smaller than 2 is smaller than 3…), order is produced by 
assuming that one qualitative attribute is more important than another. Complexity is 
abstracted into aggregated and weighted factors which are in relations to each other 
rather than relating to deterministic data. Thus, one can derive a valid and 
methodologically sound solution taking into account subjective estimates for benefits, 
opportunities, costs and risks. This is regarded as a valid approach when there is no 
alternative to abstract a problem (Saaty, 2008). 
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maybe it is ok, but for such complex problems it is not sufficient”. (Max, 
strategic planner, interview, 7 April 2011) 
In contrast to subjectively interpreted complexity, what the strategic planner referred to 
when speaking of complexity was the amount of interdependencies within a production 
network. These interdependencies are represented as flows of materials, costs of 
transforming materials into products and transporting goods from one place to the 
other, etc. With the support of sophisticated information-technological infrastructures 
nowadays, it is possible to get hold of the necessary information to quantify that 
complexity. The strategic planner was intrigued by the NetworkPlanner because he 
realised the potential to leverage transparency and, in consequence, to improve the 
strategic planning process. 
As work on VINP progressed and first results were produced by the planning tool, the 
strategic planner and doctoral student spent much effort in delving into the details of 
those results. Together they traced the logic why a particular result was produced. For 
example, the economic situation for commercial vehicles was tightening around the time 
and under conventional economic considerations a particular manufacturing plant 
would have been closed down. The NetworkPlanner-facilitated analysis of the 
interdependencies of the plant in context of the relevant global production network, 
however, surfaced that closing this plant would have had a significant negative effect in 
the case of an economic recovery. Closing the plant had been a solution to a temporary 
and acute circumstance and thus depicted a local solution. In contrast, the 
NetworkPlanner-supported analysis considered the role of the plant in the overall 
production network beyond local circumstances. The recommendation to sustain the 
plant was based on the extended analysis which took into account not only the 
temporarily negative circumstances but also likely positive effects in the future. In this 
case, although the plant was not profitable under given circumstances it was highly 
relevant for other plants connected to it in times of economic upheaval. Thus, the 
NetworkPlanner juxtaposed multiple local solutions to help deducing a global solution. 
Tracing and discussing the reasons for these kinds of results helped the lead planner and 
his colleague to learn how the planning tool operated. 
After more than a year of data collection, modelling and thorough analysis 
NetworkPlanner-deduced results on VINP were delivered to the decision makers. As 
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usual, the planning team was thoroughly questioned by senior management about the 
data and their recommendations. Responses from the lead planner were well-prepared 
and well-informed thanks to his extraordinary effort to learn about the mechanics of the 
planning tool. The decision makers, which included the head of planning of the trucks 
division and superior of Chris, were pleased about the innovative method and 
particularly the transparency of the strategic planning process. The prior success case of 
MNP and the subsequent disposal of GlobalDB culminated in an official statement by 
the head of planning to declare the NetworkPlanner as the standard planning method in 
the trucks division. At that time, this authoritative de jure standardisation statement was 
important to set a direction for future developments. It was, however, only after the 
success with VINP that standardisation was accomplished de facto because a critical 
mass of strategic planners was eventually convinced about the value added by the 
planning tool. Subsequently, efforts were undertaken to teach remaining colleagues to 
apply the planning tool in their projects whenever the artefact was applicable to the 
problem. The successful accomplishment of VINP also had a decisive impact on Tom’s 
who had worked on VINP. After finishing his doctoral thesis he transferred to the trucks 
division in January 2009 to start working in the strategic planning department under the 
supervision of the lead planner. 
 
Figure 15 Kernel of PMT's research infrastructure after the second pilot project at 
the Trucks division 
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Before moving on, we briefly take stock of how these developments at the Trucks 
division reported above had shaped the kernel of PMT’s research infrastructure (see 
Figure 15). A major difference between the episode with the first pilot project, MNP, and 
the episode with the second pilot project, VINP, is the shortfall of public funding from 
PMT’s income stream. However, the financial security of the research team was no 
longer at risk as it was in the beginning of PMT’s existence. A structural change in the 
way how CarCo’s R&D was funded internally improved the situation of PMT. Political 
influence and justification became the most important currencies to sustain PMT’s 
research activities. The disappearance of the public projects from PMT’s ecological 
terrain, therefore, was not as disastrous as it would have been at an earlier episode. The 
kernel stood on solid ground at the end of 2008. 
6.5.4 Decision to redesign the artefact 
In the beginning of 2008 the situation looked far more prosperous for the researchers 
than in the past. Chris, the first doctoral student working on the NetworkPlanner, 
switched to a position close to the head of planning of the trucks division from where he 
was able to campaign in favour of the NetworkPlanner. The planning tool itself had been 
successfully applied in several network projects including two major projects that 
attracted much attention from relevant decision makers in that division. Subsequently it 
had been declared a standard for the strategic planning process in the trucks division. 
More important than that it was accepted and adopted by some strategic planners who 
were eager to promote it to other colleagues within their team. Another highlight in 2008 
was the news that due to the success case of the Major Network Project the 
NetworkPlanner artefact had been nominated for CarCo’s internal innovation award. To 
incentivise excellence in research and technology, CarCo rewards outstanding research 
projects with an innovation award. In December 2008, the NetworkPlanner team 
eventually won the innovation award in the category for process innovation.27 All in all, 
                                                          
27 The December edition of the monthly internal newspaper features a picture of the 
‘Team [NetworkPlanner]’ including Jürgen, team leader of PMT, Max, the lead planner 
from the trucks group, Karsten, the planning intern of Team A in the trucks group, 
Chris, the first doctoral student, Kai, the supervisory researcher, Tom, the doctoral 
student succeeding Chris, and John, another doctoral student involved in early 
development. An article describes the artefact as ‘enabling PC-based and quick analysis 
of changes in production and logistics networks and [...] a valuabe decision support for 
management’. (Document: Internal research newspaper, December 2008)  
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it seemed an ideal situation for the NetworkPlanner. What was missing from the view of 
PMT was a last concerted effort to transfer the planning tool for good. 
At the end of 2006 and in the early stage of VINP, Kai, the supervisory researcher, left 
PMT for another position within CarCo. Kai became team leader of PMT in January 
2005, when the previous team leader left. Kai’s departure, on the other hand, allowed 
Jürgen to become the new team leader. Jürgen consequently inherited the responsibility 
of dealing with the task to initiate the transfer of the planning tool. The main driver 
behind the idea to transfer the NetworkPlanner was the senior management of the 
research group which regarded the development of the artefact as accomplished and no 
longer as an object for research. Thus, any subsequent action related to the artefact was 
interpreted as consultancy-like activity that was outside the realm of a researcher.  
For PMT’s new team leader, the time was ripe to finish the work on the NetworkPlanner 
and to begin the transfer of the artefact for good to embed it in the operational 
departments. However, he recognised that the state of the artefact still did not meet the 
requirements of a mature standalone application. Every network project so far had 
required strong support by a doctoral student and several inters from PMT to deal with 
numerous technical and other practical problems. Considering the state of the artefact 
from a sustainability point of view, he deemed the artefact not transferable because it 
was yet immature for this step. Indeed, he doubted that the artefact was sustainable at 
all if the resources invested in it would have been withdrawn all of a sudden. The best 
option, he concluded, was to initiate a final redesign of the artefact to stamp out its 
weaknesses and to prepare it for its existence outside the research group. 
A redesign of the artefact, however, required the support of the trucks division as it was 
the key user at that time. Therefore, he approached the manager of the specific strategic 
planning department to introduce his idea. It did not take much to convince him of his 
proposal: 
“[The manager] recognised early on, after I conveyed my view on the 
matter, that [the NetworkPlanner] was a vial tool for him and his troop, 
which stood on shaky grounds, namely, it strongly depended on [the 
doctoral student]. And after he realised that, it was not complicated any 
more. It is to say after [the manager] got cold feet, he said ‘If it really 
stands on shaky grounds, as I am told, then it has to be stabilised as soon 
as possible’”. (Jürgen, team leader of PMT, interview, 20 May 2011) 
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In contrast to the practitioner, the idea to start over again was met with strong objections 
by other researchers. In the focus group interview the team leader recalled that with this 
idea he  
“basically fell out with everyone involved in the project”. (Jürgen, third 
team leader of PMT, focus group interview, 12 December 2011).  
In the individual interview, he was more specific: 
“Everybody had an argument for why [I] had a screw loose with my 
interpretation. One felt personally degraded regarding the quality 
delivered after I said that [the artefact] was not yet the ne plus ultra. The 
other said ‘Oh, dear, if [Tom] is busy with a redesign, then he won’t be 
available to me for half a year. Everyone had a good argument. [Another 
planner] said that software projects never work out anyway”. (Jürgen, 
team leader of PMT, interview, 20 May 2011) 
Despite the resistance, he began with commissioning the development of a technical 
specification of the artefact. His intention was to preserve status quo just in case that for 
whatever reason the project is  
“frozen that we know that we can rebuild it anytime when we get it out 
of the box again”. (Jürgen, team leader of PMT, interview, 20 May 2011)  
Writing a technical specification for software or maybe any technology in general is not 
an appealing activity. It is perceived as a tedious task free from creativity which is 
shunned by most developers and engineers. The team leader correctly anticipated lack of 
participation by PMT members and therefore commissioned a consultancy firm to 
engage with the task. For about two or three months two employees of a management 
consultancy, of which one was previously an intern with PMT, analysed the software, 
spoke to those involved in its development and wrote up the functional specifications of 
the NetworkPlanner.  
The funds for the technical specification of the artefact were advanced by PMT. In 
general, the situation in terms of funding had changed fundamentally since the time 
when PMT had to participate in the public projects to generate extra income. The 
funding structure within the research group had changed to a system that provided 
PMT with a full budget. With more financial resources at hand, the PMT team leader 
decided to advance the funds for the technical specification also to indicate to the trucks 
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division that they were willing to continue supporting the artefact during the transfer 
process.  
In hindsight, as confirmed by many interviewees, the resulting specification was 
regarded poor despite the consultants’ detailed work to describe how the artefact and its 
algorithms worked. The technical language of the functional specification missed to 
unfold and explain all technical and methodological intricacies in a comprehensible 
manner. For these reasons, the technical specification did not play a relevant role as a 
point of reference in the further redesign undertaking. However, it was a good way to 
get the redesign project going. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The previous chapter examined from a meso-macro perspective on how CarCo 
interacted with other institutional actors. As a result of socio-political dynamics and 
occurrences a research team emerged that explored the subject of manufacturing 
flexibility. This chapter elaborated in more detail how the research team grew and 
expanded its socio-technical network consisting of researchers and researchers-to-be, 
complex configurations of technical artefacts and wide-reaching social ties to other 
individual and organisational actors. The artefact was frequently applied in real life 
projects in different locations. These application cases served as means for operational 
departments to test the applicability and functionality of the artefact to cope with the 
problems they were dealing with. For the researchers, these cases were essential to 
improve the design of the artefact to accommodate the demands of a diverse set of users.  
Multiple episodes of innofusion, a repetitive process of innovation and diffusion, 
allowed the researchers to design, and thus, to couple features of the artefact closer to 
the specific features of its users and their organisational contexts. The innofusion process 
was a continuous cycle in which initially presumptuous promises were consequently 
transformed into artefactual qualities to meet varying requirements posed by its users. 
The greater the exposure of the artefact to players outside the research team was, the 
more recognition of its beneficial qualities was won. The innofusion process was 
accompanied by a credibility and reputation-building cycle that benefited the artefact’s 
further advances. Different opportunities, in the shape of prominent network projects, 
increased the artefact’s credibility and reputation to the point when it was rubber-
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stamped as the dominant planning method in one business unit. Reaching apparently a 
peak time it was decided to redesign the artefact to make it fit for a transfer into praxis. 
In hindsight the first five years went very well for the NetworkPlanner and the 
researchers involved in its development. At times, the team had been facing difficult 
challenges. Some challenges were overcome by hard working and enthusiastic 
individuals. Other difficulties, however, which were not in control by the research team, 
were resolved in favour of the NetworkPlanner only due to contingencies outside the 
control of PMT. This chapter attempted to highlight both these types of events that 
rendered the artefact’s development process successful so far. An example, that revealed 
the arbitrariness of external contingencies, was the case of Matthias, the doctoral student 
who focused his doctoral thesis on the factory-level. Both Chris and Matthias started at 
the same time and spent the first year studying the same subjects. They collaborated 
closely with each other over the development of their artefact and debated frequently 
over the same methodological challenges faced by their common approaches. They were 
not only sparring partners, as characterised by John, another doctoral student involved, 
they temporarily even shared a flat with each other. Despite the strong similarities in the 
technological development and initially more successful applications in operational 
departments, it was only the network-focused artefact that made it in the end. Although 
the factory-level planning system was descriebd as promising and far advanced, it failed 
to find a host organisation that would lobby for the artefact as did the trucks division for 
the NetworkPlanner. One reason was also that Matthias did not transfer into a job 
position from where he could influence further take-up of his artefact as Chris did. A 
romantic but less informative explanation for the difference between the two artefacts 
would be to state that the failed technology was simply not loved strongly enough (see 
Latour, 1996). The reason why the NetworkPlanner seemingly enjoyed more passionate 
‘love’ from actors involved is not be explained solely by studying the shape and contents 
of the artefact and the network of allies around it. Rather, as this chapter tried to 
foreground, reasons for the successful diffusion of the NetworkPlanner were often not 
under the control of any researcher or user directly involved. For example, it was thanks 
to a Siemens manager, who recognised the high potential of the artefact before CarCo’s 
senior research management did, that the NetworkPlanner increased in reputation 
internally. Another example for a contingency that was crucial for the NetworkPlanner’s 
success was that the trucks division’s production network was dispersed globally and 
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thus was inherently complex enough to pose a problem for strategic planners who relied 
on conventional methodologies and tools. In contrast, the cars division, a division with 
almost double the revenue of the trucks division, was not that interested in pursuing a 
cooperation with the researchers beyond one test project because there was no need for 
such a complex tool. The need did arise eventually, but the temporal delay in between 
could have been long enough to kill off any efforts of sustaining  the development of the 
NetworkPlanner if it was not for the strong demand from the trucks division that kept it 
going. 
The next chapter will focus on how the NetworkPlanner was redesigned and embedded 
in operational departments. This includes occurrences and developments of the 
following five years from 2008 onwards. The redesign did not proceed as anticipated 
and resulted, contrary to the initial intention, in the expansion of research activities. The 
chapter will continue highlighting how political decisions beyond the immediate 






7 Empirical chapter 3: Redesign and transfer into 
operations 
The previous chapter has reported on how a research team came about and began 
researching the subject of manufacturing flexibility. What started out as theoretical 
research in 2002, had evolved to a fully-fledged software development endeavour by 
2007. The evolution of the activities of the research team was not following an overall 
rational strategic plan. Although rational decision patterned individual events and 
actions, the development was the outcome of multiple episodes of interactions with 
diverse actors that the researchers encountered and engaged with in course of their 
work. The social shaping of the artefact as well as the research infrastructure in which 
the development was embedded, was patterned by events occurring within the 
‘translation terrain’ - “the immediate array of players with their historical and contingent 
concerns and capabilities, each trying to map out their strategy in interaction with other 
players and in the light of their broader social, economic and cultural setting” (Williams 
et al., 2005, p. 86). CarCo’s ecology provided a unique translation terrain in which the 
events surrounding the development of the artefact unfolded. To learn how the artefact 
emerged in the first place, the previous chapter described how the artefact and its related 
actors manoeuvred in the given translation terrain and engaged with other players. 
By 2005 the artefact had matured to an operational prototype which had successfully 
been applied in strategic production network projects. The same year, the researchers 
faced the problem that funding from public projects was about to run out. Up to that 
moment, public funding provided the Production Management Team (PMT) partial 
legitimacy to operate to large extent autonomously from directives guiding the research 
programme in CarCo’s research group. This was reflected both in the improvisatory 
development of the artefact as well as in the loose organisation of those developing it. 
Contrary to the usual mode of operations within the research group, which saw 
researchers interacting with other organisational units only if necessary, PMT 
proactively monitored the translational terrain for potential users and reached out to 
other internal players to find users early on in the development process. This early 
exposure to user requirements allowed the researchers to gain both expertise in the 
domains of the users and a reputation of being competent collaborators. The positive 
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reputation was important to find ways to continue the development when the public 
funding was running out. Continuous efforts of promoting and applying the 
NetworkPlanner resulted in the planning system being declared as the standard strategic 
network planning tool in the trucks division. After the planning system successfully 
stood the test of time in further network projects in its new home, the PMT team leader 
started promoting the transfer of the artefact in 2007 as the research group saw no more 
need for any further research activities. The transfer was intended to be an act of closure 
to bring to end a development that was met with increasing resistance by the senior 
management of the research group. 
To transfer the artefact, so it was lobbied by PMT’s leader, it was necessary to redesign 
the artefact from scratch to stamp out technical flaws that yet resided in the prototypical 
artefact. A small cross-disciplinary team was formed to coordinate the redesign project 
that was commissioned to an external software company. What started as a promising 
development, however, quickly transformed to a crisis-ridden undertaking. The act of 
closure unexpectedly turned to a new season of episodes in the development of the 
strategic network planning system. The following chapter will be reporting on the 
various episodes that occurred during and in the aftermath of the redesign undertaking. 
It will reflect on how the development stepped up in terms of formality of the project 
governance and resource commitment by the organisational players involved. The 
chapter, and consequently, the report of the empirical case study will conclude with the 
transfer of the artefact out of CarCo’s research and its embedment into CarCo’s 





Figure 16 Overview of the innovation process addressed in chapter 7 
The following section will start with describing how the project management team was 
set up before detailing the emerging struggles of the redesign project. The constituency 
of the team was insofar relevant as it was a reason why the crisis escalated to a point 
where drastic changes where urgently necessary in the end. 
7.1 Redesigning the artefact 
The redesign of the artefact was initiated in the first months of 2008. PMT and the trucks 
division’s strategic network planning department, which was funding the redesign 
project, agreed to set up a joint project management team. The team consisted of a 
researcher representing PMT to deal with technical and methodological aspects and a 
planner from the trucks division to represent the users. The planner from the trucks 
division was also the same person who previously had supervised the development of 
GlobalDB. His work experience in developing database management solutions earned 
him the responsibility over the GlobalDB development in the first place. For the same 
reason he was allotted to supervise the redesign project. Due to his participation in the 
Very Important Network Project (VINP), the pilot project that helped the 
NetworkPlanner to win over Team B’s trust, and subsequent projects that applied the 
planning tool he was familiar with the artefact from a user point of view. Additionally, 
he was supported by a member from Team A who used the artefact while working on 
the first pilot project with Team A on Major Network Project (MNP). This member was 
previously the planning intern in Team A. After the successful accomplishment of MNP 
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he had been offered a full-time position as planner in Team A. Together these two 
planners contributed long-standing expertise in strategic network planning, in general, 
and expertise in the application of the NetworkPlanner, in particular. The researcher 
representing PMT, however, was a new actor who had recently switched from an 
internal engineering department outside of research. He was an industrial engineer with 
a focus on software development. Although he was not familiar with the artefact or 
previous developments, it was expected that he would be able to catch up soon after 
getting started. 
7.1.1 An external software company and its proposal for a generic framework 
Since the redesign project intended to turn the prototypical artefact to a professional tool, 
commissioning the technical development to professional software developers was an 
elementary part of the project. Negotiations with internal as well as external IT service 
providers were undertaken to find a qualified partner. Among CarCo’s internal 
organisations was an IT service provider that offered in-house services including IT 
consultancy, provision and maintenance of IT infrastructures, and the development of 
software applications. Asked to provide a quote for the redesign project the conditions 
offered by the internal service providers, however, were not acceptable to PMT: the 
development time was too long and the costs too high. In hindsight, as a former doctoral 
student and later researcher at PMT remarked, their offer probably was “too honest” 
(John, doctoral student, interview, 7 October 2010). Based on a recommendation by other 
PMT researchers not involved in the NetworkPlanner development, an external 
company was finally selected which was known to the PMT from other projects. The 
software house had collaborated with PMT before and thus was regarded as reliable and 
competent project partner. Negotiations began early 2008. The kick-off event took place 
in July 2008. For the purpose of simplification, the software house will be further 
referred to as CodeMaker henceforth. 
This first steps were to explain to CodeMaker’s representatives what the 
NetworkPlanner was about and how it worked. Basically, CodeMaker was represented 
by a main software developer in charge of the technical development and his line 
manager who dealt with administrative matters. The previously described technical 
specification was a starting point for the software developer to learn about the 
requirements. However, after looking through the document themselves, CodeMaker’s 
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software developer found the technical specification to be “too vague” (Tayfun, external 
programmer, interview, 26 October 2010). A detailed over-the-shoulder demonstration 
by the project manager from the planning department was helpful for him to see how 
the artefact was used and operated in practice but it accomplished little to shed light on 
how it functioned internally. Despite the technical specification and live demonstrations, 
the software developer found it difficult to grasp the details of how this peculiar piece of 
software worked. The situation was unintentionally made more difficult for CodeMaker 
when the users of the NetworkPlanner raised ideas about new features and concerns 
over existing features during these initial interactions. Those researchers that had 
worked on the artefact and who knew about its limitations did little to curb the flow of 
new demands. Indeed, the technical specification, which was developed under the 
supervision by PMT, itself contained vague suggestions about increasing the flexibility 
of the artefact. 
The more CodeMaker’s representatives tried to explore the task at hand, the more ideas 
and features were identified that would increase the benefit of a new version of the 
NetworkPlanner. What started as a clearly delimited redesign increasingly changed to 
the development of a product with new properties. Put simply, CarCo’s representatives 
asked for a more powerful and implicitly more flexible product compared to the 
prototype that was presented as a template. One motivation for a more flexible planning 
tool was the outlook to transfer the artefact to other divisions in the long run as the lead 
planner from Team B explained: 
“Well, to me it was obvious; if we wanted [the artefact] then in the mid-
term it had to be used by others as well, not just us. […] My motivation to 
bring others aboard, […] was always to say ‘I need to set [the artefact] up 
on a wider base in the company’. Firstly, it is valuable for the company, 
not just for us. That is fact. We have to take into account the interests of 
the whole company. And secondly, if others use it as well, then we 
would have such a wide base that it could not fail easily. I am most 
certainly convinced that it is good and that way I tried to secure it.” (Max, 
strategic planner, interview, 7 April 2011) 
Discussing the prospect of a more flexible solution, CodeMaker was attracted to the idea 
of developing a flexible solution which would be interesting to other divisions at CarCo. 
In the best case, one project could lead to another, so it was believed. It seemed like a 
good opportunity to secure more contractual work in the future. After taking into 
account all information including these prospective opportunities, CodeMaker’s 
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representatives proposed a system with a so-called generic framework to replace the 
rigid and narrowly purposed design of the prototype. The generic framework promised 
easier handling of the descriptive model that was among the most important 
components of the NetworkPlanner. In the prototype, the model was deeply integrated 
with other components of the artefact. This was also a reason why it was difficult for 
CodeMaker to understand its internal workings in the first place. A key concept of the 
proposed generic framework was to separate the model to make it directly accessible for 
changes by the user. When applying the artefact in a different division, no longer had a 
researcher change any software code in the artefact. Instead, a knowledgeable user could 
use an integrated user interface to manipulate the model directly or even replace it with 
another template model. Thus, the proposed generic framework solution resembled a 
tool kit which offered different tools for different problems. 
For PMT’s project manager, Jan, the generic framework was a valid idea deemed doable 
and worth pursuing. He shared his positive interpretation with other researchers as well 
as the users at the trucks division. Reflecting the interests of the practitioners towards 
higher flexibility, the proposal was accepted by PMT’s team leader as well as relevant 
users. Finalising the specifications with CodeMaker, a project timetable and a total 
budget with a lower six digit figure was agreed which, nonetheless, resembled a 
significant financial commitment for a single information system (Document: redesign 
project interim report). The timetable proposed a development period of about eight 
months from kick-off to the transfer of the new product into operations. What the 
interim report also reported on was the software development method that was chosen 
to overcome the initial problem of vaguely defined requirements. An ‘agile 
development’ approach was taken to ensure close fit of the product and user 
requirements (Kai, team leader PMT, interview, 22 June 2012). Agile development is a 
common methodology when user requirements are volatile and emergent. Instead of 
rigorously planning all details in advance the method takes an exploratory approach 
with multiple iterations of planning, developing and testing. This dynamic method is 
characterised by close collaboration of the developer and the user where early exposure 
to prototypes of the artefact give users the opportunity to provide feedback and to 
clarify their own interpretations and requirements early in the development process. The 
timetable for the redesign project showed four intermediate release dates when the user 




Figure 17 Changes to the kernel in scope of the redesign undertaking 
Once more, we briefly take stock of the changes to the configuration of PMT’s kernel in 
light of the redesign. The trucks division was persuaded to provide additional funds to 
support the development of the NetworkPlanner version 2. The new monies were used 
to commission an external software house with the technological development. As it 
turned out, this configuration of actors did not perform as expected. 
7.1.2 Emerging problems 
About two months into the development first signs were spotted indicating that the 
project was running into problems. It emerged that CodeMaker struggled with 
implementing the operations research-related components. The project manager from 
PMT explained that CodeMaker  
“completely underestimated [the project] […] due to lack of experience”. 
(Jan, redesign project manager, interview, 14 February 2013) 
As it turned out, CodeMaker’s software developer and the respective manager 
underestimated the effort to create the generic framework. The development of the 
generic framework, which had no such counterpart in the prototype as developed by 
PMT, drew more resources than anticipated and began to affect the work on other 
components such as the graphical user interface.  
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An innovation emerging from the new generic system architecture was a new role 
system implying a division of labour designed into the technical artefact. Whereas the 
old prototype knew only one type of user, usually a planner knowledgeable in OR 
methodology, the new framework envisaged two kinds of users: a modeller and a 
planner. The modeller was basically the same type of user who was able to operate 
previous versions of the NetworkPlanner. The planner role was a novelty in that this 
user was able to operate the planning tool without the need to be aware of the intricacies 
of complex OR methods. A modeller user’s essential role was to use an integrated editor 
to create and amend a descriptive model with clearly defined elements and boundaries. 
Based on this model a planner would find a predefined set of building blocks for use 
when modelling an actual network problem. The new division of labour largely 
separated OR expertise from the planning task and allowed planners to use the artefact 
without the need to learn about OR methods. Herein lay the front-end innovation of the 
generic framework. Generic in this context meant that a modeller knowledgeable in OR 
methods could develop a model to address any kind of problem. Referring to the generic 
capability, an interviewee explained that you can model the behaviour of an ant colony if 
you so like. A modeller could create a model for solving the path-finding problem of an 
ant on its daily forage for food (Kate, redesign project planner, interview, 16 September 
2011). Drawing on the template prepared by the modeller the remaining task for the 
planner would be to define the name of the ant, the type of food and its distance to the 
colony. In a nutshell, a modeller would define the nature of the problem while a planner 
would work on solutions for particular instances of the problem. 
Configuring the complex relationship between the modelling interface and the 
integrated mathematical solver was a massive problem for CodeMaker’s software 
developer. This was a problem going beyond software developing skills and reaching far 
into the OR domain which neither he nor anyone else at CodeMaker was sufficiently 
skilled in as it turned out. Being an expert in software development himself PMT’s 
project manager was drawn to the problem to work on a solution. This implicit 
prioritisation of the modeller perspective gave rise to another problem. Because both the 
PMT project manager and CodeMaker’s developer paid most attention to the modeller 
component, less attention was given to the planner perspective which the major concern 
of the two users from the strategic planning departments. 
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During the regular project team meetings, most time was dedicated to address problems 
and requirements of the modeller components at the expense of the elements relevant for 
the planners. And because the urgent problem was very technical and specific, the two 
planners struggled to understand what the others were talking about. CodeMaker’s 
software developer remembered misunderstandings over abstract technical terms such 
as “dimensions” and “dimensional values” which were important for a modeller but not 
for planner (Tayfun, external programmer, interview, 26 October 2010). Soon the two 
practitioners both felt left out and ignored in the regular meetings and in the 
development process in general. The project manager from the trucks group recalled:  
“You noticed that, what we told them was not implemented later in the 
software releases. We constantly had to follow things up and repeat them 
over and over again and to make Excel lists of what was not in 
accordance to what we agreed upon, what was not in accordance to what 
was defined in the technical specification and so on”. (Robert, strategic 
planner & redesign project manager, interview, 6 May 2011) 
The project manager from PMT misinterpreted the significance of the growing 
dissatisfaction and failed to act upon it. One reason why the researcher partly dismissed 
their objections and did not respond was because he saw the origin of their 
dissatisfaction in personal and hierarchical circumstances rather in the project-related 
technical problems. Instead of taking into account contributions from practitioners 
adequately, the acute technical problems fully drew the researcher’s attention. As 
reported by several other interviewees, he preferred dealing with technical problems 
rather than with social nuances. For example, CodeMaker’s software developer 
confirmed his lack of sensitivity when facilitating during conflicts (Tayfun, external 
programmer, interview, 26 October 2010). Jan, the project managing researcher, was 
offered support by both PMT’s team leader as well as the lead planner at Team B when 
they noticed these difficulties. The lead planner explicitly offered him to intervene and to 
take the blame on himself. He recalled telling PMT’s project manager:  
“Look, if you have a problem, let me deal with it, then I will be the bad 
guy, I don’t mind, then you won’t be framed for that”. (Max, strategic 
planner, interview, 7 April 2011). 
But the researcher did not make use of the offer. Instead, the dissatisfaction escalated to a 
point where the practitioners refused to continue the collaboration, as described by 
PMT’s team leader (Jürgen, team leader PMT, interview, 20 May 2011). The redesign 
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project turned to a crisis as the funding was running out while major technical flaws 
rendered the artefact dysfunctional and communication among participants stalled. The 
tension between PMT’s project manager and the two planners was intense as indicated 
by the fact that both planners refused to provide details on this episode when it was 
addressed during the individual interviews. 
Although personal frictions added another layer of problems it was a general agreement 
at the focus group interview that the reasons for the crisis were manifold and not to be 
found simply by pointing with fingers at individuals. Where the participants of the focus 
group interview agreed was that the project was flawed from the outset. Although the 
agile development approach was appropriate in light of uncertain and incompletely 
specified requirements the fixed price funding model was a deadlock in this 
configuration. Due to the unanticipated and continuing difficulties with the 
development of the generic framework CodeMaker had spent all budget before finishing 
the artefact. Facing empty pockets CodeMaker refused to continue any development. 
This was the tipping point when PMT’s team leader decided to intervene. Against the 
advice of his department manager and other colleagues, he replaced the project 
managing researcher with another colleague from PMT. Lack of funding was a catalyst 
that forced the senior management of the software house also to intervene and to start 
contesting contract details. From the outset, it was unhelpful by the strategic planners to 
demand extra functionalities that were not implemented in the prototype and to keep 
issuing new requests the further the development advanced. Experienced PMT members 
who were involved in the development of the prototype also missed to contribute to the 
redesign project in order to keep it in line with the initial task of developing a productive 
implementation of the prototype. Instead they left it to the project manager, a relatively 
new member in PMT, to negotiate with developers and users to agree on the 
requirements for the new artefact. Interviewing the project manager, he admitted to 
having missed to recognise in time the complexity and CodeMaker’s lack of experience 
to cope with the intricacies of OR methods. Reflecting on the idea of a generic framework 
he concluded  
“It was a big mistake, it overstrained everybody” (Jan, redesign project 
manager, interview, 14 February 2013)..  
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Further, he prematurely downplayed the significance of the practitioner’s dissatisfaction 
with the project’s progress and their perceived negligence of their role in the joint 
undertaking. Although the involuntary withdrawal of PMT’s project manager initially 
caused further stir, it was a decision that saved the project at the end of the day. 
7.1.3 New redesign project team organisation 
The member of PMT who was asked to take over as the new project manager did not 
support the decision personally but followed her team leader’s request to take up the 
role. The previous project managing researcher was not involved in the redesign project 
thereafter. Similarly, a change in the project management constellation was initiated at 
the trucks division. It was realised that having two project managers at a time was not an 
ideal situation. Therefore, project management responsibility was fully transferred to 
PMT and the lead planner was put in charge to represent the practitioners’ interests.  
The new project manager was not unknown to the planners at the trucks group. Months 
before the reshuffle of the project management organisation, she was assigned to 
familiarise herself with the artefact and its functionality. A strategic intention behind this 
assignment was to have another full-time PMT member ready to promote and diffuse 
the artefact. In the beginning she was still working on another project so the new 
assignment was of secondary priority. A few weeks before the reshuffle she was 
assigned to focus her work primarily on the artefact and the domain of strategic 
planning. To catch up with the assignment, she arranged for a placement at the strategic 
planning department in the trucks division. She intended to learn the requirements first 
hand by observing users in their workplace and interviewing them to learn about 
internal processes, requirements, limitations and problems in relation to the artefact as 
well as to their job roles. This ethnographic approach not only provided insights about 
the artefact and the organisational context where it was used, but also about the 
individuals at the trucks division. It was her exposure to the people as a participant-
observer that enabled a smooth start into her new role and that reduced the social 
distance to relevant project partners:  
“I think it was a decisive step to create this good atmosphere, which we 
later had in the project. It is just about knowing each other, that one was 
out for lunch a few times together, that one conversed about private 




Good team work was a much needed quality for her first weeks as the new project 
manager. When the project management team was reorganised, the project still was at a 
critical point. The software house had spent all budget and still failed to deliver a 
working artefact. On the grounds of having spent all its funds CodeMaker refused to 
continue developing the artefact. Nine days after the new project manager accepted the 
new role, she sat in a room with CodeMaker’s representatives holding “cancellation 
talks” as she called them, or “mammoth session” in reference to the day-long negotiation 
(Kate, redesign project manager, interview, 16 September 2011). During this session, they 
worked through a long list of technical details that caused conflicts in the development. 
It was a fierce negotiation over single features of the system and if they fell under the 
initial agreement or if they popped up after the development had started and therefore 
did not qualify as a deliverable under the existing contract. CodeMaker was put under 
“vehement” pressure as the lead planner explained (Max, strategic planner, interview, 7 
April 2011). After all, CodeMaker signed a binding contract to deliver the artefact and 
thus was obliged to fulfil the agreement. However, another threat issued by the lead 
planner was a powerful instrument in the negotiation. He threatened the software house 
with a negative supplier rating in CarCo’s internal supplier register. A negative rating 
could have had a significant consequence for CodeMaker because it would endanger 
future interactions with CarCo. Because CarCo was an important customer not just in 
this project but also in undertakings with other development teams at CodeMaker, the 
risk of losing the prospect of future contracts was a particularly strong argument. 
Acknowledging CodeMaker’s precarious situation both, Kate, the project manager and, 
Max, the lead planner followed a carrot-and-stick policy. They agreed on scrapping 
features deemed less valuable to make a concession but exercised pressure when 
features were considered crucial. At the end of the day, an acceptable compromise was 
found and the development continued but with strongly reduced requirements in 
regards of the final product. It was a significant achievement by both the project 
manager and the lead planner particularly in light of an economic crisis in Germany in 
mid-2009. As noted by the project manager:  
“2009 was a recession, nobody had a spare cent”. (Kate, redesign project 
manager, interview, 16 September 2011)  
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The supplier grudgingly agreed and continued development at its own expense. After 
this incident, there were a few other meetings where CodeMaker revolted but CarCo’s 
representatives got used to applying the effective carrot-and-stick policy by then. 
Indeed, the project manager identified herself as the good cop while the lead planner did 
not hesitate to act as the bad cop when it came to meeting the supplier. 
After the continuation of the project was secured, efforts were directed at reorganising 
the work on side of PMT. Grasping the severity of the problems which the redesign 
project ran into, the project manager understood that the problems would not be solved 
just by fixing any technical deficits. The project had to be reorganised to reflect the 
problematic situation. Therefore, she reinterpreted her objective:  
“I did not conceive the assignment as a ‘convert the software prototype 
into a professional software’-task but as a research subject. The subject 
was also titled ‘cost optimal’ or ‘efficient and ecological design of 
production and supply networks’”. (Kate, redesign project manager, 
interview, 16 September 2011) 
A reason why CodeMaker ran into problems was the lack of OR expertise. In scope of 
the generic framework the software developer was creating an interface allowing users 
to work on the models directly. Developing the interface already was strenuous task for 
CodeMaker’s experts. But their expertise stopped short of the ability to develop these 
models. Even if all technical problems would have been solved and a finished artefact 
was delivered, their lack of OR expertise and insights into the specifics of CarCo’s 
production networks prohibited them from conceptualising descriptive models for the 
artefact. Because the artefact was a new creation, it could not draw on the prototype and 
simply copy the existing model there. The only constructive way to solve this dilemma 
was for PMT researchers themselves to engage in the development of the missing 
mathematical models. Eventually, it was the PMT researchers who were the experts in 
OR methods as well as in the application of these methods in context of CarCo’s 
production networks. Extending the interpretation of the objective thus was another 
consequential and tactical decision to address a critical gap in the redesign project. 
At the end of the day and with combined efforts, the new project manager and the lead 
user managed to find compromises that allowed the development to continue. The 
configuration between PMT, the strategic planning department and CodeMaker was 
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maintained but at the expense of the quality of the artefact. Also the need for additional 
research work was identified that had to be addressed by PMT. 
7.1.4 Ramp-up of the research team 
In accordance Kate’s interpretation of her task, regarding it as a research area to study 
rather than an artefact to develop, she expanded the capacity of the project by bringing 
in more members of PMT to support her in the project. An important circumstance made 
it easier for her to acquire more capacity. The financing model of the research division 
had changed compared to the time when PMT was formed in 2000. In its early years 
PMT was required to acquire extra funding from other departments to fill its funding 
gap. By 2008 this has changed significantly due to changes in how the research division 
was funded in general. Relative to its size each operational division paid its share into a 
general fund from which all research activities were funded. Instead of seeking for extra 
funding through direct collaborations with operational divisions, PMT could draw on a 
fixed budget that covered its basic costs.  
The new funding model also affected the nature of collaboration between operational 
departments and PMT. Where PMT previously had to charge extra for their contribution, 
researchers no longer depended on such payments. In effect, researchers were more 
autonomous in their decisions who to work with. And the threshold for partnering 
departments was reduced as no financial commitment was required. These cooperation-
friendly circumstances allowed the new redesign project manager to engage with a ramp 
up process in which she encouraged doctoral students she was in charge of to diffuse the 
artefact by contacting new potential customers. 
When the new project manager took over, she was the only full-time researcher involved 
in the redesign project at PMT. Jan, the previous project manager, had additional 
support from two students working with PMT at that time. They supported him in 
testing the new versions of the prototype released by CodeMaker and in identifying 
technical bugs. Thanks to their experience and insights the new project manager got hold 
of these students to have them continue working with her on that project.  
These two students were both doctoral students studying business informatics with a 
focus on decision support systems and OR methods. Both of them did their PhD in the 
same academic institution. Their expertise in software development was a highly 
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valuable skill in that critical episode of the project. Although the Kate’s background was 
in computer engineering, she followed a similar approach as Chris and focused on social 
and political activities while delegating technical tasks to other project members. 
However, this was not yet enough support in her view. She approached other colleagues 
of whom she knew that they had capacity available to work with her on the redesign 
project. Talking to PMT’s team leader and the department manager, she was granted 
permission to extend the team. The next person to join the redesign project was a 
doctoral student we will call Vince. He had been working with Kate on a previous 
project. He was assigned to the project soon after the project manager change. While 
most other students studied engineering, business, computing or a mix of those subjects, 
Vince was a student of mathematics. His new primary responsibility was to support the 
development at the core problem which was the development of a descriptive model 
that would be used as the standard model. 
Another student joining soon after was a doctoral student in business studies who 
focused on strategy and management. We will refer to him as Moritz. His main 
responsibility was to test the validity of the calculus of the new model. The old prototype 
of the NetworkPlanner contained a specific built-in network model which evolved over a 
few years of time and which was validated for its compliance with corporate controlling 
standards in cooperation with controllers in the buses division. The model in the old 
prototype initially was used as the template for the new model that the redesign 
developers tried to reimplement in the new artefact. However, because of the technical 
complexity of the redevelopment the new model was at some point practically 
incomparable to the old model. Therefore, the emerging model had to be validated anew 
to be sure that it still complied with corporate controlling standards. To get the necessary 
approval from the controlling department, Moritz engaged with the controlling 
department responsible for the trucks division. Together they examined and tested the 
model to make sure that the model was compliant with corporate standards. 
The validation process was again an opportunity for the controlling department to get to 
know the NetworkPlanner. Controllers working with the artefact for test purposes found 
that it held promising capabilities potentially relevant for their own work. Based on this 
experience, a separate collaboration was later initiated with the controlling department 
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to probe the opportunity of adapting the model to solve network-related problems in 
that department. This episode will be elaborated in a later section. 
Once again, interns also played an important role in this stage of the project. Two 
students were recruited within weeks after the project manager change: Anna and 
Alexander. Anna was a business administration student. Alexander was an industrial 
engineering student. A third student joined the group a few months later. Oskar was 
also an industrial engineering student but with a previous career in software 
development. Similar to the doctoral students, all three interns remained with the 
redesign project for a time that went beyond the regular time of an internship or final 
year dissertation. Their participation at the NetworkPlanner development was 
eventually their pathway to personal careers at CarCo.  
After finishing her final year dissertation at PMT, Anna continued working with the 
NetworkPlanner community as doctoral researcher. The research topic addressed a 
particular challenge of global strategic planning faced by the trucks division and focused 
on the utilisation of the NetworkPlanner to find a solution. She was directly employed 
by the strategic planning department at the trucks division. Her supervisor there was 
Tom, the former doctoral student who succeeded Chris and who worked on VINP. 
Despite having been relocated away from the research facility she continued working 
closely with her doctoral fellows at PMT. She became the third research student who 
transferred from PMT to the trucks division, strengthening the bonds between PMT and 
the users in that user department. 
The second intern, Alexander, also embarked on a doctoral research project but he 
remained with PMT focusing on the development of the artefact. This task was soon 
supplemented by coordinating and delegating activities and liaising with users in the 
operational divisions. His role resembled strongly that of an assistant to the project 
manager who herself readily delegated important responsibilities to her doctoral 
students. The project manager generally regarded and treated all doctoral students as 
equal colleagues rather than mere subordinates. Her management style greatly 
contributed to a friendly atmosphere in which the trustworthy and cooperative relations 
between members of the redesign project flourished. 
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Finally, Oskar, the third student, who was the only graduate from the local university 
where the research facility was located, continued his studies to do a Masters degree. He 
remained with PMT during the course of his studies as a working student. His previous 
work experience in software development was a valuable skill as he contributed greatly 
to the technical development of the artefact and the improvement of the user experience. 
7.1.5 OR consultancy 
An important requirement for the redesign project was, besides developing a new 
artefact, to create a sustainable solution which included long-term support. With 
CodeMaker failing to fulfil expectations, the project manager had to look for another 
strategic partner that could replace CodeMaker. Fortunately, another opportunity was 
already on the radar. Heiko, a recent doctoral student graduate who previously worked 
with Kate in another project, joined forces with two other doctoral graduates to spin-off 
a firm that specialised in OR consultancy.28 The entrepreneurial idea originated from the 
founders’ experience working as students on projects with industrial partners: 
“[We found] that the application of optimisation models or the research 
outcomes, which were developed in [our institution], is complicated. To 
begin with, clients are struggling with understanding what you can 
achieve with mathematical optimisation and, subsequently, how to 
provide for software implementation and software development. Back 
then we saw the gap that we as a firm should carry optimisation methods 
into the economy. And we still see us as a bridge to bring to attention to 
companies how they can achieve advantages through the application of 
optimisation methods, and eventually to offer to realise these 
advantages.” (Heiko, OR consultant, interview, 11 January 2012) 
Around the end of 2009 the project manager of the redesign project commissioned Heiko 
as external consultant to support the research team and CodeMaker in finishing the 
development of the new system. Being an expert in the field of OR, trained in software 
development and knowledgeable about CarCo, the consultant represented a welcomed 
                                                          
28 Formally established in mid-2009, the new spin-off settled nearby the graduate school 
where the managing directors graduated from and which supported their enterprise 
from the outset. The spatial proximity resembled the close organisational ties with the 
academic institution and its staff. Members of the firm collaborated with the academic 
institution on various levels, including working jointly on a publicly funded project and 
offering students opportunities to work on real business cases. Besides pursuing 
academic activities, the firm also worked with industrial partners to develop and to 
implement OR-based solutions. One of these industrial clients was PMT at CarCo. 
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partner for PMT capable of dealing with difficult problems faced in the technological 
project.  
The first assignment to the consultant and his consultancy firm was a major technical 
problem experienced with the artefact. The trucks division’s users testing the early 
prototype of the artefact strongly complained about the overall slow performance of the 
new artefact, rendering network analyses in that current state an impractical activity. 
Therefore, the assignment detailed the improvement of algorithms to speed up the 
overall performance. Every time a commissioned assignment was delivered and 
implemented into the NetworkPlanner, another assignment followed up. Thanks to a 
chain of subsequent assignments Heiko had been kept involved in the development. For 
the project manager it was important  
“[…] that we had a partner, who grew with us, who was exposed to the 
tasks and who, over a long period of time, […] accompanied the project 
on different tracks, and who went along with us as supporters.” (Kate, 
redesign project manager, interview, 16 September 2011) 
As the development continued, the consultancy contributed to different aspects of the 
artefact and worked with different actors in PMT as well as the user departments. The 
firm later also became an important external partner for CarCo’s users of the 
NetworkPlanner. 
7.2 Growing the user base 
The new generic framework, although being the cause of major concerns and technically 
not fully functional in early redesign episodes, made it easier than ever to modify the 
artefact so to accommodate specifics of diverse user requirements. At least so it was 
promoted to external parties. Also, in its unfinished state it was already flexible enough 
to demonstrate interested planners that it could be used to address a wide range of 
network problems. With new students joining the research team, PMT increased its 
capacity to collaborate with external departments. PMT members therefore engaged in 
customer acquisition activities to identify potential users and to arrange meetings to 
promote the NetworkPlanner.  
It was, however, not only PMT’s researchers who engaged in new user acquisition 
activities. The lead planner from the trucks division, who was previously described as 
being significantly more motivated in understanding the NetworkPlanner’s functionality 
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than other planners, also engaged in promoting the artefact. He played a relevant role to 
re-introduce the artefact to the cars and the buses division. 
7.2.1 The trucks division promoting the artefact to the buses division 
Max, the lead planner, engaged with network planners in the buses division to interest 
and enrol them in the use of the NetworkPlanner once again. The buses division was 
significantly smaller than the cars or trucks division. The size was also reflected by the 
configuration of planning department in the buses division. At the time of this research 
the team consisted of three planners and two architects. The latter profession indicates 
that this team was involved with more diverse activities as compared to the strategic 
planning departments at the larger divisions which were almost exclusively dealing with 
strategic planning activities. Since strategic projects occurred less frequently, the 
application of a tool like the NetworkPlanner was therefore also required less frequently. 
The team leader of the buses division planning team, Jonas, explained this as the typical 
lifecycle of strategic planning in context of that division’s production network (Jonas, 
team leader, strategic planning buses division, interview, 24 March 2011). Because of its 
relatively smaller size, strategically oriented network projects occur only every couple of 
years. After the strategic stage has finished, the team’s activities change to an operational 
level supporting the realisation of the decisions made during the strategic phase. 
Therefore the team at the buses division dealt with diverse activities depending on the 
kind of projects on the agenda. The NetworkPlanner, thus, was required only in cases of 
strategically-oriented network projects. 
In 2009 the planning team was tasked with the optimisation of the production network 
including the consideration to build a new production plant in an emerging market. This 
project description reads like a typical case for which the NetworkPlanners had been 
developed for. Indeed, various managers at the buses division had been aware of a tool 
specially developed to deal with such problems. Ever since winning CarCo’s innovation 
award in 2008, the NetworkPlanner had been featured in the internal corporate-wide 
newspaper (Document: Internal research newspaper, December 2008). Everyone 
working in an area that remotely dealt with strategic planning had likely read about the 
tool or learned about it in another way. Members of the buses division planning team 
had another recent opportunity to learn about the recent version of the artefact due to an 
exchange with researchers at PMT in course of another project. Another team at PMT 
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had been working on a different decision support system, also drawing on OR-based 
methods but with a focus on an operational level. In course of this interaction they were 
also introduced to the NetworkPlanner artefact and its team. In addition to that, Jonas, 
the team leader of the buses division planning team, had a personal relation to the 
strategic department in the trucks division since he had once worked in that department. 
Indeed, Jonas had worked with the Max before and thus knew him well. Thanks to these 
multiple interconnections planners of the buses division were able to get a realistic 
interpretation about the tool even before engaging with anyone directly involved in the 
artefact’s development. With a new project on the agenda and a basic understanding 
about the artefact, it was only a small leap for the Jonas to approach Max, his former 
colleague, to find out more about the NetworkPlanner.  
Max was more than willing to respond to the request. Around November 2009 the lead 
planner engaged in an exchange with his colleagues in the buses division to introduce 
and demonstrate the functionalities of the NetworkPlanner, version 1. The redesign 
project had just started, thus Max demonstrated the artefact he was most familiar with. 
Intrigued by the success stories of previous projects at the trucks division and eventually 
convinced by the demonstration, the Jonas was willing to use it for their network project. 
Together with the lead planner they adapted the prototype to meet the requirements of 
the buses division production network. Since the flexibility of the prototype was rather 
restricted, these changes were not significant but enough to accommodate relevant 
requirements. A reason why the existing trucks division-based model was compatible 
with the buses division production network was partly because of Jonas’ origin in the 
trucks division’s strategic planning department. Drawing on his expertise of the 
planning process at the trucks division he had carried over some routines and 
terminology to the buses division. 
After the descriptive model was appropriated to meet requirements of the buses 
division, the planners started to collect data to feed the model. The actual analyses were 
run by the lead planner from the trucks division. Max convinced his colleagues from the 
buses division that it is not worth to learn the use of the old prototype. Instead he 
referred to the redesign project and promised that as soon as it would be released it 
would be made available to them. This division of labour was acceptable for the buses 
planners. It was maintained throughout the collaborative project. The network problem 
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concerned was successfully solved with the support of the NetworkPlanner. 
Participation of various actors in other functional areas including production, controlling 
and sales allowed the introduction of the artefact and its methodology to all parties 
involved in the analysis of the network problem. It was the general aim to be transparent 
about what data was used in what way to develop a broad base of understanding for 
how the eventual decision came about. The NetworkPlanner was instrumental in 
forming this consent because the calculus for producing those results was traceable and 
thus explainable. Thanks to this participatory approach results were widely accepted, so 
was the methodology with which they were obtained. Similar to the pilot projects in the 
trucks division, the success in that pilot project helped the NetworkPlanner to gain a 
positive reputation among the top management of the buses division. 
7.2.2 Vans division indicating interest 
The vans division was the smallest of the four operational divisions at CarCo and also 
had production plants outside of Germany. Therefore, strategic planners in that division 
were interested in learning more about the NetworkPlanner. A joint project with PMT 
was undertaken to explore the potential for the application of the NetworkPlanner. As 
usual, a pilot project had been selected to test the artefact. In course of the project, 
however, the potential for the application of a tool like the NetworkPlanner was found to 
be little. The kinds of problems dealt with by planners in that division were different in 
their requirements regarding complexity and flexibility. The level of complexity and 
capability of in-depth network analyses supported by the NetworkPlanner was beyond 
what the division needed at that time. Planners in that division decided not to pursuit 
the adoption of the artefact as it seemed to provide little extra benefit. However, it did 
not mean that they lost interest either. Instead, they opted for staying in touch with the 
NetworkPlanner community. For the time being they remained with their existing 
spreadsheet-based solutions. If in the future the need arises to apply a more complex 
methodology, then they would reach out to their colleagues in other divisions. 
In a previous section the team leader of the strategic planning team in the buses division 
was reported to describe a lifecycle of strategic planning. There is a strategic stage 
followed by operationally-oriented stages, for example, when increasing sales forecasts 
suggest the building of a new plant in a flourishing region. After a strategic stage has 
ended, the situation changes so that planners increasingly deal with operational 
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concerns of implementing whatever decision had been made previously in the strategic 
stage. The lifecycle applied well in the two smaller divisions where the planning 
departments had a wider range of responsibilities. According to this theory, the vans 
division was in a non-strategical stage at the time when other concerns were dominant 
than those that would require the application of a tool like the NetworkPlanner. 
7.2.3 Cars division re-enter the NetworkPlanner arena 
The cars division first learned about the NetworkPlanner in 2004. At this time the first 
doctoral student, Chris, was working on the spreadsheet-based prototype. Strategic 
planning at the cars division was the second user department approached after contact 
was successfully established with the nearby buses plant. Although the researchers 
collaborated with strategic planners at the cars division over the course of a project, there 
was no further interaction beyond that one project. It was the lead planner from the 
trucks division who engaged again with his colleagues in the cars division. 
7.2.3.1 Trucks division keeping the cars division in the loop 
The strategic planning departments of both the cars division and the trucks division are 
located at the premises of CarCo’s headquarter. Indeed, the strategic planning 
department of the vans division was also located on the same site. Only the buses 
division’s planning department was located on another site. The strategic planning 
department managers of the two larger divisions made good use of the proximity and 
met up once a month for knowledge exchange purposes. During these exchanges both 
managers shared news and information on what was going on in the other division and 
discussed socio-economic developments occurring throughout the world that were 
strategically relevant for CarCo. Another item on the agenda was current as well as 
future network projects. At one of these occasions around early 2007, the trucks division 
manager gave an update to his colleague on progress made on VINP, the successfully 
accomplished pilot project that convinced managers in the trucks division to declare the 
NetworkPlanner as the standard planning tool. Intrigued by accounts of the most recent 
version of the NetworkPlanner the cars division manager asked to get more information 
on the current state of the artefact. 
Another knowledge exchange meeting for the purpose of demonstration of the artefact 
was arranged between the two strategic planning departments. The demonstration was 
exercised by Max, the lead planner. Although it was an informative exchange, it did not 
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result in any further interaction after this meeting. It was only three years later in 2010 
that the cars division planners got interested in the tool again and, once more, asked to 
be informed about the current state of the artefact. 
7.2.3.2 Crisis in the belief of the dominance of conventional production strategies 
The renewed interest in the tool was triggered by a decision by CarCo’s board of 
management (BOM) in the first half of 2010. It was decided to look into the option of 
shifting the production of a particular car model overseas. This BOM decision was also 
identified as the moment when a fundamental shift in thinking about the organisation of 
production networks set in. A strategic planner at the cars division explained: 
“The second contact was made after the board informed us about their 
decision, when the point was made that in the future we will have to 
think in networks because the network was shaped that way […]. And 
we saw where the future journey of [the cars division] was heading to, 
that instead of rigidly allocating plants to markets, we will have to think 
in networks in future”. (Michael, strategic planner, cars division, 
interview, 15 July 2011) 
In the past the cars division organised its production network according to a solitary 
structure where plants were equipped with little flexibility regarding the products they 
could produce. Allocations of plants and markets were relatively fixed and rigid. The 
BOM decision to reorganise the production network of a particular model was a first 
step to adapt the cars division according to changing external circumstances where the 
inflexible allocation of individual products to particular plants proved to be an outdated 
and costly strategy. 
In this case, a shift in thinking is a severe disruption and comparable to a paradigm shift. 
Kuhn (1996) described a scientific paradigm as those elements that defined what was 
regarded as “normal science” including the nature of scientific inquiries, methods to 
observe phenomena and to conduct experiments and how results ought to be 
interpreted. What was accepted as normal science was replicated by and learned from 
canonical textbooks. When facing a significant anomaly that cannot be explained within 
the margins of an existing paradigm and that cannot be ignored any longer, a crisis 
emerges and eventually a paradigm shift occurs. A paradigm shift shakes the very 
foundations of normal science. Preexisting knowledge is challenged and revaluated. 
Methods and instruments, previously marginalised or even discriminated, are put in 
228 
 
perspective as they seem to offer solutions where conventional approaches fail. Similar 
was the process that triggered the BOM decision. In context of a car company, missing 
out on opportunities to gain profits when markets shifted can be broadly interpreted as 
the equivalent of an anomaly that leads to a crisis in existing knowledge, or in the belief 
of the dominance of certain production strategies, respectively. Lack of flexibility of 
production plants barred the cars division from switching from one product to another 
to react in time to market fluctuations. The BOM realised that solitary strategies of the 
past, including the methods and tools to derive such strategies, were no longer fit to 
address challenges of the present and the future. Thus, new solutions and approaches 
were sought that helped overcoming the limitations of solitary product allocation 
strategies. This was the moment, when the NetworkPlanner was recognised, or rather 
remembered, as a promising solution that offered the ability to explore new strategies. 
7.2.3.3 Diffusion to the cars division 
A planner from the cars division, Michael, was tasked to engage with PMT to learn more 
about the NetworkPlanner and to find out if it was a viable tool in light of a new 
network project. In mid-2010 he was referred by his colleagues in the trucks division to 
the researchers at PMT who promptly and positively responded to the cars division’s 
enquiry. A doctoral student, Alexander, supported by an intern, Oliver, engaged with 
the Michael to learn about the specifics of the network project and to introduce the 
NetworkPlanner to the strategic planner. Interested in learning about the capabilities of 
the tool, Michael provided data so that the researchers could adapt the standard 
descriptive model to the requirements of the cars division’s production network. 
An important role was played by Oliver, the intern. He was supervised by Alexander 
who supervised the work of two other interns at that time while working on his own 
topics as well as coordinating the testing of the prototype under development. Oliver 
was responsible to feed the model with the data provided by Michael. The strategic 
planner provided a spreadsheet that he created in scope of a previous network problem. 
Drawing on the spreadsheet and advised by the doctoral student, Oliver transferred the 
data into the model. Close interaction with the Michael was required to clarify details or 
to fill gaps which the spreadsheet left open. Within just a few weeks the researchers were 
ready to present Michael an appropriated model that was ready for running analyses of 
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different network configurations. The quick response time as well as the high level of 
expertise was positively acknowledged by the strategic planner: 
“And, in my opinion, I came across an incredibly high level of 
competence. Very quick and smart people in research who absorbed and 
grasped [the problem] although they were not from the auto world. I was 
surprised that they transferred the problem correctly into the 
NetworkPlanner. And we were quickly able to derive conclusive results. 
I liked that”. (Michael, strategic planner, cars division, interview, 15 July 
2011) 
The quick and competent response from the researchers was important in convincing the 
planner, that the package of both the artefact and the people involved deemed a 
proposition well worth to explore further. Interested by the positive results and in need 
to provide results in scope of the network project, Michael decided to dedicate his full 
attention to quickly catch up with the artefact. For this reason he spent a week at the 
research facility to shadow the intern and to learn-by-doing. Together they worked on 
the network problem and analysed different configurations. The strategic planner 
emphasised that this straightforward collaboration was a crucial investment of capacity 
by PMT to convince him about the high potential of the NetworkPlanner: 
“This was basically the knock-on financing by research that eventually 
persuaded us to endorse the undertaking. And it was well-invested 
capacity by research”. (Michael, strategic planner, cars division, 
interview, 15 July 2011) 
The satisfactory collaboration between Michael and Oliver eventually resulted in the 
intern taking up a position in the strategic planning department of the cars division. He 
was recruited as a doctoral student to continue with NetworkPlanner-related research 
within the cars division in the beginning of 2011. 
7.2.4 Training seminars 
Within a couple of months the redesign project grew rapidly in terms of people involved 
in the development as well as use of the artefact. One the one hand the growth was a 
measure of success. New actors at PMT and at the trucks division helped to increase the 
capacity to work with the new artefact and to develop it further. New users indicated a 
growing interest and increasing value of the artefact. On the other hand, many new 
customers increased the overhead costs in terms of higher organisation and coordination 
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efforts. New users had to be introduced to the artefact. Training them the use of the 
artefact was a time consuming activity. 
Initially, doctoral students visited workplaces of new users to demonstrate the artefact 
and how to use it. However, this individual approach was found impractical for the 
higher numbers of people that started to indicate their interest in the NetworkPlanner. 
Thus, the training strategy was adapted to accommodate for the new quantity of users. 
This is the episode when we contributed to the redesign project during the data 
collection stage. Our task was to elaborate a structured training programme including 
the development of materials. Together with other doctoral students, an outline was 
elaborated for a multi-stage training programme that distinguished users according to 
their existing knowledge about the artefact. In total, three different courses each 
consisting of several modules were developed for beginners as well as for advanced 
users. Developing the contents of the course materials was mostly commissioned to the 
external OR consultant. We supported the consultant in this assignment. 
All but one course were held at the research facility to allow attendants to leave their 
workplaces and to visit the research facility. The session that was organised outside of 
the research facility, was held on premises of the strategic planning department of the 
cars division. It was to show good will to the new users of the cars division’s strategic 
planning department and to make it as easy as possible for that department’s staff 
members to attend the training session as for some it was the first exposure to the 
artefact. 
There was no documentary about the first two training seminars as they were held by 
two of PMT’s doctoral students. But the other seven seminars were organised by us so it 
was possible to keep track of attendees. Attendees represented 15 different departments 
from all four operational divisions. Many of the attendees included users who had been 
working with the NetworkPlanner before but with a researcher supporting them in their 
activities. Other user had little or no exposure to the tool at all. For them it was a crash 
course to understand what this tool was about and what potentials it had for their own 
work. For example, CarCo’s internal engineering consultancy dispatched five staff 
members to learn about the NetworkPlanner. They were interested in exploring the 
opportunity to add the NetworkPlanner to their repertoire of services. 
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The training programme was shaped to appeal to and to attract a broad range of people 
with the intent to promote the NetworkPlanner as widely as possible. Many events were 
attended by users who knew about the practical value of the artefact but wanted to learn 
more about it. Although it was attempted to present the artefact as a mature product, 
attendees were not mislead to believe that it was flawless. It was emphasised that it was 
an artefact yet in development and that there were still functionalities that needed 
polishing. However, the core functions were working and ready for practical application 
as demonstrated by pointing to successfully accomplished network projects in the cars 
division and trucks division. 
7.3 Strategy change in the research organisation 
Organisational changes occurred rather often in the research division as several 
interviewees confirmed. Often such changes were preceded by rotations in the 
management level. When a new research manager took up her position, strategic 
deliberations were initiated to elaborate ideas about future directions and activities of 
the corporate research division as envisioned by the new manager. These activities 
happened behind closed doors. When results of these deliberations were announced to 
employees in the research division they usually were in their final state. There was no 
option for individual researchers to influence the outcome. This approach appears to be 
opposite to earlier times when the research division had been created. Back then 
researchers were encouraged to set their own research agenda. Nowadays, after 
numerous organisational and strategic changes, agenda setting was a rigid top-down 
process. 
7.3.1 Strategic changes and the need for protection 
Consequences of a change of the strategic direction had direct effects on an individual’s 
project activities, at times even disrupting the line of work. The OR consultant, who 
worked with PMT from 2006 to 2009, recalled three such significant changes that rippled 
through to his research team. The first one he faced was in 2006 which not surprisingly 
coincides with a new manager being appointed to lead those parts of the research 
division in which PMT was located. A consequence of the subsequent shift in strategy 
for the doctoral student was that his research subject was no more on the agenda. He 
explained the effect this had on his work: 
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“Well, you don’t stop thinking, but de facto you wouldn’t get any new 
cooperation working because you need the support of the hierarchs for 
that. You cannot begin any new project. You call your customer and you 
tell them: ‘What we planned for the next year will not be happening. You 
can complain or leave it, but we just don’t have the support any longer to 
do that’” (Heiko, OR consultant, interview, 11 January 2012) 
A full-time employee would most probably be annoyed by this disruptive change, but 
eventually settle with it. However, for a doctoral student, one year into his research, this 
was more than just an annoyance but rather a substantial threat to his thesis. A second 
incident occurred during the development of the early prototype of the artefact. During 
a trial of strength incident with a team from the Berlin research facility, PMT was 
outmaneuvered and ordered to abandon its activities into exploring a particular branch 
of research because the other team successfully claimed its jurisdiction over that research 
area. The solution was to comply with the decision as a team but to give doctoral 
students the freedom to continue with their research. It was the strong support of PMT’s 
department manager that allowed for this compromise to come about and to save a 
student’s research activities from the effects of such political decisions. In the case of the 
OR consultant, it was the department manager who stood up for him and enabled him to 
continue his work somewhat covertly. A year later the situation loosened up to that 
extent that his subject was generally accepted again so that he go about his work as 
before, e.g. engaging with other internal customers again. 
The department manager was described as being personally interested in strategic topics 
and thus granted PMT relatively much freedom to explore related subjects. When it 
came to organisational changes, he acted as a wall to avert negative implications on his 
department if possible as depicted Kate, the redesign project manager: 
“[The department manager] assumed the responsibility to be the 
protective layer between hierarchy and the people who work down here, 
and to deflect change efforts so that it did not impact on us. And he 
always made sure that we had adequate budget.” (Kate, redesign project 
manager, interview, 16 September 2011) 
As PMT’s department manager, he had directly overseen the creation of the team, its 
initial exploration of the research topics and subsequent development of multiple 
attempts to transform research findings into practical applications. His role in 
supporting these activities on multiple levels was pivotal for the NetworkPlanner to 
reach a relatively mature state. Correspondingly, his retirement at the end of 2009 had a 
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significant effect on PMT and the researchers working on the NetworkPlanner in 
particular. 
7.3.2 Research team relocated to other department 
After the department manager retired and was succeeded by another manager, a few 
months later another reorganisation initiative occurred that affected PMT directly. This 
time there was no protective hand keeping things together as the manager did in the 
past. PMT was restructured and all members that worked on the NetworkPlanner were 
allocated to another department in mid-2010. This change did not result in a friendlier 
work environment for the NetworkPlanner team. In general, the researchers around the 
NetworkPlanner had most of the time been in a troublesome political situation. The 
research undertaking originated to large extent from initiatives that footed outside of 
CarCo. The top-down-oriented hierarchy struggled with PMT’s strong and practice-
backed bottom-up approach. Acceptance, or rather tolerance, by top research 
management was achieved through successful collaborations with operational 
departments at times, when external funding was an important stream of income, and 
when the research division could make use of showcasing collaborative engagements 
between research and practice. However, these expectations have changed since PMT 
had been created about a decade ago. The redesign project manager briefly summarised 
her project’s situation in relation to the overall research strategy at that time: 
“What is not popular at the research group, neither now nor in the past 
three years, is the topic production and the topic of [the trucks division]. 
Actually, we were supposed to work on [the cars division] 
development.” (Kate, redesign project manager, interview, 16 September 
2011) 
The former department manager shed more light on this conflict by highlighting the 
organisational interdependence of the research division to the cars division, the largest 
division at CarCo: 
“I think it is to do with the fact that it depends on the structures in the 
top. The topic we do is rather production-oriented. And as long as the 
head of research is also head of [The cars division] development, it will 
remain difficult.” (Patrick, research department manager, focus group 
interview, 12 November 2011) 
Traditionally, the cars division has been the largest and thus the more important division 
within CarCo. Due to this historically contingent circumstance, the research division was 
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most dependent politically on the cars division. As reminded by the former department 
manager, the head of the research division was also the head of development for the cars 
division. This dual responsibility explains a bias towards research topics that are more 
relevant to the cars division rather than any other division. In particular, the fact that this 
person is in charge of development, a function that is concerned with new product 
design and development, is explanatory for the discrimination of production-oriented 
subjects within the research division. To conclude, it can be stated that, to some extent, 
the top management of CarCo’s research division was hostile to research activities 
involving the NetworkPlanner. It was only the support of the middle management, i.e. 
the department manager, and PMT’s frequent successes in acquiring both funding from 
outside the research division and strong support from managers in production-oriented 
areas of the company, that convinced the top management not to dismiss but to tolerate 
PMT’s nonpartisan activities over a long period of time. 
After PMT’s restructuration the project manager found herself removed from her 
previous environment and assigned to a new department and new team leader. The 
relative lack of support from the new department manager for the development of the 
NetworkPlanner was apparent. Taking into account the low level of interest of her new 
superior in her work and considering the new overall situation critically, the project 
manager decided to bring the project to an end, at least from the research point of view: 
“I drew the conclusion that we reached a certain state and now we 
transfer. Because for me personally this was unsatisfactory and also for 
my colleagues, my doctoral students who always had to stand in the 
shadows. In the new department were we arrived at up last summer, we 
were not allowed to communicate these topics upwards: ‘Stay away with 
your production topics. I cannot show these to [a top research manager] 
.’” (Kate, redesign project manager, interview, 16 September 2011) 
Discouraged to continue work under such adverse circumstances, she decided to focus 
on finding a sustainable solution to transfer the NetworkPlanner artefact out of the 
research division and into the operational area of CarCo. 
7.4 Transfer into user departments 
By the end of 2010 the artefact had reached a relatively stable version that was regularly 
applied by the trucks division. By this time, the researchers also had their foot in the 
door at the cars division. Thanks to several training seminars a wide range of people in 
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various departments had been exposed to the artefact.29 The project was popularity-wise 
at a long-time high. Existing users and attendees of the training seminars reported their 
positive experience to their superiors who reported this further to their superiors. Thus, 
the NetworkPlanner had a strong visibility in upper management levels at the end of 
2010. For the project manager this was an ideal moment to seek closure for the project. 
She decided to organise a single large event to declare the redesign project as 
accomplished.  
7.4.1 The Launch Event, an agenda-building exercise in disguise 
The event was titled ‘Launch Event’ to show that the artefact development had been 
finished and that a roll out could begin. Of course, this title was only symbolic as the 
launch had happened gradually in various different episodes throughout the previous 
years. But the event’s title can be interpreted as an important message aiming at decision 
makers whose turn it was to agree on what ought to happen next with the artefact, and 
thus, with the doctoral students whose fate was partly connected with it. 
The launch event was held at CarCo’s headquarter, home of most of the strategic 
planning departments, in December 2010 and attracted a large group of people from 
different levels and departments. About 60 people attended the first hour that comprised 
several ten-minutes long talks of high-ranking managers from different divisions. The 
main objectives of the event were, firstly, to officially announce the accomplishment of 
the redesign project, and secondly, to proclaim the establishment of a community of 
practice. As described above, announcing the accomplishment of the project was mostly 
a symbolic act directed at the management including the research division which wanted 
the project to be finished. The proclamation of a community of practice served the 
purpose to emphasise the existing social bonds between the different planning 
departments and to encourage new users to join the open community. It was a concerted 
show of force to players outside that this was a successful undertaking supported by 
strong inter-organisational bonds (see Figure 18 for an illustration of the kernel 
configuration at the time of the launch event with new players highlighted in bold). 
                                                          
29 In total nine training courses were held in the second half of 2010 including five 




Figure 18 Extended ecology of PMT's kernel at the time of the launch event 
The event was successful in making visible the rich research infrastructure constructed 
over many years. A wide range of people was informed firsthand about the current state 
of the NetworkPlanner and the value added by the artefact to the overall company. 
Those attendants who had not had any exposure to the artefact yet must have gotten the 
impression that this was the final stage of a project that successfully transitioned linearly 
from research and development to practice. At least this is how the launch event was 
conceptualised to be perceived. In fact, the launch event disguised the case that yet there 
was no sustainable solution in place. It was unclear who would take over the 
responsibility of the maintaining the artefact and how the final arrangements would look 
like. In this respect, the launch event could also be interpreted as an agenda-building 
exercise coordinating multiple actors to bring to light shared beliefs and expectations 
(van Lente & Rip, 1998a). Identifying shared beliefs and expectations allows actors to 
accommodate their interests in respect with the interests of other actors. This exercise of 
mutual positioning creates a demand for action that results in agenda-building 
eventually. To conclude this interpretation of the launch event, it aimed at preparing the 
agenda for the final negotiation talks between research and the operational departments. 
7.4.2 The cars division positioning itself prior to the transfer 
For the project manager the launch event was a welcome moment to demonstrate the 
value added by the NetworkPlanner and the team of people behind the artefact. It was a 
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chance to raise the profile of the artefact and the individuals in the negotiation talks that 
followed the event. The first action after the launch event was a transfer of expertise, 
embodied by individual researchers, from research to operational departments. 
The trucks division was already well positioned at that time as it had two members of 
staff who had previously been involved in the artefact’s development at PMT. Tom had 
been a doctoral student at PMT who was primarily responsible for the development of 
technical and OR-related aspects of the artefact. Anna was a doctoral student developing 
a trucks-specific network model for the artefact. Previously she has been a student 
working at PMT. This leaves the trucks division in a good situation to operate the 
artefact in the long run and to deal with future challenges. In contrast, the cars division 
had no such arrangements. All it had at that moment was Michael who was familiar 
with the NetworkPlanner. However, this was by far not enough experience to use the 
artefact without further support by experts. In short, it was the cars division’s strategic 
planning department who had to catch up if it wanted to secure its stake in the artefact. 
There is no clear evidence of any rivalry between the cars division and the trucks 
division’s strategic departments. Indeed, both divisions had been collaborating and 
sharing information frequently and on different levels including monthly meetings of 
the departments’ heads and irregular meetings between strategic planners. Despite the 
harmony between the two departments, the socioeconomic discrepancy between the two 
divisions cannot be ignored. The cars division is by and large the bigger division 
producing about twice as much revenue as the trucks division. This difference in volume 
is indicative for the cars division’s dominance in CarCo which is also reflected by 
CarCo’s organisational structure. For example, the head of the cars division’s 
development is also head of CarCo’s research division. This historically-contingent 
imbalance resulted somewhat in an understanding that the cars division was regarded as 
the leading division in CarCo. In this light, it was comprehensible that, at times, the 
trucks division sampled the pleasures of being the competence leader in complex 
strategic network planning. For example, during a training seminar, when strategic 
planners from both divisions attended as trainees, it was a strategic planner from the 
trucks division who took the chance to lecture his colleague from the cars division when 
it came to a discussion about financial evaluation of options in network configurations. 
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With the power dynamics in mind, it is not surprising then that the cars division 
increased its effort to gain control over the artefact to not depend on any other 
organisational entity. The first decision by the cars division’s strategic planners was to 
take onboard Oliver, the intern who had been collaborating with Michael in course of the 
network project at the cars division. Oliver was recruited as a doctoral student to work 
with the strategic planning department in February 2011. With this move the cars 
division positioned itself to gain some agency so not to be reliant on any other player, in 
particular not from the trucks division who de facto was the intellectual property owner 
of the NetworkPlanner. 
Employing one of PMT’s interns was a first step. However, it was yet insufficient as 
intern had had only limited exposure to the artefact and its development. To mirror the 
situation as it was in the trucks division, where there were two previous PMT members 
at work, the cars division was yet one person short. This gap was filled by the 
employment of Alexander, the doctoral student who had previously been supervising 
Oliver at PMT. He was offered a full-time position as strategic planner at the cars 
division later in April 2011. 
7.4.3 Community of Practice to coordinate further actions 
After the establishment of the community of practice was announced at the launch event 
in December 2010 a first community meeting was organised five months later in April 
2011. This event was titled ‘initial meeting’ to mark the first event of its kind. It was 
organised by the research team and held on the premises of the research facility. A total 
of twenty individuals attended the meeting of which half the people were users. With six 
attendees the majority of the users were the trucks division’s strategic planners. Three 
attendees represented strategic planning of the buses division and the cars division 
while the remaining two individuals were potential users from other departments. A 
small group of three individuals were externals: the OR consultant, a visiting professor 
and myself. The last six attendees represented what remained of the former PMT 
including Kate, the redesign project manager, Alexander and two other doctoral 
students. 
The agenda of that meeting was to present what had happened in the months since the 
launch event in regards of the development by the researchers and the application of the 
artefact in the user departments. Further topics were the future of the community, the 
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transfer of the artefact and a concept for maintenance and support services for the 
artefact. Particularly the latter two items on the agenda were still unresolved matters as 
no final decision has been made by relevant decision makers. The meeting was used to 
discuss different options presented by the redesign project manager. She reiterated the 
research strategy that did not include the NetworkPlanner development among the 
remits of the research group. The two options she proposed differed in the level of 
coordination among the different users. One option was that every user department 
would deal with the development, application and maintenance of the artefact 
individually. The other option accommodated a collective approach with the community 
of practice being the instance that would coordinate all activities related to further 
development, maintenance and support. This option also stipulated a financial 
commitment by each participating department. 
Independent from the final solution, a solution had to be found for the problem of who 
would be providing the services for maintenance and support for the artefact. These 
activities had previously been catered for by the researchers. However, the end of this 
arrangement was a settled matter. An alternative had to be put I place. CodeMaker, the 
software company that initially developed the new version of the NetworkPlanner and 
which was intended to take this role, was not available any more. Instead, the OR 
consultancy offered to extend its services to cover maintenance and support activities. 
For this purpose the consultant outlined the range of services his company could cater 
for and how much these different levels of support would costs. A forth option 
comprised a cooperation with CarCo’s internal engineering consultancy. The 
engineering consultancy had previously sent five consultants to the training seminars to 
learn about the NetworkPlanner and to evaluate its value for the consultancy. After his 
presentation, the attendees were asked to discuss the pros and cons of each solution. 
After the final presentation on future challenges of the planning and coordination of 
global production and supply networks by the visiting professor, the redesign project 
manager concluded the event by wrapping up the event. In her final address she 
outlined the next steps to be taken by each represented department. She stressed the 
need to discuss the potential solutions presented at this event with other members of the 
respective department and to report to her what solution was preferred. She would 
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collate the results and forward a recommendation to a group of managers who had 
scheduled a meeting in June 2011 to decide on further actions. 
The community gathered again in December 2011. In the eight months that had passed 
in between, the transfer of the artefact from research to the members of the community 
had been accomplished. During this transitional time, the internal engineering 
consultancy withdrew its interest because it found that the artefact did not match the 
organisation’s requirements. The artefact was too specific and complex to be used in 
projects dealt with by the consultancy. Due to the steep learning curve and the specificity 
of use cases in which the NetworkPlanner was applicable, it did not fit the into the 
methodological tool kit of the consultancy. The only remaining option was the OR 
consultancy, which readily stepped into the gap. Consequently, the OR consultancy 
became the only service provider covering activities including, among others, provision 
of support and further development of the technical artefact.  
The second community of practice meeting was organised by the trucks division’s 
strategic planning department2. The meeting attracted 22 people from four departments. 
Half the attendees were strategic planners from the cars division because the meeting 
was held in the building of that department. Seven planners from the trucks division 
came over from their offices on the same site. Two attendees represented a department 
that dealt with challenges in transport rather than production. One of them was Oskar, 
the intern who had been working with the research team parallel to his studies for about 
two years. Making use of his expertise in developing and applying the NetworkPlanner 
he left the research team to do his Masters thesis on a research problem within that 
transport department. The transport department was interested in learning about the 
possibilities afforded by the artefact during this engagement. Another attendee was from 
the controlling department. Finally, one attendee represented the strategic planning 
                                                          
2 To coordinate the event with the other participating departments and to assist the lead 
planner at the trucks division in the agenda setting process, we were commissioned to 
support the organisation of this event. Similar to the initial meeting the agenda 
comprised updates on technical changes of the artefact and methodological advances on 
the different network models under development by different students. Planners 
presented current and new projects where the NetworkPlanner was put in action. Oskar 
reported on his approach to adapt the standard descriptive model to accommodate the 
requirements of the project in his department. After these presentations, attendees were 
asked to participate in focus group discussions. 
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department of the buses division. The constituency of the event reflected the purpose of 
the community of practice concept in respect of the NetworkPlanner. A core group 
consisting of planners from the cars division and the trucks division dominated the 
community but other departments interested in the artefact and the practice of strategic 
planning were encouraged to participate and to contribute. 
Both community meetings successfully brought together people interested in the practice 
of network planning and provided space for the exchange information and to share 
knowledge. The heads of the strategic planning departments of both the cars division 
and the trucks division attended the events and acknowledged the potential contribution 
of these meetings to increase quality of the network planning practice in CarCo. Despite 
the positive feedback, there was no further community of practice meetings in big scales 
thereafter. What followed were occasional informal meetings off-work which were 
mostly organised by the generation of planners who previously were actively involved 
in the development of the artefact. Thus, a space for interaction and knowledge exchange 
was retained, albeit on a smaller scale. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Although the redesign project was intended to ‘close’ the NetworkPlanner development, 
a well-minded and broadly supported approach to improve the flexibility of the artefact 
yielded unintended and severe consequences. The new turn in design weakened and 
partly uncoupled the socio-technical configuration between the artefact, organisational 
settings and practices, and the individuals involved which had been carefully co-
configured in numerous episodes over several years. What followed was a new season of 
episodes where parts of the artefact had to be reconceptualised and redeveloped, and 
users had to re-adapt to the use of the altered NetworkPlanner anew. However, despite a 
serious strain of resources and organisational tensions caused, the technical change 
opened up new avenues to promote the artefact to a new array of players. The newly 
acquired generic capability, whose implementation was the cause for significant 
technical and managerial struggles, enabled the proponents of the technological project 
to create bespoke couplings between artefact and users relatively easier than it would 
have been possible with the old architecture. The generic feature enabled different 
researchers to pursue new strategies to engage with users in more effective ways. In 
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other words, it was a feature that was particularly effective in enabling social learning 
processes between actors and across multiple locales. 
This chapter closes the investigation into the empirical case study. We started with a 
historical examination of the corporate history to learn about the organisational 
landscape and to understand why historical and contextual dynamics created 
opportunities for specific actors in a certain locale to pursue particular strategies and 
actions. Without the knowledge and the understanding about these historio-contextual 
details it would have not been possible to explain the reasons why some strategies where 
more effective than others. It was our purpose to highlight the close alignment of 
historically-contingent, contextual dynamics with local actions of individual actors. The 
historical examination put the technological project into perspective to the many 
dynamics and contingencies that shape the course of actions of organisations. These 
dynamics and contingencies are chaotic due to the numerous linked ecologies that 
characterise an organisation. Local events play out in the context of such linked 
ecologies. Therefore, we argue, it is an important requisite for a social study to know 
about these ecological dynamics to make sense of events within individual ecologies. 
This and the previous chapters detailed the events and processes that played out within 
a set of linked ecologies over a longer period. Reporting about the social shaping of the 
NetworkPlanner, we continued to relate local practices to dynamics in the wider 
ecological fabric. The global context and local processes are mutually intertwined to the 
extent that any incident on each side ripples through to the other side. A change event in 
the context allowed for actors to take advantage on a local level. For example, after 
losing its interest in the NetworkPlanner, a change of direction by the corporation’s 
Board of Management enabled the industrial researchers to direct its attention towards 
the engagement with strategic planners that division. Equally, advances on local level 
can have an effect on contextual properties. For example, after implementing a generic 
framework, the industrial researchers were able to pursue new strategies to address new 
audiences. Technological advances on the local level thus allowed new possibilities to 
interact with other ecologies and contexts.  
In conclusion, the empirical chapters attempted to jump back and forth between content 
and context to make visible these linkages between multiple locales in different 
ecologies. Since we investigated how the technological project evolved over an extended 
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period of time, we traced qualitative changes in these relationships. Over time, new 
actors entered the scene while others departed. At times, actors reappeared to form 
previous alliances anew. However, the relationships changed in shape and contents as 
compared to previous relationships. In general, change was a prominent feature 
throughout the case study. Almost every element, if not any, was somehow affected by 
change: the technological properties of the artefact, the configuration of individual actors 
and organisational players, relationships between players, etc. The innovation process 
itself changed qualitatively over time. While uncertainty and ambiguity dominated early 
activities, the innovation processes gained in pace and clarity over time. What was a 
distributed research undertaking in the beginning evolved to a technological project 
with a project management structure. As the innovation process unfolded, a 
technological artefact crystallised in context of an ecology of actions distributed across 
multiple locales. The technological artefact is a reflection of these historically-contingent 
and context-dependent actions. In the following discussion chapter we will elaborate 
how the empirical data relate to our ecological framework. There, we discuss in more 







8 Discussion  
The social shaping of technology is a long process of negotiations where progress plays 
an important role. Privileged actors make choices that decide about shape and content of 
an artefact. Technological development is thus a ‘garden of forking paths’ (Williams & 
Edge, 1996, p866) where when a choice was made, new choices open up while others 
close down. Consequently, actors construct their own histories by making decisions 
among a variety of choice options. However, the conditions under which these choices 
are made and the contents of these choices can be beyond the immediate control of said 
actors. The availability and contents of choice are shaped by pre-existing social 
structures, i.e. the context of action. Therefore, to understand the social shaping of a 
technology, i.e. the availability and contents of past technological choices, one needs to 
understand the context under which a technology was shaped.  
In this chapter, we attempt to condense and to summarise the previous empirical 
chapters by applying the ecological framework. In order to simplify the analytical 
narrative and to strengthen the readability of the complex case analysis, emphasis will be 
given to a comprehensible reflection of the empirical data. The chapter is structured in 
two sections. The first section will be reflecting primarily on the context of the 
technological development. In particular, it will report on how the initial organisational 
topography, in which the technological development was embedded and which 
patterned subsequent developments, came about in the first place. This first section will 
stress transformations of larger social and corporate structures in CarCo as they occurred 
from the 1980s up to 2000. The second section addresses primarily the dynamics of 
technological developments as they occurred in the period between 2000 and 2012. There 
it will be reported on how the group of industrial researchers accumulated and 
transformed resources to sustain their research activities and, consequently, the 
development and implementation of the technology concerned. All concepts of the 
ecological framework apply to the whole period. However, we will pull out and detail 
those episodes of the innovation process that illustrate the concepts well. 
The two sections in this chapter address macro-level dynamics and micro-level 
observations, respectively. Nonetheless, the analytical narrative attempts to maintain the 
same flight level by taking a meso-level perspective. This perspective is an intermediate 
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view that compromises between individualism and emergism (Abbott, 2005). The former 
is an account where social systems are the sum of all individual actions while the latter is 
an account where social systems have an inherent logic that determines the actions of an 
individual. In other words, the meso-level perspective acknowledges the actions of 
individuals but equally takes into consideration how structural properties are involved 
in shaping social dynamics. For this reason, the analysis adopts the ecological metaphor 
and the concept of linked ecologies as the underlying conceptual foundation in order to 
maintain a meso-level perspective. In this intermediate view, individuals can freely 
interact but within a corset of structural conditions negotiated collectively through past 
interactions. Past events of negotiations, history in general, therefore are crucial pieces in 
the understanding of why and how a technology was shaped in a particular way and 
why one choice was made over another in contextually patterned situations. With the 
localist turn, studies of technology either neglected or took for granted such knowledge 
about historical facts and identities of actors and organisations (Pollock & Williams, 
2010). This discussion chapter aims to foreground the role and influence of history and 
context, and the identities and relationships of individual actors and organisational 
players in the social shaping of technology. This combination of context and content is at 
the heart of the Ecological Shaping of Technology framework. 
8.1 The context of social shaping of technology 
The first section addresses contextual and historical matters of the case studied. It will 
summarise and discuss how historical transformations within CarCo patterned the 
conditions under which the development of the NetworkPlanner was made possible in 
the first place. Visionary and strategic efforts of transforming the firm’s organisational 
landscape triggered long-term developments which patterned the context of both the 
research group in general and the research team studied in particular. Elaborating the 
coming about of this peculiar organisational context will explain why it was a certain set 
of actors, the members of PMT in this case, who found themselves eventually in the 
spotlight of inter-divisional tensions and why contextual conditions limited the range of 




8.1.1 Historical transformations shaping the context of the research group 
The development of the artefact examined in this study was not the intentional outcome 
of a deliberate research strategy. It was not an accidental event either. It resulted from 
situated actions (Suchman, 1987) by a small set of actors whose choices were limited and 
governed by the particular topography of a socio-politically constructed organisational 
landscape. The configuration of CarCo’s organisational topography was also neither 
fully planned nor a random occurrence but resulted from the unfolding of consequences 
of organisational transformations within the firm. We have to go as far back as to the 
mid-1980s to learn about the initiatives of organisational transformations that patterned 
the socio-political configuration in which the emerging research team was embedded in 
2000.  
In scope of the grand vision in the 1980s the research group was established to symbolise 
CarCo’s excellence in technology and research, and to be the link between various 
organisational units that characterised the diversified but integrated technology firm. In 
the early 1990s the research group witnessed the peak of its reputation within CarCo. 
Indeed, when the organisation was new and effective ways to coordinate central 
research directions were yet to be implemented, the researchers were granted much 
intellectual freedom in deciding about the contents of their work. However, 
subsequently their privileged standing and autonomy was gradually reduced by the 
implementation of more and more quality and performance measures to ensure their 
alignment with business strategies. 
An important organisational circumstance of the research group was that it was not set 
up as an independent division. Reflecting existing internal power structures, it was 
attached to the car division, which was the largest division among CarCo’s operational 
divisions. In particular, the head of development in the car division became also the 
head of the research group. Attaching the corporate research unit to the car division gave 
the car division privileged managerial control over the unit. From a linked ecology 
perspective, the centralisation of corporate-wide research activities into the research 
group can be interpreted as the formation of a new location, in an Abbottian sense, 
which the car division successfully gained control over due to its privileged position in 
the company. This political bias within the research group did not play an immediate 
role in the biography of the artefact because the grand vision embraced an inclusive 
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approach encouraging and empowering researchers to engage with research topics 
beneficial for all divisions. It was not until ten years later that the vision of an integrated 
technology firm was replaced by an emphasis on the shareholder value. This shift in the 
corporate vision was accompanied by major transformations of CarCo’s organisational 
and political topology. It was then that the hierarchical location of the research group 
inside the political structures of an operational division started to show an effect. 
As the vision of the integrated technology firm failed to deliver its promises it was 
increasingly regarded as a failing overall strategy. The new CEO appointed in the mid-
1990s re-prioritised the corporate strategy to focus again on the core competencies of 
manufacturing land-based vehicles and de-facto abandoned the grand vision of his 
predecessor. The previous corporate vision promoted technological excellence as the 
dominant evaluation criteria. A shift to a shareholder-oriented vision, however, also 
shifted the dominant evaluation criteria away from technological quality towards the 
economic qualities of productivity and profitability. As a result, CarCo experienced a 
considerable change in its corporate culture due to a change in the dynamics of collective 
expectations (Konrad, 2006). The wide-spread disappointment, also reflected by critics 
outside the firm, about the moderately successful strategy of technology integration 
paved the way for rhetorics about productivity and profitability to gain traction. 
Proponents of technological excellence, of which the research staff in the research group 
was among the strongest supporters, began to lose out against the supposedly rational 
arguments from proponents of the new corporate strategy already in the years leading 
up the swap in the board room. 
In the arena of expectations concepts, enactors engage with selectors to gain their trust 
and mandate to pursue a direction of actions. The vision of the integrated technology 
firm can be interpreted as an arena which CarCo entered under the leadership of the 
CEO appointed in 1985. The dominating cultural matrix of expectations was 
characterised by the widely shared belief that high investments into technology and 
science hold the key for riches and high profitability. These generic expectations 
surrounding the idea that research and technology excellence were sufficient for the 
CEO to get a mandate from the board to pursue this strategy. Putting the vision into 
practice and delivering the promises in terms of specific outcomes, however, failed in the 
long run. Eventually, the strategy was deemed a failure as the promise was found to be 
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undeliverable. The board did not renew its mandate to the CEO and appointed a new 
one who departed from a strategy pursuing excellence in research and technology in 
favour of a strategy that favoured economic factors. 
With a new CEO and a new cultural focus in which economic considerations prevailed, 
all assets of the firm were re-evaluated in terms of their shareholder value and their 
contribution to CarCo’s core competencies. Organisational units were singled out and 
either put up for sale or liquidated. In other words, CarCo was un-diversified and re-
homogenised. This had a negative consequence on the research group. At the time of its 
founding, the research group was envisaged to be the binding element for the diverse 
technological landscape united under CarCo. However, with an increasingly 
homogeneous corporate landscape and a new cultural matrix of expectations in place, 
this broadly defined objective did not match the corporate strategy any longer. Many 
research projects, although technologically top of their class, saw their perceived value 
decreasing because they were not exclusively tailored towards CarCo’s redefined core 
competence which was the manufacturing of land-based vehicles. Thus, the research 
group found itself in a situation where some of its outcomes risked not meeting the 
requirements in terms of both the specific technological needs of operational business 
units and the dominating performance measurement criteria. Applying the linked 
ecology concept again, this episode of organisational transformations resulted in a major 
modification of relationships between the research group and other linked ecologies. 
While the research group enjoyed a dominant role in the previous corporate vision, this 
status was largely reduced in the succeeding corporate vision. This change in status was 
mostly represented by a reduction of linkages to other organisational units of which 
some disappeared entirely. Besides this qualitative change in relationships, the corporate 
arena of expectations to which the research group catered for became a space populated 
by fewer but a more homogeneous group of selectors. The narrower range of selectors 
resulted in a narrower range of promises acceptable within the arena of expectations. 
Research undertakings previously accepted by a heterogeneous group of selectors failed 
to meet functionally more specific expectations of homogeneous selectors. The fabric of 
linked ecologies, the topography surrounding the research group, therefore is linked 
intimately with the contents of promissory activities. A change in the fabric of linked 
ecologies inevitably affects the arena of expectations and its inherent cultural matrix. 
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This subsection has reflected on events that happened over a period of twenty-five years 
in which the larger context of this case study had developed. The developments reported 
unfolded slowly over a long period of time. The meso-level perspective, which 
emphasises how dynamics shape individual ecologies in contrast to an actor-oriented 
micro-level perspective, maintained the analytical gaze on single organisational units but 
took into account large-scale dynamics affecting the entire firm. The following 
subsection will turn the other way and examine actions of a collective of individual 
actors. However, we maintain the meso-level perspective to foreground how dynamics 
play out within an ecology of interconnected organisational players. 
8.1.2 Context shaping conditions of the organisation of the research team 
Due to investments in highly-educated scientists specialised in narrow subject fields and 
expensive instruments and materials, strategic redirections were more difficult to impose 
on the research group than on other parts of the firm. After all, R&D was an important 
prestige object for the public perception of the firm. CarCo’s new corporate landscape 
therefore posed a long-term structural problem for the research group. Typical for 
hierarchical and mechanistic organisations (Burns & Stalker, 1961), the senior 
management of the research group decided to delegate elements of the problem to a new 
organisational unit and thus created a new team, the Production Management Team 
(PMT), to address the problem of the low spillover of research outcomes into operations. 
The general understanding was that one major problem of the low spillover was due to 
the late consideration of social and economic factors in the research and development of 
new technologies. It was a lack of “soft skills”, as one member of PMT put it, that 
rendered final research outcomes unfit to the operational requirements on the shop floor. 
The supposedly missing soft skills thus were a cause for the apparent mismatch between 
research activities and operational requirements. Obviously, even five years after the 
coerced introduction of a new corporate culture, the research group was still struggling 
to conform to the new culture. The new team ought to build a bridge and to be the 
missing link between the two cultures. The remit of the new team, mainly to provide 
technology assessment services to other research groups in order to facilitate a successful 
transition of research outcomes into operations, indicates that a linear model of 
innovation prevailed when the idea for the team was conceptualised. On a basic level a 
linear model implies that the innovation process follows an inherent logic where a 
technology goes through the process of design and development before it transitions to 
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the market (Williams & Edge, 1996) or into the operational environment in case of 
production technologies. Broadly speaking, technology assessment, among PMT’s chief 
responsibilities, has three functions: forecasting, monitoring and control (Kranakis, 
1988). Because PMT was instructed to engage with existing projects, where technologies 
have already been designed and developed to large extent, the control aspect of 
technology assessment was the only function that was available for PMT’s members to 
engage with. This later-stage control function aims at “[shaping] the ways and contexts 
in which technologies are used” (Kranakis, 1988, p. 291). Thus, PMT’s members engaged 
with their research colleagues’ technologies-in-development and potential users of their 
technologies.  
A budgetary detail ensured that PMT had a strong interest in collaborating with its 
internal colleagues. Half of PMT’s budget was guaranteed. The other half was to be 
acquired through their collaborations with other research projects. This financial design 
feature rendered the internal research group a selection environment with one side 
offering services and the other side selecting to accept the offer, or not. PMT’s members 
became market players who had to promote their services like vendors on an internal 
quasi-market. Thus, the lack of funding required PMT’s members to act like vendors. 
This included an increased degree of autonomy in the team. To offer and sell their 
services on the quasi-market, PMT’s members were required to adopt a different 
mindset towards their work than their colleagues working on their own projects. The 
dynamics of expectations became a highly important aspect of PMT’s work. Because 
they had to promote their work to other players, PMT’s members adopted a strong 
routine of raising expectations by promoting their services and promising increased 
gains to other market players. Similar quasi-market dynamics had been observed in the 
research unit of a big bank. A group of internal researchers combined deliberate strategic 
decision-making with opportunism to offer their services to internal departments in 
order to develop and implement multimedia technology (Gallacher, 2004). To conclude 
and to emphasise the significance of PMT’s contextual circumstance, the research group, 
unintentionally as we argue, created a team that had no choice but to develop an 
idiosyncratic style of work, which was dominated by promissory activities, that diverged 
from what was perceived as the norm within the research group. The socio-political 
configuration of ecologies in which PMT was embedded gave rise to a liberal culture that 
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encouraged the researchers in PMT to seek out relatively autonomously for ways to find 
new locations in order to fund their own activities. 
The innovative idea to introduce some degree of market liberalism, however, failed to 
anticipate the behaviour of other market actors. In particular other internal researchers in 
the research group, who controlled the budgets of their research projects at which PMT 
was aiming at, showed unanticipated reactions. These colleagues were found to be 
reluctant to comply with the liberal idea that expected them to share their budgets for 
services they did not necessarily regard as necessary. Different to what the senior 
management anticipated, the researchers did not see the value in PMT’s offerings. Far 
from it, they did not like sharing sensitive details of their work with external actors who 
then evaluated their work. To them PMT appeared to be yet another controlling instance 
that tried to gain control over their research activities. Understandably, they were 
reluctant to collaborate with PMT. As a consequence of their colleagues’ resistance and 
the viscous flow of income from internal collaborations, PMT looked out for other 
sources of funding. 
The tension in the supply of resources required PMT to adopt novel strategies to sustain 
their activities. The unintended consequence here was the emergence of a style of work 
that was characterised by an enhanced relevance of promissory work in the routines of 
PMT. Since the internal contest for resources and status turned out to be problematic, 
members of PMT drew their attention to opportunities outside the firm. An opportunity 
where PMT could apply their skills in promissory work was the participation in publicly 
funded projects. Looking into the potential of new and promising technological arenas 
was another reason why PMT was created and falls into the remit of another function of 
technology assessment. The public projects provided PMT with additional resources and 
the mandate to freely engage in research activities as in contrast to the primary objective 
where the dependence on other researchers restricted PMT actions. Thus, working on the 
research projects was a more pleasing and rewarding activity for it allowed PMT to 
explore a new technological arena and to develop unique expertise in a subject with 
potentially high value for CarCo. External funding also enabled the team to access 
relatively cheap but competent workers by recruiting PhD students. The focus of PMT’s 
activities switched over time to deal with research objectives of publicly funded projects 
rather than the collaborative work with other internal research projects.  
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8.1.3 Conclusions: Brown field of history and context 
The two subsections above looked at different developments on different time scales. All 
these developments are interconnected and played a role in patterning the conditions 
and the context in which the development of the NetworkPlanner commenced. The first 
subsection reflected on historical transformations which reconfigured CarCo’s 
organisational landscape significantly. Unfolding consequences of subsequent 
transformation initiatives eventually shaped and configured the socio-political 
topography of the firm. The context of the research group shaped the cultural matrix of 
expectations and the set of assessment criteria that was applied to determine the value of 
research activities. To sum up, the historical transformations beginning in the mid-1980s 
were in favour of the research group which was established as the organisational unit 
that was supposed to unite corporate-wide research efforts. The following round of 
historical transformations beginning in the mid-1990s reversed some of the previous 
transformations and left the research group vulnerable and in need to deal with an 
organisational landscape that was adverse to its initial purpose. In the second subsection 
it was discussed how the research group attempted to deal with this tense political 
situation by creating a team of specialist to support other researchers in aligning their 
work with the specific requirements of the operational divisions. 
These two narratives highlighted past events and dynamics that happened in different 
moments in time and on different scales. The historical transformations affected the 
entire organisation over a period of two decades while the creation of PMT happened in 
a specific locale and moment in time. All these occurrences shaped the initial context and 
conditions of PMT’s engagement with its research activities on the public projects and 
consequently with the development of the artefact. The historical context and its 
examination in this study serve more than just to be an informative backdrop. It is the 
most immediate explanatory source to understand why the development of the 
technological artefact was undertaken in the first place and why it was taking a 
particular direction in the beginning.  
This section summarised data that highlighted the role of historical events and dynamics 
in patterning the socio-political configuration, or context in other words, in which PMT 
was automatically embedded in the moment of its creation. Rather than being a vacuum 
or green field where everything is possible and ‘Sartrean Engineers’ (Latour, 1988) 
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experience no restrictions besides material or non-human barriers, technological 
development occurs on a brown field (Sørensen & Levold, 1992, p.32): 
“The problem is that the terrain on which engineers and technological 
scientists move has been thoroughly shaped by previous actions” 
(Sørensen & Levold, 1992, p.32) 
Past events and actions, even remote to the locale of technological development, have 
mudded the political playing ground and created a space in which actions of individuals 
are limited due to pre-existing conditions and patterns of shared beliefs and expectations 
inherent in a historically shaped context. 
The next section will reframe the development and diffusion of the NetworkPlanner in a 
way that appreciates historical events and contextual contingencies. It will continue 
exemplifying how an ecological view, following the biography of an artefact approach, 
supports tracing related innovation processes across a diverse organisational landscape 
and multiple locales while taking into account relevant dynamics in contiguous 
ecologies. 
8.2 The content of social shaping of technology 
The first part of the discussion chapter has examined how historical transformations 
shaped the context and the conditions of the social space in which the Production 
Management Team (PMT) had been embedded. Knowing of these historical dynamics is 
important to understand how the organisational context affected the shaping of the 
technological artefact. The following sections will report how this technological 
development unfolded and how this development related to events in contiguous 
ecologies. We will begin with examining the conditions under which PMT was supposed 
to be operating and how these conditions required PMT to adjust its objectives. The 
repurposing of its objectives led PMT to engage with multiple user organisations. 
Thanks to these engagements, the technological artefact evolved and gained in 
capabilities which, in turn, allowed PMT to expand its activities further. Eventually, we 
will summarise how the research infrastructure behind the artefact was unwound. 
8.2.1 Repurposing the team to investigate a new research subject 
PMT was initially created to pursue the goal of supporting other research teams within 
the research group by offering technology assessment services. The provision of such 
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services was motivated by historical contingencies that left CarCo’s entire research 
organisation in an organisationally tense situation since grand-scale corporate 
transformations resulted in a relative mismatch of prior research strategies with new 
business strategies. However, PMT was required to remap its initial strategies and to put 
more emphasis on the team’s secondary objective after the primary objective, and with 
this the basic funding arrangements, did not work out as expected. In order to survive 
and to generate other income, PMT was required to look into new promising arenas and 
for other profitable opportunities to engage with. Originally established to support other 
research teams, PMT’s objective was partially repurposed to engage with the research 
subject of flexible manufacturing – an entirely new location in the Abbottian sense. This 
concrete opportunity for PMT to enter the promising arena of manufacturing flexibility 
was due to external events originating from another locale. 
The German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (FMER) made available 
funding for research undertakings that aimed to improve the competitiveness of SMEs in 
the manufacturing industry. This created an incentive for eligible firms to enter the 
flexible manufacturing arena. By limiting eligibility criteria, however, the Federal 
Ministry encouraged primarily SMEs to enter this specific arena. It was only due to 
another player, an engineering consultancy, that CarCo was able to participate despite 
not being a SME. This player invited PMT to join its undertaking in creating an alliance 
of ecologies to form a research consortium and to draft a joint research proposal for the 
bid. Eventually, the joint research proposal was awarded a research grant to run the 
SATFAB project. Existing resources – mainly manpower as the team yet had not 
developed unique instrumentalities else than conducting generic technology assessment 
tasks – which were not optimally utilised before were allocated to the SATFAB project. 
The incoming research fund was an important political currency to justify the 
transformation of PMT’s objectives. The acquisition of external research funds was 
generally well perceived by the management of the research group. Following the 
terminology of the kernel of research infrastructure concept (Ribes & Polk, 2015) the 
kernel, which is the totality of resources and services under control of PMT and its 
members, was both repurposed and extended in order to engage with a new arena. With 
the establishment of the research consortium and new linkages between players, 
especially with FMER, PMT successfully entered the new arena of flexible 
manufacturing. Its purpose from working with other research teams was recalibrated to 
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also engage with a new research object. Consequently, the grant created an opportunity 
to take up work on instrumentalities that later led to the development of technological 
artefacts. 
Another public research grant was acquired soon after. Similar to the Federal Ministry, 
the European Commission (EC) aimed to improve the competitiveness of manufacturing 
industries in its constituent nations. Flexible manufacturing, therefore, was equally a 
relevant arena which the EC wanted to see being populated by European players. Taking 
the lead, PMT put together another alliance of players and succeeded in tapping the 
research fund provided by the EC which gave rise to the LICOPRO project. The 
additional funding yet again extended the kernel’s resources. This enabled PMT to 
recruit new student members which were tasked to intensify work on promising 
instrumentalities, i.e. elaborating theories, methods and technologies relevant for the 
subject of flexible manufacturing from the point of view of a car manufacturer. 
8.2.2 Linking up with internal user departments 
The resources provided by SATFAB and LICOPRO enabled the research team at CarCo 
to enter a new arena and to explore the subject area of flexible manufacturing. The goals 
in these projects were to formalise functional requirements of methods and techniques 
that were potentially helpful in solving the abstract problems of the technological field of 
flexible manufacturing. Besides the two projects, PMT simultaneously advanced another 
strategy to sustain PMT’s research infrastructure over time since there was a due date 
attached to the public project. 
PMT’s growing kernel, including the increase in methodological and technological 
capabilities, opened up opportunities to engage with potential users within CarCo. To 
attract new sources of funding and to raise expectations with new players, members of 
PMT approached internal practitioners and demonstrated both their artefact and their 
competences in mastering complex strategic planning problems. Actually, such 
interactions started to take place soon after the projects were taken up in the first place 
because PMT developed a strong routine of seeking new sources of funding early on its 
existence. During these interactions, promises where voiced that the artefact was capable 
of solving the complex problems strategic planners were struggling with in their 
projects. What distinguished these promises from SATFAB’s and LICOPRO’s functional 
promises was that PMT’s members were challenged to take into account the contingent 
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dynamics and developments they stumbled upon locally when interacting with strategic 
planners. Thus, PMT’s promises were not only specific but also localised since every 
planning department was dealing with different sets of challenges, technically and 
politically.  
Each strategic planning department operated within its own arena of expectation. Since 
PMT required only little adjustments to its rhetoric to voice similar promises to different 
planning departments, these arenas possessed similar features. This hints at the co-
existence of contiguous arenas which are distinguished only by a different set of beliefs 
and expectations, i.e. the cultural matrix of expectations, dominant within the respective 
division. Differences between these matrices become visible when operational premises, 
in other words beliefs and expectations, change. For example, the bus division, PMT’s 
first internal client, withdrew from the alliance with PMT because planning premises 
changed. Similarly, the car division’s cultural matrix of expectations changed in a later 
stage of the project in favour of the NetworkPlanner after the senior management 
decided on a different production strategy. Attracting the interest of selectors in charge 
within the confines of these various arenas required PMT to adjust the contents of their 
promises according to the requirements of the cultural matrix of strategic planners of the 
targeted department. The generic functionality of the final version of the 
NetworkPlanner was an attempt to do justice to the variations in the cultural matrices of 
expectations dominating these arenas. 
Even when PMT’s researchers succeeded in attracting the interest of practitioners, the 
planners proceeded carefully in evaluating PMT’s promising claims about benefits and 
demanded proof. However, in order to provide such proof, the researchers required 
access to live data and, thus, to real life projects. In effect, the demand for proof was the 
first mandate handed over to PMT to engage in a collaborative exchange. The 
presentation of results in follow-up meetings presented further opportunities to raise 
new expectation by making even bolder claims about technological and methodological 
capabilities. The completion of one promise-requirement cycle enabled the initiation of 
another. Every successful completion of a cycle contributed to building the trust 
relationship between enactors and selectors and to gaining a mandate with more 
privileges attached. As the community of strategic planners at CarCo was manageable in 
size, reputation turned out to be a valuable currency when it came to approaching 
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planning departments in other divisions. References to collaborations and successfully 
accomplished network projects, i.e. previous promise-requirement cycles in other 
locales, made it easier to engage in new but thematically related promise-requirement 
cycles. 
Over time, PMT’s researchers succeeded in linking up with multiple organisational 
players within CarCo. What started with a collaboration with the bus division led to the 
application of the prototype in a network project in the car division. Eventually, the 
truck division was found to be the most interesting player as its production network and 
its strategic planning organisation showed qualities that favoured the application of the 
NetworkPlanner. For historical reasons, the Truck division had two strategic planning 
departments within the overall planning department. Although their responsibilities did 
not overlap as they were separated geographically there was in a sense a competition 
going on between the two. Besides different responsibilities, there were also some 
cultural and methodological differences in the way how each department was going 
about the strategic planning process in general. One department, referred to as Team B 
in the empirical chapter, was collaborating with an external company to develop their 
own technological artefact in order to support their work. Team A, on the other hand, 
was without a bespoke tool and relied entirely on methods based on conventional 
spreadsheet approaches. For this reason, Team B was not interested any other artefact 
whereas Team A obviously was curious to learn about any artefact that could support 
their work and that potentially could compete against Team B’s artefact. This 
constellation of existing linkages between ecologies, therefore, was an influential factor 
in predetermining the chances of success for PMT to implement their artefact. After 
successfully adopting the NetworkPlanner, Team A took turn to convince Team B, who 
was still working on its own artefact, of apparent benefits of the NetworkPlanner. It was 
only after a political move by an individual actor, who switched from PMT to an 
influential position within the overall planning department and close to the head of that 
department, that Team B abandoned the development of its artefact in favour of the 
NetworkPlanner after a benchmark of the two artefacts was undertaken. To summarise, 
the capabilities of the technological artefact were an important factor in attracting the 
interest of Team A in the first place, but it was the combination of skilful strategising and 
navigation within a historically shaped and politically-laden ecological terrain by 
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multiple actors involved that eventually led to the NetworkPlanner being embedded in 
that social environment. 
So far we have focused on how the kernel of PMT’s research infrastructure, the totality 
of resources and services available to PMT’s members to investigate the subject of 
flexible manufacturing, has been established and linked with other organisational 
players. Next, the discussion will examine how the NetworkPlanner itself had been 
developed. A technology does not emerge independently from social processes but is a 
co-developed product of social interactions. In other words, the artefact has been worked 
on at the same time as the events occurred that have been discussed above. However, to 
maintain narrative simplicity, the development of the artefact is narrated separately in 
the following section. This is also to highlight links to other social dynamics in remote 
locales which are independent from these events discussed previously but which 
influenced the social shaping of the technology nonetheless. 
8.2.3 From generic theory to functional prototype to specific artefact 
The special episode in the truck division exemplifies that the NetworkPlanner is shaped 
contextually and historically depending on the fabric of linked ecologies. However, the 
emerging technical capabilities of the NetworkPlanner also contributed in shaping social 
dynamics and the context of its development. This subsection will emphasise on the 
technical qualities of the NetworkPlanner and how they relate to remote developments 
in other locales. Especially, we examine why the development took the turn to 
incorporate methods of operations research (OR). Indeed, the adoption of OR methods 
represents the linkage to developments beyond the immediate set of actors involved in 
the technological project. 
In Fujimura’s (1995) study the articulation of oncogene theory kicked off a complex and 
ramified social process within the domain of cancer research that over time 
fundamentally transformed how cancer research was interpreted and how the field 
operated. In this case study, a similarly game-changing event can be identified with the 
exploration and utilisation of a theory based on operations research (OR) methodologies 
in the domain of strategic network planning. Jordan and Graves’ (1995) theoretical study 
on the “Principles on the Process Benefits of Manufacturing Flexibility” became a 
seminal work for researchers interested in supply chain configurations in light of 
uncertainty and complexity (Volling et al., 2013). This paper also attracted the interest of 
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PMT’s researchers. The publicly funded research projects SATFAB and LICOPRO 
enabled PMT to explore these and related theories and methods relevant for the domain 
of flexible manufacturing in two ways. Firstly, it justified and legitimised the 
repurposing of PMT’s kernel towards the study of a new research subject. Secondly, both 
projects extended the kernel by providing new research funds which allowed the 
recruitment of three doctoral students, each dedicated to a different aspect of flexible 
manufacturing. Drawing on students doing their undergraduate and postgraduate 
dissertations, PMT’s doctoral students began experimenting with operations research 
(OR) methodologies by developing functional prototypes. Further, the LICOPRO project 
linked PMT with academic partners who provided valuable theoretical expertise in 
exchange for insights into real life cases and data from CarCo. In collaboration with 
academic partners, PMT’s researchers were able to advance their knowledge on the 
subject, methods, and, consequently, their prototypes. One of the first prototypes, 
therefore, was a repository of Microsoft PowerPoint slideshows that documented 
relevant concepts and information. 
The OR grounded approach gave PMT’s researcher strong advantages in pursuing their 
research objectives. First of all, it directed PMT’s researcher towards an approach 
promising a possible set of methods to solve complex problems as experienced in the 
management and planning of production and supply networks that could not be 
addressed with conventional approaches. Researching methods with potential practical 
benefit for CarCo further legitimised PMT’s exploration of the new arena and location of 
flexible manufacturing. Second, OR and its different facets were being researched by a 
global community allowing PMT to establish links and collaborations with numerous 
well-known research groups and institutes, and to draw on a wider pool of theoretical 
findings and resources. The extended network led, thirdly, to an increase in reputation 
and recognition by other organisational units within CarCo. The research division 
appreciated international collaborations as they increased the division’s visibility within 
the corporation. Equally, the reputational gain was valuable as a currency to improve 
PMT’s position when engaging in promissory activities with user departments. The 
opportunity to point to a large network of academics and practitioners that supposedly 
believes in and utilises the same theoretical foundation is more convincing a fact (Latour, 
1987) than in the case of a technological development that only draws on the expertise of 
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a limited grouping as did the competing technological artefact that was developed by 
Team B in the Truck division, for example. 
The approach elaborated by Jordan and Graves (1995) was a generic theory addressing a 
general and abstract production problem faced by manufacturing companies all over the 
world. PMT’s researchers adopted the theory as for them it appeared to be the most 
promising approach in finding a workable solution to the type of problems addressed in 
their research activities. The researchers concretised the theory by adapting it to the 
requirements of CarCo’s global production and supply networks. Although CarCo’s 
network spans the globe, it nonetheless introduced restrictions and specific requirements 
of a single organisation. Thus, the generic theory was reduced and concretised to 
functional methods applicable to the needs of a certain corporate environment. The 
functional methods were embedded in and embodied by the NetworkPlanner, a 
functional and prototypical artefact. Technically, the artefact evolved from a repository 
of slideshows to, at first, a generic set of Microsoft Excel spreadsheets with complex 
formula that processed data. With the implementation of OR-based functional methods 
these formulas became mathematically more complex. The next stage was to adapt the 
functional prototypes into technological solutions fit for operations in specific locales. 
The prototype was instrumental in demonstrating the capabilities of the functional and 
OR-based methods to an interested audience of strategic planners. The exposure to 
practitioners taught PMT to consider elements such as graphical user interfaces. Their 
artefact became ‘sexier’ as more components were implemented that catered for the 
needs of non-scientists and that increased the perceived ease of use. Different currencies 
were used to appeal to the varying tastes and requirements of different researcher-user 
nexuses. Engaging with potential users allowed the researchers to gather more detailed 
requirements about the specifics of user locales and to adapt the functionalities of the 
prototype accordingly. Identifying, implementing and refining the best information 
technological components was an arduous exercise shared with and delegated to both 
the doctoral students as well as the undergraduate and postgraduate students working 
with PMT. The prototype gained in sophistication the more it was exposed to and 
utilised in real-world projects. Also, the artefact gained in technical sophistication as not 
only components were replaced with better ones but that the artefact was completely 
overhauled changing its underlying technical architecture. The prototype transformed 
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from an improvised set of interconnected spreadsheets to a professional software with a 
graphical user interface and powered by a database management system. 
While generic theories were the boundary objects between PMT and its academic 
partners, the prototypes became boundary objects between PMT and an increasing 
number of internal strategic planning departments. For the user departments, it was a 
promising artefact potentially capable of solving important but complex practical 
problems. For PMT, on the other hand, collaborations with internal users was the 
necessary currency to persuade the senior management of the research division to 
continue allocating research funds for their research activities. The more PMT’s 
researchers engaged with users, the more promises were made and requirements 
mandated, the more local constraints were implemented in the prototype, the further the 
crystallisation of abstract theories into specific problem-solution techniques proceeded. 
The diversity of user engagements provided a diverse set of requirements, allowing PMT 
to get a rich body of knowledge on various facets of strategic planning. This is why the 
final version of the NetworkPlanner was a highly flexible instrument trying to live up to 
a wide range of expectations held by various individuals in different locales. Eventually, 
this wide range of expectations encouraged the redesign of the system which led to the 
problematic development of the NetworkPlanner with a generic framework. 
The adoption and declaration of the NetworkPlanner as standard planning instrument in 
parts of the company effectively transformed the practices of strategic planning within 
CarCo. Furthermore, it transformed the way how problems of strategic planning were 
interpreted. This was most obvious in the fact that the user departments began 
articulating problems from the point of view of the NetworkPlanner. The doctoral 
students recruited by the strategic planning departments continued to develop the 
artefact and to adapt it to the specifics of their divisions. They engaged with new sets of 
research questions whose articulation was tied to the capabilities of the artefact to 
engage in ways with existing problems. Thus, the flexibility of the artefact gave rise to 
the articulation of problems which previously could not have been addressed drawing 
on conventional methods. The technological artefact was utilised to explore new ideas 
and methods by creating functional and experimental prototypes. In other words, the 
process of concretisation began to reverse and to turn into a process of abstraction where 
local experience informed the formulation of new functional methods based other 
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generic theories. The final episodes in the case study, therefore, hinted empirically at 
what the notion of instrumentality conceptually addressed as the reciprocal 
advancement of science and technology. 
This section shed light on the development of the technological artefact, the 
NetworkPlanner. Following the intention of articulating an ecological perspective on the 
social shaping of the technology, we highlighted how the artefact relates to dynamics in 
other locales. In this case, it was elaborated, that the methods and techniques utilised by 
the NetworkPlanner have not been invented by PMT’s researchers. Rather, the 
intellectual origins of the artefact are identified to stem from outside of CarCo. It was the 
development of a generic theoretical approach by researchers elsewhere that inspired 
PMT’s researchers to pursue a particular methodological direction. However, it was 
PMT’s researchers’ achievement to concretise and localise the generic and abstract theory 
according to the specific requirements extracted from CarCo’s strategic planning 
departments. In line with notion of the instrumentality package of our framework, we 
have elaborated the links between theory, method, technique and artefact and thus 
indicated that the contents of a technological artefact are contextually shaped. The ability 
of the artefact to shape its context is indicated by the observation that the more feature 
were integrated into the artefact, the wider applicable it became. Thus, the evolving 
artefact allowed PMT’s members to engage with a wider range of users interested in the 
qualities of the artefact. Also, the innovative capabilities of the artefact allowed users to 
tackle new problems. Thus, the NetworkPlanner enabled to some extent the redefinition 
of the strategic planning process and the kinds of problems addressed in this process. 
8.2.4 Unwinding the research infrastructure 
PMT’s members succeeded in initiating sustainable collaborations with other players in 
CarCo who benefited from the application of the NetworkPlanner in their work 
activities. These engagements with users or, in other words, episodes of social learning 
contributed largely to the refinement of the artefact. User feedback and feature requests 
provided PMT’s researchers with opportunities to engage in promise-requirement cycles 
and to elaborate the NetworkPlanner’s capabilities. Another important result of longer-
lasting engagements with users was the migration of researchers. Individual researchers 
switched sides leaving the research team and joining user departments. In particular, 
both the truck and the car division recruited each a doctoral student and a dissertation 
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student working with PMT. Doing this, these individuals carried with them the 
knowledge about instrumentalities, i.e. knowledge about the artefact as well as the 
theories and methods utilised by the artefact. Since the artefact was an in-house 
development, it was unproblematic for these individuals to carry on contributing to 
further developments from a user perspective and across organisational boundaries. 
Therefore, it was not simply a process of implementation or diffusion but episodes of a 
process which resembles what Ribes and Polk (2015) described as the forking of a kernel. 
These authors introduced the notion of forking to describe how a newly established 
kernel makes use of resources and services of an existing kernel to serve a distinct but 
remotely related purpose. In open source software development, where the term is 
commonly applied, this is a process splitting a technological development, its respective 
community of developers and, to some extent, the available set of resources apart. It is a 
method to encourage alternative technological innovations and also to resolve conflicts 
about visions of future technological development. In our case study, the actors switched 
departments but continued to interact with their former colleagues at PMT and informed 
the ongoing development of the NetworkPlanner after their transfer. At the same time, 
they engaged with the investigation of problems specific to the local requirements of 
their new employers. 
PMT’s kernel was forked twice. First it was forked to the truck division then, about two 
years later, to the car division. This second process took place in light of the plan by 
senior management of the research group to withdraw from the technological project. In 
hindsight, the second forking of the kernel can be interpreted as part of a process to 
unwind the research infrastructure in charge of the development of the NetworkPlanner. 
In this process of dispersal, valuable resources, including human actors, in the research 
team were redistributed and relocated into other institutional arrangements and 
sociotechnical configurations within other locales and ecologies.  
In case of the NetworkPlanner, the dispersal was the result of reaching a certain degree 
of maturity in the instrumentalities elaborated within the kernel. After more than a 
decade, theoretical research activities had been largely succeeded by the practical 
activities of the development and implementation of a technological artefact. The 
existence of PMT’s research infrastructure, at least the part that was dedicated to the 
NetworkPlanner enterprise, reached a point at which resistance from the senior 
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management to support this type of practical research any further was too strong. Thus, 
it was decided to unwind the research team working on the technological artefact to free 
up resources and capacities for other and more promising research activities. 
Dispersal is not an ending but a major transformation of funding, management and 
coordination arrangements of the kernel’s resources. Ever since the start of the research 
activities PMT has been the central player in the development of the kernel. With the 
retreat of this central player, the kernel entered a different mode of operation where its 
future development became an activity largely distributed among the two forks. A 
notional community of practice has been created to fill parts of the void and to serve as a 
common platform for representation and exchange. The NetworkPlanner’s generic 
capabilities provided much common grounds on which collaborative but distributed 
development was regarded as useful. In the first months after the dispersal was 
accomplished, interaction between the two forks was still observed. However, further 
close-up observations of how the dispersed state of the kernel unfolded further was 
beyond the temporal scope of this thesis. 
8.3 The relationship of context and content in technological 
change 
In the first part we highlighted that PMT was embedded into a brown field patterned by 
previous actions and established sets of linked ecologies. This brown field patterned the 
starting conditions and the range of options available to members of PMT and other 
relevant actors. In the second part, we have revisited how the research infrastructure 
responsible for the development and implementation of the NetworkPlanner unfolded 
under the leadership of PMT and in light of the contextual constraints of the given 
brown field. To avert a financial bottleneck the research team made an unanticipated 
turn by focusing its activities on researching a new technological field. By navigating 
around a serious problem it entered a promising new arena which allowed the team to 
expand its capacities to engage with the development of a technological artefact which 
utilised generic theories to solve complex problems practitioners were struggling with. 
Multiple episodes of innofusion led to the implementation of the NetworkPlanner as a 
standard instrument in the strategic planning process in adopting divisions. With the 
gradual transfer of the artefact into operations, the research infrastructure was unwound 
as institutional support for further development ceased.  
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These local events occurred over a period of twelve years, in contrast to the 25-year 
period in which historical dynamics shaped what was found to be the relevant context of 
the NetworkPlanner enterprise. Comparing these two figures, we can deduce that, at 
least in this case study, that the shaping of influential contextual factors takes about 
double the time than the shaping of the actual contents. In other words and in more 
general terms, context and content evolve in different speeds. Despite this difference on 
a temporal dimension, both dynamics are intrinsically connected. As time moved on, 
contextual dynamics, i.e. changes in contiguous ecologies, kept interfering with ecologies 
and actors directly involved in the development of the technological artefact. For 
example, the eventually successful implementation of the NetworkPlanner in the car 
division was mostly due to the change in the division’s strategic planning premises. This 
was triggered by a change of strategy decided by the management board in order to 
react to changing market conditions. Without this decisive strategic change, which was 
outside the reach of any actor involved in the project, the outcome of the technological 
development would have been different since the car division was a powerful ally for 
PMT. After all, the research group was embedded in the hierarchical structure of the car 
division and thus sensitive to dynamics in that division. Equally, the innofusion of the 
NetworkPlanner influenced its context by affecting practices in linked ecologies. 
Especially the application of the generic version of the artefact enabled strategic planners 
to engage with problems that previously had been unattainable with conventional 
methods. Thus, in the long run, the innovative technical capabilities inherent in the 
NetworkPlanner redefined the contents and the meaning of the strategic network 
planning practice in CarCo. What previously was performed by drawing on standard 
applications, such as software available in the Microsoft Office package, evolved to the 
utilisation of professionally designed software that required understanding of operations 
research methods. The adoption of the NetworkPlanner strengthened the position of 
strategic planners in relation to its linkages to other functional areas such as controlling 
and its representing ecologies. 
Since the research purpose of this thesis was to explore how best to study long and 
complex technological developments, we have applied concepts of our ecological 
framework to bring some order to the many events and dynamics observed in this case 
study. The analysis benefited in the sense that events and developments were 
interpreted according to the conceptualisations put forward by the framework. As the 
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structure of the discussion demonstrates, we were encouraged to split the analysis of 
context and content into separate sections. This discussion, we argue, makes a strong 
point in showing that technological change does not occur on a green field where 
technologists and engineers are free to unfold their ideas and actions but are strongly 
restricted by the brown field of interests and expectations inherent in existing and 
surrounding social structures. Understanding technological change essentially rests on 
the equal understanding of the context and the content of technological change.  
Overall, our framework contributes to the development of a methodological approach 
that aims to balance analytical attention equally between matters of context and content. 
This lines up with arguments put forward by the Biography or Artefacts and Practices 
perspective which calls for sensitising spatial and temporal concerns of technological 
change. Based on the ecological orientation of our analysis we gained a different 
perspective on the interactive relationship between multiple ecologies over longer 
periods of time. The next section will elaborate findings that have been made possible by 
this ecological perspective. 
8.4 An ecological approach to expectation dynamics 
A prevailing feature of our case study has been found to be the flexibility and mobility of 
both actors involved in the innofusion process and the technical artefact. PMT’s 
members navigated from one division to another in their endeavour to implement the 
artefact in a strategic planning department. These recurring engagements with users and 
their respective requirements shaped the content of the artefact, PMT’s kernel of research 
infrastructure and, eventually, practices of users. Our ecological framework described 
these engagements as processes where predominantly PMT’s members attempted to 
construct relations to other ecologies – a process Abbott (2005) termed ligation. In section 
3.2, where we set out to construct the part of the Ecological Shaping of Technology 
framework that focuses on mapping the ecological terrain of a technology project, we 
noted that the combination of ideas from the sociologies of professions (Abbott, 2005) 
and expectations (Bakker et al., 2011) appeared promising in providing a more nuanced 
description of change in relationships between ecologies. This conceptual combination 
produced an insightful perspective on how actors engaged in promissory work to 
construct and sustain relations with actors from other ecologies over time. In this section 
we will focus on this specific element of our theoretical framework because it highlights 
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a frequently observed phenomenon in our case study that allows for a special 
contribution to the literature on the innofusion process. 
In our empirical chapters we have described how the NetworkPlanner gained in shape 
due to continuous efforts of actors who sought out to find a location to which the artefact 
could be transferred to at the end of the development. Over the course of a decade the 
emerging artefact had been introduced to multiple users in various departments and 
divisions. Developing a technical artefact from scratch, PMT played the role of an 
enactor that promised benefits to potential users, i.e. selectors, in order to get financial 
resources to fund the development, and political currency to strengthen the legitimacy of 
the project in the research group whose senior managers held a sceptical view on the 
undertaking. The first promise-requirement cycles highlighted in our analysis were 
PMT’s participation in SATFAB and LICOPRO, the two publicly-funded projects. 
Participating in these projects enabled PMT to extend its activities to another 
technological field. Previously, PMT’s primary objective was to collaborate with other 
research projects and to provide additional services including economic evaluations of 
technology implementation and others. The public projects expanded the range of 
objectives to include research on flexibility in production and supply networks. Drawing 
on terminology from the sociology of professions, the new subject area can be 
interpreted as both a ‘location’ that is worked on by PMT’s researchers and a ‘proto-
boundary’ that demarcates sites of difference. The difference here is similar to what 
Hughes (1983) described as a reverse salient. A reverse salient is a technical component 
that is holding back the advancement of a larger system. Thus, the proto-boundary in 
our case indicates practices that would significantly benefit from new technological 
solutions. We argue that by the time institutional bodies provide funding to research a 
certain subject, the subject in question is past the stage of being a mere ‘difference’. By 
this time it has been identified and classified as a worthwhile research topic by a range of 
players including practitioners, policy makers and researchers. In a drive to foster 
innovation, the efforts of the institutional players, in this instance a federal ministry and 
a transnational funding body, therefore reflected the broadly-shared intention to explore 
whether the proto-boundary of ‘manufacturing flexibility’ allowed for the creation of 
novel social entities such as novel technological development initiatives, technology 
spin-offs, etc.. The effort of doing the actual exploratory work had been delegated to 
respective research consortia of which PMT was part of. 
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The first two promise-requirement cycle, with PMT taking the role of an enactor and the 
funding bodies that of selectors, aimed at testing the potential of a new technological 
field – the proto-boundary labelled ‘manufacturing flexibility’. We briefly remind that 
this particular proto-boundary emerged from the convergence of multiple domains 
including, at least, industrial and academic research on production and supply 
networks, as well as advances in both technological capacities of information 
technologies and methods in operations research. The exploration and testing of the 
potential of creating a new social entity along this proto-boundary commenced on a 
generic level where technical specifications and local requirements were yet abstract. 
Participants of the publicly-funded projects engaged with researching issues 
surrounding the subject of manufacturing flexibility in order to improve understanding 
and develop concepts and methods to cope with related problems. As time moved on, 
participants, and PMT in particular, gained experience on the subject, its potentials and 
specifics. However, since the public funds would run out at some point, PMT’s research 
activities would simply be redirected to other subjects at the end. To avoid this, PMT’s 
members began to seek new selectors within the confines of CarCo for two reasons. First, 
they needed to secure external mandates and resources to sustain the level of 
technological development. And second, the development reached a point where 
researchers required more specific and practical input rather than more generic research. 
This is when attention was widened to potential users. 
Strategic planning departments were found as relevant arenas that showed interest in 
the artefact. Thus, on approach, new promises were uttered to new selectors which 
granted mandates and provided further resources including both financial and political 
currencies. These engagements with users were new instances of promise-requirement 
cycles. PMT kept the role of the enactor whereas user departments and respective 
decision-makers therein took the role of selectors. As in the first promise-requirement 
cycle PMT’s members engaged in maximising expectations of selectors in order to secure 
new resources and mandates. What was different with these cycles was that the mandate 
did not guarantee a durable state of stability. Contrary to long-lasting resourceful 
packages provided by public funding bodies, PMT faced a different situation dealing 
with potential user departments. Instead, engagements with strategic departments 
resulted in a series of promise-requirement cycles in which claims made by PMT’s 
researchers were continuously scrutinised. While the Federal Ministry and the European 
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funding body were satisfied with abstract formulations of promises and gains articulated 
in a research proposal, user departments were more demanding.  Orally presented 
claims made by PMT’s members in formal meetings were more frequently tested against 
specifications and requirements rendered by respective users and their social settings. 
PMT’s members visited user departments repeatedly to demonstrate the artefact’s 
abilities. These engagements were arenas for PMT to meet selectors with whom they 
negotiated about both present and future capabilities. 
The artefact was still under development at the time of the first interactions with 
potential users. It was not fully functional and not even stable enough to be used by a 
non-expert. Basically, it was useless in the hands of a user unless the user was carefully 
navigated by an expert from PMT. Despite a technical state that leaves a lot to be 
desired, PMT’s members succeeded in persuading user departments to test PMT’s 
artefact and practical competence by granting temporary mandates to support them in 
their projects. In order to secure these and future mandates PMT’s members promised 
users that their artefact could be relatively easily adapted and expanded to fulfil the 
requirements posed by the strategic planning projects dealt with by user departments. 
The initial mandates granted by user departments were volatile as their level of 
commitment was low. Initial engagements aimed at building trust between PMT’s 
members and user departments. Also, initial promise-requirement cycles with a user 
department yielded political currency for PMT rather than financial resources. To 
safeguard PMT’s transition from being partially dependent on external public funds to 
fully dependent on internal funds again, political currency was more important for PMT 
as it helped justifying the continuation of its research activities to the management of the 
research organisation.  
Frequent promise-requirement cycles with users involved became more specific and 
tailored to their needs. Selecting users were able to test if new technical fixes met 
requirements while enacting developers got further feedback and opportunities to make 
new promises about prospective features. PMT’s members continuously succeeded in 
meeting expectations and returning to the arena to reengage with users despite the 
artefact being still under development and reliant on some sort of student-led ‘concierge 
service’. As a result, the artefact strongly benefited from these shorter intervals in which 
feedback was received and timely incorporated into the shaping process. The artefact 
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changed its shape according to the engagements prevailing at the time – a context-
contingent process we described as ecological shaping. To sum up, capabilities present at 
the time of a prototypical demonstration were important to initiate engagement with 
potential users but it was the potential of future capabilities that allowed enactors to 
return. 
 
Figure 19 Yoking process of the NetworkPlanner 
Another interesting observation that emerges from analysing these promissory 
engagements with users is the view of yoking together the technological development 
with another ecology and to ‘anchor’ the artefact temporarily to that ecology to sustain 
its further development. Promise-requirement cycles do not guarantee adoption but are 
sequential episodes in a process of convergence. Setting up relationships with multiple 
user departments at various moments in the innovation process contributed to 
sustaining the availability of both financial and political currencies. The survival of the 
development was dependent on PMT’s members’ opportunistic navigation along the 
changing textures of CarCo’s ecological terrain. Anchoring the artefact temporarily in a 
particular spot of that terrain, i.e. yoking it to another ecology, enabled the undertaking 
to survive for another moment and to move to a new position from where PMT could 
access and yoke it to other ecologies that were previously out of reach. For instance, the 
initial engagement with planners from the Buses division, an opportunity contingent to 
spatial proximity, gave PMT’s members the opportunity to learn about the specifics of 
internal planning practices including the requirement to comply with financial 
regulatory standards (see Figure 19 for an overview of the yoking process of the 
NetworkPlanner). Expertise in formal planning practices was an important factor 
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enabling PMT’s members to approach the Cars division and to continue user 
engagements with a new partner. When practitioners from the Buses division withdrew, 
the Cars strategic planning department was a temporary saviour providing legitimacy 
for the artefact’s further development until the interaction was interrupted by yet 
another withdrawal. However, the development of the NetworkPlanner survived long 
enough for the tool to be applied in the Trucks division where the yoking process was 
most successful. Temporarily anchoring the technological development and PMT’s 
respective ecology to others was a strategy to sustain the undertaking over time. In the 
course of yoking the artefact to other ecologies, PMT’s kernel gained relevant resources 
and capabilities which increased the likelihood of the survival of the artefact and the 
organisation surrounding it. 
To come to a conclusion, we will wrap up this section by elaborating the key 
contribution of our framework in more abstract terms. The process of ecological shaping 
of technology is characterised by enactors bringing together selectors to work together 
on a technological undertaking. Technological development becomes a social space, an 
arena or location in between one or more social entities, in which actors come together to 
engage in promise-requirement cycles. The intersection between this yet virtual social 
space and existing entities occurs along proto-boundaries that mark sites of difference 
and potential spots along which new entities could emerge. Enactors work on bringing 
in selectors into this social space by identifying or demarcating proto-boundaries. This 
process of bringing together or linking up of ecologies has been described as yoking 
(Abbott, 1995). In the Abbottian sense, yoking is a dynamic but slow process that can 
produce strong institutional links but which can endure over multiple decades. We 
propose a more granulated interpretation of yoking by enriching it with concepts of 
expectation dynamics. This allows the notion of yoking to be applied to more fast-paced 
developments that occur over shorter periods of time such as the development, 
implementation and adoption of a technological artefact. The concept of arenas of 
expectation and the corresponding notion of the promise-requirement cycle allow 
theorising the yoking process on the level of both individual actors and institutional 
collectives. Here, yoking describes an innovation process in which actors anchor a 
technological artefact and its shaping process to one or more ecologies over time. Doing 
this they take advantage of beneficial circumstances that prevail in ecologies in social 
proximity to the technological development. The yoking process proceeds through a 
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series of promise-requirement cycles which bring both enacting and selecting ecologies 
together the closer the artefact comes to meeting expectations of users and requirements 
of their social settings. Our interpretation of the yoking process brings in an ecological 
perspective that takes into account change as it unfolds over different moments in time 








This study set out to document the long and complex story of the development, 
implementation and adoption of a technological artefact and to identify effective ways to 
analyse such a complex and extensive social phenomenon. A review of the evolving 
literature on the social analysis of technology and innovation highlighted that some of 
the most prevalent theories on technology fail to give proper attention to contextual and 
historical influences. Indeed, common action-focused approaches such as Actor-Network 
Theory and Social Construction of Technology have been found to be profoundly 
acontextual and ahistorical. Although such theories have made an enormous 
contribution to the growing body of research that focuses upon the social dynamics of 
the shaping of technology, they neglect structural influences and, hence, omit important 
aspects in the explanation of technological change. 
At the same time we note a recent resurgence of approaches which encourage analysts to 
transcend methodologically and conceptually limited framings in terms of space and 
time of their objects of study. Exploiting these revised articulations of the 
technology/society relationship, this study adopted an ecological and biographical 
perspective to highlight how the development and implementation of technological 
artefacts is strongly shaped by historical and contextual contingencies. To this end we 
developed a conceptual framework, tentatively termed Ecological Shaping of 
Technology, which combines methodological principles of the Biography of Artefact 
perspective with cognate concepts that articulate nuances of spatial and temporal aspects 
of technological change. The framework has been applied to analyse the case study of 
the development, implementation and adoption of a strategic information system. 
This chapter will review how the findings arising from the analysis relate and contribute 
to wider academic debates in technology studies. We identify three major contributions 
to knowledge in our study. To begin with, first, our case study offers an extensive 
narrative and analysis of the long and complex biography of a technological artefact. 
Studies of this sort remain a rare and thus important empirical contribution to 
researchers and practitioners alike. It provides valuable insights to learn about the extent 
and contingencies that govern the lifecycle of complex decision support systems 
embedded in larger organisations. Second, we reflect upon our reasoning to develop the 
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Ecological Shaping of Technology framework to address conceptual limitations of 
prevalent theories of technology. This is accompanied by the foregrounding of an 
ecological metaphor to underline the basic tenets of our approach and a summary of the 
conceptualisations and empirical findings emerging from the framework. This part 
wraps up with elaborating our contribution to research on innofusion. Third, by 
applying the still emergent ‘Biography of Artefact and Practice’ perspective to study the 
innovation process of a single technological artefact we both test and develop the 
perspective in a new cultural and organisational context, an innovation project in a large 
and historically complex industrial corporation, and contribute to addressing 
methodological concerns. In particular, this case-study can be a helpful starting point for 
the design of doctoral research undertakings that aim to study biographies of technology 
in similar organisational arrangements. Then we reflect upon how the unfolding of this 
research journey and the design of this study was intertwined with events taking place 
outside the control of the author. Unexpected events required adjustments and 
improvisations which contributed to the shaping of the final outcome of the study. The 
chapter will conclude with a discussion on research limitations and opportunities for 
future studies.  
9.1 An ecological analysis of a technological artefact 
A major intellectual challenge of this thesis was to find a way to report the long and 
complex innovation journey taken by the NetworkPlanner, the technology concerned in 
this study. This challenge increased with the intention to explore an extended temporal 
and spatial horizon to pursue ‘why’ questions rather than just questions of ‘what’ and 
‘how’. However, prevalent approaches and frameworks were found to be restrictive in 
regards of addressing ‘why’ questions. Limitations in theories on technology such as 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) were 
identified regarding the acknowledgment of issues of history and context. Indeed, 
students of technology are explicitly discouraged from paying too much attention to 
historical and contextual aspects (see Callon & Law, 1982, and Pinch & Bijker, 1986).  
Proponents of the actor-network theory (ANT) framework suggest focussing exclusively 
on the manipulation and transformation of interests of individuals (Callon & Law, 1982). 
Their subjects of inquiry are powerful and privileged individuals, i.e. scientists and 
engineers, whose presence in the spotlight of social inquiry is taken for granted. Social 
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inquiries focus on activities of these actors who engage in translation and alliance 
building processes constructing intrinsic networks with human and non-human actors. 
From this perspective, context and social structures do not exist as entities outside the 
network but are represented as allies tightly interwoven in the actor-network (Latour, 
1987; Callon & Law, 1982). What about history, we are prompted to ask. Callon and Law 
(1982) address that question and express their view that tracing social structures, context 
and history is not of special relevance anyway:  
“Though it may be that for any particular study this process can only be 
traced so far before a ‘backcloth’ of prior interests has to be taken for 
granted, our aim would be to avoid attributing any special status to that 
backcloth” (Callon & Law, 1982, p. 622) 
In short, the necessity for a broader historical and ecological analysis is downplayed. 
Rather, ANT proponents advance the imperative to ‘follow the actor’ to trace relevant 
contextual information in the form of associations to other actors in proximity. But which 
actor do you follow, is the next question (Sørensen & Levold, 1992). Because ANT 
emerged from laboratory studies, the scientist is regarded as a key figure in actor-
network theoretical accounts of technological development (Latour, 1987). Actor-
network theoretical accounts of engineering-related projects put their emphasis on 
engineers, who take the role of the heroic actor, building networks of heterogeneous 
elements (Law, 1987). The framework is criticised for its atomistic and actor-centric focus 
which overstates the potentials of individual actors (Sørensen & Levold, 1992) and 
perhaps in consequence adapts a voluntaristic and even militaristic tone (Fujimura, 
1995). Sørensen and Levold (1992) also raise the insufficiently addressed issue of context 
and history and note that:  
“The problem is that the terrain on which engineers and technological 
scientists move has been thoroughly shaped by previous actions” 
(Sørensen & Levold, 1992, p.32) 
Merely observing engineers or scientists will not provide the insights necessary to 
understand historical processes, as they occur beyond the reach of what can be observed 
locally and temporarily. Instead, they argue that a “heterogeneous mix of historical, 
ethnographic, economic, and sociological competence seems required” (Sørensen & 
Levold, 1992, p.32). Hence, rather than occurring in a vacuum or ‘green field’ where 
everything is possible and where ‘Sartrean Engineers’ (Latour, 1988) experience no 
278 
 
restrictions besides material or non-human barriers, technological development typically 
takes place in a ‘brown field’. There, past events and actions, more or less remote to the 
locale of technological development, have muddied the political playing ground (see 
Sørensen & Levold, 1992, quote above) and created a space in which actions of 
individuals are limited due to pre-existing patterns of shared beliefs and expectations 
inherent in a historically shaped context. 
ANT emphasises actions of individuals, and how they align and adapt interests of other 
actors according to their own interests. SCOT focuses on how social groups negotiate 
over problems and try to find solutions by reducing interpretative flexibility. This 
approach is helpful in learning how a technological artefact comes about (Bijker, 2009). 
However, like ANT, it fundamentally lacks in conceptual capacity to address the 
question why an artefact is being developed in the first place and how the development 
is sustained over time. In particular, the simplicity of SCOT’s conceptualisation of 
relevant social groups as the main analytical entity fails to do justice to complexities of 
relationships between individual actors and organisational players (Rosen, 1993). Our 
account has highlighted that social groups can be highly dynamic. Their identities and 
objectives can change significantly over time since they are partly defined by contingent 
linkages to other ecologies. Further, the notion of closure and stabilisation remain 
disputed as the interpretative flexibility of technological features can be irresolvable 
(Rosen, 1993). Moreover, as this case study has indicated, interpretative flexibility of 
features of the NetworkPlanner was correlated with the necessity of the industrial 
researchers to gather more resources and to sustain the survival of their technological 
project. Actors may on occasion seek to reverse stabilisation in order to attract new 
sources of funding by accommodating interests of new users.  
The strong focus on context inherent in an ecological analysis addresses another 
limitation of the SCOT approach which is to explain why certain problems and relevant 
social groups come into being and why some are given preference over others (Russell, 
1986). A contextualised account that pays attention to historical and ecological 
developments offers to explain contingencies in the yoking of actors and activities. By 
now it should be clear that some theories of technology are methodologically restricted 
in their ability to take into account details of history and context, either by design as in 
the case of Actor-Network Theory, or by decision as in the case of Social Construction of 
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Technology (SCOT) where the theorists lean on foundational ideas of ANT (see Pinch & 
Bijker, 1986). Therefore, these methods are of limited capacity in addressing certain 
social inquiries. They may be flexible and helpful tools for conducting empirical inquiry 
into how technological development occurs and proceeds. But issues of context and 
history, or more generally time and space, crucial aspects to respond to ‘why’ questions, 
are inappropriately and unsatisfactorily accounted for. 
9.1.1 The ecology metaphor and a suitable framework 
One of the reasons for the lack of interest in engaging with these considerations is the 
use of metaphors that limit the analytical gaze of theoretical frameworks. Network and 
system metaphors are inherently limited in their capacity to represent matters of history 
and context, or, time and space adequately. Both metaphors make assumptions about 
stability in structures in which technological developments are embedded in. For 
example, ANT disavows stability, but, lacking tools for discriminating between contexts 
in which change can or cannot be anticipated, it de facto presumes stability amongst 
those elements that are not included in the nexus of action that it focuses upon. Such 
assumptions are helpful when examining research objects that have temporally and 
spatially limited scope where contextual factors remain stable. However, as we argued, 
for the analysis of technological projects, such limitations are detrimental to the 
explanatory capacity of a theoretical framework. A problem is that we cannot trace the 
histories through which stable systems or networks are achieved. It was for this reason 
that an alternative metaphor was proposed to serve as the foundation for advancing the 
articulation of new concepts and theories on technology dynamics.  
Drawing on studies of natural ecosystems, the metaphor of ecology has been adopted. It 
differs significantly to system and network metaphors in the appreciation of chaotic and 
unpredictable dynamics which emanate from interactions between neighbouring 
ecologies. While systems and networks tend to be conceptualised as central entities with 
fixed surroundings, ecologies are characterised by decentrality, openness and volatility 
(Abbott, 2005). Change events within an ecology do not go unnoticed but are met with 
counter-reactions in other ecologies. Contextual interrelations are inherent features of the 
ecological metaphor. Tracing changes of relationships between ecologies consequently 
enables tracing historical developments. In conclusion, the ecological metaphor was 
found more suitable as a foundation for conceptualisations of technological change when 
280 
 
considering extended scales of time and space. Abbott’s work, arising from the sociology 
of professions, was particularly instructive. 
Some elements of our approach were anticipated by an early interpretation of the 
network metaphor which distinguished analytically content from context of 
technological development while simultaneously highlighting the inseparable nature of 
the relationship (Law & Callon, 1988). Although this framework articulated the 
contingent negotiation processes between resource-providing global actors with 
technology-creating local actors and although the empirical data makes extensive note of 
fluctuations in the constituency of the context-defining, global network, it lacked the 
metaphorical depth to account conceptually for these well documented ecological 
dynamics. The explanation of technological change was limited conceptually to events 
and developments occurring along a single axis of local and global actors. For this 
reason, we developed a new framework, which was tentatively titled ‘Ecological 
Shaping of Technology’, drawing on conceptualisations deemed in compliance with the 
ecological metaphor. Recent advances in the Social Learning perspective, an approach 
that sought to develop the first generation of theorisation in the Social Shaping of 
Technology tradition (Sørensen, 1996), called for more nuanced theorisations of spatial 
and temporal aspects of technological change. Inspired by the social learning approach, 
the Ecological Shaping of Technology framework was developed by combing a set of 
ecologically-sensitive concepts.  
Using this framework to analyse the empirical data allowed getting a handle on the 
complexity of the case studied while taking into account conceptually historical and 
contextual contingencies of multiple locales. Informed by an ecological approach, the 
analysis tackled questions of how the technology was shaped as well as questions that 
explored the reasons why certain developments occurred. Instead of emphasising heroic 
actions of individual actors or social groups, as ANT and SCOT respectively tend to do, 
our framework highlighted details of dynamics in other locales which explained why an 
actor or group of actors were in the privileged situation of having a choice in the first 
place. Heroic actors deserve credits in situation where they succeed in creating choices 
which would not have been there without their doing. Other moments of choice, 
however, are not the result of their doing but emerge from events over which these 
actors have no immediate control. Action-oriented approaches lack the capabilities of 
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attributing credits to important but non-agential developments. As a result, those remote 
developments are either ignored or credits are unproportionally given to local 
occurrences.  
Thus, an ecological perspective that takes equally into account the content and the 
context of technological change promises to address fundamental conceptual 
weaknesses of the most prevalent theories on technology. This case study demonstrated 
the application of an ecological perspective in the social study of a technology. In the 
next section we will address how our approach and framework help in understanding 
and telling the long and complex story of the development and implementation of a 
technological artefact. 
9.1.2 Ecological shaping of a strategic network planning tool 
The case study of this research project was a technological artefact developed in a 
research department of a German car company. Its development lasted more than a 
decade during which it evolved from a prototypical artefact to a professional application 
in the strategic network planning domain. During its shaping process it was introduced 
to and tested in different user departments. Thanks to these engagements with users, the 
artefact gained in meaning as users found ways to accommodate the artefact according 
to their social and political interests. In these engagements, developers learned about 
needs and concerns of users and adapted the technology accordingly. Eventually, the 
resulting strategic network planning tool was successfully transferred into operational 
departments. This was a sketch of ‘how’ the social shaping process yielded the strategic 
network planning tool. Our intention was to go beyond a mere description of what 
happened. We wanted to explain ‘why’ the project produced not just any tool but this 
particular instance of a technology. Prevalent theories of technology offer frameworks 
and concepts to answer ‘how’ questions of technological development (Bijker, 2009). 
However, our research found that addressing context-sensitive ‘why’-questions has not 
been a major concern of technological theorisation until recently. The Biography of 
Artefacts and Practice perspective is an intellectual endeavour to give further 
momentum to contextualised theorisation of technological change which has been 
previously advanced under the umbrella of social shaping and social learning theories. 
Since this perspective is an emerging field of study, concepts and frameworks are yet 
under development and few in numbers. For this reason, we developed our own 
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framework, tentatively termed the Ecological Shaping of Technology, to contribute to the 
emerging field and to provide for a helpful language to describe and explain relevant 
technological dynamics in this case study. 
We have learned that technology is the configurational product of interactions between 
multiple actors. Our framework adopts a multi-level view and a longitudinal 
understanding of technological change that traces historically these long chains of 
interactions. However, as we traced these prolonged innovation processes we found that 
they continued to be characterised by surprises and discontinuities the longer the time-
frames were that we examined. Prior attributions, such as the roles and authorities of 
relevant players, were relativised when we extended the scope to examine dynamics 
beyond the immediate vicinity of the development of the artefact. Roles of individual 
actors that were clear in one time-frame increased in ambiguity in a larger time-frame. 
Equally, organisational players rose to prominence but disappeared again over the 
period of a decade. Varying the parameters of time and space elicited the relativity of 
roles and authorities as the ecological terrain, or topography, around the technological 
project was instable. Popular conceptualisations of heroic builders of systems or 
networks failed to account for these longitudinal dynamics. We conceived of the 
ecological framework to grasp the historically shaped and contingent topography 
uncovered in the analysis of the evolution of the development project. Further, we aimed 
to link the surrounding topographic texture to the events that took place in scope of the 
technological project. In this light, events are to be seen as patterned by historical 
developments and local circumstances where the constitutions of players, technological 
artefacts and contexts are subject to significant changes.  
We adopted the kernel concept to add an infrastructural perspective to the framework. 
Through the extended time-scale of this investigation we learned that many elements in 
the technological project were subject of significant changes as the ecological topography 
surrounding the project varied over time. The concept of the kernel of a research 
infrastructure helps us to simultaneously to account for persistence in the 
instrumentalities, resources and services held together over time, and the need to allow 
for flexibility in the constituent elements of a research infrastructure (Ribes & Polk, 
2015). It attributes to the technological project a notion of ‘sameness’ that runs like a 
common thread through space and time. Maintaining the availability of resources in 
283 
 
order to react to and to prepare for change was a crucial activity that characterised the 
innovation process throughout the project. Thus, the kernel conceptualised a structural 
foundation on which future changes could be built on. The respective mechanisms to 
build upon the project’s kernel was framed in terms of a promise-requirement cycle 
where actors enter arenas of expectations to win mandates over resources and 
jurisdiction over problem areas (Bakker et al., 2011). In this case study, public funding 
bodies sought to strengthen the promising arena of flexible manufacturing by providing 
research grants. These grants funded research efforts that eventually culminated in the 
development of the artefact. Recurrent promise-requirement cycles created temporary 
stabilities, or linkages, between players that allowed for social learning to happen and 
technological development to continue. These linkages between players are understood 
in terms of Abbott’s (2005) conception of linked ecologies. The framework provides a 
specialised conceptualisation for interpreting processes in a social, decentralised and 
interconnected world. Actors seek to advance their agendas by forming temporary 
alliances in order to compete with alliances of other linked ecologies. The history of a 
technological development is a history of changing relationships and shifting alliances. 
Since the artefact integrated methods of operations research, the developers drew on 
expert knowledge from academic partners to develop prototypical artefacts adapted 
according to the specific needs of the car company. An artefact thus crystallised from 
and extended the reach of an instrumentality package. Instrumentality has been defined 
as a method to transform nature and the notion also points to the mutual relationship 
between objects of science and technology (de Solla Price, 1983). An instrumentality 
package represents a distributed ecology of boundary objects which link multiple 
players through a lineage of theories, methods and artefactual instruments that are 
related to each other (Fujimura, 1995). Interpreting technology as a component of a 
wider instrumentality package helps to link technological development to a wider 
context, including the scientific realm, and to track its advances beyond organisational 
and disciplinary boundaries and across time and space. As the source of funding shifted 
from public grants to internal commissions from user departments the technological 
artefact was shaped according to increasingly specific user requirements. Internal 
politics encountered in user departments also influenced the shaping of the technology 
and strategising processes of the developing researchers. The more resources and 
capabilities the kernel accumulated the more opportunities for alliances and political 
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configurations opened up. Temporary alliances with different players at different times 
helped the researchers to sustain their innovation project in the long run.  
In the course of time virtually every element in the technological project had been 
affected by change at some point in time. There was no key engineer directing actions 
following a grand vision. There was no consistent organisational agenda or a senior 
manager that voiced top-down directives. There was no user who consistently voiced 
requests that guided the development from the beginning to the end. The innofusion of 
the strategic planning tool was the result of an innovation process distributed across a 
collective of actors who pursued their individual and their organisations’ agendas. Our 
longitudinal analysis suggests that attributions of authority and the role to actors are 
relative and dependent on time and perspective. It is not recommended to make prior 
judgments on who the key actors are without exploring the historical and ecological 
context of an innovation project. The ecological metaphor allows for a broader and fairer 
attribution of credits for successful achievement of technological change where other 
theories cut the analysis short and attribute credits unproportionally to a fewer number 
of people in senior positions. Particularly in regards of current trends of popularising 
entrepreneurship, where successful entrepreneurs tend to be stylised as role models for 
young generations, we find it is essential to offer a perspective that foregrounds 
contextual details which often are either deliberately neglected for journalistic and 
narrative purposes, or omitted due to lack of appreciation.  
9.1.3 An ecological perspective on innofusion 
Our ecological approach to the analysis of an innovation project provided in-depth 
insights into the interactions of users, producers and a range of other intermediaries. We 
shed light on recurring cycles of interaction at different locales as the artefact was 
developed and appropriated to fit particular social settings. Interactions were 
characterised by struggles of learning about user requirements and of configuring the 
artefact correspondingly to solve problems in the practice of strategic planning. This 
process of learning-by-struggling is at the core of the innofusion model (Fleck, 1988). It 
describes an evolutionary process of development  
“[...] in which environmental contingencies are explicitly built in at each 
stage of variation.” (Fleck, 1988, p. 22) 
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Originally emerging from studies of robotics, varying instances of the innofusion process 
have recently been articulated in a number of studies. For example, the notion of 
dispersed-user innovation has been conceptualised to describe an innofusion process 
where conventional vehicle manufacturers fail to conquer a market that is dominated by 
user-made technologies (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015). The extent of configurability of a 
technical artefact and a dynamic political environment has also been well documented 
by the analysis the development and implementation of an Indian health technology 
(Sahay et al., 2009). A study that is close to the remit of our work analysed shifting 
meanings of innovativeness, i.e. the perceived value of novelty, and technological 
potentials over multiple decades (Höyssä & Hyysalo, 2009). This study elaborates how a 
technological innovation, a ‘liquid microprocessor’, struggled to materialise its 
disruptive potential in the industrial context. Although its innovativeness was widely 
acknowledged by different players, otherwise the development would not have 
survived over such an extended period of time, no breakthrough moment occurred. Both 
the technology and its configuration with social contexts changed significantly in shape 
over time. The study concludes with coining the notion of ‘the fog of innovation’ to 
emphasise the limitedness of managing technological change when it comes to 
understanding innovativeness internally and presenting it externally to others. Similarly, 
our study analysed how a technological innovation came about and transformed over 
time as it crossed paths with a variety of players. However, our ecological perspective 
narrowed our attention to changing nature and shape of relationships among these 
different social entities. Our analysis draws on the combination of concepts on 
expectation dynamics and the configuration of ecologies. Thus, it allows us to articulate 
a contribution regarding an ecological perspective on the innofusion process. 
The discussion chapter reflected how we distinguished the contents of technological 
development from its surrounding context which, in our study, is embodied by the 
wider ecology of ecologies contiguous to the organisation of the artefact concerned. This 
interpretation of an interactive social world enabled a focus on the promissory work at 
the fringes of social entities. There, actors entered arenas to engage in promise-
requirement cycles with actors from other ecologies. In exchange for promises, enactors 
were granted mandates and resources to engage with exploratory or developmental 
activities. Our case study indicated how under particular circumstances this process can 
escape organisational and disciplinary boundaries to reach out to contiguous ecologies 
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in social proximity to an ongoing enterprise. Each completion of a promise-requirement 
cycle, which is marked by an enactor delivering an acceptable outcome to the respective 
selector, brings the two ecologies closer together and opens the opportunity to utter new 
promises. This process of bringing together of social entities has been termed yoking in 
an institutional context (Abbott, 1995). Taking into account expectation dynamics, our re-
interpretation of yoking emphasises the local and spatial specificity of this process. It 
allows a finer examination of interactions between actors of different ecologies. In 
particular, it points to how the innofusion process can be dispersed across multiple 
locales simultaneously. Because of the ‘fog of innovation’ (Höyssä & Hyysalo, 2009), 
enactors cannot not predict what variation of technology or what sociotechnical 
configuration will be successful. Therefore, they constantly search for opportunities to 
enter new promising arenas to anchor their artefact to another ecology in order to 
sustain their enterprise by gaining financial, political or other types of currencies. This 
temporal ecological anchoring, made possible by partial realisation of expectations, 
sustains the piecemeal building of the artefact. The ecological approach underscores the 
temporality of this strategy since political circumstances can shift both ways as our and 
other case studies indicate (e.g. Sahay et al., 2009). 
Technological development is often presented as a linear achievement. At the launch 
event of the NetworkPlanner the audience was presented a linear account of a success 
story that transitioned linearly from research and development to practice. The analysis 
of our data sketched a different picture of the various biographies of the artefact. 
Innovation is not a linear process and neither was the development and implementation 
of the NetworkPlanner. It is a repetitive cycle of learning-by-struggling which oscillates 
between development and use (Fleck, 1988). However, it is not limited to a single user-
producer configuration. Our contribution emphasises that the innofusion process 
transcends organisational and disciplinary boundaries as actors creatively plot diverse 
strategies depending on the opportunities patterned by the current ecological landscape. 
By yoking together ecologies, stronger relationships are built between users and 
producers as the artefact is configured to match specific requirements of the user setting. 
The notion of innofusion was conceptualised to counter the perception that technological 
development is a linear process (Fleck, 1988). It introduced the differentiated 
understanding of technology as being configurational to argue against the diffusion 
theoretical account that knowledge about an innovation moves only in one direction. 
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Rather, innofusion underlines the bi-directionality of technological development. The 
ecological approach continues this line of argument. We argue that innofusion can also 
go side-ways and thus accounts for moments of discontinuity along established paths. 
9.2 A biographical perspective on an innovation project 
The ecological framework was developed because the biographical perspective does not 
provide a strong programmatic guidance yet. The framework allowed us the accomplish 
our goal to tell the long and complex story of the NetworkPlanner. In this course we 
gained further insights into innofusion processes. We also gained further understanding 
about the biography perspective. In this section we reflect on these two accomplishments 
and outline the empirical and methodological contribution to knowledge that our study 
derived. In the first part of this section we will highlight how this study confronted us 
with a complex set of methodological and conceptual problems which eventually 
influenced our framework development and analysis. The second part will address in 
more detail how we applied a particular methodological perspective to support our 
approach and how our work contributes to generate further insights into that 
perspective. 
9.2.1 Analysing and narrating a long and complex technological project 
Our study unfolded to become an empirical investigation into the crystallisation process 
of a technological artefact. Therefore, we made decisions to privilege the examination of 
some phenomena over others. For example, constructing the analytical framework we 
chose to foreground how, as time moved on, changes in linkages between different 
organisational entities influenced qualitative interactions between individuals and, as a 
consequence, the shape of the technology concerned. Other choices about the research 
focus or configuration of the framework would have resulted in a different analytical 
approach. For instance, the viewpoint of this study might not have been on the 
technological project but on a different aspect or perhaps on a different level. Akera 
(2007) elaborated a layered representation of how knowledge can be connected across 
multiple levels and ecologies. Drawing on this representation, this study could have 
focused, for example, on how the application of OR influenced knowledge and skill sets 
of actors involved. This could have led to a study analysing how the increasing 
utilisation of OR methods in workplaces reshaped the role of strategic planners. Our 
data indicated that the job specification of strategic planners began to change due to the 
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adoption of the artefact. The profession of industrial engineers appeared to get to upper 
hand in the strategic planning domain at the expense of the traditionally strong 
profession of mechanical engineers. There are various opportunities to change the 
configuration of the research design to examine different aspects of the same social 
phenomena. 
However, we decided to examine the historically contingent and contextually shaped 
texture of the innovation project. In line with this objective, we identified a certain set of 
research problems and scoped this research project accordingly. Consequently, we faced 
analytical challenges as the research undertaking unfolded. The data collection resulted 
in a contextually and historically-rich set of data which was, we argue, inadequately 
accounted for by prevalent theories and frameworks of technology. We found that social 
analyses of comparably complex technological projects neglected influences of historical 
and contextual linkages in their analytical frameworks (e.g. Callon & Law, 1988; Latour, 
1996). This prompted the development of a new analytical framework that better 
distinguished agential and structural influences in the social shaping process. The 
development of the framework proceeded in tandem with the analysis of the data. 
However, it was not a linear development process but an experimental process of 
innofusion where advances occurred iteratively. This study is the synthesis of an 
ecological analysis and the narration of empirical findings that covered a period of more 
than decade and that were patterned by historical dynamics dating back another two 
decades. 
The final outcome of our research design is not only the thick description of the 
biography of a technological artefact – usually the primary objective of an actor-centric 
account – but also the broader explanation of its coming about. This narrative result 
marks the first contribution to knowledge of this study that we want to emphasise. Due 
to the prolonged shaping of the technology and the complete turnover of people 
involved in its development and implementation, no other single individual had an 
extensive overview of all relevant events and development else than the author of this 
thesis. Therefore, an important contribution to knowledge is the comprehensive report of 
the empirical data on the social shaping and social learning processes rendering the 
biography of the technology concerned. This contribution is valuable not only for other 
researchers but also for practitioners involved in processes of social shaping of 
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technology. Especially practitioners in the operations research domain may be interested 
in learning about the details of the development process. Appreciating how context and 
history influence a technological development could help understanding better why 
local difficulties emerge in implementation stages of other operations research-based 
solutions. Equally, users of such technologies could learn to understand that difficulties 
during episodes of implementation and use can be rooted in a technological artefact’s 
prior configuration to a different social setting.  
To summarise, we argue that the consideration of an extended biographical and 
ecological account of technological development can help in improving our 
understanding about the general technology/society relationship. However, in order to 
advance a historically and contextually more nuanced perspective on technological 
change there are methodological challenges to be faced. A challenge that we addressed 
was to test and to extend methods that support nuanced examinations. The ‘Biography 
of Artefacts and Practices’ perspective proposes an integrated approach that 
incorporates those ecological principles that we found important. The next section will 
address how we made use of this perspective in our study and how this study 
contributes to its further development. 
9.2.2 Extending the ‘Biography of Artefact and Practices’ perspective 
The intention to conduct a longitudinal study of the development, implementation and 
use of a technology carries demanding methodological implications. A technology comes 
into existence through interactions and negotiations among a wider set of players. 
Innovation processes are characterised by disturbances and discontinuities that 
complicate any technological development. We adopted the ‘Biography of Artefact and 
Practices’ perspective to capture these contingencies and continuities of technology 
dynamics and their unfolding over time. This perspective outlines a methodological 
approach that does justice to the multiple dimensions of technological change. Its 
proponents argue for social analysts of technology to consider that events and 
developments take place in multiple locales and practices, and may advance in different 
speeds over varying timescales (Pollock & Williams, 2009; Hyysalo, 2004, 2010). 
There are many studies available that deal with longitudinal analyses of organisations 
(e.g. Pettigrew, 1985) or technology (e.g. Latour, 1996). However, these did not provide 
an adequate methodological template or guide for our purposes. In light of this shortfall 
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of methodological perspectives, the biography approach is yet an emerging perspective 
where there are not many studies available to turn to for guidance. Hyysalo (2004) 
largely paved the way for framing the biographical approach in scope of a doctoral 
thesis which serves as a guideline for this study. Our study, however, addressed some 
issues that we found required further attention and that posed interesting questions. 
Addressing these challenges enabled us to derive findings that could be helpful in 
guiding further biographical studies, especially PhD theses. 
The most significant consequence of applying a biographical perspective in this study 
was the limitation of resources and, most of all, time. Since doing a PhD is an 
educational exercise to acquire an academic qualification, its scope to conduct research is 
limited to a few years only. Although this timeframe can be extended it usually does not 
last long enough to follow the entire lifecycle of a complex technology. The way how we 
designed and implemented a research strategy to accommodate the biographical 
approach within this limited time period is, therefore, a helpful template for other 
students to plan their research projects. In particular, this study is characterised by its 
longitudinal design that takes into account both multiple locales and multiple 
perspectives. Our broadly scoped data collection process entailed a certain level of 
redundancy in enquiry. This enabled a richer and more robust account that was better 
able to pick up unexpected influences. Exploring multiple locales and adopting multiple 
perspectives of different involved actors, not just those of elite actors, produced a rich 
understanding of a broad range of processes and events that contributed to sustaining 
the technological project. 
A particular contribution to the biography of artefact perspective emerged from our 
explicit interest in exploring the themes of history and context. Especially the focus on 
historical dynamics of technological development pushed the perspective into a 
direction, i.e. further back in time, which has not been given extensive consideration by 
the authors developing the perspective. Although Pollock and Williams (2009) propose 
the use of historical methods within a set of mixed methods, it is not further 
conceptualised how this should be applied in reference to a technology concerned. Our 
approach framed the use of archival and other historical data in relation to relevant 
dynamics in the development of the technology studied. In particular, the development 
of our framework foregrounds the notion of relating findings of a historical analysis with 
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findings derived from ethnographic data. In general, the conceptual framework 
designed to make sense of this rich but mixed set of data is the core contribution of this 
study. It enabled us to produce a narrative that pulls together a corporate historical 
analysis with an account of the prolonged development of a technological project.  
As a result, we successfully developed a framework to support the application of the 
Biography of Artefacts and Practices perspective to a special form of innovation, a 
project within a single large organisation with a long historical track record. The first 
biographical study of a single technological artefact was the examination of the 
development and implementation of a health and social care technology (Hyysalo, 2004). 
This study was scoped around a single organisation that was lined up to produce this 
particular type of product. Thus, the historical record of that organisational context was 
relatively short. We do not aim to argue that other biographical studies neglect the 
historical perspective. In contrary, other authors of the biographical perspective pay 
extensive attention to preceding historical, organisational and technological 
developments that conditioned the shaping of artefacts and practices. The difference in 
our approach is that we do not only aim to pay attention to historical precursors but to 
take them actively into account in our conceptualisation of social processes of 
technological change. Our case study explored a technological project that was 
embedded within a single large organisation with a long and intricate history. Historical 
occurrences have given rise to a unique corporate topography of organisational and 
political gulfs which required the project’s members to strategise carefully about what 
alliances to forge and which to avoid. Our interpretation of the biographical perspective 
therefore is distinguished by the inclusion of histories and contexts of not just the 
technological project but also that of the social organisation of actors and resources 
involved in the development and the partnering ecologies which made the success of the 
technology possible. This is why the title of our thesis highlights the multitude of 
biographies involved in an innovation project. We argue, it is only the application of an 
extended biographical perspective, which integrates a detailed understanding of micro-
level developments with long-term dynamics, that enables us to comprehensively 
understand how the social shaping of a technology correlates with the continuous 




9.3 Reflection on the research journey 
We continue with a reflection upon the research journey this study has taken over the 
course of five years, a path patterned by difficulties in its early episodes. Just as an 
innovation project is sensitive to dynamics in its surroundings and that are rooted in 
past events, this PhD enquiry has been shaping and was shaped by its context. By 
reflecting on these influences, we can shed light on how the conditions under which we 
designed the research strategy were constrained externally and how this affected the 
overall outcome of the study. The research design was emergent in the sense that we, 
like our research object, depended on opportunities to forge alliances with various 
players at different moments in time to advance the research. Particularly in the early 
stage of this PhD, unexpected events significantly influenced the range of options that 
were available in later episodes of the research project. 
9.3.1 Complications in the early stages of the research journey 
The lack of a strong and coherent research strategy from the outset is usually considered 
a considerable weakness in light of a temporally limited undertaking of a doctoral 
research project. In the first two years this research undertaking struggled to identify a 
clear research focus. Shifts in the configuration of the supervisory team and the transfer 
to a new research institution took its toll. Moving to another research environment 
involved a move between analytical traditions with implications for the research design. 
A consequence of the early lack of coherence in the research design was the somewhat 
extensive, broadly-scoped and open-ended approach to data collection. In respect of the 
final outcome this weakness turned out to be an empirical cornerstone of this thesis. As a 
result of taking a broad perspective on the technology, actors and dynamics involved, a 
rich set of data had been accumulated that documented events and developments in 
relation to both the contents and the context of the technological project.  
The prolonged data collection stage and the researcher’s intimate involvement in the 
project under study enabled us to gain a level of insights and understanding that would 
not have been achievable had the data collection stage been shorter. A shorter duration 
would have yielded a more limited perspective on the state of the project, but, arguably, 
would have resembled more of a snapshot study of a few episodes in the innofusion of 
the artefact. With the extended data collection period, it was possible to participate in a 
wider range of activities and to observe multiple instances of similar processes under 
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different conditions. For example, about a year after starting the collaboration we were 
able to arrange for extended placements in the three user department thanks to strong 
interpersonal relations developed during the prolonged exposure to project participants.  
In hindsight the early difficulties on defining a specific research focus unintentionally 
contributed to establishing a broad and in-depth understanding of the technological 
project. This encompassed both extended duration and multiple settings within the firm. 
A more specific framing of the research would most likely have resulted in a more 
selective focus and probably a shorter period of data collection. However, in the early 
episodes of the data analysis, this rich set of data was problematic as the lack of a precise 
research focus complicated the sense-making process. Identifying a clear research focus 
and articulating a set of research questions was a procedural achievement that stretched 
over a long period of time including later stages of the study. Hence, the research focus 
was reshaped in tandem with progress in analysing the data. 
Arguably, a less ambitious project with a research strategy that was demarcated more 
precisely from the outset would have yielded a compacter thesis. However, we feel, a 
compacter thesis would not have done justice to the richness of the data collected. 
Although this extended thesis, probably to the dismay of the reader, is characterised by 
the level of detail and temporal and spatial breadth, it produced insightful and 
comprehensive contributions to knowledge that had unlikely been achieved had the 
research strategy worked out in an orderly manner. This thesis is the result of a long 
process of strategising in which opportunities were taken, if available, and in which risks 
were circumnavigated, if possible. The final outcome, thus, was unpredictable from the 
beginning. An interesting insight emerging from this, then, is to understand how the 
troublesome research journey shaped the contents of this research. We will look at this in 
the following section. 
9.3.2 Emergent design of a project-level perspective 
The shaping of our research agenda was conditioned by external events but also by 
deliberate choices we have made. In light of difficulties during early data collection 
efforts we found that the best opportunity to sustain the availability of resources to fund 
this study was to align our research agenda with the agenda of the industrial research 
team that we gained access to. This contextual circumstance, i.e. an opportunity to link 
up with a contiguous ecology in favour of our undertaking, was among the most 
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significant reasons why the research focus diverged from initial research interests. As a 
result, the research focus and data collection strategy were patterned by the decision to 
scope this study in respect of a particular technological development within a certain 
organisational context. In more general terms, the design of any research project results 
in the construction a particular viewpoint (Pollock & Williams, 2009). The concept of 
agora, which is the Greek term for “market” or “marketplace”, has been introduced to 
conceptualise broadly the social space where all producers and consumers of technology 
interact (Kaniadakis, 2006). A market player can be a producer and consumer at the 
same time: its role is determined by its interaction with other players. A viewpoint 
makes a slice of the agora and highlights a certain set of relationships between players. 
We acknowledge that this research delineates a particular viewpoint, a project-level 
perspective, from which we examine this case study and draw our conclusions. 
When building the conceptual framework, the project-level approach influenced our 
preferences in selecting suitable concepts to make sense of data. The multi-sited 
character of this study, i.e. the examination of practices and dynamics across multiple 
locales, suggested pursuing theorisation that foregrounded both the diversity of local 
practices and commonality across locales. This led our research journey to implicitly 
adopt a research strategy that resulted in the conceptualisation of what can be 
characterised as the middle range of theory. Middle range theory reconciles between 
micro-theorisation of day-to-day observations and all-encompassing, systematic theories 
of global phenomena (Merton, 1967). Multi-sited ethnography has been described as a 
means to address the divide between micro-level analyses, such as single-sited 
laboratory studies, and social theories of the macro-scale (Hine, 2007). Applying 
methods of multi-sited ethnography we examined how local practices changed over time 
to adapt to shifting conditions in surrounding and linked ecologies. Equally, we 
examined how the innofusion process of the technological artefact provoked changes in 
the fabrics of alliances between ecologies.  
To conclude, the orientation of theoretical and conceptual findings to contribute to the 
population of middle range theorisation is understood, admittedly, as a result of an 
initially unspecific research strategy. Had the research strategy been designed more 
rigidly and had it been backed by a consistent institutional setting and more secure 
funding conditions, the outcome would have likely been more compact and oriented 
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towards a more specific goal. However, despite imponderables complicating the 
research journey, the outcome of this study offers a case to argue generally for more 
flexible and open-ended research strategies. Particularly in scope of a biographical study 
of technology, where in the beginning it can be unclear how far a technological 
development stretches spatially and temporally, such research strategies can be 
advantageous in avoiding methodological and epistemological pitfalls that are due to 
limiting assumptions about the boundaries of innovation processes. We intend not to 
propagate abandoning the design of clear research strategies but want to highlight that 
as much as innovation is an unpredictable endeavour, a research strategy should not 
strive to anticipate and solve all problems in advance but remain open and flexible to 
change in terms of unexpected findings or events. 
9.4 Limitations of research 
Facing practical and theoretical concerns in different episodes of our journey this 
research study emerged from applying a mix of strategies ranging from careful strategic 
planning to taking advantage of opportunities appearing along the path. Planfully 
applying techniques and methods of data collection and analysis helped in complying 
with generally accepted principles to uphold expectations of objectivity and critical 
thinking. However, we can identify influences that limited the outcomes of this research 
by design. These limitations are due to our particular circumstances and also decisions 
we had to make at different times to advance our work. Major limitations emanated 
from the decision to take a case study approach. However, another limitation we have 
identified results from the emergent nature of the development of the analytical 
framework. We begin with exploring the methodological limitations of this study. 
Our study benefitted greatly from being intensively exposed to the case study 
organisation and the innovation process examined. We have been deeply involved in the 
technological project and innovation activities surrounding the development and 
implementation of the technological artefact. Interacting with industrial researchers and 
users involved over an extended period of time resulted in a social and cultural closeness 
that privileged us to gain insights and that would probably not have been possible had 
we undertaken a shorter data collection approach. However, while being among the 
strongest qualities of this study, it is at the same time potentially its most significant 
limitation. Weaknesses of ethnographic data collection instruments, such as biases and 
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false accounts by interviewees, can be mitigated by the use of triangulation to generate a 
richer and more valid picture (Denzin, 1994). However, it does not avert the weaknesses 
entailed by being “native” (Alvesson, 2003). Having worked with the research 
department and some of the individuals involved prior to the study introduced a strong 
sense of familiarity and cultural bias. Emotional, cultural and professional attachment 
makes it more difficult for a researcher to break out from taken-for-granted assumptions 
and ideas which can prevent from addressing questions uncomfortable for both the 
interviewee as well as the interviewer. Alvesson (2003) introduced the term self-
ethnography to circumscribe limitations of interview-based qualitative research and 
ethnographies. Much like some features of this study, a self-ethnography is characterised 
by ease of access to the research object and its participants who regard the researcher 
more or less on equal terms with other participants. As a consequence, our interpretation 
was necessarily biased in the sense of lacking liberation from taken-for-granted 
assumptions. However, no research can be fully liberated from biases of socially shared 
frameworks (Alvesson, 2003). Our awareness of this limitation was one way to address 
this general weakness in the process of analysing and writing up this research text. What 
contributed further to an increased awareness and consideration of cultural bias was the 
fact that this study has been conducted in a research institution based in a different 
country than the case study organisation. Discussions with supervisors from a different 
cultural background than myself helped in eliciting differences that might have gone 
unnoticed otherwise. Finally, the development of an analytical framework helped us 
examining the data from a stranger’s point of view. Adhering to the framework during 
analysis allowed us to create some distance from our biased experience as participant 
observer in the project under investigation. Nonetheless, the narrative produced is an 
interpretative outcome of the author of this study. It is most likely that a researcher from 
another background would produce a narrative that would diverge in some details from 
our account. 
Further concerns of methodological limitations could be raised by addressing the single 
case study methodology applied in this research. Although some aspects were covered 
that addressed external organisations, most activities examined in course of the thesis 
took place within the confines of a single German company. Thus, the study was 
geographically and culturally limited. These methodological features potentially raise 
the questions about the generalisability of theoretical and conceptual findings to other 
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organisational and cultural settings. In general, the case study approach has been 
perceived sceptically in regards of its validity to making generalisations, mostly by 
critics who themselves operate in logics of statistical inference (Blaikie, 2009). However, 
other forms of logics have been proposed for case study methodology including analytic 
generalisation (Yin, 2003; Blaikie, 2009). Analytic generalisation allows to link between 
case studies and, thus, supports theory development and testing. Our approach followed 
and contributed to the tradition of theorisation of the social shaping of technology. 
Consequently, we have drawn on a robust set of theoretical principles which have been 
applied and tested in numerous other studies examining technological projects in a 
variety of national and cultural settings. In that sense, we have applied methods of 
logical inference to increase replicability and validity of our approach by emphasising 
linkages to other theoretical and conceptual accounts (Mitchell, 2006). In conclusion, we 
argue that our findings offer valid theoretical contributions that can be generalised to 
other cases of technological developments which have similar empirical features. 
9.5 Future studies 
Different technologies emerge under different social structures and circumstances. 
Organisations with a competitive work environment exert different structural and 
circumstantial influences than organisations with a collaborative work environment. The 
historically-extended biographical and ecological perspective attempted to capture the 
richness of such contextual and structural influences which play important roles in 
patterning the development of technological projects which often are beyond the control 
of the designers and users of the artefact.  For example, the NetworkPlanner emerged in 
a context where the senior management of the research group attempted to implement 
conditions of a partial internal market to orient research activities more closely to 
meeting business needs. This had significant influences on the strategies that the 
researchers applied. Similar corporate initiatives to set up market-like behaviour within 
corporate research infrastructures have been made in other private organisations 
(Gallacher, 2004). Our empirical analysis foregrounded how such contextual dynamics 
interrelated with ‘contentual’ dynamics over an extended period of time. 
In industrial contexts, although this is similar in other contexts, the large majority of 
studies on technology are concerned with investigating the process of technology 
development and adoption and, eventually, the unfolding of consequences to society or 
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a narrower social space. The dominating quest for technologists and practitioners, 
therefore, is “How is technology made? That is the question!” as the title of Bijker’s 
(2009) contribution to a research journal proclaimed. We agree to the relevance of the 
‘how’ question but we go further by claiming that we equally require a better 
understanding of why technology is developed. Although ‘why’ questions generally 
pose interesting challenges for philosophical discussions on technology, we argue that 
understanding why technologies are developed has strong practical value as it is 
essential to increase the effectiveness and success rate of technological innovation. A 
technology can be developed by different players who are interlinked with different 
ecologies and thus motivated by different agendas. For example, a competitor of CarCo 
developed a similar information system to support its strategic network planning 
department (Fleischmann et al., 2006). Although Fleischmann et al. (2006) acknowledge 
the research by Jordan and Graves (1995), a contribution that strongly shaped the 
methodological approach taken by the developers of the NetworkPlanner, the authors 
rejected the method without providing the rationale for their decision. In this case, a 
different set of contextual and circumstantial influences produced a different decision. 
Therefore, an interesting direction for further studies would be to broaden the scope to 
other similar information systems. A comparative study of biographies of strategic 
network planning systems, for example, CarCo’s NetworkPlanner and the information 
system reported in Fleischmann et al. (2006), poses an interesting research challenge 
which promises valuable insights into how different structural properties enable and 
constrain the development of the family of technology. A major challenge to this 
undertaking, however, would be the uncertainty of getting access and enough exposure 
to collect sufficient data to conduct a biographical study of another strategic network 
planning tool since this sort of privilege was probably the most relevant strategic 
advantage of this study. 
Another direction of future studies can be identified in exploring how the evolution of 
the instrumentality package, which in our case study is the application of operations 
research (OR) methods in context of strategic network planning, continued to unfold to 
other locales. We see at least two opportunities where the development of 
instrumentalities, i.e. the development of methods to transform nature, branched into 
new research objects. First, the implementation of the generic version of the 
NetworkPlanner enabled users to engage with planning problems that conventional 
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methods could not address adequately. For instance, a new doctoral researcher was 
recruited by a planning department to explore such a new research object. Her research 
undertaking applied the artefact to redefine an existing problem, in this case the analysis 
of implications of various free trade agreements on CarCo’s production networks, 
according to the terms of the NetworkPlanner. The NetworkPlanner potentially becomes 
the boundary object for a new alliance of ecologies which deals with matters related to 
free trade agreements including, for example, planners and regulators who monitor that 
CarCo meets relevant regulatory requirements and regional production quotas. Tracing 
this branch allows learning about how the instance of a new but specific artefact informs 
the redefinition of previously anomalous phenomena into doable problems. Second, the 
interaction between the industrial researchers with their academic counterparts in course 
of the LICOPRO project also posed an episode where the work on instrumentalities 
opened an opportunity to carry on researching the utilisation of OR methods in other 
domains. Informed by insights gained from working with an industry partner, the 
academic research partners continued elaborating theories and methods that are 
applicable in other domains such as, for example, the domain of logistics. Basically, these 
two opportunities differ in the locales which lend themselves for further studies. While 
the first opportunity points to expand investigation into the industrial context, the 
second encourages broadening the investigation by exploring the academic setting of the 
instrumentality package concerned. Exploring these and other potential linkages 
promises to improve the understanding of how instrumentalities, the means and ends of 
science and technology, evolve by oscillating between episodes of concretisation and 
abstraction. 
Finally, we address a potential conceptual opportunity to improve our framework. The 
development of the analytical framework was informed by a focused review of literature 
on technology and innovation studies. For this reason we found the Biography of 
Artefact and Practice perspective to be most applicable for our purposes. But we are 
aware of other perspectives that seem to do similar work. One such perspective is the 
social worlds framework (Clarke & Star, 2008). Similar to the Ecological Shaping of 
Technology framework, the social worlds framework is a theory/methods package 
comprising a set of analytical and methodological concepts of which some are 
represented in our framework. Inherent to the framework is the belief that social actions 
exist in a space populated by complex social actors with their own perspectives, 
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commitments and agendas. Making sense of and finding social order in these complex 
interrelations is an objective that both the social worlds framework and the ecological 
shaping framework have in common. However, due to the former framework’s roots in 
grounded theory and symbolic interactionism (Clarke & Star, 2008), these two 
frameworks diverge in their ontological and methodological assumptions. The social 
worlds framework foregrounds social action and seeks to map current concerns through 
situational analyses (Clarke, 2005). Articulating the differences and similarities between 
the Ecological Shaping of Technology framework and the social worlds framework could 
be a useful future direction. 
Above we have pointed a few opportunities how to carry on ecological analyses of 
technological change. There are promising venues and good reasons to continue tracing 
the evolving development of social processes and instrumentalities in the domain of 
operations research. Methods of operations research co-evolve with the increasing 
computational capacities of information technologies. As this case study has reported, 
highly-skilled operations research analysts successfully claim new grounds in areas 
traditionally dominated by other professions. We expect that operations research 
researchers and practitioners will continue in forming strong alliances both in external 
and internal ecologies as well as across sectors. The thorough social study of the 
empirical data shed light on how these dynamics play out in a specific organisational 
context. It can be a helpful starting point for other empirical cases to draw on our 
insights. Building on Hyysalo’s (2004) first doctoral venture into the biographical study 
of an innovation project, the methodological approach outlined in this study provides a 
promising framework to inform the design of follow-up studies. 
9.6 Closing remarks 
Much like an innovation project, this study was shaped by the topography of the 
landscape and timescape (Gaddis, 2002) that we passed through during our research 
journey. Reflecting on major influences along this path and highlighting that we 
attribute significance to specific moments in time retrospectively, much in line with a 
kairotic representation of our timeline (Czarniawska, 2004b), we understand that a few 
events were central in shaping the focus of this study. In the first chapter we introduced 
an anecdote about speaking to the individual who was pivotal in developing the first 
prototype of the NetworkPlanner. He challenged us with the statement that he could 
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write up the biography of the artefact on a weekend. As a result of this conversation we 
decided to place the emphasis of our study on examining those influences that he was 
not aware of due to his limited viewpoint as an engineer of the artefact. Drawing on 
Gaddis’ (2002) reductive interpretation of time, where structural residues are the only 
remaining witnesses of past processes, we set out to reconstruct past processes to explore 
the structures that gave life to the technological development. This study found that 
there was no single individual that can be attributed as the mother or father of the 
NetworkPlanner. We found that knowledge about the origins of contributing structures, 
the residues of past processes, was limited. As a result the attribution of due credits was 
skewed. Interestingly, accurate knowledge about historical and contextual facts was not 
a prerequisite to accomplish the technological development. We find it is this negligence 
or even ignorance over the relevance of ecological influences in past processes that 
contribute to misleading representations and narratives of technological change. It is 
understood that the ending, or rather the representative of a winning party, defines its 
own beginning (Czarniawaska, 2004b). Our study was a step towards giving a voice to 
those who are not immediately associated with the winning party, i.e. the wider 
collective of actors and players involved in the development, implementation and use of 
a technology that is embedded in a specific organisational setting. We strongly believe 
that the ecological and biographical approach can contribute to a more balanced 
perspective on how past processes continue to predetermine the choices available to us 
in the present. We hope that this case study will be soon only one among many that 
combine the historical method with social analyses to draw attention to structures that 
are easily overlooked otherwise. In that sense, we leave the final words to the historian 
Timothy Snyder (2015) who in his sociohistorical analysis of climate change remarks: 
"When we lack a sense of past and future, the present feels like a shaky 







10 Appendix A – Timeline spreadsheet  
 
  






11 Appendix B – Quantitative analysis I 
 
Figure 21 Visualisation of people involved in different years (Manual configuration 




Figure 22 Visualisation of all people involved in the technological project 
(application used for visualisation: TimeFlow) 
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12 Appendix C – Quantitative analysis II 


































































Research 2 3 5 6 8 6 5 4 9 9 7 5 0 
Trucks 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 4 7 8 8 7 
Vans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 
Cars 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 
Buses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
 
 
Figure 23 Mapping of people involved (per division) 
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